https://new.kenyalaw.org/akn/ke/judgment/keelc/2026/4251

Njoroge & 3 others (All suing as legal representatives of the Estate of Njoki Karuri) v Land Registrar, Kiambu & another (Environment and Land Miscellaneous Application E024 of 2025) [2026] KEELC 4251 (KLR) (13 May 2026) (Judgment) Neutral citation: [2026] KEELC 4251 (KLR) Republic of Kenya In the Environment and Land Court at Thika Environment and Land Miscellaneous Application E024 of 2025 JA Mogeni, J May 13, 2026 Between Edwin Wilson Mungai Njoroge 1st Applicant Nguru Gathecere (Deceased 2nd Applicant Wanjiku Gathecere (Deceased) Represented by Wanjiku Mwaura Gathecere 3rd Applicant Wangari Gathecere (Deceased) Represented by Jane Njoki Njoroge 4th Applicant All suing as legal representatives of the Estate of Njoki Karuri and Land Registrar, Kiambu 1st Respondent The Honorable Attorney General 2nd Respondent Judgment 1.The Applicant vide an Originating Summons dated 26/03/2025 filed under Certificate of Urgency and brought under Section 56 of the Trustee Act, Section 80 of the Land Registration Act and Section 3A of the Civil Procedure Act Cap 21 Laws of Kenya sought the following:1.That the trust bestowed on the 2nd, 3rd and 4th Applicants be terminated and have the property Karai/Karai/1376 jointly owned be transferred to the 1st Applicant herein EDWIN WILSON MUNGAI NJOROGE2.That the 1st Respondent herein be Ordered to transfer all that parcel of land Karai/Karai/1376 to the 1st Applicant herein3.That the 1st Respondent be directed to effect the transfer on all that parcel of land Karai/Karai/1376 in favour of the 1st Applicant.4.That such other orders as this Honorable Court shall in the circumstances deem fit to grant in the interest of justice.5.That cost of this application be in the suit. 2.The Application based on the grounds on the face of it and the Supporting Affidavit of Edwin Wilson Mungai Njoroge sworn on even date. The Applicant has also filed Authority to Appear, Act and plead under Order 4 Rule 1 (4) of the Civil Procedure Rules 2010. He has stated therein that the 3rd and 4th Applicants authorized him to appear, act, plead and swear Affidavits on their behalf. 3.Notably the Authority to Appear, Act and Plead is also signed by way of finger print by Elizabeth Wanjiru Njoroge who is not a party to the application and it is therefore not clear why she signed the Authority. Further the 2nd Applicant who is equally deceased is not represented in any manner and there is no document filed in support of the Application. From the pleadings his estate is equally not represented except for the administrator of the 1st Applicant following the Confirmation of the Grant dated 4/03/2024. 4.In the Affidavit, the Applicant deponed that he is the Administrator and legal representative of the Estate of the late Njoki Karuri, and that in that capacity he had authority to swear the Affidavit on behalf of all the Applicants, attaching the relevant authority as an annexure as “EWMN-1”. 5.He further deponed that the deceased, Njoki Karuri, was the registered proprietor of land parcel Karai/Karai/1376, having been issued with the title deed on 25/07/2003, and that she held that land as trustee for the 2nd, 3rd and 4th Applicants. A copy of the original title deed was annexed in support of this application as “EWMN-2”. 6.He went on to state that the 2nd, 3rd and 4th Applicants now wish to bring that trust to an end and to have the land registered in the name of the 1st Applicant, with a view to developing the property. He deponed that all the beneficiaries had consented to this arrangement, and that a succession matter had been concluded in the Kikuyu Law Court, Succession Cause No. E206 in the Estate of Njoki Karuri pursuant to which a Certificate of Confirmation of Grant was issued confirming the 1st Applicant as the absolute owner of Title No. Karai/Karai/1376 as per annexure “EWMN-3” of the Certificate of Confirmation. 7.He concluded by stating that the Affidavit was filed in support of the application before the Court and that it was in the interest of justice that the orders sought be granted. 8.When the parties appeared in Court on 02/07/2025, the Applicants did not attend Court but the 1st and 2nd Respondents who were represented by Snr State Counsel Motari sought for a further mention and the Court directed that the parties try an out of Court settlement. 9.On 8/12/2025 when the parties appeared and the Applicants were represented by Counsel Waweru they informed the Court that they had received no response to the Originating Summons Application. Counsel for the 1st and 2nd Respondents informed the Court that they had filed Grounds of Opposition dated 07/07/2025 which they committed to serve again upon the Applicants, they also sought 14 days to file a response which was granted. Parties were further directed to file and exchange written submissions. 10.At the time of writing this Judgment, the Respondents had not filed any response to the application nor the Grounds of Opposition as stated in Court by the Snr State Counsel and neither had a representative of the 2nd Applicant filed any claim since the Authority to plead is only in respect of the 3rd and 4th Applicants and one Elizabeth Wanjiru Njoroge who is not mentioned as an Applicant and neither is she mentioned in the annexed title deed as a tenant in common in the proprietary section of the title deed issued on 29/07/2003. However, Nguru Gachere, Wangari Gachere and Wanjiku Gachere are mentioned as having Njoki Karuri (deceased) holding title for them in trust in common. Applicant’s Submissions 11.The 1st Applicant submits that this matter concerns Title No. Karai/Karai/1376, which was registered on 28/07/2003 in the name of Njoki Karuri (Deceased) as trustee for the 2nd to 4th Applicants, who are also now deceased. Following the issuance of a Certificate of Confirmation of Grant by the Kikuyu Law Courts on 4th March 2024 appointing the 1st Applicant as Administrator and vesting the land absolutely in him, and with the surviving representatives of the 2nd to 4th Applicants having unequivocally consented to the termination of the trust and transfer of the land to him, the 1st Respondent - the Land Registrar, Kiambu - has nonetheless persistently refused to remove the trust registered against the title, thereby paralyzing the 1st Applicant's right to use, develop, or otherwise deal with the land. The 1st Applicant humbly submits that this refusal is both unlawful and unconscionable, and he invites this Honourable Court to grant the reliefs sought. 12.On the question of jurisdiction to order rectification, the 1st Applicant submits that this Court is fully seized with jurisdiction to order rectification of the register under Section 80(1) of the Land Registration Act, 2012, which in express terms empowers this Court to:-“…. order rectification of the register by directing that any registration be cancelled or amended where it is satisfied that any registration was obtained, made or omitted by fraud or mistake." 13.In his submissions he further relies on the decision in Mary Ruguru Njoroge v John Samuel Gachuma Mbugua & 4 Others [2014] eKLR, where the Court affirmed that it has powers to order rectification of a title or register in appropriate circumstances and that it will, under Section 80(1) of the Land Registration Act, order the cancellation or amendment of an entry or any registration when satisfied that the registration was obtained, made or omitted by fraud or mistake. 14.It is his submission that the continued registration of the trust in circumstances where the trustees are deceased, where the beneficiaries' representatives have consented to its termination, and where a Court of competent jurisdiction has vested the grant absolutely in the 1st Applicant constitutes a grave mistake that is squarely correctable under Section 80 of the Land Registration Act. Further that rectification in the present circumstances is not merely permissible but is a constitutional imperative under Article 40 of the Constitution of Kenya, 2010, which guarantees every person the right to own property. It is accordingly his humble submission that this Court's jurisdiction to rectify is not discretionary but is a duty owed to prevent the register from becoming an instrument of injustice. 15.In his submissions he also addressed the question of whether the trust should be terminated and removed and stated that the trust registered against Title No. Karai/Karai/1376 has been spent and ought to be terminated and excised from the register. He submits, with reference to Black's Law Dictionary, 9th Edition, that a trust is defined as the right, enforceable solely in equity, to the beneficial enjoyment of property to which another holds legal title, a property interest held by one person as trustee at the request of a settlor for the benefit of a third party as beneficiary. He relies on Section 56 of the Trustee Act, which confers upon this Court the power to authorise dealings with trust property. 16.At the same time, he also places reliance on In the Matter of the Estate of Joseph Muthama Ngare (Deceased) [2013] eKLR, where the Court was confronted with a similar trust constituted under a Confirmation of Grant and was moved to terminate it so as to pave way for the distribution of the estate among the beneficiaries. It is the 1st Applicant's submission that the present case is on all fours with that authority. That the 2nd and 4th Applicants being deceased, and their living representatives having consented to the removal of the trust and the registration of the title in the name of the 1st Applicant, the trust's very purpose, that of holding the land for the benefit of those beneficiaries has been entirely extinguished. 17.That therefore, according to the 1st Applicant, to compel him to hold land for deceased beneficiaries is legally untenable, and he humbly urges this Court to find that the trust is a legal fossil whose removal is not just warranted but constitutionally compelled under Article 40 of the Constitution so as to guarantee his proprietary rights. 18.At the same time the 1st Applicant has addressed the question on whether the Land Registrar can be compelled to act and submits that the 1st Respondent, as a Public Officer, is bound by the Constitution and Statute to discharge the functions of that office in accordance with the law. He invokes Article 10 of the Constitution of Kenya, 2010, which expressly provides that the national values and principles of governance bind all State organs, State officers, and public officers whenever they apply or interpret the Constitution, enact, apply or interpret any law, or make or implement public policy decisions. He further relies on Section 3A of the Civil Procedure Act, which grants this Court inherent power to make such orders as may be necessary for the ends of justice. 19.On the question of compellability of the Land Registrar, he places reliance on Republic v Chief Land Registrar & 2 Others; Alot (Suing as the Administrator of the Estate of Samuel Alot Magaga — Deceased) (Exparte Applicant) (Environment and Land Judicial Review Case No. 2 of 2023) [2024] KEELC 1442 (KLR), decided on 14/03/2024, where the Environment and Land Court sitting at Murang'a held that where there is a Court Decree or order, all that the Land Registrar is required to do is to obey that Court order. He submits that the 1st Respondent's refusal to act despite the existence of a valid Grant of Representation, the consent of all beneficiaries' representatives, and a statutory duty under Section 79 of the Land Registration Act constitutes unreasonable administrative action warranting an order in the nature of mandamus. He further submits that this Court has power under Section 80 of the Land Registration Act to order the Land Registrar to rectify the title by removing the trust placed on Title No. Karai/Karai/1376. 20.He thus invites this Honorable Court to rectify the register under Section 80 of the Land Registration Act by removing the trust; to terminate the trust under Section 56 of the Trustee Act; and to direct the 1st Respondent to transfer the land to the 1st Applicant within fourteen (14) days. He submits that every day of continued inaction by the Land Registrar constitutes a deprivation of his constitutionally guaranteed rights under Article 40 of the Constitution, and he respectfully urges this Court to grant the prayers sought in their entirety. Analysis and Determination 21.Before proceeding to the substantive merits of this application, this Court is duty-bound to examine certain procedural and evidentiary concerns that have emerged from the record. These concerns are not peripheral. They go to the root of the equitable competence of this application and must be addressed with the honesty, openness and thoroughness that the protection of property rights demands. 22.The 1st Applicant filed an Authority to Appear, Act and Plead pursuant to Order 4 Rule 1(4) of the Civil Procedure Rules, 2010, purporting to authorise him to appear, act, plead and swear Affidavits on behalf of the 3rd and 4th Applicants. This Court has noted with concern, however, that the said Authority also bears the fingerprint of one Elizabeth Wanjiru Njoroge. That person is not named as a party to this application. Her name does not appear in the title deed exhibited as annexure “EWMN-2” as one of the beneficiaries for whom the late Njoki Karuri held the parcel in trust. The persons expressly identified in that title deed as holding beneficial interests under the trust are Nguru Gachere, Wangari Gachere and Wanjiku Gachere. 23.Elizabeth Wanjiru Njoroge is a complete stranger to both the proceedings and the trust instrument. No Affidavit, Certificate of Administration, Grant of representation, or other document of title has been placed before this Court to explain who she is, what connection she has to the estate or to any of the named beneficiaries, or in what capacity she purported to execute the Authority. 24.An authority to plead, in order to be effective under Order 4 Rule 1(4) of the Civil Procedure Rules, must be executed by a person who has the legal standing and capacity to confer such authority. A person who is a stranger to the proceedings and who has no demonstrated legal nexus to the estate or to the trust property cannot competently execute such an instrument. Her fingerprint on the Authority is accordingly of no legal consequence whatsoever, and this Court treats it as a nullity. 25.The concern regarding the 2nd Applicant is of an altogether more substantive character. That person is expressly named in the proceedings as one of the Applicants and is identified in the title deed as one of the three persons for whose benefit the late Njoki Karuri held Title No. Karai/Karai/1376 in trust. The 2nd Applicant therefore has a direct, vested and legally cognisable beneficial interest in the trust property. Yet the record discloses that the 2nd Applicant did not sign the Authority to Appear, Act and Plead, has filed no Affidavit, has made no application of any kind, and has not participated in these proceedings in any manner whatsoever. The 1st Applicant's Supporting Affidavit contains an assertion that all the beneficiaries consented to the termination of the trust and the transfer of the land to him. That assertion stands entirely unaccompanied by any consent letter, sworn statement, or instrument of any kind executed by or on behalf of the 2nd Applicant. This is a gap that this Court cannot overlook, and the reasons for that will become apparent in the analysis that follows. 26.Having set out the background and identified the preliminary concerns, this Court proceeds to frame the issues that fall for determination in this matter. The issues I consider to be key for determination in this matter are as follows:i.Whether this Court has jurisdiction to entertain this application and to order rectification of the register under Section 80 of the Land Registration Act, 2012.ii.Whether, having regard to the law and to the state of the evidence on record, the trust registered against Title No. Karai/Karai/1376 has been spent and ought in law and equity to be terminated and removed from the register.iii.Whether the 1st Respondent can properly be compelled by this Court to give effect to any orders made herein. This Court takes each issue in turn. 27.I will proceed and elaborate on each issue. On the jurisdictional issue, this Court's jurisdiction to hear and determine this application is grounded, in the first instance, in the Constitution of Kenya, 2010. Article 162(2)(b) of the Constitution established the Environment and Land Court as a superior Court of record with the status of the High Court and conferred upon it exclusive original jurisdiction to hear and determine disputes relating to the use, occupation of and title to land. 28.Section 13 of the Environment and Land Court Act, 2011 gives detailed legislative expression to that constitutional mandate and specifically empowers this Court to hear and determine disputes relating to land administration, including matters arising from trusts constituted over land. There is accordingly therefore no question that this Court is the proper forum for this application. 29.The specific statutory power to order rectification of the register is contained in Section 80(1) of the Land Registration Act, 2012, which provides in express terms that this Court may order rectification of the register by directing that any registration be cancelled or amended where it is satisfied that any registration was obtained, made or omitted by fraud or mistake. The breadth and proper scope of that power were considered by the Court in Mary Ruguru Njoroge v John Samuel Gachuma Mbugua & 4 Others [2014] eKLR, where the Court stated that:“The Court too has powers to order the rectification of the title or register in appropriate circumstances. The Court will under Section 80(1) of the Land Registration Act, order the cancellation or amendment of entry or any registration when it is satisfied that the registration was obtained, made or omitted by fraud or mistake." 30.The jurisdiction vested in this Court by Section 80 is therefore broad and is clearly capable of reaching the circumstances of the present application, where the continued registration of a trust whose trustees are deceased and whose beneficial purpose has been overtaken by events reflects a state of the register that is materially inconsistent with the current legal reality. 31.Beyond the statute, this Court's jurisdiction in this matter draws further sustenance from Article 40(1) of the Constitution of Kenya, 2010, which guarantees to every person the right to acquire and own property. Where the state of the register operates, without lawful justification, to deprive a person of the practical enjoyment of that constitutionally guaranteed right, this Court is not only empowered but is obligated to intervene. This Court accordingly finds, on the first issue, that it is fully and properly seized of jurisdiction to entertain and determine this application, and that finding is not in doubt. 32.The second issue is the one that lies at the heart of this matter, and it is here that the law, the equity, and the facts of this case must be carefully weighed against each other. At its core, this application asks this Court to bring to an end a trust that was constituted in 2003 for the benefit of persons who are now deceased, and to register the trust property absolutely in the name of the person appointed by a Court of competent jurisdiction as the Administrator of the estate of the deceased trustee. 33.It is useful to begin with first principles. Black's Law Dictionary, 9th Edition, defines a trust as:“The right, enforceable solely in equity, to the beneficial enjoyment of property to which another holds legal title; a property interest held by one person (the trustee) at the request of another (the settlor) for the benefit of a third party (the beneficiary)." 34.The essential character of a trust is therefore the deliberate and purposeful separation of legal and beneficial ownership. The trustee holds the legal estate not for his own benefit but as a vehicle for the fulfilment of the settlor's intention toward the beneficiaries. Once the beneficial interest is extinguished or fully consolidated in the hands of a single person who also holds the legal estate, the trust has no further object and cannot in equity be permitted to persist as a mere encumbrance upon the title. 35.The foundational principle governing the termination of a trust by the consent of its beneficiaries has its roots in the celebrated English decision of Saunders v Vautier (1841) 49 ER 282, where Lord Langdale MR held that:“Where there is an absolute gift of personalty, the legatee, if he is of full age, may demand payment from the trustees without waiting for the time which may be pointed out for the payment of the fund." 36.That principle, which has been extended through nearly two centuries of equity jurisprudence to encompass all trust property including land and to accommodate the reality of multiple beneficiaries, proceeds on the foundational premise that where all the beneficiaries are ascertained, are of full legal capacity, and are collectively and unequivocally of one mind in seeking the termination of the trust, they are entitled as of right to bring the trust to an end. The unanimity of the beneficiaries, or of their properly constituted legal representatives where the beneficiaries are deceased, is not a procedural nicety. It is a substantive equitable requirement that goes to the root of the Court's power to make the order sought. 37.Under our laws, the power of this Court to authorise dealings with trust property, including termination, is expressly conferred by Section 56 of the Trustee Act. The circumstances in which a Court will exercise that power to terminate a trust constituted under a Confirmation of Grant were specifically addressed in In the Matter of the Estate of Joseph Muthama Ngare (Deceased) [2013] eKLR, where the Court recounted that:“The grant herein was confirmed on 10th March 2003. According to the confirmation certificate dated 10th March 2003 all the immovable assets were to be held in trust by the administrators for themselves and for all the dependents and minor children. The dependents and minors were listed as Agnes Wanja Ngare, Immaculate Wangui Muthama, Peter Ngare, Joyce Wangui and Christopher Ndaruacha. It is this trust that the Applicants seek to have terminated to pave way for the distribution of the estate among the beneficiaries." 38.The Court in that matter granted the orders of termination upon being satisfied that the relevant parties were agreed and that the trust had served its purpose. 39.The present matter is directly analogous in its essential character, and this Court finds that authority both persuasive and applicable. 40.The trust over Title No. Karai/Karai/1376 was constituted for the benefit of Nguru Gachere, Wangari Gachere and Wanjiku Gachere. Those persons are stated to be deceased. Where all the named beneficiaries of a trust are deceased, the trust has no living object capable of enjoying the beneficial interest, and its continuation as a registered encumbrance on the title serves no purpose that law or equity can recognise or protect. 41.As Lord Eldon stated in Knight v Knight (1840) 3 Beav 148, a valid trust requires three certainties, namely certainty of intention, certainty of subject matter, and certainty of objects. Where the objects of the trust are extinguished, one of the foundational pillars of the trust collapses entirely, and no principled legal basis exists for its continued maintenance. This Court accepts that analysis without reservation and finds that the trust over the subject parcel has, as a matter of both law and equity, served and exhausted its purpose. 42.That finding, however, cannot by itself entitle this Court to make a final unqualified order of termination at this stage. The reason lies in the position of the 2nd Applicant, and this Court must confront that position with candour. The 2nd Applicant is a named beneficiary of the trust. Whether that person is alive or deceased, a direct legal interest in the beneficial ownership of the trust property vests in that person or in that person's estate. The 1st Applicant's Supporting Affidavit asserts that all the beneficiaries have consented to the termination of the trust. Yet the record before this Court contains not a single document executed by or on behalf of the 2nd Applicant in support of that assertion. No consent letter, no sworn Affidavit, no Letters of Administration establishing the authority of a legal representative of the 2nd Applicant's estate, and no instrument of any kind has been placed on record in respect of the 2nd Applicant's position. 43.The Supreme Court of Kenya, in Nicholas Kiptoo Arap Korir Salat v Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission & 7 Others [2014] eKLR, affirmed the foundational principle that:“A party cannot be condemned unheard and justice demands that all persons whose rights and interests may be affected by the outcome of proceedings must be given an opportunity to be heard." 44.That principle is not confined to adversarial proceedings between opposing parties. It applies with equal force in proceedings of this nature, where this Court is asked to make orders that will irrevocably determine the proprietary rights of persons who are named as beneficiaries of a trust but whose voice has been entirely absent from the record. The 2nd Applicant's silence cannot be treated as consent. Consent, in order to be effective in equity, must be positive, informed and freely given. It cannot be inferred from silence, and it cannot be established by the unverified assertion of the very person who stands to benefit from its existence. 45.The Court of Appeal of Kenya drove this point home in Trusted Society of Human Rights Alliance v Mumo Matemu & 5 Others [2014] eKLR, where it held that:“The right to be heard is a cardinal principle of justice, so fundamental that a departure from it renders any resulting decision liable to be set aside." 46.This Court is acutely conscious of that guidance. To make a final and unqualified order terminating a trust and vesting the title absolutely in the 1st Applicant without any evidence of the 2nd Applicant's Estate representative’s consent or participation would be to strip a named beneficiary of a legally protected proprietary interest without affording that beneficiary or the representative of that beneficiary's estate any opportunity to be heard. 47.I do not as a Court the observations of the High Court in Ephantus Mwangi & Another v Duncan Mwangi Wambugu [1982-1988] 1 KAR 278, where the Court stated that“An affidavit which makes averments without exhibiting the documents upon which those averments are founded cannot constitute sufficient proof of the facts averred." 48.The 1st Applicant's assertion of universal consent, standing naked and unsupported on the record, does not satisfy the standard of proof required to establish the factual foundation upon which this Court's equitable jurisdiction to terminate the trust must rest. It is in the interest of the 1st Applicant himself to regularise this position, for any order made on an insufficient evidentiary foundation would be liable to challenge and could ultimately unravel the very relief he seeks. 49.Finally on the third issue, seeking to compel the 1st Respondent the Land Registrar, Kiambu, a public officer to exercise statutory functions under the Land Registration Act, 2012. I do note that the officer is not a free agent at liberty to decide, on the basis of personal preference or institutional inertia, whether or not to give effect to a Court order or to discharge a duty imposed by statute. Article 10 of the Constitution of Kenya, 2010 binds all State organs, State officers and public officers to the national values and principles of governance, which include the rule of law, accountability and good governance, in all their actions. 50.The 1st Respondent is directly bound by those values. Section 79 of the Land Registration Act further imposes on the Registrar a duty to give effect to Court orders affecting registered land. That duty is ministerial in nature and not discretionary. The Registrar does not have a lawful basis upon which to withhold compliance with a Court order directing the removal of an encumbrance or the registration of a transfer. 51.The ELC Court in Murang’a, my sister Lady Justice Lucy Gacheru stated the position plainly in Republic v Chief Land Registrar & 2 Others; Alot (Suing as the Administrator of the Estate of Samuel Alot Magaga — Deceased) (Exparte Applicant) (Environment and Land Judicial Review Case No. 2 of 2023) [2024] KEELC 1442 (KLR), where she held that;“In the instant case, there is a Court Decree/Order and all that the Land Registrar needs is to obey the said Court order." 52.This Court adopts that statement in full and without qualification. Once the orders of this Court issue, the 1st Respondent's obligation is to obey them promptly and without prevarication. The inherent powers of this Court preserved by Section 3A of the Civil Procedure Act, which empowers this Court to make all such orders as may be necessary for the ends of justice, provide a further and independent basis for compelling compliance, and the remedy of mandamus is available to this Court should the 1st Respondent persist in the refusal to act. 53.Following the analysis, I have made and having carefully considered the affidavit evidence, the annexures exhibited thereto, the written submissions filed by the 1st Applicant, and the authorities placed before this Court, and having identified and resolved the three issues set out above, this Court arrives at the following findings and makes the following orders. 54.As already stated above, this Court finds that it is properly and fully seized of jurisdiction to determine this application under Section 80 of the Land Registration Act, 2012, Article 162(2)(b) of the Constitution of Kenya, 2010, and Section 13 of the Environment and Land Court Act, 2011. That finding is made without equivocation. 55.Further, this Court finds that the legal and equitable framework for the termination of the trust constituted over Title No. Karai/Karai/1376 is firmly established on the authorities and on the law, and that the trust has, as a matter of both law and equity, served and exhausted its purpose. The named beneficiaries are deceased, the trustee is deceased, the purpose for which the trust was constituted has been overtaken by the succession proceedings that culminated in the Certificate of Confirmation of Grant of 4/03/2024, and the continued annotation of the register with this trust serves no legitimate legal purpose. This Court finds accordingly that the trust ought to be and is hereby ordered to be terminated. 56.Further, the Court additionally finds, however, that the position of the 2nd Applicant remains unresolved and unaccounted for on the record. The 2nd Applicant is a named beneficial owner under the trust, but that person has filed nothing, signed nothing, and said nothing in these proceedings. The 1st Applicant's bare assertion of universal consent is unsupported by any instrument executed by or on behalf of the 2nd Applicant. The purported execution of the Authority to Appear, Act and Plead by Elizabeth Wanjiru Njoroge, a person who is a complete stranger to these proceedings and whose legal standing has not been established, is a nullity and is hereby expunged from the record for all purposes. 57.This Court further finds that the 1st Respondent has advanced no substantive legal basis for the continued refusal to act upon a valid Certificate of Confirmation of Grant, and that such refusal is inconsistent with the statutory obligations imposed by the Land Registration Act and with the constitutional obligations imposed by Article 10 of the Constitution of Kenya, 2010. The 1st Respondent's inaction is hereby declared to be unlawful. 58.In the premises, this Court makes the following orders.i.It is hereby declared that the trust constituted over Title No. Karai/Karai/1376 has been spent and is terminated with effect from the date of this Judgment.ii.The 1st Applicant is hereby directed, within thirty days of the date of this Judgment, to place before this Court satisfactory evidence establishing the following: first, if the 2nd Applicant is deceased, the identity and authority of the legal representative of that person's estate, evidenced by the relevant Grant of Letters of Administration or Certificate of Confirmation of Grant; and second, the written and duly sworn consent of the 2nd Applicant or the legal representative of the 2nd Applicant's estate to the termination of the trust and the registration of Title No. Karai/Karai/1376 absolutely in the name of Edwin Wilson Mungai Njoroge.iii.Upon the filing and acceptance by this Court of satisfactory evidence in accordance with the foregoing directions, this Court shall issue a final order directing the 1st Respondent to remove all trust annotations from the register of Title No. Karai/Karai/1376 and to register the said title absolutely in the name of Edwin Wilson Mungai Njoroge within fourteen days of service of that final order upon the 1st Respondent.iv.The 1st Respondent is hereby put on notice that any failure to comply with the final order of this Court within the time prescribed shall be treated as contempt of Court and dealt with accordingly.v.Mention for further directions on 17/06/2026.vi.Costs of this application shall abide the final disposal of the matter. 59.It is so ordered. DATED SIGNED AND DELIVERED VIRTUALLY AT THIKA VIA VIDEOLINK THIS 13TH DAY OF MAY, 2026...................................MOGENI JJUDGEIn the presence of:Mr. Bahati holding brief for Mr. Waweru for the PlaintiffMiss Mwangi holding brief for Mr. Motari for the RespondentsMr. Melita - Court Assistant………………………MOGENI JJUDGE