https://new.kenyalaw.org/akn/ke/judgment/kehc/2026/12006

Nzinzi v Republic (Criminal Appeal E056 of 2025) [2026] KEHC 12006 (KLR) (30 July 2026) (Judgment) Neutral citation: [2026] KEHC 12006 (KLR) Republic of Kenya In the High Court at Makueni Criminal Appeal E056 of 2025 MW Mutuku, J July 30, 2026 Between Peter Nzinzi Appellant and Republic Respondent Judgment 1.The appellant, Peter Nzinzi, was arraigned before the Principal Magistrate's Court at Makindu charged with the offence of Defilement contrary to section 8(1) as read with section 8(2) of the Sexual Offences Act, No. 3 of 2006. 2.The particulars of the charge were that on the 13th day of September 2021, at [Particulars withheld] Village, [Particulars withheld] Location, Mukaa Sub-County within Makueni County, the appellant intentionally and unlawfully caused his genital organ to penetrate the genital organ of J.M., a child aged five (5) years. 3.In the alternative, the appellant faced the offence of Committing an Indecent Act with a Child contrary to section 11(1) of the Sexual Offences Act, the particulars being that on the same date and at the same place, he intentionally touched the genital organ of the said child with his genital organ. 4.The appellant pleaded not guilty to both counts. Upon a full trial, the learned trial magistrate found him guilty of the principal charge, convicted him accordingly and sentenced him to life imprisonment, being the sentence prescribed under section 8(2) of the Sexual Offences Act. 5.Being dissatisfied with both conviction and sentence, the appellant lodged the present appeal challenging the decision of the trial court on several grounds. In summary, he contends that the charge sheet was defective; that the prosecution failed to prove the essential ingredients of the offence beyond reasonable doubt; that the voire dire examination was improperly conducted; that the evidence was inconsistent and unreliable; that his defence was not adequately considered; and that the conviction was therefore unsafe. 6.The appeal is opposed by the respondent, who maintains that the charge sheet disclosed a known offence; that the complainant's age, penetration and the appellant's identity were proved beyond reasonable doubt; that the voire dire examination complied with the law; that the appellant's defence was duly considered and rejected; and that both the conviction and sentence were lawful. The Parties' Submissions The Appellant's Submissions 7.The appellant submitted that the conviction was unsafe because the prosecution failed to establish the offence beyond reasonable doubt. Counsel argued, firstly, that the charge sheet was fatally defective for failing to state that the appellant "unlawfully" caused penetration, thereby omitting an essential ingredient of the offence. 8.The appellant further submitted that penetration was not proved. It was argued that the complainant's testimony was inconsistent with the medical evidence and that the clinical officer conceded during cross-examination that a perforated hymen could result from causes other than sexual intercourse. The appelant therefore urged the Court to find that the medical evidence fell short of proving penetration beyond reasonable doubt. 9.On identification, the appellant contended that the prosecution evidence was insufficient to place the appellant at the scene of the offence and that the trial court failed to appreciate the inconsistencies in the prosecution case. It was further submitted that the appellant's defence, including his assertion that he had been falsely implicated because of a boundary dispute between the two families, was not adequately considered. 10.The appellant also challenged the conduct of the voire dire examination, contending that the complainant's unsworn testimony ought not to have formed the basis of a conviction. It was further argued that the trial court improperly relied upon an alleged request for forgiveness by the appellant, which counsel submitted did not amount to an admission of guilt and carried little evidential value. 11.The appellant consequently urged the Court to find that the prosecution failed to prove the charge beyond reasonable doubt, allow the appeal, quash the conviction and set aside the sentence. The Respondent's Submissions 12.Learned Prosecution Counsel opposed the appeal and submitted that the conviction was supported by overwhelming evidence. It was argued that the omission of the word "unlawfully" from the charge sheet did not occasion any prejudice to the appellant, as the charge clearly disclosed the offence known in law and adequately informed him of the case he was required to answer. 13.Counsel submitted that the complainant's age was conclusively established through the birth certificate produced in evidence together with the testimony of her mother. It was further submitted that penetration was proved both by the complainant's account of the incident and by the medical evidence showing partial perforation of the hymen. 14.The respondent further submitted that the appellant was positively identified through recognition, the complainant having known him before the incident. Counsel argued that there was therefore no possibility of mistaken identity. 15.Regarding the voire dire examination, the respondent maintained that the learned trial magistrate properly satisfied herself that the complainant possessed sufficient intelligence and appreciated the duty of telling the truth before receiving her unsworn evidence. Counsel further submitted that the complainant's evidence was credible and, in any event, found material support in the medical evidence and the testimony of the other prosecution witnesses. 16.On the appellant's defence, the respondent submitted that the alleged boundary dispute was a mere assertion unsupported by evidence and incapable of displacing the cogent prosecution case. It was therefore urged that the learned trial magistrate correctly rejected the defence. 17.The respondent accordingly prayed for the dismissal of the appeal and the affirmation of both the conviction and sentence. Duty of the First Appellate Court 18.This being a first appeal, this Court is enjoined to subject the entire evidence tendered before the trial court to a fresh and exhaustive examination and to draw its own independent conclusions, while bearing in mind that it neither saw nor heard the witnesses testify and must therefore give due allowance for that disadvantage. The Court is not bound merely to scrutinize the evidence to determine whether there was some evidence upon which the trial court could have reached its findings. Rather, it must itself weigh the conflicting evidence, evaluate the entire record and arrive at its own conclusions, whilst bearing in mind that the trial court had the advantage of seeing and hearing the witnesses. This principle was authoritatively stated in Okeno v Republic [1972] EA 32 and has consistently guided first appellate courts. 19.Guided by that duty, I have carefully reconsidered the pleadings, the proceedings before the trial court, the judgment appealed against, the grounds of appeal, the rival submissions and the applicable law. Issues for Determination 20.Upon considering the record and the parties' respective arguments, the following issues arise for determination—a.Whether the charge sheet was fatally defective;b.Whether the age of the complainant was proved beyond reasonable doubt;c.Whether penetration was proved beyond reasonable doubt;d.Whether the appellant was positively identified as the perpetrator;e.Whether the appellant's defence raised a reasonable doubt as to the prosecution case; andf.Whether the conviction and sentence should be interfered with. Analysis and Determination (a) Whether the Charge Sheet was Fatally Defective 21.The appellant submits that the charge sheet was fatally defective because it omitted the word "unlawfully" from the particulars of the offence. According to the appellant, that omission rendered the charge incurably defective as it failed to disclose one of the essential ingredients of the offence. 22.The respondent takes the contrary position that the omission neither altered the nature of the offence nor occasioned any prejudice to the appellant. It is submitted that the charge sufficiently informed the appellant of the accusation facing him and enabled him to prepare and present his defence. 23.The law governing the framing of criminal charges is found in section 134 of the Criminal Procedure Code, which requires every charge to contain such particulars as are necessary to give reasonable information as to the nature of the offence charged. The object of a charge sheet is therefore not one of technical perfection but of ensuring that an accused person clearly understands the case he is required to meet. 24.The Court of Appeal in Yongo v Republic [1983] KLR 319 observed that a charge is defective only where it does not accord with the evidence, gives a misdescription of the offence, cites the wrong statutory provision, or is otherwise so fundamentally flawed that it occasions prejudice or embarrassment to the accused in the conduct of his defence. Similarly, in Daniel Oduya Oloo v Republic [1985] eKLR, the Court held that procedural imperfections which do not occasion prejudice or result in a failure of justice are curable under section 382 of the Criminal Procedure Code. 25.I have carefully examined the charge sheet. The appellant was charged under the correct statutory provisions, namely section 8(1) as read with section 8(2) of the Sexual Offences Act. The particulars clearly disclosed the date, place, complainant, age of the complainant and the specific act of causing penetration. Throughout the proceedings, the appellant actively participated in the trial by cross-examining the prosecution witnesses and tendering his defence. At no stage did he express uncertainty as to the nature of the allegation confronting him or seek clarification of the charge. 26.In my respectful view, the omission of the word "unlawfully" did not obscure the offence charged nor deprive the appellant of a fair opportunity to defend himself. The Sexual Offences Act criminalizes intentional penetration with a child, and the particulars set out in the charge unmistakably conveyed that allegation. The omission complained of was therefore one of form rather than substance. 27.Guided by sections 134 and 382 of the Criminal Procedure Code and the principles enunciated in Yongo v Republic (supra) and Daniel Oduya Oloo v Republic (supra), I find that the charge sheet sufficiently disclosed the offence known to law and that no prejudice or miscarriage of justice was occasioned to the appellant. Accordingly, this ground of appeal fails. (b) Whether the Age of the Complainant was Proved Beyond Reasonable Doubt 28.Age is a fundamental ingredient of the offence of defilement because the applicable punishment under section 8 of the Sexual Offences Act depends upon the age of the complainant. The prosecution therefore bears the burden of proving age beyond reasonable doubt. 29.The Court of Appeal in Maripett Loonkomok v Republic [2016] eKLR held that although a birth certificate constitutes the best evidence of age where available, age may also be proved by other credible evidence, including the testimony of parents, age assessment reports or other documentary evidence. Likewise, in Edwin Nyambogo Onsongo v Republic [2016] eKLR, the Court reiterated that the totality of the evidence should be considered in determining whether age has been satisfactorily established. 30.In the present case, PW1, the complainant's mother, testified that the complainant was born on 19th June 2016. She produced the complainant's Birth Certificate, which was admitted into evidence without objection. That documentary evidence was entirely consistent with her oral testimony and established that the complainant was five years old when the offence was allegedly committed on 13th September 2021. 31.The defence did not challenge the authenticity of the birth certificate nor contest the complainant's age during the trial. Indeed, nothing emerged in cross-examination to cast any doubt upon the evidence tendered by PW1 regarding the complainant's date of birth. 32.Having independently evaluated the evidence, I am satisfied that the prosecution discharged its burden of proving beyond reasonable doubt that the complainant was a child aged five years at the time of the offence. Accordingly, this ingredient of the offence was conclusively established. (c) Whether Penetration was Proved Beyond Reasonable Doubt 33.The appellant contends that the prosecution failed to prove penetration beyond reasonable doubt. It is argued that the complainant's testimony was inconsistent with the medical evidence and that the clinical officer conceded that a perforated hymen could arise from causes other than sexual intercourse. According to the appellant, those factors created reasonable doubt which ought to have been resolved in his favour. 34.The respondent submits that penetration was proved both by the direct evidence of the complainant and by the medical findings of PW4, who examined the complainant shortly after the incident and formed the opinion that she had been defiled. 35.Penetration is one of the essential ingredients of the offence of defilement. Section 2 of the Sexual Offences Act defines penetration as "the partial or complete insertion of the genital organs of a person into the genital organs of another person." It follows that the law does not require proof of complete penetration, ejaculation, rupture of the hymen or the presence of spermatozoa. Proof of even partial penetration is sufficient. 36.In Mark Oiruri Mose v Republic [2013] eKLR, the Court of Appeal held that penetration may be proved by the credible testimony of the complainant and that medical evidence, though important, serves to reinforce rather than replace direct evidence. Likewise, in Bassita v Uganda, Criminal Appeal No. 35 of 1995, the Supreme Court of Uganda observed that penetration is established upon proof of the slightest penetration of the female genital organ and need not be demonstrated by scientific evidence alone. Kenyan courts have consistently adopted that reasoning. 37.In the present case, the complainant testified that the appellant took her into a bush, removed her clothes and underwear, laid her down and "slept on" her while pointing to her genital area. Considering her tender age, that description was both natural and age-appropriate. It conveyed, in simple language, that the appellant inserted his genital organ into hers. 38.The complainant's account was substantially corroborated by the evidence of PW4, the Clinical Officer, who examined her shortly after the incident. PW4 observed that the complainant's hymen was partially perforated and, upon examination together with the history given, formed the clinical opinion that the complainant had been defiled. 39.The appellant placed considerable reliance upon PW4's concession during cross-examination that a perforated hymen may result from causes other than sexual intercourse. In my respectful view, that concession merely acknowledged a medical possibility. It did not constitute evidence that the complainant's injuries were, in fact, occasioned by some other cause. The existence of a theoretical medical possibility does not, without more, negate the clinical findings made in this particular case. 40.Indeed, PW4 remained steadfast in his professional opinion that the complainant had been defiled. That opinion was based not only upon the physical findings but also upon the history obtained during examination. The defence did not place before the trial court any evidence suggesting an alternative explanation for the complainant's condition, nor did the cross-examination expose any inconsistency capable of undermining PW4's ultimate conclusion. 41.I am equally unpersuaded by the submission that the absence of bleeding, spermatozoa or extensive genital injuries weakened the prosecution case. Such findings are not legal prerequisites for proving penetration under section 2 of the Sexual Offences Act. The offence is complete upon proof of even partial penetration, and the absence of additional physical injuries does not negate its occurrence. 42.Having independently evaluated the complainant's testimony together with the medical evidence, I am satisfied that the prosecution proved penetration beyond reasonable doubt. This ground of appeal therefore fails. (d) Whether the Appellant was Positively Identified as the Perpetrator 43.The appellant further disputes his identification as the perpetrator, contending that the prosecution failed to establish beyond reasonable doubt that he was the person who committed the offence. 44.The respondent maintains that this was not a case of visual identification of a stranger but one of recognition. It is submitted that the complainant knew the appellant before the incident and identified him by name immediately after the offence. 45.The law draws a clear distinction between identification of a stranger and recognition of a person previously known to the witness. In Anjononi & Others v Republic [1980] KLR 59, the Court of Appeal held that recognition is generally more reliable than identification of a stranger because it is based upon prior knowledge of the person recognized. Nevertheless, even evidence of recognition must be examined carefully to eliminate the possibility of error. 46.In the present case, the complainant unequivocally identified the appellant as the person who took her into the bush and sexually assaulted her. She referred to him by name during her testimony and there was no suggestion that she had mistaken him for someone else. 47.The complainant's evidence that she knew the appellant beforehand was independently confirmed by PW1 and PW3, who testified that the appellant was a relative known to the family. Their evidence firmly established that the complainant's identification of the appellant was one of recognition rather than a fleeting observation of an unknown person. 48.There was no evidence of poor visibility, confusion or any other circumstance capable of impairing the complainant's ability to recognize the appellant. On the contrary, the evidence demonstrates that the complainant had prior familiarity with him and had ample opportunity to recognize him during the incident. 49.Upon my own evaluation of the record, I am satisfied that the appellant was positively identified through recognition. The possibility of mistaken identity was effectively excluded by the evidence, and I therefore find that the prosecution proved beyond reasonable doubt that it was the appellant who committed the offence. (e) Whether the Appellant's Defence Raised a Reasonable Doubt as to the Prosecution Case i) Whether the Voire Dire Examination Complied with the Law 50.The appellant contends that the voire dire examination conducted by the learned trial magistrate was defective and that the complainant's unsworn testimony ought not to have formed the basis of his conviction. It is his position that the complainant did not demonstrate a sufficient understanding of the nature of an oath and that her evidence therefore lacked the requisite legal foundation. 51.The respondent submits that the learned trial magistrate properly conducted the voire dire examination and correctly found that although the complainant did not understand the nature of an oath, she possessed sufficient intelligence and appreciated the duty of speaking the truth. Consequently, her unsworn evidence was properly received. 52.The reception of evidence from a child of tender years is governed by section 19 of the Oaths and Statutory Declarations Act and the proviso to section 124 of the Evidence Act. The purpose of a voire dire examination is to enable the court determine whether the child possesses sufficient intelligence to testify and whether the child appreciates the duty of telling the truth. Where the child does not understand the nature of an oath but demonstrates sufficient intelligence and appreciates the obligation of speaking the truth, the court is entitled to receive the child's unsworn evidence. 53.In Johnson Muiruri v Republic [1983] KLR 445, the Court of Appeal observed that the object of a voire dire examination is not to test a child's knowledge of religious doctrine or legal concepts, but to satisfy the court that the child is intelligent enough to testify and appreciates the importance of telling the truth. Similarly, in Patrick Kathurima v Republic [2015] eKLR, the Court emphasized that the trial court should satisfy itself that the child understands the duty of speaking the truth and record the basis upon which it reaches that conclusion. 54.I have carefully examined the voire dire examination conducted by the learned trial magistrate. The record demonstrates that although the complainant did not understand the nature of an oath, she clearly appreciated the distinction between truth and falsehood and understood that it was wrong to tell lies. The learned trial magistrate therefore properly directed that her evidence be received unsworn. 55.I therefore find no merit in the appellant's complaint that the complainant's evidence was inadmissible merely because it was unsworn. The learned trial magistrate complied with the applicable legal principles in receiving that evidence. 56.Equally unpersuasive is the appellant's contention that the complainant's evidence required corroboration before a conviction could properly be entered. The proviso to section 124 of the Evidence Act expressly permits a court to convict on the sole evidence of the complainant in a sexual offence where the court believes the complainant to be truthful and records the reasons for that belief. In Mohamed v Republic [2006] 2 KLR 138, the Court of Appeal affirmed that the proviso to section 124 constitutes a statutory exception to the common law requirement for corroboration and that a conviction may properly be founded on the sole testimony of the complainant where the trial court believes that evidence and records its reasons for doing so. 57.In the present case, the complainant's evidence did not stand alone. Apart from the trial court recording its reasons for believing the complainant, her account was materially supported by the medical evidence of PW4 and the surrounding circumstances established through the testimony of PW1 and PW3. Consequently, even if corroboration had been required, which it was not, the record discloses ample independent evidence lending assurance to the complainant's testimony. 58.I therefore find that the learned trial magistrate properly conducted the voire dire examination and lawfully admitted the complainant's unsworn evidence. (ii) Whether the Alleged Contradictions Were Material 59.The appellant further submits that the prosecution evidence was riddled with contradictions and inconsistencies which rendered the conviction unsafe. 60.It is trite that not every inconsistency in the testimony of witnesses will justify interference with a conviction. Human recollection is seldom perfect, and honest witnesses may differ on peripheral matters without affecting the substance of the prosecution case. It is only material contradictions touching upon the essential ingredients of the offence that may render a conviction unsafe. 61.In Twehangane Alfred v Uganda, Criminal Appeal No. 139 of 2001, a decision consistently cited with approval by Kenyan courts, it was held that grave contradictions, unless satisfactorily explained, may justify rejection of evidence, whereas minor discrepancies which do not affect the substance of the prosecution case ought to be disregarded. The Court of Appeal adopted the same approach in Erick Onyango Ondeng' v Republic [2014] eKLR. 62.I have carefully considered the inconsistencies identified by the appellant. The discrepancies regarding the circumstances surrounding the alleged request for forgiveness and the isolated reference by PW4 during cross-examination to attempted defilement do not, in my view, affect the essential ingredients of the offence. They neither undermine the complainant's account of the assault nor diminish the medical findings establishing penetration. 63.Viewed in their proper context, the inconsistencies relied upon by the appellant are peripheral rather than fundamental. They do not demonstrate deliberate falsehood, nor do they create any reasonable doubt regarding the occurrence of the offence or the identity of the perpetrator. This ground of appeal therefore fails. (iii) Whether the Appellant's Alibi Defence Raised a Reasonable Doubt 64.The appellant's defence before the trial court was, in substance, an alibi. He denied committing the offence and asserted that he had been falsely implicated because of an alleged boundary dispute between his family and that of the complainant. 65.The law relating to alibi is well settled. An accused person bears no burden of proving an alibi. The burden remains throughout upon the prosecution to disprove the alibi by establishing beyond reasonable doubt that the accused was present at the scene and committed the offence alleged. 66.In Kiarie v Republic [1984] KLR 739, the Court of Appeal held that an alibi introduces into the prosecution case a specific defence which the prosecution is under a duty to disprove. Likewise, in Victor Mwendwa Mulinge v Republic [2014] eKLR, the Court reiterated that an accused person does not assume the burden of proving an alibi; rather, it is sufficient if the defence raises a reasonable doubt. 67.I have carefully reconsidered the appellant's defence alongside the prosecution evidence. Apart from asserting the existence of a boundary dispute, the appellant tendered no evidence demonstrating the existence or nature of that dispute or showing how it could have motivated the complainant's family to fabricate such a serious allegation. 68.More significantly, the prosecution evidence positively placed the appellant at the scene through recognition by the complainant, whose evidence was independently corroborated by PW1 and PW3 regarding the prior relationship between the parties, and by the medical evidence establishing the commission of the offence. 69.Weighing the appellant's alibi against the totality of the evidence on record, I am satisfied that the prosecution successfully displaced the defence beyond reasonable doubt. The alibi therefore fails to raise any reasonable doubt as to the appellant's guilt. (iv) Whether the Alleged Admission Strengthened the Prosecution Case 70.The appellant also challenges the trial court's reliance upon evidence that he allegedly knelt before the complainant's family and sought forgiveness after the incident. It is submitted that such conduct did not amount to an admission of guilt and ought not to have been accorded significant evidential weight. 71.Upon my own evaluation of the record, I respectfully take a different view from the learned trial magistrate regarding that aspect of the evidence. The words allegedly uttered by the appellant were neither recorded with precision nor did they amount to an unequivocal acknowledgment of the offence charged. A request for forgiveness, standing alone, is capable of multiple interpretations and cannot automatically be equated with an admission of criminal responsibility. 72.Further, sections 25A and 26 of the Evidence Act prescribe the circumstances under which a confession or admission of guilt may properly be received in criminal proceedings. Although the evidence in question was not tendered as a formal confession within the meaning of those provisions, the statutory safeguards underscore the need for courts to approach alleged informal admissions with considerable caution. 73.I therefore find that the alleged request for forgiveness carried little probative value and did not materially strengthen the prosecution case. In that respect, I respectfully depart from the reasoning of the learned trial magistrate. 74.That finding, however, does not alter the outcome of this appeal. Even excluding the alleged admission from consideration, the complainant's evidence, the medical findings proving penetration and the evidence of recognition independently established the appellant's guilt beyond reasonable doubt. The conviction therefore remains firmly anchored upon admissible and credible evidence. Disposition 75.This being a first appeal, this Court has discharged its duty by subjecting the entire evidence on record to a fresh and exhaustive examination and by drawing its own independent conclusions, while bearing in mind that it neither saw nor heard the witnesses testify. Upon that re-evaluation, I am satisfied that the prosecution proved beyond reasonable doubt each of the essential ingredients of the offence of defilement contrary to section 8(1) as read with section 8(2) of the Sexual Offences Act. 76.The evidence adduced before the trial court satisfactorily established that the complainant was five years old at the time of the offence. Her age was proved by the production of her Birth Certificate and the evidence of her mother. The complainant's testimony, which was lawfully received after a proper voire dire examination, was credible, coherent and truthful on the material particulars. Her account of the assault was materially supported by the medical findings of PW4, which established penetration within the meaning of section 2 of the Sexual Offences Act. 77.I have further found that the appellant was positively identified through recognition by a complainant who knew him beforehand, thereby eliminating any realistic possibility of mistaken identity. The omission of the word "unlawfully" from the charge sheet did not render the charge fatally defective, as no prejudice was occasioned to the appellant and the charge sufficiently disclosed the offence known to law. Likewise, the inconsistencies identified by the appellant were minor and peripheral and did not affect the substance of the prosecution case. 78.I have also found that the appellant's alibi defence did not raise any reasonable doubt once weighed against the cogent prosecution evidence placing him at the scene of the offence. Although I have attached little evidential weight to the alleged request for forgiveness and have respectfully declined to treat it as an admission of guilt, its exclusion from consideration does not diminish the overwhelming admissible evidence establishing the appellant's culpability. 79.Consequently, I am satisfied that the conviction was founded upon credible, reliable and sufficient evidence. No error of law or fact has been demonstrated that would justify this Court's interference with either the conviction or the sentence imposed by the learned trial magistrate. Sentence 80.The appellant was convicted of defilement of a child aged five years. Section 8(2) of the Sexual Offences Act prescribes life imprisonment upon conviction for defilement of a child aged eleven years or below. The sentence imposed by the learned trial magistrate was therefore lawful and in accordance with the express provisions of the statute. 81.This Court is alive to the well-settled principle that sentencing is primarily a matter within the discretion of the trial court and that an appellate court will not interfere unless it is shown that the trial court acted on a wrong principle, overlooked a material factor, considered an irrelevant factor, or imposed a sentence that is manifestly excessive or manifestly inadequate in the circumstances. No such basis has been established in the present appeal. 82.I therefore find no justification for interfering with the sentence imposed by the trial court. Disposition and orders 83.In the result, the appeal against conviction is without merit and is hereby dismissed. 84.The appeal against sentence is likewise dismissed. 85.The conviction for the offence of Defilement contrary to section 8(1) as read with section 8(2) of the Sexual Offences Act, No. 3 of 2006 is hereby upheld. 86.The sentence of life imprisonment imposed by the trial court is hereby affirmed. It is so ordered. DELIVERED, DATED AND SIGNED ON 30TH DAY OF JULY, 2026.JUDGEMENT DELIVERED THROUGH MICROSOFT TEAMS ONLINE PLATFORM.MARTHA MUTUKUJUDGEIn the presence of: -Miss Omol for the StateAppellant in personCourt Assistant – Mr. Kibet.