https://new.kenyalaw.org/akn/ke/judgment/kehc/2026/12467

Odhiambo v County Government of Nairobi & 12 others (Petition E260 of 2025) [2026] KEHC 12467 (KLR) (Constitutional and Human Rights) (3 August 2026) (Judgment) Neutral citation: [2026] KEHC 12467 (KLR) Republic of Kenya In the High Court at Nairobi (Milimani Law Courts) Constitutional and Human Rights Petition E260 of 2025 RE Aburili, J August 3, 2026 IN THE MATTER OF: ARTICLES 1, 2, 3 (1), 10, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 27,174, 209 AND 210 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF KENYA, 2010 AND IN THE MATTER OF: THE FOURTH SCHEDULE OF THE CONSTITUTION OF KENYA, 2010 AND IN THE MATTER OF: THE CONTRAVENTION OR BREACH OF ARTICLES 174, 209, 210 AND THE FOURTH SCHEDULE OF THE CONSTITUTION OF KENYA, 2010 AND IN THE MATTER OF: THE INTERPRETATION, IMPLEMENTATION, ENFORCEMENT AND CONTRAVENTION/BREACH OF ARTICLES 209, 210 AND THE FOURTH SCHEDULE OF THE CONSTITUTION OF KENYA, 2010 AND IN THE MATTER OF: INTERPRETATION OF ARTICLES 93, 94 AND 185 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF KENYA, 2010 AND IN THE MATTER OF: THE COUNTY OUTDOOR ADVERTISING CONTROL ACT, CAP. 276 LAWS OF KENYA AND IN THE MATTER OF: THE NAIROBI CITY COUNTY, KAJIADO COUNTY, MACHAKOS COUNTY, NAROK COUNTY, KITUI COUNTY, MAKUENI COUNTY, THARAKA NITHI COUNTY, GARISSA COUNTY, ISIOLO COUNTY, EMBU COUNTY, MURANGA COUNTY, NYERI COUNTY AND KIAMBU COUNTY FINANCE ACTS Between Clifford Onyango Odhiambo Petitioner and The County Government of Nairobi 1st Respondent The County Government of Kajiado 2nd Respondent The County Government of Machakos 3rd Respondent The County Government of Narok 4th Respondent The County Government of Kitui 5th Respondent The County Government of Makueni 6th Respondent The County Government of Tharaka Nithi 7th Respondent The County Government of Garissa 8th Respondent The County Government of Isiolo 9th Respondent The County Government of Embu 10th Respondent The County Government of Muranga 11th Respondent The County Government of Nyeri 12th Respondent The County Government of Kiambu 13th Respondent Judgment Background 1.The Petitioner Clifford Onyango Odhiambo is an adult Kenyan male of National Identification Card number 27xxxx76 and a practicing Advocate of the High Court of Kenya. All the thirteen Respondents are County Governments and of the 47 devolved governments established under Article 176 of the Constitution of Kenya, 2010. 2.Vide the Petition dated 5th May 2025, the Petitioner, Clifford Onyango Odhiambo, seeks various constitutional declarations and injunctive orders against the 13 County Governments. The Petitioner challenges the decisions allegedly made by the 13 County Governments imposing advertising taxes, levies or fees on branded motor vehicles operating as moving vehicles passing through or operating in their jurisdictions under their respective County Finance Acts. It is alleged that to compel payment, county officials have been detaining, clamping or denying entry/transit to these moving vehicles. 3.The Petition was initially filed alongside an interlocutory Application dated 5th May 2025 and the Petitioner’s Supporting Affidavit of even date. However, on 25th July 2025, the Petitioner formally withdrew his interlocutory Application, effectively withdrawing the supporting affidavit and its annexed exhibits from the record. 4.The Petitioner seeks the following substantive reliefs:a.A declaration that the cess/charge/levy/tax imposed by the Respondent County Governments for advertisements displayed on or in any moving motor vehicles employed as moving vehicles are cess/charge/levy/tax are without justification and not in exchange of a public need, services or amenities contrary to Article 209(4) and (5) of the Constitution of Kenya.b.A declaration that the cess/charge/levy/tax imposed by the Respondents County Governments for advertisements displayed on or in any moving motor vehicle employed as a moving vehicle, are in violation of Article 210 (1) of the Constitution as they are taxes without any legislative approval.c.A declaration that the detention or denial of transit of motor vehicles with advertisements displayed on or in them whereas they are employed as a moving vehicle through the Respondents’ jurisdictions is in violation of persons fundamental rights under Article 40 (1) to property, fair administrative action under Article 47 and freedom of movement of persons/labour contrary to Article 39 (1) of the Constitution of Kenya.d.The imposing of the cess/charges/levies/taxes on motor vehicles employed as moving vehicles with advertisements displayed on or in them by the Respondents prejudices national economic interests, policies and activities and the mobility of goods, services, capital and labour in violation of Article 209 (5) of the Constitution of Kenya.e.A permanent injunction be issued barring the 1st – 13th Respondents from imposing cess/charge/levy/tax on motor vehicles with advertisements displayed on or in them whereas they are employed as a moving vehicle. 5.The Petitioner asserts that the Respondents are levying taxes on advertisements on moving vehicles without providing any public need or amenity in return and without the required Parliamentary approval, thereby violating Constitutional protections under Articles 209, 210, 39, and 47 of the Constitution. It is averred that county governments cannot impose taxes without Parliamentary authorization and that neither can they do so outside statutory provisions. The Petitioner pleads that the County Outdoor Advertising Control Act (Cap 276) explicitly exempts advertisements on vehicles normally employed as moving vehicles licensed in another county. 6.According to the Petitioner, county governments are empowered under Article 209 of the Constitution to raise revenue and levy taxes or charges, but that under Article 209(4), they are only authorized to charge for services they actually provide. He relies on the definition of "Services" as stated by the Supreme Court in Base Titanium Limited v County Government of Mombasa & another (2021), eKLR where "services" is defined as a system providing for a public need or amenity such as county roads, street lighting or traffic control. The Petitioner argues that counties can only impose charges in direct exchange for specific services, a public need or amenity. That in this case, counties offer no service to moving, branded vehicles in return for these taxes. 7.It is the Petitioner’s further case that while county legislative assemblies hold delegated power under Article 1, their authority must comply with the Constitution. He asserts that the presumption that County Finance Acts are constitutional is rebuttable and that under Article 2 of the Constitution, the High Court has the power to declare the Respondents’ Finance Acts null and void for violating Articles 209 and 210. 8.It is argued that because of this practise by county governments, charging moving vehicles in every county they pass through, amounts to multiple taxation, increases transport costs, inflates prices for goods and services and hinders the mobility of goods, labour and capital across county borders, in violation of Article 209(5) of the Constitution. 9.It is also asserted that detaining or restricting the movement of these vehicles infringes on vehicle owners’ constitutional rights to property under Article 40, freedom of movement under Article 39 and fair administrative action under Article 47 of the Constitution. Responses to the Petition 10.In response to the Petition, the 1st , 6th, 9th , 12th and 13th Respondents filed their respective responses by way of Replying Affidavits. The 2nd, 3rd, 4th, 5th 7th, 8th, 10th and 11th Respondents did not file any responses to the Petition. 11.The 1st Respondent, which is the City County Government of Nairobi filed its Replying Affidavit dated 4th December 2025 sworn by Dr. Machel Waikenda, the County Chief Officer in charge of the Mobility Sub-Sector in which it is deposed that the Petition lacks merit, is an abuse of the court process and should be dismissed. 12.The 1st Respondent contends that Nairobi City County Government operates strictly within its constitutional and legal mandate under Article 209 (3) & (4), Part 2 Clause 3 of the Fourth Schedule to the Constitution, the County Outdoor Advertising Control Act (Cap 276), the Nairobi City County Finance Act, 2023 and the Nairobi City County Transport Act, 2020. 13.It is deposed that the County Government provides regulatory services in return for outdoor advertising fees, including monitoring compliance with advertising standards, maintaining public amenities and infrastructure impacted by advertising and ensuring road safety, environmental orderliness and aesthetic control. 14.According to the 1st Respondent, its laws apply strictly to local commercial advertising vehicles operating within Nairobi City County, not to intercounty/transit vehicles merely passing through the City County and that the Petitioner failed to provide any evidence such as invoices, fines, enforcement entries or detention records showing that Nairobi City County has ever charged or detained a transit vehicle licensed in another county. 15.It therefore characterizes the allegations made by the Petitioner as being speculative, unsubstantiated and based on misinterpretation of the law and hypothetical fears rather than proven violations. Additionally, the 1st Respondent denies infringing on property rights under Article 40, freedom of movement under Article 39 (1) or fair administrative action under Article 47. 16.It is deposed further that enforcement by the City County Government of Nairobi targets non-compliant local advertisers and strictly follows fair administrative action processes, including notices and internal review/appeal options and that the Petitioner has adduced no evidence showing that the 1st Respondent’s advertising fees caused price increases for goods/services or restricted cross-county commerce. That accordingly, and in the absence of credible evidence of wrongdoing, the Petition fails the threshold for enforcement of constitutional rights and ought to be dismissed. 17.The 6th Respondent, the County Government of Makueni filed a Replying Affidavit sworn by Boniface Mutua on 28th November 2025 opposing the Petition and arguing that its outdoor advertising fees are lawful, constitutional and properly enacted under the county legislative authority. 18.The 6th Respondent asserts that after withdrawing his interlocutory Application, the Petitioner left the main Petition as a "skeleton" devoid of supporting evidence or specific proof of rights violations. It is deposed that under Part 2, Paragraph 3 of the Fourth Schedule to the Constitution, controlling outdoor advertising is a fully devolved function assigned to county governments. Citing the Supreme Court’s decision in Base Titanium Ltd v. County Government of Mombasa, the 6th Respondent through the contends in deposition that under Article 209(4) of the Constitution, it can levy charges in exchange for regulatory services, infrastructure and access to the local audience or market provided to mobile advertisers operating in its area. 19.It is further deposed that the advertising charges are enacted under the Makueni County Finance Act, 2023 pursuant to legislative powers granted by Article 185(2) of the Constitution and that therefore, declaring these fees unconstitutional would cripple county revenue and devolution. 20.The deponent for the 6th Respondent deposes that the Petitioner failed to show with precision how Makueni County Government specifically violated Articles 10, 40, 47, 176, 209, or 210 of the Constitution and that the Petitioner provided no proof that the 6th Respondent confiscated property, interfered with vehicle movement or harmed national economic interests. It characterizes the Petitioner’s claims as broad, speculative and failing the pleading threshold established in the case of Anarita Karimi Njeru v. Republic (1976) eKLR. 21.The 6th Respondent County Government avers that Section 3(c)(vi) of the County Outdoor Advertising Control Act (Cap 276) does not prohibit counties from levying charges on moving vehicles, but rather, that the framework regulates and empowers county governments to do so within constitutional bounds. 22.Citing Section 19 of the County Outdoor Advertising Control Act, the deponent asserts that statutory dispute resolution mechanisms must be exhausted before invoking the High Court jurisdiction. It is urges that the petition should be dismissed because the Petitioner jumped directly to litigation without following the prescribed statutory redress mechanisms as set out in Speaker of the National Assembly v. Karume. The 6th Respondent prays for costs as well. 23.The 9th Respondent, the County Government of Isiolo filed a Replying Affidavit dated 9th December 2025 and sworn by Luqman Ahmed, the County Executive Committee Member for Finance, Economic Planning & ICT in which it is deposed that under Article 209(2), (3), and (4) and the Fourth Schedule of the Constitution of Kenya, 2010, County Governments are empowered to levy taxes and service fees within their assigned functions, which includes outdoor advertising management. 24.The deponent asserts that the County Outdoor Advertising Control Act vests outdoor advertising management in the County Governments and allows County Assemblies to pass county-specific legislation. Therefore, that there is no conflict between the relevant laws and the Isiolo County Finance Act, 2023, which is constitutional and lawful. 25.It is deposed that the fees collected from outdoor advertising are lawfully charged and applied toward service delivery for the residents of Isiolo County and that under Section 3(c)(vi) of the County Outdoor Advertising Control Act, vehicles operating in transit are exempt from applying for an outdoor advertising licence only if they hold a valid licence from another county. 26.The deponent swears that the Petitioner withdrew their interlocutory Application dated 5th May 2025, thereby failing to tender evidence in support of their key assertions and that even if the Court analysed the Petitioner’s Exhibit (CO-41), there is no proof that specific motor vehicles being KBP 432B, KDG 221P, KDD 051P and KDM 153C possessed a valid advertising licence from another county before applying for branding in Isiolo County. That in the absence of proof of licensing from another county, the 9th Respondent was legally justified in levying the vehicle branding fee of Kshs. 20,000/= per vehicle. 27.Citing the case of Anarita Karimi Njeru v Republic (No. 1) [1979] KLR 154, the 9th Respondent contends that the Petition lacks reasonable precision regarding what specific constitutional provisions or rights were violated by Isiolo County Government and further contends that the Petition is an abuse of court process. The 9th Respondent urges the Court to dismiss the Petition with costs. 28.The 12th Respondent, the County Government of Nyeri opposes the Petition through a Replying Affidavit sworn by Edward Irungu Mwangi the County Secretary, on 5th November 2025. He deposes that its advertising fees are constitutional, statutory and reasonable and that the Petition is incompetent, devoid of merit and should be dismissed with costs. 29.The deponent states that under Part 2, Paragraph 3 of the Fourth Schedule to the Constitution, controlling outdoor advertising is a devolved function assigned to County Governments. Further, that pursuant to Article 209(4) of the Constitution, the fees levied on outdoor advertising including moving vehicles are regulatory service charges, not taxes requiring Parliamentary approval. That these fees fund active regulatory activities such as preventing visual clutter, conducting road-safety inspections and preserving environmental aesthetics. 30.It is deposed that the fee structure is established under Section 21 of the County Outdoor Advertising Control Act (COACA) and operationalized via the Nyeri County Finance Act, 2023. That Section 3(c)(vi) COACA provides that an exemption from outdoor advertising fees applies conditionally only to transit vehicles holding a valid outdoor advertising licence from another county. 31.It is their deposition that the Petitioner failed to provide proof that any affected vehicles held a licence from another county, making the claim for exemption legally unsustainable. Further, that vehicles primarily used for transport and logistics that carry corporate branding do not fall under the statutory exclusions and remain subject to county regulatory oversight. 32.They assert that the Petitioner withdrew his interlocutory Application dated 5th May 2025 pursuant to a Court Order dated 25th July 2025 and that this withdrawal effectively removed the supporting evidence and annexures such as payment receipts from the court record, leaving the Petition unsupported. 33.The deponent avers that the Petitioner provided no admissible evidence demonstrating unlawful detention, denial of transit or breach of rights under Articles 39 on freedom of movement, Article 40 on property rights or Article 47 on fair administrative action. 34.The 13th Respondent, the County Government of Kiambu filed a Replying Affidavit filed in opposition to the Petition dated 16th October 2025. The Replying Affidavit is sworn by Waithira Waiyaki, the County Attorney. She deposes that the County Government’s regulation and fee levies on outdoor advertising including moving branded vehicles are constitutional, statutory, reasonable and necessary. 35.That under Part 2, Paragraph 3 of the Fourth Schedule to the Constitution, the control and regulation of outdoor advertising is exclusively assigned to county governments and that pursuant to Article 209(4) of the Constitution, counties are authorized to impose service charges for regulating outdoor advertising. 36.It is deposed that moving branded vehicles utilize county roads and public amenities, exposing local residents to commercial advertising for the benefit of the advertiser, which justifies regulatory charges. The deponent also states that charges are passed via County Finance Acts and the Public Finance Management Act, 2012, following required public participation and approval by County Assemblies as required under the constitution. 37.It is contended that the Petitioner’s reliance on the County Outdoor Advertising Control Act, Cap 276 is misplaced and untenable. The 13th Respondent argues that Parliament acted ultra vires in enacting legislation on a devolved county function. That even under Section 2 of Cap 276, the definition of a "vehicle" excludes those used primarily for displaying advertisements. Thus, that the Act does not bar county regulation of mobile billboard vehicles. 38.The deponent asserts that under Regulation 6 of the Physical and Land Use Planning (Advertisement) Regulations (Legal Notice 242 of 2021), vehicles primarily used as mobile billboards or advertising displays are not exempt from approval fees. 39.The 13th Respondent avers that regulating mobile advertisements ensures equitable revenue sharing among counties where vehicles circulate, preventing unjust enrichment of a single licensing county at the expense of other counties whose residents view the advertisements. 40.The 13th Respondent through its deponent denies any violation of Articles 39 on freedom of movement, Article 40 on property rights, Article 47 on fair administrative action, or Article 210 on taxation principles. Further, that the regulation does not hinder the transit of goods or national economic interests; rather, it maintains orderly outdoor advertising and transparent revenue collection. 41.The 13th Respondent urges the Court to dismiss the Petition with costs, citing it as frivolous, vexatious and an abuse of the court process. 42.The parties took directions to canvass the Petition by way of written submissions which are now on record and are summarized as hereunder. Submissions 43.The Petitioner’s Submissions are dated 10th November 2025. He submits on four issues namely:i.whether by failing to approve Finance Bills each year, the Respondents have violated Articles 196 (b) and 209 (3) of the Constitution of Kenya;ii.Whether the Respondents are imposing cess on branded moving motor vehicles without providing any service in return contrary to Article 209 (4) of the Constitution of Kenya;iii.Whether the enactment of the Nairobi City County Finance Act, 2023 by the 1st Respondent or by the other Respondents violated the constitutional principles of public participation under Articles 10, 174, 196, and 201 of the Constitution due to the absence of a Tariffs and Pricing Policy andiv.whether the Petitioner is entitled to the reliefs sought. 44.On the first issue of failure to enact annual Finance Bills being in violation of Articles 196(b) & 209(3) of the Constitution, the Petitioner submits that under Sections 131 and 133 of the Public Finance Management Act (PFMA), county governments are required to pass Appropriation and Finance Bills annually by 30th June and approve Finance Bills within 90 days of passing the Appropriation Bill. The Petitioner produced exhibits CO-3 to CO-15 to demonstrate that the Respondent County Governments are relying on outdated Finance Acts. 45.The Petitioner submits that continuing to levy fees/cess using outdated Finance Acts bypasses annual public participation required under Article 196(b) of the Constitution. Citing Nyabuto v County Assembly of Nairobi City County & 2 others; Commission on Revenue Allocation (Interested Party) (Petition E040 of 2025) [2025] KEHC 8865 (KLR) (Constitutional and Human Rights), the Petitioner highlights that County Assemblies abdicate oversight and breach Article 47 on Fair Administrative Action and PFMA duties when they pass fiscal measures without proper policy frameworks like a Tariffs and Pricing Policy. 46.On the second issue of imposition of charges without providing services being in violation of Article 209(4), the Petitioner submits that he submitted invoices and receipts CO-16 to CO-76 showing fees levied on owners of moving branded vehicles. He further relies on the definition of "Service" by the Supreme Court in Base Titanium Limited v County Government of Mombasa [2021] KESC 33 (KLR), and submits that "charges" under Article 209(4) can only be levied in exchange for a public service, need or amenity. 47.He further submits that those counties provide no service to moving branded vehicles carrying goods or people across county lines and therefore, charging solely for being branded inflates consumer prices. He further submits that the county charges on inter-county transit run counter to national economic policies, disrupting the movement of goods, capital, and labour impeding economic mobility under Article 209(5) of the Constitution. 48.The Petitioner in his submissions also refutes Kiambu County Government’s claim that fees are justified because vehicles use county roads. He argues that the Fourth Schedule limits road-user fees to toll charges in approved Finance Bills. Furthermore, that Section 3(c)(vi) of the County Outdoor Advertising Control Act explicitly exempts moving vehicles licensed in another county. 49.On the third issue of unconstitutionality of County Finance Acts due to lack of Tariffs & Pricing Policy, the Petitioner cites Nyabuto v County Assembly of Nairobi City County & 2 others; Commission on Revenue Allocation (Interested Party) [2025] KEHC 8865 (KLR) where the High Court held that the Nairobi’s Finance Act 2023 was unconstitutional for lacking a Tariffs and Pricing Policy, rendering its public participation flawed. That, consequently, Section 3 of the Nairobi Finance Act, 2023 imposing Kshs. 13,650–15,000 per fortnight on branded moving vehicles, along with similar provisions in other Respondents’ Finance Acts are null and void. 50.The Petitioner invokes the Court’s Remedial Powers under Articles 23(3), 165, and 259, of the Constitution to declare unconstitutional statutes invalid and grant remedies such as injunctions or declarations. He urges the Court to declare the county charges inconsistent with Articles 47, 196(b), 209 and 210 of the Constitution, following the precedents set in the Base Titanium and Nyabuto cases (supra). The Respondents’ Submissions 51.The County Government of Makueni the 6th Respondent’s submissions are dated 15th December 2025 in which Counsel isolates five issues for determination being:i.Whether the 6th Respondent has the Constitutional and the statutory mandate under the County Outdoor Advertising Control Act Cap 76 Laws of Kenya to impose charges and levies for outdoor advertising including advertisements displayed in any moving vehicles;ii.Whether the Petitioner has demonstrated any violation of fundamental rights under Articles 10, 47, 176, 209 and 210 of the Constitution; Whether Section 3 (c) (vi) of the County Outdoor Advertising Control Act, Cap 76 Laws of Kenya bars the Respondents from imposing levies and charges on moving vehicles;iii.Whether the Petitioner has exhausted all the available mechanisms before filing the Petition; andiv.Whether the Petition discloses a justiciable cause of action against the 6th Respondent. 52.As a preliminary issue, Counsel notes that while the Petitioner filed an application on 5th May 2025 alongside the Petition, he subsequently withdrew it on 27th July 2025, leaving the Petition without supporting evidence. On the first issue, it is submitted that under Part 2, Paragraph 3 of the Fourth Schedule as well as Article 176 (1) of the Constitution of Kenya, 2010, controlling outdoor advertising is a fully devolved function assigned to County Governments. Citing Article 209 (4) of the Constitution, Counsel contends that charges levied for outdoor advertising are service fees for monitoring and regulating advertising space rather than taxes requiring Parliamentary approval under Article 209 (3) (c). 53.On the second issue, it is submitted that moving branded vehicles utilize county infrastructure such as roads, public amenities and local visibility to gain a commercial advantage, which justifies regulatory charges imposed via the Makueni County Finance Act, 2023. Counsel cites the case of Base Titanium Ltd v County Government of Mombasa [2021] KESC 33 (KLR) to affirm that county governments have the constitutional discretion to impose charges in exchange for public amenities and services. 54.On the third issue of statutory interpretation of Section 3(c)(vi), Counsel for the 6th Respondent argues that Section 3(c)(vi) of the County Outdoor Advertising Control Act (Cap. 276) does not prohibit counties from charging fees on moving vehicles. Instead, that it empowers county governments to lawfully regulate and levy charges on such outdoor advertisements within their jurisdiction. 55.On the fourth issue, it is submitted that Section 19 of the County Outdoor Advertising Control Act requires parties to a dispute to exhaust statutory or alternative dispute resolution mechanisms prior to approaching the High Court. Citing the case of Geoffrey Muthinja v Samuel Mugura Henry [2015] KECA 304 and Speaker of the National Assembly v James Njenga Karume [1992] eKLR, Counsel argues that the Court should decline jurisdiction because the Petitioner prematurely filed the Petition without utilizing the mandatory statutory dispute resolution channels. 56.Counsel argues that the Petition is in breach of pleadings rule. Citing the case of Anarita Karimi Njeru v Republic [1979] KLR 154, Counsel contends that constitutional claims must be pleaded with a high degree of precision. That in this case, the Petitioner failed to provide concrete evidence showing how Makueni County specifically violated Articles 10, 40, 47, 176, 209, or 210 or how his private property was seized or damaged. 57.Counsel for the 6th Respondent submits that it acted entirely within its constitutional and statutory mandate and prays that the High Court dismisses the Petition with costs awarded to the County Government of Makueni. 58.The 9th Respondent, the County Government of Isiolo, filed submissions which are dated 15th December 2025. Counsel cites Chief Justice (Emeritus) Willy Mutunga in Speaker of the Senate & Another v Attorney-General & Others [2013] eKLR and highlights that implementing social, economic and civil rights under the Bill of Rights requires county governments to generate substantial revenue. It is submitted that under Articles 209(2), (3), and (4) read alongside Schedule 4 of the Constitution, counties possess the mandate to impose taxes and service charges within their devolved scope of functions, which explicitly includes outdoor advertising management. 59.Counsel asserts that the Petition has not met the evidentiary standard for petitions, citing the case of Edward Karanja Chogo v County Government of Kakamega [2018] eKLR and argues constitutional petitions require clear, established facts. Counsel also refers to the Hon. Justice Edward Muriithi’s High Court ruling in Base Titanium Ltd v County Government of Mombasa [2017] KEHC 7040 (KLR) and contends that mere claims or proof of tax payments do not establish a violation of Article 209 (5). That a petitioner must strictly prove that the levy was so prohibitive that it damaged national economic policies or prevented businesses from operating. 60.It is further submitted that since the Petitioner withdrew his interlocutory Application dated 5th May 2025, Isiolo County asserts there is no admissible evidence supporting the Petition’s claims against it. That further, Section 3(c)(vi) of the County Outdoor Advertising Control Act exempts a moving vehicle from local advertising levies only if it holds a valid advertising license from another county and in this case, no Inter-County License was provided even through Exhibit CO-41. 61.Counsel points out that the Petitioner failed to produce evidence that the motor vehicles in question KBP 432B, KDG 221P, KDD 051P, and KDM 153C possessed valid licenses from another county prior to applying for branding in Isiolo and consequently, maintains that the 9th Respondent acted lawfully and within its statutory discretion under the Isiolo County Finance Act, 2023 when imposing the Kshs. 20,000 branding fees on those vehicles. 62.Citing Kay Construction Ltd v Eco Bank Kenya Ltd [2015] eKLR and the Supreme Court decision in Jasbir Singh Rai v Tarlochan Singh Rai [2014] eKLR, Counsel for the 9th Respondent submits that costs should follow the event to compensate the successful party. Counsel prays for the entire Petition to be dismissed with costs awarded to the 9th Respondent. 63.The County Government of Nyeri, the 12th Respondent filed submissions dated 28th November 2025 in which Counsel isolates the following 3 issues for determination:i.Whether the impugned outdoor advertising fees constitute a tax requiring Parliamentary approval, or a lawful regulatory charge for services under Article 209(4);ii.Whether the Petitioner qualifies for exemption under Section 3(c)(vi) of the County Outdoor Advertising Control Act; Whether the Petitioner has demonstrated any violation of rights under Articles 39, 40 and 47 of the Constitution;iii.Whether the Petitioner is entitled to the declaratory and injunctive reliefs sought. 64.Counsel submits that under Part 2, Paragraph 3 of the Fourth Schedule, and Article 185(2) of the Constitution, controlling outdoor advertising including on moving vehicles is a devolved function assigned to county assemblies. Citing Article 209(4) of the Constitution and the Supreme Court decision in Base Titanium Ltd v County Government of Mombasa [2021] KESC 33 (KLR), Counsel for Nyeri County Government submits that the fees are lawful regulatory charges for managing public safety, preventing visual clutter and controlling public nuisances, rather than taxes requiring Parliamentary approval. 65.It is submitted that Section 21 of the County Outdoor Advertising Control Act (COACA) explicitly authorizes County Assemblies to pass local legislation and prescribe rate cards for outdoor advertising. This provision, it is submitted, serves as express statutory authorization for the Nyeri County Finance Act, 2023. That under Section 3 (c) (vi) of COACA, a vehicle is exempt from county advertising fees only if it meets two cumulative requirements: - either it is normally employed as a moving vehicle or it holds a valid advertising license from another county. 66.Counsel for the 12th respondent submits that the Petitioner produced no licenses, permits, or registration records showing that any of the subject vehicles held an outdoor advertising license from another county. Counsel for Nyeri County also notes that the annexures initially attached to the Petitioner’s Application of 5th May 2025 were withdrawn by court order on 25th July 2025. That even as described, those documents were mere payment receipts which do not satisfy the statutory requirement of possessing a valid license from another county. 67.It is submitted that the Petition does not meet the requirements of a constitutional threshold of precision as was held in Anarita Karimi Njeru and Mumo Matemu cases. Citing Mbuthia v Kajiado County Government [2023] KEHC 27293 (KLR), Counsel argues that constitutional violations must be pleaded with precision and supported by concrete evidence. That the Petitioner provided no witness statements, detention logs, formal complaints, or contemporaneous records proving that Nyeri County detained vehicles, blocked movement in violation of Article 39, seized property in violation of Article 40 or denied fair administrative action under Article 47 of Constitution. 68.Counsel submits that the Petitioner also tendered no data or financial records proving that Nyeri’s regulatory fee prejudiced national economic policies, cross-county trade, or supply chains under Article 209(5) and asserts that declarations and permanent injunctions require proof of an actual constitutional or statutory breach. It is their submission that restraining the county from exercising its constitutional mandate under Article 209(4) and the Fourth Schedule would impermissibly disrupt county fiscal autonomy and the broader architecture of devolution protected under Articles 6, 174, 175, and 186. 69.Accordingly, the 12th respondent urges this Court to find that the Petition lacks merit and should be dismissed with costs awarded to the 12th Respondent. 70.The 13th Respondent’s (County Government of Kiambu) filed submissions dated 28th November 2025 in which Counsel isolates the following 4 issues for determination:i.Whether the Respondents have constitutional and statutory authority to regulate and impose charges for outdoor advertising including on moving vehicles;ii.Whether Section 3(c)(vi) of the County Outdoor Advertising Control Act, Cap. 276, Laws of Kenya bars the Respondents from imposing charges on branded moving Vehicles;iii.Whether the Respondents’ Finance Acts and revenue measures violate Articles 10, 47, 196, 209 or 210 of the Constitution;iv.Whether the Petitioner has proved any constitutional violation entitling him to the reliefs sought andv.Who should bear the costs of the Petition? 71.Counsel for the 13th Respondent submits that on 25th July 2025, the Petitioner withdrew his interlocutory Application dated 5th May 2025, which thereby withdrew the Supporting Affidavit and all annexed exhibits. As a result, Kiambu County contends that the Petition stands unsupported by any admissible evidence. Counsel submits that under Part 2, Paragraph 3 of the Fourth Schedule of the Constitution, controlling outdoor advertising is a devolved function assigned to County Governments and moving billboards or branded vehicles fall squarely within this function. 72.Counsel further submits that branded moving vehicles utilize county infrastructure and resources such as county roads, street lighting, traffic control, enforcement and public exposure for commercial advantage. Citing the case of Base Titanium Ltd v County Government of Mombasa [2018] KECA 375 (KLR), Counsel emphasizes that "services" include road transport facilities, administrative regulation and infrastructure. 73.It is also submitted that Section 3 (c) (vi) of the County Outdoor Advertising Control Act prevents double licensing so an advertiser does not need a second permit to display an advert in another county, but it does not create a blanket exemption from county regulatory service charges under Article 209(4). 74.It is argued further that allowing a single county where a vehicle is registered to license a moving advertisement while denying all other 46 counties the ability to charge for infrastructure usage, exposure, or enforcement would severely undermine fiscal autonomy under Article 209 and offend Articles 6, 174, and 175 of the Constitution. 75.Counsel also submits that a Finance Act does not automatically expire simply because a new Finance Bill is not enacted within a given financial year. Counsel draws a distinction between the present case and the Nyabuto case cited by the Petitioner stating that it was fact-specific to Nairobi City County’s process and cannot be used broadly to invalidate the fiscal measures or Finance Acts of all 13 Respondent counties. 76.Counsel for Kiambu County government argues that the Public Finance Management Act, 2012 does not make a Tariffs and Pricing Policy a mandatory statutory precondition to passing a Finance Act. It is also submitted that Article 210 of the Constitution governs taxes, whereas the fees in question are service charges under Article 209(4) of the Constitution. 77.Counsel submits that requiring compliance with lawful regulatory measures does not restrict freedom of movement under Article 39. That the Petitioner produced no evidence of property seizure under Article 40 or procedurally unfair administrative decisions under Article 47. 78.Further submission is that the Petitioner failed to present any factual or financial evidence showing that Kiambu’s revenue measures prejudiced national economic policies, cross-county trade, or the movement of goods, labour, or capital. It is also submitted that county legislation carries a presumption of constitutional validity, which the Petitioner failed to rebut. 79.Applying the rule that costs follow the event, Counsel for Kiambu County Government submits that the Petitioner should bear all costs of the Petition for failing to prove any constitutional or statutory breach. The 13th Respondent urges the Court dismisses the Petition with costs. Analysis and Determination 80.I have considered the petition, supporting affidavit, responses and the respective parties’ written submissions. I find the following issues for determination:i.Whether the Court has jurisdiction to determine the petition.ii.Whether the impugned outdoor advertising charges constitute unlawful taxes under Article 210(1) or valid regulatory service charges under Article 209(4) of the Constitution.iii.Whether the Petition is merited and therefore whether the Petitioner is entitled to the declaratory and permanent injunctive reliefs sought. 81.To determine the above issues, this Court also identifies the following ancillary questions:a.Whether the Petition meets the constitutional threshold.b.Whether the respective impugned County Finance Acts are unconstitutional.c.Whether the Petitioner or the persons for whose benefit the petition was filed qualify for exemption under Section 3(c)(vi) of the County Outdoor Advertising Control Act (COACA).d.Whether the Petitioner has established any infringement of constitutional rights under Articles 39, 40, 47, or a violation of Article 209(5) of the Constitution.e.Who should bear the costs? 82.Whenever a jurisdictional question arises, the court must first determine that question because jurisdiction is everything without which a court of law acts in vain. It downs its tools the moment it determines that it has no jurisdiction, the merits of the case notwithstanding. This is the hallowed principle espoused in the locus classicus Owners of Motor Vessel ‘Lilian S’ vs Caltex Oil (Kenya) Ltd [1989] KLR 1 that:30.With that I return to the issue of jurisdiction and to the words of Section 20 (2) (m) of the 1981 Act. I think that it is reasonably plain that a question of jurisdiction ought to be raised at the earliest opportunity and the court seized of the matter is then obliged to decide the issue right away on the material before it. Jurisdiction is everything. Without it, a court has no power to make one more step. Where a court has no jurisdiction, there would be no basis for a continuation of proceedings pending other evidence. A court of law down tools in respect of the matter before it the moment it holds the opinion that it is without jurisdiction. Before I part with this aspect of the appeal, I refer to the following passage which will show that what I have already said is consistent with authority:“By jurisdiction is meant the authority which a court as to decide matters that are litigated before it or to take cognisance of matters presented in a formal way for its decision. The limits of this authority are imposed by the statute, charter, or commission under which the court is constituted, and may be extended or restricted by the like means. If no restriction or limit is imposed the jurisdiction is said to be unlimited. A limitation may be either as to the kind and nature of the actions and matters of which the particular court has cognisance, or as to the area over which the jurisdiction shall extend, or it may partake of both these characteristics. If the jurisdiction of an inferior court or tribunal (including an arbitrator) depends on the existence of a particular state of facts, the court or tribunal must inquire into the existence of the facts in order to decide whether it has jurisdiction; but, except where the court or tribunal has been given power to determine conclusively whether the facts exist. Where a court takes it upon itself to exercise a jurisdiction which it does not possess, its decision amounts to nothing. Jurisdiction must be acquired before judgement is given”See Words and Phrases Legally defined – Volume 3: I – N Page 11331.It is for that reason that a question of jurisdiction once raised by a party or by a court on its own motion must be decided forthwith on the evidence before the court. It is immaterial whether the evidence is scanty or limited. Scanty or limited facts constitute the evidence before the court. A party who fails to question the jurisdiction of a court may not be heard to raise the issue after the matter is heard and determined.32.I can see no grounds why a question of jurisdiction could not be raised during the proceedings. As soon as that is done, the court should hear and dispose of that issue without further ado.” 83.The above case was decided before the promulgation of the Constitution of Kenya, 2010. However, post 2010 court decisions have followed the reasoning and provided justification and rationale for the doctrine under the 2010 Constitution. The Court of Appeal provided the Constitutional rationale and basis for the doctrine in Geoffrey Muthinja Kabiru & 2 Others v Samuel Munga Henry & 1756 Others (Civil Appeal 10 of 2015) [2015] KECA 304 (KLR) (30 October 2015) (Judgment) where it stated that: -“It is imperative that where a dispute resolution mechanism exists outside courts, the same be exhausted before the jurisdiction of the Courts is invoked. Courts ought to be fora of last resort and not the first port of call the moment a storm brews…. The exhaustion doctrine is a sound one and serves the purpose of ensuring that there is a postponement of judicial consideration of matters to ensure that a party is first of all diligent in the protection of his own interest within the mechanisms in place for resolution outside the courts...These accords with Article 159 of the Constitution which commands Courts to encourage alternative means of dispute resolution." 84.The High Court in a three Judge bench in Names Expunged (Suing on their behalf and on behalf of the Mui Coal Basin Local Community) & 15 others v Permanent Secretary Ministry of Energy & 6 others; Fenxi Mining Industry Company Ltd & 11 others (Interested Parties) (Constitutional Petition 305 of 2012 & 34 of 2013 & 12 of 2014 (Consolidated)) [2015] KEHC 473 (KLR) (18 September 2015) (Judgment) stated the rationale for the doctrine of exhaustion follows: -“The reasoning is based on the sound Constitutional policy embodied in Article 159 of the Constitution: that of a matrix dispute resolution system in the country. Our Constitution creates a policy that requires that courts respect the principle of fitting the fuss to the forum even while creating what Supreme Court Justice J B. Ojwang’ has felicitously called an “Ascendant Judiciary.” The Constitution does not create an Imperial Judiciary zealously fuelled by tenets of legal-centrism and a need to legally cognize every social, economic or financial problem in spite of the availability of better-suited mechanisms for comprehending and dealing with the issues entailed. Instead, the Constitution creates a Constitutional preference for other mechanisms for dispute resolution – including statutory regimes – in certain cases..." 85.On jurisdiction of the Court, The Supreme Court in Samuel Kamau Macharia & another v Kenya commercial Bank & 2 others, SC Application No 2 of 2011; [2012] eKLR, held that a court’s jurisdiction emanates from the Constitution or statute or both. The apex court held as follows with respect to the issue of jurisdiction: -“68.A Court’s jurisdiction flows from either the Constitution or legislation or both. Thus, a Court of law can only exercise jurisdiction as conferred by the constitution or other written law. It cannot arrogate to itself jurisdiction exceeding that which is conferred upon it by law. We agree with counsel for the first and second respondents in his submission that the issue as to whether a Court of law has jurisdiction to entertain a matter before it, is not one of mere procedural technicality; it goes to the very heart of the matter, for without jurisdiction, the Court cannot entertain any proceedings. This Court dealt with the question of jurisdiction extensively in, In the Matter of the Interim Independent Electoral Commission (Applicant), Constitutional Application Number 2 of 2011. Where the Constitution exhaustively provides for the jurisdiction of a Court of law, the Court must operate within the constitutional limits. It cannot expand its jurisdiction through judicial craft or innovation. Nor can Parliament confer jurisdiction upon a Court of law beyond the scope defined by the Constitution. Where the Constitution confers power upon Parliament to set the jurisdiction of a Court of law or tribunal, the legislature would be within its authority to prescribe the jurisdiction of such a court or tribunal by statute law.” 86.The 6th Respondent, the County Government of Makueni in its Replying Affidavit and submissions cites Section 19 of County Outdoor Advertising Control Act (COACA) and argues that the Petition is premature and should be dismissed because the Petitioner bypassed mandatory statutory dispute resolution mechanisms set out in that Section 19 of the Act, before approaching the Court. In other words, the 6th respondent raises the issue of jurisdiction relating to the doctrine of exhaustion. 87.It is trite that where the Constitution or statute confers jurisdiction upon a tribunal, person or body or any authority, that jurisdiction must be exercised in accordance with the Constitution or statute and must first be exhausted before the parties can move the Court under the doctrine of exhaustion. This was held by the Court of Appeal in Secretary County Public Service Board & another v Hulbhai Gedi Abdille [2017] eKLR thus: -“Time and again it has been said that where there exists other sufficient and adequate avenue or forum to resolve a dispute, a party ought to pursue that avenue or forum and not invoke the court process if the dispute could very well and effectively be dealt with in that other forum. Such party ought to seek redress under the other regime.” 88.Similarly, in Speaker of the National Assembly v Karume [1992] KECA 42 (KLR), the Court of Appeal stated as follows: -“In our view, there is considerable merit in the submission that where there is a clear procedure for the redress of any particular grievance prescribed by the Constitution or an Act of Parliament, that procedure should be strictly followed. We observe without expressing a concluded view that order 53 of the Civil Procedure Rules cannot oust clear constitutional and statutory provisions.” 89.I have considered the provisions of Section 19 of the COACA which provides that:19.Dispute resolution1.The National government, a county government or any other person who is a party to a dispute arising under this Act shall take reasonable measures to resolve the dispute by alternative dispute resolution before resorting to judicial proceedings.2.A party is considered to have taken reasonable measures to resolve a dispute by alternative dispute resolution if such a party—a.notifies the other party of the issues that are in dispute and offering to settle them;b.responds appropriately to a notification under paragraph (a);c.provides relevant information and documents to the other party to enable that party understand the issues and determine the best approach to take in responding to the issues; ord.where an alternative dispute resolution mechanism is agreed to —i.collaborates with the other party in determining the person to facilitate resolution of the dispute; andii.attends the alternative dispute resolution process. 90.The Petitioner challenges the fees, charges, or levies allegedly imposed by the Respondents County Governments on outdoor advertisements displayed on or in moving motor vehicles operating within the respective jurisdictions of the respondent county governments. 91.Simply put, the Petition directly challenges the legality, applicability and administration of fees, taxes, cess and charges levied on advertisements displayed on moving motor vehicles across different counties. That is the basis upon which the petitioner seeks to have the respective finance Acts of the respective County Governments to be declared unconstitutional for want of public participation and that there is therefore no basis for levying the charges or fees complained of without legislative basis. 92.The long title to the COACA shows that it is An Act of Parliament to provide for a legal framework for the regulation of outdoor advertisement in the counties; and for connected purposes. The scope of the Act encompasses licensing requirements, application procedures, safety and amenity considerations, inspections, renewals, revocations, and county-level rate card enactments. 93.Under the Act, particularly Section 19, resolvable disputes include any dispute arising under the provisions of the Act between national or county governments and private entities such as grievances over licensing decisions, fee assessments, advertisement revocations or removals, compliance and inter-county advertising exemptions, which parties are statutorily required to attempt resolving through Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) prior to instituting judicial proceedings. 94.Based on the foregoing, The Petitioner’s grievances and in particular the charges complained of as being unconstitutional entail issues that are grounded in and regulated under the statute, being the County Outdoor Advertising Control Act (COACA). The core argument in this Petition fundamentally arises under this Act and is capable of resolution through the provisions of Section 19. 95.This is so, because, Section 19(1) of the Act enlists parties to a dispute as the National Government, a County Government or any other person. In this case, the Petitioner, a private person initiated this Petition against 13 County Governments. Section 19 explicitly governs dispute resolution between these exact parties. 96.Secondly, Section 19(1) states in mandatory terms that a party shall take reasonable measures to resolve the dispute by alternative dispute resolution before resorting to judicial proceedings. Under the section, all that the petitioner is expected to do is to demonstrate that he took reasonable measures to have the dispute resolved by alternative means other than court action prior to initiating judicial proceedings. 97.The Doctrine of Exhaustion is anchored in Article 159(2)(c) of the Constitution which mandate Courts and Tribunals to promote alternative forms of dispute resolution including reconciliation, mediation, arbitration, conciliation, as long as the modes are not inconsistent with the Constitution, are not repugnant to justice and morality or contravene the Bill of Rights. 98.More recently, the Supreme Court in the Supreme Court in NGOs Co-ordination Board v EG & 4 others; Katiba Institute (Amicus Curiae) (Petition 16 of 2019) (2023) KESC 17 (KLR) held that: -“86.…In this country, it is now firmly established law that in cases where there is an alternative dispute resolution mechanism established by legislation, the courts must exercise restraint in exercising their jurisdiction and accord deference to such dispute resolution bodies under the doctrine of exhaustion….In the case of Albert Chaurembo Mumba & 7 others v Maurice Munyao & 148 others SC Petition No 3 of 2016; [2019] eKLR we underscored the need for the relevant person, bodies, tribunals and any other quasi-judicial authorities and organs to be given the first opportunity to deal with disputes as provided for in the relevant parent statute. In the case of United Millers Limited v. Kenya Bureau of Standards, Director, Directorate of Criminal Investigations & 5 others, SC petition (application) No 4 of 2021; [2021] eKLR we were emphatic that the courts must exercise restraint in exercising their jurisdiction conferred by the Constitution and must give deference to the dispute resolution bodies established by statutes with the mandate to deal with such specific disputes in the first instance.87.This is further firmly rooted in Article 159 of the Constitution which requires the courts to promote alternative dispute resolution mechanisms. The moment a storm begins to brew; courts should not be the first port of call but rather the final resort. Before using the court's jurisdiction, it is essential to exhaust any available alternative dispute resolution options. The exhaustion doctrine serves the purpose of ensuring that there is a postponement of judicial consideration of matters to ensure that a party is, first of all, diligent in the protection of his interests within the mechanisms in place for resolution outside the courts. The exhaustion doctrine acts as a safeguard to delay judicial consideration of cases to ensure that a party is vigilant in protecting his interests within the channels available for dispute settlement methods. In this way, the doctrine serves to promote an efficient justice system and an autonomous administrative state.” (Emphasis added) 99.In this case, there is no evidence that prior to initiating these proceedings, the petitioner attempted to invoke section 19 of the Act to have what he considered to be the dispute between him and the 13 respondent County governments resolved through alternative dispute resolution means. Instead, he proceeded at the onset to file the present Constitutional Petition without attempting alternative dispute resolution mechanisms. There is no evidence that he even issued formal settlement notifications or exchanged relevant documentation with the county governments as outlined in Section 19(2) of the Act. 100.This Court is aware that to every rule, there are exceptions to every rule and as was stated in the Abidha Nicholus v the AG and 7 Others, Supreme Court Petition No. E007 of 2023 and KRA v. Darasa Investments Ltd, Civil Appeal No. 24 of 2018, the mere presence of alternative remedies does not bar court access especially when constitutional interpretation is required and alternative remedies are inadequate. In this case, however, the Petitioner failed to demonstrate exceptional circumstances that rendered Section 19 ineffective. Examining the arguments raised by the Petitioner, I am not satisfied that it was necessary for him to seek constitutional redress and pray for declarations seeking to invalidate the various county government Finance Acts for want of constitutionality when his core grievance is that of collection of the levies and charges which dispute could be addressed through other legal channels as espoused in Article 159(2) (c) of the Constitution and as provided for in section 19(1) of the COACA. 101.I further find that the Petitioner has framed his grievance as a constitutional petition alleging violations of fundamental rights in Articles 39, 40, 47 and fiscal principles under Articles 209 and 210 of the Constitution. However, courts are replete with decisions which have warned against parties construing ordinary statutory or regulatory grievances as constitutional grievances merely to bypass statutory dispute resolution mechanisms such as Section 19 of COACA. 102.The principle of constitutional avoidance was expounded on by the Supreme Court in Communications Commission of Kenya & 5 Others vs Royal Media Service Limited & 5 Others (2014) eKLR.“(256)The appellants in this case are seeking to invoke the “principle of avoidance”, also known as “constitutional avoidance”. The principle of avoidance entails that a Court will not determine a constitutional issue, when a matter may properly be decided on another basis. In South Africa, in S v. Mhlungu, 1995 (3) SA 867 (CC) the Constitutional Court Kentridge AJ, articulated the principle of avoidance in his minority Judgment as follows [at paragraph 59]:“I would lay it down as a general principle that where it is possible to decide any case, civil or criminal, without reaching a constitutional issue, that is the course which should be followed.”(257)Similarly the U.S. Supreme Court has held that it would not decide a constitutional question which was properly before it, if there was also some other basis upon which the case could have been disposed of (Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 297 U.S. 288, 347 (1936)).” 103.Additionally, in Lugo v Director of Public Prosecutions [2022] KEHC 10574 (KLR) the Court observed as follows:“Courts will not normally consider a constitutional question unless the existence of a remedy depends on it; if a remedy is available to an applicant under some other legislative provision or on some other basis, whether legal or factual, a court will usually decline to determine whether there has been, in addition, a breach of the Declaration of rights. Currie and de Waal opine that the principle of constitutional avoidance is of crucial importance in the application of the Bill of Rights. The author states: -“When applying the Bill of Rights in a legal dispute, the principle of avoidance is of crucial importance. As we have seen, the Bill of Rights always applies in a legal dispute. It is usually capable of direct or indirect application and, in a limited number of cases, of indirect application only. The availability of direct application is qualified by the principle that the Bill of Rights should not be applied directly in a legal dispute unless it is necessary to do so.”11.An important and critical issue arises from the above statements by Currie and de Waal. It is a fact that every legal dispute is capable of either direct or indirect application of the Bill of Rights. Every dispute is essentially a constitutional issue when one looks at it. This arises necessarily because of the principle of constitutional supremacy. One needs to be aware, however, of the singleness of the legal system. This is embodied in the fact that the supremacy of the Constitution does not detract from the usefulness of the rest of the body of law. In essence, all other laws give full expression to the ideals of the Constitution until found to be inconsistent with it.….The exceptions to the application of the doctrine of constitutional avoidance are: -i.Where the constitutional violation is so clear and of direct relevance to the matter,ii.In the absence of an apparent alternative form of ordinary relief andiii.Where it is found that it would be a waste of effort to seek a non-constitutional resolution of the dispute.” 104.In C O D & another vs Nairobi City Water & Sewerage Co. Ltd [2015] KEHC 7762 (KLR), the Court stated as follows:“11.Similarly, in Papinder Kaur Atwal -vs- Manjit Singh Amrit Nairobi Petition No. 236 of 2011where after considering several authorities on the issue, Justice Lenaola remarked as follows:“All the authorities above would point to the fact that the constitution is a solemn document, and should not be a substitute for remedying emotional personal questions or mere control of excesses within administrative processes….. I must add the following; Our Bill of Rights is robust. It has been hailed as one of the best in any Constitution in the World. Our Courts must interpret it [with] all the liberalism they can marshall. However, not every pain can be addressed through the Bill of Rights and alleged violation thereof.” (Emphasis added)12.The Supreme Court of India has also held that ordinary remedies available under common law and statutes must be pursued in the ordinary manner or as provided under statute. For instance, in Re Application by Bahadur[1986] LRC (Const) the Court expressed itself as follows at page 307;“The Courts have said time and again that where infringements of rights are alleged which can be founded in a claim under substantive law, the proper course is to bring the claim under such law and not under the Constitution. This case highlights the un-wisdom of ignoring that advice.... The Constitution sets out to declare in general terms the fundamental concepts of justice and right that should guide and inform the law and the actions of men. While an infringement of the Constitution might in certain cases give rise to the redress provided for at section 14, yet, as has been proclaimed by the highest Court in the land, it is not, “a general substitute for the normal procedures for invoking judicial control of administrative action.” (See Harrikissoon v A-G [1979] 3 WLR 62).13.It was further observed in the case of Minister of Home Affairs vs Bickle & Others (1985) LRC Const (per (Georges C.J):“Courts will not normally consider a constitutional question unless the existence of a remedy depends on it; if a remedy is available to an applicant under some other legislative provision or on some other basis, whether legal or factual, a Court will usually decline to determine whether there has been in addition a breach of the Declaration of Rights.” 105.In line with the above judicial pronouncements, it is clear that the Petitioner’s failure to invoke Section 19 of the County Outdoor Advertising Control Act (COACA) violates three other constitutional doctrines which are constitutional avoidance, ripeness and justiciability. 106.Under the doctrine of constitutional avoidance, as exemplified from the above cited decisions, this Court is precluded from assuming constitutional jurisdiction over statutory or administrative disputes that have not matured or can be handled through established statutory mechanisms. The Constitutional Court in South Africa in S v. Mhlungu, 1995 (3) SA 867 (CC) addressed the principle of avoidance in Kentridge AJ’s minority Judgment as follows [at paragraph 59]:“I would lay it down as a general principle that where it is possible to decide any case, civil or criminal, without reaching a constitutional issue, that is the course which should be followed.” 107.The Petitioner raised the issue of exemptions under Section 3 (c) (vi) of the County Outdoor Advertising Control Act. He also produced, as part of his evidence, invoices and receipts in CO-16 to CO-76 showing fees levied on owners of moving branded vehicles as proof of the allegedly unconstitutional levies imposed by the Respondents. 108.It is the view of this Court that the proper channel for redress would have been for the Petitioner to utilize Section 19’s Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) mechanism and approach the Respondents with a view to resolving the issue of whether a specific vehicle met the statutory criteria for exemption under Section 3(c)(vi) of the Act as opposed to filing a constitutional petition alleging violations of Articles 39, 40, 47, 209, and 210 of the Constitution. 109.As stated in the above cited judicial pronouncements, the doctrine of Constitutional Avoidance impedes this Court’s jurisdiction to hear, determine and declare county revenue laws unconstitutional when the grievance can be settled through the ADR as provided for under Section 19 or through the standard statutory interpretation. 110.Alongside the doctrine of Constitutional Avoidance is the Doctrine of Ripeness which is pegged on the progress of a matter and the timing of judicial intervention. A case is ripe for judicial determination only when the underlying injury has fully materialized, concrete administrative steps have been taken and statutory remedies have been exhausted. It is primarily designed to avoid premature judicial intervention. 111.Thirdly, Justiciability relates to whether a matter is appropriate for judicial resolution by a court of law. A dispute is non-justiciable if it either belongs to a specialized statutory forum, if it seeks declarations without an underlying live controversy or if it interferes with matters reserved for executive or legislative discretion such as policy formulation, prior to administrative exhaustion. 112.In Faraj & 3 others v Police & 2 others [2022] KEHC 287 (KLR), the High Court explained these three intertwined doctrines and held thus:“…the doctrine of ripeness and the doctrine of avoidance. Like res judicata or the doctrine of exhaustion, these two doctrines can preclude a court from entertaining a case. Constitutional avoidance has been defined as a preference for deciding a case on any basis other than one which involves a constitutional issue being resolved. As a principle, constitutional avoidance has been linked to the doctrine of justiciability. In broad terms, justiciability governs the limitations on the constitutional arguments that the courts will entertain. It encompasses three main principles: standing, ripeness, and mootness. The avoidance doctrine was fortified in Sports and Recreation Commission v Sagittarius Wrestling Club and Anor. …” 113.In other words, these doctrines prevent courts from entangling themselves in abstract or premature controversies before administrative agencies or statutory bodies have had a chance to render a final decision. 114.As already established above, Section 19(2) of COACA outlines clear processes for raising and resolving a dispute relating the county outdoor advertising. By failing to adhere to Section 19, the Petitioner elevated his grievance into a Constitution dispute for determination by this Court before allowing the County Governments to formally review specific vehicle exemptions, evaluate licenses or reach an administrative resolution. 115.The prematurity of the Petition is further underscored by the fact that there was no admissible evidence of actual detentions on record or double-licensing or financial harm. I find that the dispute brought by the Petitioner is not ripe. 116.As contended by the 12th and 13th Respondents, I find that this Court cannot issue declarations and permanent injunctions barring all 13 counties from charging moving advertisements in the absence of proof and jurisdictional authority, when in particular, such a decision has the effect of disrupting county fiscal autonomy. 117.In other words, since this petition involves issues relating to policy and multi-county fiscal disputes which the Petitioner has not attempted to seek redress on from the existing statutory channels under Section 19 of the COACA, I find that the Petition is non-justiciable and procedurally premature. 118.In the premises, this Court finds that it is bereft of jurisdiction to further determine the other merit issues raised and the ancillary questions arising from the merit issues framed above, which issues for determination are now moot for want of jurisdiction. Accordingly, the Petition dated 5th May, 2025 is dismissed. 119.Each party shall bear their own costs of the petition. 120.This file is closed. 121.Orders accordingly. DATED, SIGNED AND DELIVERED VIRTUALLY AT NAIROBI THIS 3RD DAY OF AUGUST, 2026R.E. ABURILIJUDGE