Okwiri v Kenya School of Law & another (Tribunal Appeal E012 of 2026) [2026] KELEAT 24 (KLR) (25 March 2026) (Judgment)

 # REPUBLIC OF KENYA IN THE TRIBUNAL OF KENYA AT NAIROBI COUNTY COURT NAME: LEGAL EDUCATION APPEALS TRIBUNAL CASE NUMBER: LEAA/E012/2026 BENSON VS KENYA SCHOOL OF LAW AND COUNCIL OF LEGAL EDUCATION # JUDGMENT **A. INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND** 1. The Appellant, **BENSON OKWIRI,** instituted this appeal before this tribunal against the **Kenya School of Law** as the respondent and **the Council of Legal Education** as interested party, vide a memorandum of appeal dated January 20th 2026, seeking the following orders; * + 1. The Honorable Tribunal be pleased to set aside the decision of theDirector/Chief Executive Officer of the Kenya School of Law dated 31 December 2025. 2. The Honorable Tribunal be pleased to substitute the decision withan order admitting the Appellant to the Advocates Training Programme for the 2026/2027 Academic Year. 3. The Honorable Tribunal be pleased to award the costs of this appealto the Appellant. 4. The Honorable Tribunal be pleased to grant any other relief the Tribunal may deem just and equitable. 1. The appeal is premised on the following grounds: 1. THAT the Director/Chief Executive Officer of the Kenya School ofLaw erred in law and fact in denying the Appellant admission to the Advocates Training Programme the 2026/2027 Academic Year despite the Appellant having met admission requirements for LLB Programme which he qualified for and was awarded the degree. 2. THAT the decision by the Director/Chief Executive Officer of theKenya School of Law did not cite the legal basis upon which the determination was made. If the Director/Chief Executive Officer of the Kenya School of Law was to do so, he would quickly realize that his decision cannot stand scrutiny going by the recent binding judicial precedent set by the Court of Appeal and this Honorable Tribunal in **Stephen Nikita Otinga v Cabinet Secretary & 3 Other, Civil Appeal E625 OF 2023** and **Tribunal Case E009 of 2024) [2025] KELEAT 1 (KLR).** 3. THAT the decision by the Director/Chief Executive Officer of theKenya School of Law failed to properly consider all Applicant's academic qualifications and supporting documentation submitted by the Appellant. The fact is that thirty-four years ago the Applicant scored a mean grade of B- in KCSE, with a C- in English and B- in Kiswahili, which enabled him to proceed for his first BSc degree and consequently his MA degree at the University of Nairobi. He recently qualified for an LLB degree from the University of London and is currently concluding his LLM degree program at the University of Nairobi. 4. THAT the Appellant holds a Bachelor of Laws degree from a foreignuniversity duly recognized by the Commission for University Education (CUE) and CLE. Furthermore, having successfully attended a Pre-Kenya School of Law program at Riara University as directed by the Council of Legal Education, he was deemed duly qualified for admission to the ATP. 5. THAT the impugned decision is procedurally unfair, unreasonable,and contrary to Article 47 of the Constitution of Kenya that mandates a fair administrative action. 6. THAT the Director/Chief Executive Officer of the Kenya School ofLaw misinterpreted and/or misapplied the relevant provisions of the Legal Education Act (Section 8 (3)) and the Advocates Act (Section 13 (1 (a-c)). 7. THAT the decision violated the Appellant's legitimate expectationarising from the recent decision of the Court of Appeal in **Stephen Nikita Ottinga v Cabinet Secretary & 3 Other, Civil Appeal E625 of 2023** which rendered any requirements for admission into the ATP at KSL, specifically based on Section 16, as read together with Paragraph 1 of the second schedule of the KSL Act, unlawful. 8. THAT the decision by the Director/Chief Executive Officer of theKenya School of Law was irrational, disproportionate, and not supported by the evidence on record, thus unlawful. 2. The Respondent subsequently filed its Replying Affidavit, sworn byLawrence Ndirangu, an Academic Services Officer at the Respondent institution, dated 3rd February 2026. The Respondent averred that matters concerning admission to its Advocates Training Programme are exclusively governed by Section 16 of the Kenya School of Law Act, Cap 16C. The Respondent also challenged the Tribunal’s jurisdiction to adjudicate on the matter, arguing that its jurisdiction is limited to disputes arising under the Legal Education Act, 2012. 3. The Interested party filed its Replying Affidavit, sworn by Prof. Busalile,Jack Mwimali, dated 5th February, 2026. The Interested Party averred that its statutory mandate under the Legal Education Act, Cap 16B, includes establishing standards for legal education and that Kenyan courts have consistently affirmed its regulatory authority in such matters. The Interested Party further deponed that it is in full compliance with the Court of Appeal decision in ***Otinga & Others***, and is currently exercising its mandate through a lawful, participatory rule-making process to develop new ATP regulations. The Interested Party stated that the Appellant made an application to the Interested Party seeking recognition and approval of his Bachelor of Laws (LLB) Degree that he had obtained from the University of London. The Interested Party further stated that the Appellant had initially been advised to undertake a remedial program since he had not covered some core units envisaged by **Part II of the Second Schedule of the Legal Education Act**, for his University of London LLB, which he completed, leading to the subsequent recognition and approval of his degree qualifications. 4. The Interested Party maintained that it is the statutory body best placed todetermine whether a candidate's qualifications meet the minimum legal requirements, and that its conduct in developing regulations through stakeholder engagement epitomizes the constitutional values of rule of law, good governance, and transparency. **B. SUBMISSION BY PARTIES** **Appellant Submissions** 1. The Appellant in his written submissions dated 13th February 2026, he claims that the Respondent’s letter dated 31st December 2025 declining its admission for the Advocates Training Program (ATP) for the Academic year 2026/2027 was unlawful and lacked legal basis in light of the Court of Appeal decision **Otinga & Others.** 2. The Appellant alleges that he scored a mean grad of B- (MINUS) in KCSE,with a C- (MINIS) in English and a B- (MINUS) in Kiswahili, which enabled him to proceed for his Bachelor of Science degree at The University of Nairobi and consequently his Master of Arts degree from the same university in 2006. He further states that he qualified for many other qualifications including a Post Graduate Diploma from the University of Cape Town, and that he currently undertaking an LLM program at the University of Nairobi. 3. The Appellant has raised three issues for determination 4. On the first issue of the jurisdiction of this Honorable Tribunal, theAppellant submitted that it has jurisdiction to hear and determine the matter. To support his arguments, the Appellant relied on previous decisions of the Tribunal including **Tribunal Case E009/2024 [2025] KELEAT**, paragraphs 34, 35 and 36**.** 5. On the second issue on the law governing admission to the Respondent’sATP, the Appellant relied on the Court of Appeal decision in **Otinga & others** where the superior court found that the admission criteria in section 16 as read with paragraph 1 of the Second Schedule of the Kenya School of Law Act were in conflict with section 8(3)(c) of the Legal Education Act, and was therefore unconstitutional, null and void. The Appellant further cited this Tribunal’s decision in ***Wanjiru v Kenya School of Law & another (Appeal E009 of 2024)*** where this tribunal recognized the implications of the superior court’s decision. 6. The Appellant argued further that the Respondent lacks legal authority tosubmit him to an admission criteria that was declared unconstitutional by the Court of Appeal in **Otinga & another.** He further contended that he is qualified for admission by virtue of hid LLB degree, duly recognized by the respondent, and the provision of section 8(3) of the Legal Education Act and section 13 of the Advocates Act. 7. On the third issue on whether he is qualified for admission to ATP, theAppellant reiterated that he is qualified having obtained an LLB degree from a foreign institution, which was subsequently recognized by the Interested party. He further argues that he has obtained several other qualifications including an ongoing LLM program at the University of Nairobi. The Appellant further invited this Honorable Tribunal to take judicial notice on new developments in common law jurisdictions such as Canada and the United States which provide alternative entry pathways for individuals seeking to pursue a legal career where they hold an undergraduate degree from in any discipline. **Respondet’s Submissions** 1. The Respondent, in its submissions, presented four issues before thisTribunal for determination 2. The First issue raised by the Respondent contends that the Tribunal doesnot have the jurisdiction over a matter that is outside the scope of the Legal Education Act as expressly conferred by Section 31 of the Act and the effect of this limitation of jurisdiction is to render the Tribunal’s role in this matter void, the law cannot countenance a situation where a Tribunal’s powers are not circumscribed by the parent statute. To buttress this position, the Respondent relied on the following authorities: ***Article 159*** of **The Constitution of Kenya 2010, Legal Education Act 2012** which states in **Section 31(1),** ***Society of Kenya v Centre for Human Rights and Democracy & 13 others [2013] eKLR, Bakeries Limited vs. Rent Restriction Tribunal and Kiriti Raval Nairobi HCMCC No. 246 of 1981; and Ex Parte Mayfair Bakeries Limited vs. Rent Restriction Tribunal and Kirit Raval, Nairobi HCMCC No. 246 of1981, Owners of the Motor Vessel “Lillian S” vs. Caltex Oil (Kenya) Ltd [1989] eKLR, Samuel Kamau Macharia case.*** They submit that Section 30 flows from section 29 which established LEAT, spells out its purpose and specifies the membership and crucially, section 31 grants the Tribunal jurisdiction on any matter relating to this Act, and that it is clear that these sections do not expressly confer upon Tribunal power to adjudicate matters that are outside the scope of the LEA 2012. 3. The Respondent contends that the process of and admission to theRespondent’s Advocates Training Programme (ATP) is exclusively provided for under section 16 of the Kenya School of Law Act No. 26 of 2012 and is further required by its establishing act; the Kenya School of Law Act, to consider applications for admission to the ATP and once satisfied that the applicant is qualified, admit the applicant to the School which is provided in section 17 of the Kenya School of Law Act. 4. The Respondent claims that the Appellant have by their own admissioncomplied with sub section 17(1) but have moved this tribunal to effectively arrogate the duty and powers of the respondent provided in 17(2). 5. The Respondent claims that the Appellant’s appeal essentially asks for theTribunal to grant him admission to the school and thereby arrogate the statutory duties of the school and relies in the case of ***Kenya Pipeline Company Limited vs. Hyosung Ebara Company Limited & 2 others*** ***[2012] eKLR.*** They further submit that the question of the jurisdiction of this Tribunal in matters of admission criteria was most recently considered by the ***Honourable Justice Andayi in HCCA/E002/2023 Kenya School Of Law Vs Isaiah Munoru Mucheke.*** 1. For the Second issue, on whether there was a double standard inadmission qualifications and whether the criteria were discriminatory or justifiable, the Respondent submitted that it is a rule of practice to adhere to the ordinary meaning of words used in legal provisions. The Respondent invited the Tribunal to avoid the consequences of a literal interpretation of the wording of a statute when such an interpretation would lead to a manifest absurdity or to a result that is obnoxious to principles of public policy, in this instance, unfair discrimination. In support of this position, the Respondent cited ***Court of Appeal in NRB Civil Appeal No. E472 of 2021.*** 2. Additionally, the Respondent contends that no legitimate expectation hadbeen created in favor of the Appellant. 3. On whether the procedure to refuse admission was illegal or unreasonable,the Respondent submits that its actions were in line with Article 47(1) of the Constitution, which guarantees the right to fair administrative action. 4. On whether academic progression is applicable to the Appellant, theRespondent submits that the Appellant does not qualify to be admitted to the Advocates Training Programme (ATP) by reason of academic progression because the applicable law, which is the Kenya School of Law Act 2012, as amended by Statute Law Miscellaneous Amendments Act (No. 18 of 2014) does not provide for academic progression. 5. The Respondent cites the case **in Civil Appeal E625 of 2023 Stephen Otinga Nikita V The Cabinet Secretary, Ministry Of Education & 3 Others** where they submit that the Court of Appeal directed the Interested Party to enact regulations to establish and govern ATP programmes including the Respondent’s program. The Respondent claims that the regulatory bodies set minimum standards and the regulated bodies are obliged to comply with the minimum standards established, but are not barred from setting higher standards for themselves and is demonstrated by the fact that the Interested Party has allowed legal education providers to set their own criteria for admission into undergraduate law programmes. The Respondent urges the Tribunal to take judicial notice of the fact that that The Court of Appeal having affirmed the Respondent’s right to determine its own admission criteria in Civil Appeal E 472 0f 2021, could not have intended to completely cripple the operations of the school including paralegal Training and Continuing Professional Development which also admit under the provisions of section 16 as read with the second schedule. They claim that it could not have been the intention of the court to effectively disband the school’s programmes causing its mandate to be unachievable and we humbly urge the Tribunal to contextualize the two decisions of the court of Appeal on the issue of the Respondent’s admission criteria. **Interested Party’s Submissions** 1. The Interested Party has raised 4 issues in their submissions. 2. On the First issue, the Interested Party submits that they acknowledge thebinding authority of the Court of Appeal's decision in **Otinga case (supra),** which declared Section 16 and the Second Schedule of the Kenya School of Law Act CAP 16C unconstitutional. They claim that the legal effect of this nullification is precise and specific: it removed the Kenya Certificate of Secondary Education (KCSE) mean grade and specific subject grades as a mandatory qualification, a stand-alone filter for admission to the Advocates Training Programme (ATP). They submit that this nullification, however, was not a blanket invalidation of all admission criteria, nor did it constitute a positive order to admit any particular candidate. Its effect was to delete one unconstitutional barrier, not to automatically construct a bridge over all remaining regulatory requirements for every applicant. They further claim that Appellant KCSE results can no longer be cited as a lawful basis for exclusion and corrects a historical injustice in the pplication process and that removal of an invalid disqualifier merely returns the Appellant to the starting line of the evaluation process; it does not award her the finish line and he must still, like every other candidate, affirmatively satisfy all other valid and extant requirements prescribed by the law. 3. They contend that the Court of Appeal's Judgement addressed an unfairpre-tertiary academic barrier; it did not and could not touch upon the legitimate tertiary-level curricular standards necessary to ensure a candidate possesses the foundational knowledge to succeed in the intensive ATP. 4. Interested Party argues that the legal effect of the nullification is toredirect the focus of the inquiry from an irrelevant secondary school grade to the relevant post-secondary school curriculum. Accordingly, the issue before the Tribunal reframed from whether the Appellant attained a Grade C+ in KCSE? to whether the Appellant undertake a relevant progression Diploma in Law. The Interested Party maintains that the Appellant’s case failed on this issue, as he had not placed before the Tribunal sufficient evidence to this new, proper question in the affirmative. 5. Interested Party submits that the Appellant’s argument erroneouslyassumed that the nullification of the KCSE clause invalidated the entirety of the Respondent’s decision-making process, thereby creating a legal vacuum that ought to be resolved in the Appellant’s favour. They contend that this assumption is fundamentally misconceived. Interested Party argued that, as a matter of administrative law, where a decision is founded on multiple grounds, and one ground is subsequently found to be unlawful, the decision maker or reviewing tribunal is entitled to sustain the decision on any other lawful and evidentially supported ground. In this regard, the Interested Party maintains that a valid and independent ground existed, namely the Appellant’s failure to demonstrate sufficient compliance with the requirements for attaining a Diploma. 6. According to the Interested Party the judgment protected the Appellant'sright to be considered without reference to her KCSE and it did not guarantee her admission, nor did it absolve her of the duty to prove she meets the professional and educational standards that lawfully remain. It was submitted that the legal effect of the Court of Appeal's nullification is purely eliminative. It removed a specific, unjust obstacle, and it did not create a new entitlement, nor did it alter the fundamental architecture of legal education prerequisites. 7. They claim that the Appellant's case is fundamentally unsupported byevidence. They contend that the Appellant was inviting the Tribunal to make a finding of statutory compliance in an evidential vacuum, which the Tribunal could not lawfully do. The Interested Party maintains that the only logical, lawful, and just conclusion is that the Appellant has failed to discharge the burden of proving her Diploma meets the core curriculum requirements. On that basis, and independently of the nullified KCSE issue, the Interested Party urged that the Appeal is without merit, and should be dismissed with costs. 8. In the second issue on whether the Academic Progression is relevant to thelaw, the Tribunal was invited to be guided by the binding precedent of the ***Court of Appeal in Kenya School of Law v Akomo & 41 others (Civil Appeal E472 of 2021) [2022] KECA 1132 (KLR) (21 October 2022).*** In that decision, the Court of Appeal rendered an authoritative interpretation of ***Section 8(3)(c)*** of the ***Legal Education Act,*** which is central to the Appellant's case. The Court of Appeal held *that “The wording in Part C above is clear as it is, that prior learning and experience in law is what ought to be considered in formulating a system that would see the progression in legal education.”* That this case establishes the foundational principle that for any prior qualification to constitute relevant "progression" toward legal training, it must be intrinsically and substantively legal in nature. 9. The Court of Appeal further clarified this principle with definitiveexamples, stating: "*We do not think a degree in aeronautics or a diploma in interior design for instance, can be termed as progression towards studying law. Indeed, the only closer aspect contemplated was experience and learning in law culminating in a diploma in law or related course in law."* The Interested Party submits that this pronouncement is not obiter; it is the core of the Court's reasoning, and it establishes a bright-line rule: a generic "diploma" is insufficient. To be recognized for progression, the diploma must be a "diploma in law or related course in law," meaning its curriculum must be demonstrably and predominantly legal. 10. The Interested Party submits that while the Appellant's subsequentacademic and professional achievements, including an MBA, a BBA, a diploma in insurance, and various certifications, are undoubtedly commendable, they do not constitute the "academic progression" contemplated under the Legal Education Act CAP16B for the purposes of admission to the Advocates Training Programme. They aver that the statutory framework and binding jurisprudence, as established in **Kenya School of Law v Akomo**, are unequivocal: progression or legal experience. 11. In light of the foregoing, and guided by the binding authority in **Kenya School of Law v Akomo,** the Interested Party has urged the Tribunal to find that the Appellant had not demonstrated that her Diploma constituted the requisite "prior learning... in law." To rule otherwise would be to disregard a clear precedent of the Court of Appeal and to accept an unverified assertion in place of the substantive proof of legal learning that the law demands. 12. On the third issue, the Interested Party contended that the appeal againstit was founded on a fundamental and legally untenable confusion between the distinct statutory mandates and legal personalities of the Interested Party and the Respondent. It was averred that the Appellant had improperly sought to attribute liability to the Interested Party for the alleged denial of admission to the Kenya School of Law, which, in the Interested Party’s view, constituted a classic case of misjoinder, arising from a fundamental misapprehension of Kenya's legal education architecture. They asserted that this error was fatal to their case. 13. The Interested Party submits that the Kenyan legal framework establishedthe Interested Party and Respondent as separate and distinct bodies corporate, each with perpetual succession, a common seal, and independent legal personality. It was contended that this separation is statutorily grounded, with the Interested Party established under Section 4 of the Legal Education Act, Cap16B, and the Respondent established under section 3 of the of the Kenya School of Law Act, CAP 16C. 14. It was further submitted that the statutory mandates of these two entitiesare diametrically different and deliberately separated by Parliament. The Interested Party’s core function, under *Section 8(1) of the Legal Education Act, CAP 16B*, is to regulate legal education and training in Kenya, a regulatory and standard setting function. In contrast, the Respondent’s function, under ***Section 4 of the KSL Act,*** is the provision of professional legal training, an operational, service-delivery mandate. The interested Party asserts that this distinction was central to the reasoning of the Court of Appeal in Otinga, wherein the Court invalidated Section 16 of the Kenya School of Law Act on the basis that it encroached upon the Interested Party’s regulatory domain. It was contended that, at paragraph 43, the court held that the Legal Education Act is the framework of legal education and training in Kenya, including training in ATP, and that its provisions apply to all legal training in Kenya. The Interested Party maintains that this ruling reinforced the Interested Party’s supremacy in setting the framework, but it did not, and could not, merge the two entities or make the Interested Party the operator of the Respondent. 15. Interested Party further avers that the impugned act, the admission of theAppellant to the Advocates Training Programme, was an operational decision squarely within the purview of the Respondent’s mandate to "provide training." It was contended that decisions on when to advertise, how to admit, and who to admit is a day-to-day administrative function of the training provider, not the regulator. The Interested Party’s asserts that its role, as per Otinga, is to prescribe the standards for admission, and that it would be illogical to hold the regulator liable for an independent contractor's operational decisions, especially when their relationship is statutory, not hierarchical. 16. It is submitted that a challenge to the act of admission properly liesagainst the Respondent as the actor, whereas a challenge to the substance of the admission rules lies against the Interested Party as the rule maker. 17. Interested Party further contend that the doctrine of vicarious liabilitydoes not apply, as no employer-employee or analogous relationship exists between the two entities. It was averred that the Interested Party does not employ the Director of the Respondent, KSL; it does not dictate his daily operations, and that the two bodies are separate legal persons created by separate Acts of Parliament, accountable to different governance structures. The Interested Party maintains that its function is one of oversight rather than control. 18. Interested Party also submit that its ongoing process to develop newregulations, as outlined in its affidavit, constitutes the lawful exercise of its proper, post-Otinga mandate. It was contended that the Court of Appeal in Otinga directed the Interested Party to formulate the regulatory framework, and that it would be unjust to enjoin it for the alleged actions of another statutory body during the transitional period preceding the gazettement of new regulations. 19. The Interested Party asserts that its role, as affirmed by the Court ofAppeal, is to formulate the system while the Respondent’s role is to function within it. It was contended that the Petition alleges a failure in the Respondent’s function. The Interested Party maintains that the constitutional and statutory scheme provides clear remedies against the Respondent for that functional failure, and that no remedy lies against the Interested Party simply because the Appellant is dissatisfied with the pace at which a new system is being formulated, especially when that process is ongoing and lawful. 20. On the fourth and final issue submitted by the Interested Party, on theissue of costs, they contend that the award of costs as anchored in section 27 of the Civil Procedure Act is discretional. It was averred that the statute vests the court with full power to determine by whom and to what extent costs are to be paid, and out of what property such costs shall be satisfied. 21. The Interested Party further rely on the decision **in R V Rosemary Wairimu Munene, Exparte Applicant V Ihururu Dairy Farmers Cooperative Society JR No. 6 of 2014,** wherein the court recognized that the objective of awarding costs is not to penalise the unsuccessful party nor to compensate the successful party for the inconvenience of litigation. 22. The Interested Party also cite the **English Court of Appeal decision In Scherer V Counting Instruments Ltd [1986] IWLR 615,** which set out the principles for the award of costs. It was contended that the Court held, inter alia, that the general rule is that costs follow the event, that the judge retains an unfettered discretion to make such order as to costs as justice may require; that a successful party has reasonable expectation, but no absolute right, to costs; and that such discretion must be exercised judicially, in accordance with established principles and the facts of the case. It was further contended that the discretion must be grounded on relevant considerations connected with the litigation and that where a party wholly fails to establish the necessary ingredients for the relief sought, it would be difficult to justify an order for costs in their favour. 23. The Interested Party maintains that, in exercising its discretion, theTribunal should be guided by the indemnity principle and the general rule that costs follow the event, and urged the Tribunal to exercise its discretion appropriately in the circumstances of the case. **C. ANALYSIS AND DETERMINATION** 1. The Tribunal has considered the issues raised by both the Parties and hasnarrowed them down to the following issues for determination: - * + 1. Whether the Tribunal has the jurisdiction to hear and determinethis Appeal? 2. Whether the Appellant qualifies for ATP on Academic progression 3. Whether the Respondent acted unreasonably by refusing toadmit the Appellant. 1. **Whether the Tribunal has the jurisdiction to hear and determinethis Appeal?** 2. The respondent in its replying affidavit and submissions, alleges that thejurisdiction of this tribunal is limited to only matters arising out of the Legal Education Act. It is a well-established principle of law that whenever an issue of Jurisdiction is raised, the same should be determined first before other issues are dealt with. It is further well established through precedents, that jurisdiction flows either from a statute or constitution or both, and therefore, a court cannot arrogate to itself jurisdiction. 3. The jurisdiction of this Tribunal to hear and determine appeals emanatingfrom the respondent and interested party is anchored in section 31 of the Legal Education Act. This was confirmed by Majanja, J (as he then was) in **Kenya School of law –Vs- Gachoki & 2 others [ civil appeal E062 of 2022(2024}.** While upholding the Tribunal's jurisdiction, he stated that: **“On my part I do not see any reason to depart from the settled position on jurisdiction. Section 31(1) of the Legal education act grants the Tribunal Jurisdiction to inquire into” ……………. any matter relating to this Act” which is an all –encompassing clause that affirms the Tribunal’s jurisdiction to deal with matters concerning legal education arising not only within the Act itself but also from the Kenya school of law Act under which KSL is guided by and applies the provisions of Legal Education Act”** Emphasis, ours 1. Without belabouring further, this Tribunal has in several of its decisions,held that it has jurisdiction to deal with matters emanating from KSL relating to ATP. Therefore, this Tribunal has jurisdiction to hear and determine this matter and therefore, this limb of argument fails. * 1. **whether the Appellant qualifies for ATP on Academicprogression** 1. The appellant in his appeal, supporting affidavit and submissions, hasheavily relied on the **Otinga case (Supra),** to buttress his argument of academic progression. 2. It is settled that career progression is the child of section 8(3) (c) of theLegal Education Act, which provides that: **“In carrying out its functions under subsection (2) the council shall-** **(c) formulate a system for recognizing prior learning and experience in law to facilitate progression in legal education from lower level of learning to higher levels”** 1. The Respondent claims that the Appellant does not qualify to be admittedto the Advocates Training Programme (ATP) by reason of academic progression because the applicable law, which is **the Kenya School of Law Act 2012**, as amended by **Statute Law Miscellaneous Amendments Act (No. 18 of 2014)** does not provide for academic progression. 2. The central issue for determination by this Tribunal is the precise legaleffect of the Court of Appeal’s in **Otinga Case** (supra) nullification of **Section 16 and the Second Schedule to the Kenya School of Law Act** on the Appellant’s application, and whether such nullification automatically entitles the Appellant to admission to the Advocates Training Programme. 3. This tribunal has in its recent decisions in the case of **Caroline Kathure Kiruki v. Kenya School of Law and Council of Legal Education (LEEA No. E003 of 2025) and Samuel Mbugua Ndung’u v. The Kenya School of Law and Council of Legal Education (LEEA No. E008 of 2024),** considered the cumulative effect of the Court of Appeal’s pronouncement in Otinga case, on admissions to ATP. In both decisions, the Tribunal affirmed the binding authority of the Court of Appeal’s judgment in **Otinga** and acknowledged the legal pathway it has created for individuals who, but for the impugned provisions of **Section 16 of the Kenya School of Law Act**, would have been deemed inadmissible to the ATP. 4. The question before this Tribunal therefore, is whether the appellant canbenefit from section 8 (3) (c) of Legal Education Act and what really constitutes academic progression? 5. This tribunal notes that in **Civil Appeal No 472 of 2022 Kenya School of Law vs. Otene Richard Akomo & 41** others the Court of Appeal addressed itself on the issue of academic progression. The superior court defined progression at paragraph 47 as: ***“Progression is ideally the process of developing or moving gradually towards a more advanced state”*** 1. In the present appeal, the appellant has a Bachelor’s of Science degreeand later a Master of Arts (Economic Policy and Management) from the University of Nairobi. Then, he pursued an LLB degree from The University of London which was later recognized by the Interested Party in August 2024 after completing his remedial program at Riara University School of Law**.** Our understanding of progression is that, it should be in the same field. This was well captured in **Kenya School of Law- Vs-Akomo (Supra)** when the court stated that: ***“47 We do not thinks that a degree in aeronautics or diploma in interior design for instance can be termed as progression towards studying law. Indeed, the only closer aspect contemplated is experience and learning of law or related course in law. We therefore hold that such a degree and diploma are not to be categorized as a progression in law whatever kind………”*** 1. From the foregoing, this Tribunal is inclined to adopt the Court of Appeal’sconclusion. The appellant in this case therefore, by possessing a Bachelor of Science degree, MA and LLB from a foreign university cannot be treated as progression towards studying law. Furthermore, there is no evidence tendered to this Tribunal that the appellant has pursued a Diploma in Law to warrant it embracing the provisions of section 8 (3) (c) of the Legal Education Act in determining his eligibility for admission to ATP under that section. 1. **Whether the Respondent acted unreasonably by refusing to** **admit the Appellant** 1. This Tribunal has seen the Respondent’s letters dated 31/12/2025 and13/01/2026 declining the appellant’s application for admission to ATP on the ground that “**the applicant does not meet the requirements, he got a C Minus in English and B Minus in Kiswahili”,** which is reiterated in its submissions**.** It is worth noting that the Tribunal has had an opportunity to interrogate the Appellant’s KCSE certificate where it is evident that the attained a mean grade of B Minus, C Minus in English and a B Minus in Kiswahili. 2. Owing to the legal effect of the nullification of section 16 of the KenyaSchool of Law Act which imposes the minimum KCSE requirements, this tribunal finds that the Respondent acted illegally. However, the Appellant still does not qualify for admission into ATP on academic progression. **DISPOSITION** In the premises, the Tribunal makes the following determinations: * + 1. The appellant’s appeal dated **20th January, 2026** is hereby dismissed. 2. That, the Appellant, **BENSON OKWIRI** is not eligible for admission to the Advocates Training Programme on account of academic progression pursuant to section 8(3) (c) of the Legal Education Act. 3. Each party shall bear its own costs. 4. A party aggrieved by this decision is at liberty to appeal to the HighCourt under section 38 (1) of the Legal Education Act, 2012, on a point of law. **It is so ordered by the Legal Education Appeals Tribunal.** **HON. JULIANA NJIRIRI - CHAIR** **HON. JOSHUA NGULU- MEMBER** **HON. FELIX OKETCH - MEMBER** **HON. MOSES MUNOKO – MEMBER** **HON. GODANA YATANI – MEMBER** SIGNED BY/FOR: HON. JULIANA WAMAITHA NJIRIRI | | | --- | | **★ THE JUDICIARY OF KENYA ★** **HON. JULIANA WAMAITHA NJIRIRI** **VINCENT GODANA YATANI** **FELIX OTIENO OKETCH** **MOSES SITATI MUNOKO JOSHUA MBINDA NGULU** Legal Education Appeals Tribunal Legal Education Appeals Tribunal Date: 2026-03-25 10:15:50 |