https://new.kenyalaw.org/akn/ke/judgment/kehc/2026/12836

Osiqsa EPZ Ltd v Official Receiver (as Administrator of Amor Coco Kenya (EPZ) Ltd - in Administration) (Insolvency Cause E287 of 2025) [2026] KEHC 12836 (KLR) (14 August 2026) (Ruling) Neutral citation: [2026] KEHC 12836 (KLR) Republic of Kenya In the High Court at Mombasa Insolvency Cause E287 of 2025 J Ngaah, J August 14, 2026 IN THE MATTER OF THE INSOLVENCY ACT, 2015 AND IN THE MATTER OF AMOR COCO KENYA (EPZ) LIMITED (IN ADMINISTRATION) Between Osiqsa EPZ Limited Applicant and Official Receiver (as Administrator of Amor Coco Kenya (EPZ) Limited - in Administration) Respondent Ruling Introduction and the application 1.Before the Court for determination is the Applicant’s Notice of Motion dated 18th September 2025, expressed to be brought under sections 560(1)(c) and (d) of the Insolvency Act, No. 18 of 2015 (“the Act”), sections 3 and 3A of the Civil Procedure Act (Cap. 21, Laws of Kenya) and Order 51 rule 1 of the Civil Procedure Rules, 2010. The Motion seeks, in the main, the following orders:(a)that the Applicant be granted leave to proceed to exercise its right of forfeiture and/or to re-enter the leased property being part of Subdivision No. 3697/III/MN, Mombasa (“the demised premises”);(b)that the Respondent be ordered to vacate and deliver vacant possession of the demised premises;(c)that the O.C.S. and/or Deputy O.C.S. and/or any other officer at Mtwapa Police Station do supervise and maintain law and order at the time of eviction;(d)that the Applicant be granted approval to proceed to file a counterclaim in Mombasa CMELC No. E081 of 2024 – Amor Coco Kenya EPZ Limited v Osiqsa EPZ Limited – to recover rent arrears and mesne profits; and(e)that the costs of the application be borne by the Respondent. 2.The Motion is supported by the grounds on its face and by the Supporting Affidavit of Hussein Yakub, the Applicant’s manager, sworn on 18th September 2025, together with exhibits. It is opposed by way of the Replying Affidavit of Sylvia Githungo, an Assistant Official Receiver, sworn on 10th November 2025, together with relevant exhibits. The Motion was canvassed by way of written submissions: the Applicant’s dated 3rd November 2025 and the Respondent’s dated 18th February 2026, each accompanied by a bundle of authorities. I have considered all this material. The applicant’s case 3.The Applicant is the registered proprietor of the property known as part of Subdivision No. 3697/III/MN, Mombasa. By a lease agreement, the Applicant let part of the property to Amor Coco Kenya (EPZ) Limited (“the Company”) for a term of five years and three months commencing on 1st September 2023, at a monthly rent of USD 2,500, on condition that the Company would perform its obligations under the lease, including the punctual payment of rent. 4.It is the Applicant’s case that the Company has not paid any rent whatsoever from the commencement of the lease. By a demand letter dated 14th February 2024 issued through counsel, the Applicant demanded arrears then standing at USD 15,000. Payment was not forthcoming. On 29th August 2024, the Applicant caused to be served upon the Company a thirty-five (35) day notice of forfeiture issued pursuant to sections 73 and 75 of the Land Act, No. 6 of 2012, demanding that the Company remedy the breach by settling arrears which had by then accrued to USD 30,000, failing which the lease would stand forfeited. The Applicant contends that the notice was not complied with, and that the lease accordingly stood forfeited on or about 3rd October 2024, from which date mesne profits continue to accrue. 5.In the meantime, on 17th April 2024 the Company had instituted Mombasa CMELC No. E081 of 2024 – Amor Coco Kenya EPZ Limited v Osiqsa EPZ Limited – seeking a declaration that distress for rent levied by the Applicant was unlawful, together with injunctive relief. By a ruling delivered on 4th April 2025, the learned Principal Magistrate granted an interlocutory injunction restraining the Applicant from attaching or interfering with the Company’s goods on the demised premises pending the hearing of that suit. The Applicant complains that the Company has since taken no steps to prosecute the suit, while continuing to enjoy the interim orders. 6.By a Gazette Notice dated 18th December 2024, the Official Receiver was appointed Administrator of the Company by the holder of a qualifying floating charge, with effect from 17th December 2024. In compliance with section 560(1)(c) of the Act, the Applicant, through its advocates’ letter dated 24th March 2025, sought the Administrator’s consent to re-enter the demised premises. By a letter dated 11th April 2025, the Administrator declined consent, invoking the statutory moratorium, denied any obligation to pay mesne profits or to deliver vacant possession, and invited the Applicant to lodge a proof of debt. 7.The Applicant deposes that since the Administrator’s appointment no rent, mesne profits or compensation of any kind has been paid or even proposed; that the demised premises have remained locked and non-operational; that the Administrator’s sole preoccupation has been the realisation of the Company’s assets for the benefit of creditors, to the exclusion of the Applicant’s proprietary interest; and that the moratorium is being deployed as a shield for what is, in substance, a continuing uncompensated occupation of the Applicant’s land. The Applicant asserts that this state of affairs violates its rights to property under Article 40 of the Constitution and deprives it of a core income-generating asset. The respondent’s case 8.The Respondent opposes the Motion in its entirety. Ms. Githungo deposes that the Company was placed under administration on 17th December 2024 at the instance of Kenya Development Corporation, the holder of a qualifying floating charge registered against the Company, owing to the Company’s default on its secured obligations; that the requisite notices of appointment were published in the Kenya Gazette and the Daily Nation newspaper; and that upon taking over, the Administrator undertook a valuation of the Company’s assets and advertised them for sale by national open tender. The bids received were low and the Administrator is pursuing disposal by private treaty, a process which is ongoing. 9.Significantly, at paragraph 13 of the Replying Affidavit, the Administrator expressly acknowledges that “there are outstanding rents owed prior to our appointment and that there is rent owing since our take-over of the Respondent Company.” The Administrator’s position, however, is that the Applicant is an unsecured creditor whose remedy lies in lodging a proof of debt; that forfeiture rights cannot supersede those of the secured creditor; that granting the orders sought would stall the realisation process, erode the asset pool, and upset the hierarchy of payments prescribed by the Second Schedule to the Act; that the Company’s machinery is bulky and affixed to the premises, such that a forced vacation would necessitate dismantling, with attendant risk of damage, depreciation and cost; and that in any event the Applicant is catered for under section 474 of the Act, which ring-fences a prescribed share of net floating-charge realisations for unsecured creditors. The parties’ submissions 10.For the Applicant, it was submitted that this Court has jurisdiction under sections 2 and 560 of the Act; that the factors in section 560A(1) favour the grant of approval; and that the Court should undertake the balancing exercise described in Planlink Limited v Wellcrest Hospital Limited [2022] KEHC 16025 (KLR), which adopted the guidance in Re Atlantic Computer Systems Plc [1992] Ch 505 as restated in Lazari Investments Limited v Saville [2015] EWHC 2590 (Ch). Counsel emphasised that the Administrator has admitted the arrears; that not a cent has been paid since 1st September 2023; that no rescue plan exists and the premises lie idle; and that, on the authority of Planlink and Owiti, Otieno & Ragot Advocates v Mumias Sugar Co. Limited (Under Administration) [2020] eKLR, a landlord cannot be compelled to continue “hosting” a defaulting occupier indefinitely. On the counterclaim, counsel invoked section 560(1)(d) and Article 23 of the Constitution, submitting that the subordinate suit – instituted by the Company itself – has been left dormant since the interim orders of April 2024, and that leave should issue so that the Applicant’s cross-claims for rent and mesne profits may be ventilated in that forum. 11.For the Respondent, it was submitted that the Applicant has not met the statutory threshold under sections 560 and 560A. Counsel relied on Midland Energy Limited v George Muiruri t/a Leakeys Auctioneers & Another [2019] eKLR and Cook v Mortgage Debenture Ltd [2016] EWCA Civ 103 on the purpose and reach of the moratorium; on Re Royal Swiss Bakery Limited [2023] KEHC 21919 (KLR) for the proposition that a landlord cannot demand payment otherwise than in accordance with the Second Schedule; on I & M Bank Limited v Mastermind Tobacco (K) Limited (Under Administration) [2025] KEHC 15058 (KLR) and Lutta v Mumias Sugar Company Limited (Under Administration) [2025] KEHC 5425 (KLR) for the proposition that an admitted or asserted debt does not, by itself, justify lifting the moratorium and that hardship to an individual creditor is insufficient; and on Entreprise Générale Malta Forrest S.A.S v Kenya Electricity Transmission Company Limited & Another [2022] KEHC 601 (KLR) for the proposition that leave should be refused where it would visit unnecessary expense upon the estate. Counsel further submitted that the prayer for a police-supervised eviction is inherently coercive and falls outside the “peaceable re-entry” contemplated by section 560(1)(c), and that the counterclaim would fragment litigation when the proof-of-debt mechanism suffices. Issues for determination 12.Having considered the pleadings, the affidavit evidence and the rival submissions, the following issues fall for determination:(i)whether the Applicant should be granted approval under section 560(1)(c) of the Act to exercise its right of forfeiture by re-entry, together with the consequential prayers for vacant possession and police supervision;(ii)whether the Applicant should be granted approval under section 560(1)(d) of the Act to file and prosecute a counterclaim in Mombasa CMELC No. E081 of 2024; and(iii)what order should be made as to costs. The law and analysis (i) Jurisdiction and the statutory moratorium 13.Section 2 of the Act defines “the Court” as the High Court, and where an insolvency division exists, that division. The Company is in administration and the demised premises are situate within this Court’s territorial jurisdiction. I am satisfied that this Court is properly seized of the application. 14.Section 560(1) of the Act provides, insofar as material:“While a company is under administration — … (c) a landlord may exercise a right of forfeiture by peaceable re-entry in relation to premises let to the company only with the consent of the administrator or with the approval of the Court; and (d) a person may begin or continue legal proceedings (including execution and distress) against the company or the company’s property only with the consent of the administrator or with the approval of the Court.” 15.Section 560(2) empowers the Court, in giving approval, to impose conditions on or requirements in connection with the transaction. Section 560A(1), introduced by the Business Laws (Amendment) Act, sets out a non-exhaustive catalogue of considerations, including:(a)the statutory purpose of the administration;(b)the impact of the approval on the applicant, and in particular whether the applicant is likely to suffer significant loss;(c)the legitimate interests of the applicant and of the company’s creditors, giving the right of priority to the proprietary interest of the applicant; and(d)the conduct of the parties. 16.The rationale of the moratorium is well settled. In Midland Energy Limited v George Muiruri t/a Leakeys Auctioneers & Another (supra), Tuiyott J (as he then was) explained that the design of the Insolvency Act, 2015 is “to give a second chance to financially distressed companies”, and that to achieve that objective “the Company must be insulated from aggressive creditors who could cause a run of the Company assets.” A similar sentiment was expressed in In re Nakumatt Holdings Limited [2017] eKLR. In England, whose Insolvency Act 1986 (Schedule B1, paragraph 43) is the progenitor of our section 560, the Court of Appeal in Cook v Mortgage Debenture Ltd (supra) observed that the moratorium “best preserves the opportunity to save the company or its business by preventing the dismemberment of its assets through execution or distress” and prevents the company “from being distracted by unnecessary claims.” 17.Two points must, however, be underscored at the outset. First, the moratorium is procedural, not substantive: it suspends the enforcement of rights; it does not extinguish them. The Respondent’s own submissions properly concede as much. Secondly, the gateway in section 560 is not a wall. The statute itself contemplates that a landlord may forfeit, and a claimant may litigate, with the approval of the Court. The question in every case is how the Court’s discretion should be exercised. (ii) The governing principles: the balancing exercise 18.The principles that guide the exercise of this discretion were authoritatively set out by Nicholls LJ in Re Atlantic Computer Systems Plc [1992] Ch 505 (CA), and have been repeatedly adopted by our courts, including in Planlink Limited v Wellcrest Hospital Limited (supra), which cited them through Lazari Investments Limited v Saville (supra). They may be distilled as follows:(a)the onus is on the applicant to make out a case for leave;(b)where the applicant seeks to enforce a proprietary right – as a lessor does – and the exercise of that right is unlikely to impede the achievement of the purpose of the administration, leave should normally be granted;(c)in other cases, the court must carry out a balancing exercise between the legitimate interests of the applicant and the legitimate interests of the other creditors;(d)in carrying out that balance, great importance is normally attached to the proprietary interests of the lessor: an administration for the benefit of unsecured creditors should not be conducted at the expense of those who have proprietary rights, save to the extent that this is unavoidable, and even then usually only to a strictly limited extent; and(e)it will normally be a sufficient ground for leave if significant loss would be caused to the lessor by a refusal, unless substantially greater loss would be caused to others by the grant. 19.These principles harmonise entirely with section 560A(1)(c) of our Act, which – remarkably and deliberately – directs the Court to give “the right of priority to the proprietary interest of the applicant.” The Kenyan legislature has thus codified the very emphasis that Nicholls LJ placed on proprietary rights. They also cohere with Article 40(1) of the Constitution, which guarantees to every person the right to acquire and own property, and with the principle that a statutory limitation upon that right – which the moratorium undoubtedly is – must be applied no more widely than its purpose requires. (iii) Whether approval to forfeit and re-enter should be granted 20.Applying those principles, the following features of this case stand out. 21.First, the Applicant’s status as proprietor of the demised premises is not disputed. Nor is the lease, its commencement date, or the contractual rent. What the Applicant asserts is a proprietary right – the right of a lessor, upon breach of the covenant to pay rent and upon due service of a statutory notice under sections 73 and 75 of the Land Act, 2012, to forfeit the lease and resume possession of its own land. This is precisely the category of claim to which both section 560A(1)(c) and the Atlantic Computer Systems guidelines attach priority. 22.Secondly, and decisively, the indebtedness is admitted by the very officer now in the saddle of the Company. Paragraph 13 of the Replying Affidavit concedes that rent was owing before the Administrator’s appointment and has continued to accrue unpaid since. It is true that in Mombasa CMELC No. E081 of 2024 the Company had contended – and the learned Principal Magistrate found, on a prima facie basis and for interlocutory purposes only, invoking estoppel in relation to a payment of USD 40,000 made to Talab EPZ Limited – that the Company was not in arrears. I say nothing that determines that dispute, which remains live in the subordinate court. But for the purposes of the present application, what matters is the position during the administration itself: from 17th December 2024 to the date of this ruling, a period now well in excess of a year, the Administrator has occupied, or retained possession of, the Applicant’s premises – the Company’s machinery remaining affixed and stored therein for the purposes of the intended realisation – without paying or even proposing to pay a single shilling by way of rent or compensation for use and occupation. That much is common ground. 23.Thirdly, the treatment of rent accruing during an administration deserves emphasis, because it exposes the fallacy in the Respondent’s contention that the Applicant’s only recourse is a proof of debt ranking with the general body of unsecured creditors. The distinction between rent accrued before administration (a provable debt) and rent accruing during administration, where the administrator retains the premises for the benefit of the administration, is of long standing. It traces to the “salvage” principle in In re Lundy Granite Co., ex parte Heavan (1871) LR 6 Ch App 462, where James LJ held that where a company’s officeholder retains leased property “for the convenience of the winding up… for the purposes of the estate”, the rent for that period ought to be paid in full as an expense, ahead of the general creditors. The principle was applied to administrations in Goldacre (Offices) Ltd v Nortel Networks UK Ltd (In Administration) [2009] EWHC 3389 (Ch), and authoritatively restated by the English Court of Appeal in Pillar Denton Ltd v Jervis (Re Game Station Ltd) [2014] EWCA Civ 180, where Lewison LJ held that an administrator “must make payments at the rate of the rent for the duration of any period during which he retains possession of the demised property for the benefit of the winding up or administration… treated as accruing from day to day… payable as expenses of the… administration.” Although those decisions construe English legislation, the underlying equity – that an estate which enjoys the use of another’s property for its own benefit must pay for that use – is of universal application and is, in my view, entirely consonant with the scheme of our Act, which in section 560A(1)(c) subordinates the collective interest to the proprietary interest of a landlord, and which nowhere licenses an administrator to occupy premises gratuitously. 24.Fourthly, the purpose of this administration must be candidly identified. Section 522(1) of the Act ranks the objectives of administration:(a)to maintain the company as a going concern;(b)to achieve a better outcome for creditors as a whole than liquidation would; or(c)to realise property in order to make a distribution to one or more secured or preferential creditors.On the Respondent’s own evidence, no attempt is being made to trade or revive the Company: the premises are locked, a valuation has been done, the assets have been advertised for sale by open tender, and disposal by private treaty is being pursued. This is, in substance, a realisation for the benefit of the secured creditor – objective (c). As Mabeya J observed in Planlink Limited v Wellcrest Hospital Limited (supra), “the purpose of administration is to rescue a company on its death bed and revive it”; where no revival is in prospect and the occupier “is not paying rents which is already owing and continue to accrue”, the landlord “cannot be expected to continue hosting” it. The continued occupation of the demised premises is not necessary to preserve any going concern; it serves only as free warehousing for assets awaiting sale. An administration conducted on that footing is being conducted at the landlord’s expense in precisely the manner Atlantic Computer Systems condemns. 25.Fifthly, I have considered the authorities pressed by the Respondent, and in my view they are distinguishable. In I & M Bank Limited v Mastermind Tobacco (K) Limited (supra) and in Re Royal Swiss Bakery Limited (supra), what was sought was, in effect, the preferential recovery of a money debt – execution or payment outside the statutory waterfall. A landlord seeking possession of its own land stands on a different footing: it does not seek to be “paid” out of the estate ahead of anyone; it seeks the return of property that has never belonged to the estate at all. The estate’s asset is the lease (now, on the Applicant’s case, forfeited); the reversion is and always was the Applicant’s. Lutta v Mumias Sugar Company Limited (supra) turned on an applicant who had failed to demonstrate sufficient particulars; here the default is admitted and total. Entreprise Générale Malta Forrest S.A.S v KETRACO (supra) concerned garnishee-style enforcement that would have drained funds from the estate; an order for possession takes nothing out of the asset pool save the free use of premises to which the estate has shown no continuing entitlement. And Cook v Mortgage Debenture Ltd (supra), far from assisting the Respondent, confirms that the moratorium exists to serve the purposes of administration – not to be an end in itself. 26.Sixthly, the section 560A factors, taken seriatim, favour the Applicant:(a)the statutory purpose of this administration – realisation – will not be defeated by an orderly restoration of possession; the machinery can be sold wherever it lawfully sits, and nothing prevents a sale in situ within a defined window;(b)the Applicant has suffered, and absent relief will continue to suffer, significant loss: on the Administrator’s own admission it has received nothing since September 2023, a period approaching two and a half years, while arrears and mesne profits mount;(c)the legislature has directed that priority be given to the Applicant’s proprietary interest; and(d)as to conduct, the Applicant has acted with restraint and regularity – demand, statutory notice, a request for consent, and only then this application – whereas the Company procured interim orders in April 2024 and has since let its own suit lie fallow, and the Administrator, for over a year, has neither paid, proposed, nor negotiated. The Respondent’s reliance on section 474 (the prescribed share for unsecured creditors) is no answer: a contingent dividend at an unknown date, from an asset pool whose bids were, on the Respondent’s own evidence, “low”, is not adequate protection for a landlord haemorrhaging rental income month on month. 27.I am, however, alive to the Respondent’s legitimate concern that an abrupt, forced vacation would require the dismantling of heavy affixed machinery, with risk of damage and diminution of realisable value, to the prejudice of the general body of creditors. The English Court of Appeal in Sunberry Properties Ltd v Innovate Logistics Ltd (In Administration) [2008] EWCA Civ 1321 demonstrates how that tension is properly resolved: not by refusing the landlord relief altogether, but by moulding the relief – and imposing conditions, including the payment of a monthly sum for continued occupation – so that the administration is given a limited breathing space while the landlord is compensated for it. Section 560(2) of our Act confers precisely that power on this Court. That is the course I propose to take. (iv) The prayers for vacant possession and police-supervised eviction 28.The prayer for vacant possession is consequential upon the grant of leave to forfeit and will be provided for, on terms, in the disposition. The prayer for a police-supervised eviction stands on a different footing. Section 560(1)(c) speaks of forfeiture “by peaceable re-entry.” What the Court approves under that provision is a peaceable resumption of possession, not a coercive eviction executed under police supervision. The Respondent is the Official Receiver, a public officer; there is no evidence before me of any threat of resistance or breach of the peace that would warrant conscripting the Officer Commanding Mtwapa Police Station into a civil re-possession at this stage. That prayer is premature and is declined, with liberty to apply should the orders of this Court be obstructed. (v) Whether approval should be granted to file and prosecute the counterclaim 29.Section 560(1)(d) requires the Court’s approval before legal proceedings may be begun or continued against the Company or its property. Three considerations persuade me that approval should issue. First, the subordinate suit was commenced by the Company itself, which obtained – and continues to enjoy – interlocutory orders against the Applicant, yet has taken no step to prosecute it since April 2024. A company (or its administrator) cannot deploy the moratorium as both sword and shield: suing when it suits it, and invoking statutory protection to prevent its opponent from defending itself fully and asserting cross-claims arising out of the very same lease. Elementary fairness, and the right of access to justice under Articles 48 and 50(1) of the Constitution, require that where the estate elects to litigate, the defendant be permitted to meet that litigation with all the weapons the law allows, including a counterclaim. 30.Secondly, the underlying debt is, at least in part, genuinely disputed: the learned Principal Magistrate’s ruling of 4th April 2025 found a prima facie case, resting on the payment of USD 40,000 to Talab EPZ Limited and the doctrine of estoppel, that the Company may not be in arrears at all – a finding which sits awkwardly with the Administrator’s admission at paragraph 13 of the Replying Affidavit, but which only a trial can resolve. A disputed debt of this character is not well suited to the administrative proof-of-debt process, which presupposes claims capable of verification on documents; it calls for judicial determination on viva voce evidence. It is in the interest of the estate itself, no less than of the Applicant, that the true state of accounts between landlord and tenant be conclusively established in the one forum already seized of the dispute, rather than fragmented between the subordinate court and the Administrator’s desk. This Court took a similar course in Owiti, Otieno & Ragot Advocates v Mumias Sugar Co. Limited (Under Administration) (supra), granting leave to continue proceedings against a company in administration where the applicant demonstrated a legitimate interest. 31.Thirdly, the mischief against which the moratorium guards – the dismemberment of the estate through execution – is fully met by conditions. Following the approach in Atlantic Computer Systems and consistent with section 560(2), leave to counterclaim will be granted on terms that no decree arising therefrom shall be executed against the Company or its property without the further approval of this Court, and that any sums found due shall (subject to any claim properly maintainable as an expense of the administration in respect of the period of the Administrator’s retention of the premises) be lodged and ranked in accordance with the Second Schedule to the Act. So conditioned, the counterclaim adds nothing to the estate’s burdens beyond the obligation – which every litigant bears – to meet a case it has itself provoked. Disposition 32.In the result, the Notice of Motion dated 18th September 2025 substantially succeeds. Doing the best I can to hold the balance between the Applicant’s proprietary rights and the orderly conduct of the administration, I make the following orders:(a)Approval is granted to the Applicant under section 560(1)(c) of the Insolvency Act, 2015 to exercise its right of forfeiture by peaceable re-entry upon the demised premises being part of Subdivision No. 3697/III/MN, Mombasa. The approval shall, however, stand suspended for a period of ninety (90) days from the date of this ruling.(b)During the period of suspension, the Respondent shall be at liberty either:(i)to pay to the Applicant, as an expense of the administration, sums equivalent to the contractual rent of USD 2,500 per month in respect of the period from 17th December 2024 and continuing for so long as the Administrator retains possession of the demised premises, in which event the suspension shall continue while such payments are maintained, pending further orders; or(ii)to remove the Company’s assets from, and deliver vacant possession of, the demised premises to the Applicant.(c)In default of compliance with either limb of order (b) within the period of suspension, the Applicant shall be at liberty to re-enter the demised premises peaceably upon giving the Respondent not less than fourteen (14) days’ written notice of the date and time of re-entry, at which the Respondent shall be entitled to be present.(d)Within twenty-one (21) days of this ruling, the Respondent shall file and serve a full and accurate inventory of all the Company’s assets situate upon the demised premises.(e)Approval is granted to the Applicant under section 560(1)(d) of the Insolvency Act, 2015 to file and prosecute its amended defence and counterclaim in Mombasa CMELC No. E081 of 2024 – Amor Coco Kenya EPZ Limited v Osiqsa EPZ Limited – for rent arrears, mesne profits and related relief, on condition that no decree arising from the counterclaim shall be executed against the Company or its property without the further approval of this Court, and that any sums adjudged due shall, subject to any expense claim in respect of the period of the administration, be proved and ranked in accordance with the Second Schedule to the Act.(f)The prayer for supervision of the eviction by the O.C.S. and/or Deputy O.C.S., Mtwapa Police Station, is declined as premature, with liberty to apply in the event of obstruction of the orders of this Court.(g)The costs of the application are awarded to the Applicant. 33.It is so ordered. SIGNED, DATED AND PUBLISHED ON 14TH AUGUST 2026NGAAH JAIRUSJUDGE