https://new.kenyalaw.org/akn/ke/judgment/keelrc/2026/2252

Mbugua v Danca Ventures Ltd (Appeal E009 of 2025) [2026] KEELRC 2252 (KLR) (30 July 2026) (Judgment) Neutral citation: [2026] KEELRC 2252 (KLR) Republic of Kenya In the Employment and Labour Relations Court at Nakuru Appeal E009 of 2025 J Rika, J July 30, 2026 Between Patrick Kamau Mbugua Appellant and Danca Ventures Limited Respondent (An Appeal from the Judgment of Hon. E.S. Soita, Senior Resident Magistrate in Nakuru C.M.E.L.R.C Cause No. E029 of 2024, dated 18th February 2025, between the Parties herein) Judgment 1.The Claim filed by the Appellant at the Trial Court, was that he was employed verbally by the Respondent, as Respondent’s property manager, in January 2018. 2.He was dismissed by the Respondent on 28th February 2021, without valid reasons. 3.He averred that he was underpaid, and was denied annual leave pay. He prayed for notice, compensation, leave and underpayments, added up at Kshs. 974,434. 4.The Trial Court concluded that the Appellant left employment voluntarily, and was therefore not entitled to the prayers sought. 5.He filed his Memorandum of Appeal dated 25th February 2025, listing 13 Grounds of Appeal, which are summarized below: -a.The Trial Court erred by dismissing the Claim without valid reason.b.The Trial Court erred by disregarding oral agreements between the Parties.c.The Trial Court erred by concluding that the Appellant did not exhibit documents.d.The Trial Court erred in finding that the Appellant left employment voluntarily.e.The Trial Court ignored the Appellant’s evidence and pleadings.f.The Trial Court did not consider procedural fairness.g.The Trial Court did not determine issues it had framed.h.The Trial Court usurped the role of a handwriting expert, in concluding that the Appellant entered into an agreement dated 3rd Marc 2020. 6.The Appellant proposes that Judgment of the Trial Court is quashed, reviewed or set aside, and the same is replaced by a decree of this Court. He prays for costs of the Appeal. 7.It was agreed by the Partie that the Appeal is considered and determined on the strength of the Record of Appeal and Submissions filed by the Parties. The Court Finds:- 8.There was a written contract of employment executed by the Parties on 3rd March 2020. There was no reason for the Trial Court to look into existence of an oral contract. There was a written contract executed by the Parties. Evidence of an oral contract, was precluded by Sections 97 and 98 of the Evidence Act. 9.Section 9 [1] of the Employment Act, requires an Employer to issue an Employee a written contract. Where an Employer exhibits a written contract, indicated to be executed by an Employee, the rebuttable presumption ought to be made, that the written contract is validly issued, pursuant to the Employment Act. 10.The Appellant did not establish at the Trial Court that he was employed through any other contract, written or oral, other than that exhibited before the Court. 11.The Appellant’s allegation that the written contract was forged was just a mere allegation, unsupported in his evidence at the Trial Court. 12.There were other documents executed by him on record. His distinctive signature, was on the contract of employment, acknowledgements dated 14th October 2020 and 28th January 2021, his verifying affidavit and witness statement. It was the same signature on all these documents, and he never alleged that there was forgery on any other document, other than his contract of employment. The Trial Court need not have been a handwriting expert, to conclude that the written contract of employment, was executed by the Appellant. If he was convinced that the signature on the exhibited contract was forged, it was for him to provide the Court with evidence of a handwriting expert , and not allege on Appeal that the Trial Court usurped the role of a handwriting expert. 13.The written contract established that the Appellant was employed on 3rd March 2020. He claimed he was employed orally by the Respondent in January 2018. 14.The Respondent exhibited its certificate of incorporation. It was incorporated on 5th December 2019. It cannot have employed the Appellant preceding this date. 15.The written contract shows that the Appellant was a field officer, on 1-year contract, commencing 3rd March 2020. The 1-year ended around the 2nd March 2021. The Appellant told the Trial Court that he took a break on 28th February 2021. Only 3 days remained to the end of the contract. He never resumed after his break. 16.The Trial Court did not err in its evaluation of evidence. The Appellant left employment voluntarily at the end of his 1-year contract. There was no basis for grant of notice pay and compensation. 17.The Trial Court did not err in rejecting the claim for underpayment. The Appellant insisted he was a property manager. He did not show where in the Regulation of Wages [General] [Amendment] Order, the salary of a property manager falls. 18.He pleaded that he was paid salary below that earned by cashiers and salesmen. Cashiers and salesmen are roles that are provided for under the Order. The Appellant could only have succeeded in his pursuit of underpayment, by pointing out what was the applicable rate for a property manager if any, instead of pushing for underpayment by analogy. 19.The Order does not apply across the labour market. It applies to the categories of workers set out in the schedule. 20.Managers are deemed to possess adequate bargaining strength, to negotiate individual contracts with their Employers, setting out their terms and conditions of employment. 21.The Appellant was in his own estimation, a property manager, whose terms and conditions of service, were not covered under the wage instrument he pleaded. 22.He pursued annual leave over a period of 3 years, 2 months. This was correctly rejected by the Trial Court. His contract was for 1 year. 23.The Respondent did not deviate from the dictates of procedural fairness as submitted by the Appellant. Parties agreed on a employer-employee relationship, limited to a period of 1 year. The Appellant left, at end of that year. The law did not require the Respondent to hear the Appellant and establish the reason for termination. 24.It was inherent in the contract that Parties would free each other, at the end of a given period. No other reason was required to justify separation. 25.The Appeal has no merit.It is ordered: -a.The Appeal is declined.b.Costs to the Respondent. DATED, SIGNED AND DELIVERED ELECTRONICALLY AT NAKURU, UNDER RULE 68[5] OF THE E&LRC [PROCEDURE] RULES 2024, THIS 30TH JULY 2026.JAMES RIKAJUDGERepresentation:Nancy Njoroge Kairu & Company Advocates for the AppellantWaiganjo & Company Advocates for the Respondent