https://new.kenyalaw.org/akn/ke/judgment/kehc/2026/8259

**REPUBLIC OF KENYA** **IN THE HIGH COURT OF KENYA AT MILIMANI, NAIROBI** **CIVIL APPEAL NO. E1001 OF 2023** **(Consolidated with Civil Appeal No. E316 of 2024)** **PATRICK MOOI NKOMEA**...............................................................................APPELLANT -VERSUS- **JOSEPH KIMEMIA MBAE**...........................................................................RESPONDENT *(Appeal from the Ruling and Order of the Small Claims Court sitting at Nairobi* *(Hon. D. S. Aswani) delivered on 28th August, 2023)* **JUDGMENT** 1. This judgment determines Civil Appeal No. E1001 of 2023 which, by consent of the parties recorded on 31st March 2026, was consolidated with Civil Appeal No. E316 of 2024, both arising out of the same cause of action in Milimani Small Claims Court Claim No. E2116 of 2023. Civil Appeal No. E1001 of 2023 is the lead file. 2. The two appeals concern distinct decisions of the trial court, Civil Appeal No. E1001 of 2023 challenges the ruling of the learned Adjudicator, Hon. D. S. Aswani, delivered on 28th August 2023, which dismissed the Appellant’s Notice of Preliminary Objection grounded on section 34(1) of the Small Claims Court Act, No. 2 of 2016 while Civil Appeal No. E316 of 2024 challenges the substantive judgment of the trial court delivered on 2nd February 2024. Both appeals share as their common backdrop the same road traffic accident, the same parties and the same proceedings in the court below. 3. The underlying dispute arises from a road traffic accident that occurred on 4th November 2020 along Langata Road near Langata Barracks in Nairobi. The Respondent, Joseph Kimemia Mbae, through his insurer ICEA Lion General Insurance Company Limited and pursuant to the principle of subrogation, filed a Statement of Claim on 12th May 2023 at the Milimani Small Claims Court against the Appellant, Patrick Mooi Nkomea, as the registered owner of Motor Vehicle Registration No. KBY 585B Toyota Crown. 4. The claim, valued at Kshs. 117,893/=, comprised repair costs of Kshs. 99,228/=, tracing charges of Kshs. 18,115/= and motor vehicle search fees of Kshs. 550/=. 5. The Appellant denied liability, attributing the accident to the sudden emergency braking by the Respondent’s driver, Mrs. Christine Kapkusum. 6. On 25th August 2023, the Appellant filed a Notice of Preliminary Objection contending that the trial court had lost jurisdiction under section 34(1) of the SCCA as the 60-day statutory period had lapsed on 12th July 2023. The Adjudicator dismissed the Preliminary Objection on 28th August 2023 and proceeded to hear the matter. 7. Thereafter, having closed the Appellant’s case in his absence on 1st November 2023 after his advocate failed to attend, and having dismissed the Appellant’s application to reopen on 14th December 2023, the trial court delivered its substantive judgment on 2nd February 2024 finding the Appellant 100% liable and entering judgment against him for Kshs. 99,778/= with interest and costs. **The Appellant’s Submissions in both Matters** 1. The Appellant, through Kamwaro & Company Advocates, filed written submissions dated 26th May 2025 on Civil Appeal No. E1001 of 2023. The Appellant contends that section 34(1) of the SCCA imposes a strict, mandatory and unyielding 60-day deadline for the Small Claims Court to hear and finally determine any claim from the date of filing. 2. Relying on Lady Justice Gichohi’s decision in ***Kartar Singh Dhupar & Company Limited v ARM Cement PLC (In Liquidation)* (Civil Appeal 129 of 2022) [2023] KEHC 2417 (KLR),** the Appellant submits that the 60-day period is self-executing and jurisdictional: upon its lapse, the trial court is stripped of all power to continue and any proceedings thereafter are a nullity. The Appellant further supports this position by analogy with *Aprim Consultants v Parliamentary Service Commission & Another* [2021] KECA 1090 (KLR) concerning the 45-day limitation under section 175 of the Public Procurement and Asset Disposal Act, and with the 6-month election petition deadline upheld in *Martha Wangari Karua v Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission* [2019] eKLR 3. The Appellant argues that the word practicable in section 34(1) qualifies only the pace of daily proceedings, not the 60-day outer deadline which is couched in mandatory language. He relies on the Supreme Court in *Re: The Matter of the Interim Independent Electoral Commission* [2011] eKLR and *Samuel Kamau Macharia & another v Kenya Commercial Bank Limited & 2 Others* [2012] eKLR for the cardinal proposition that jurisdiction flows from the law and cannot be expanded by interpretive craft. 4. He further relies on *The County Government of Kiambu v The Senate & Others* [2017] eKLR for the proposition that unambiguous statutory language is conclusive and requires no further interpretive inquiry. The Appellant submitted that the proliferating backlog in the Small Claims Court is itself a symptom of treating the 60-day limit as aspirational, and that the creation of Decongestion Courts demonstrates the consequences of that approach. 5. In Civil Appeal No. E316 of 2024, the Appellant filed further written submissions dated 6th May 2025 on the substantive appeal. He raises six grounds challenging the judgment of 2nd February 2024. 6. First, the Appellant contends that the learned Adjudicator wrongly disregarded his Witness Statement entirely, on the supposed basis that pleadings are not evidence, notwithstanding that the matter had proceeded under section 30 of the SCCA, a provision that allows determination on the pleadings and filed documents without a full oral hearing. 7. He argues that while the Adjudicator readily relied on the witness statement of the Respondent’s driver, Mrs. Christine Kapkusum, she dismissed the Appellant’s own witness statement without any analysis, in a manner that was asymmetric and unfair. He points out that key facts in his statement, including that Mrs. Kapkusum had applied emergency brakes suddenly due to a matatu joining from a side road, and that the police officer at the scene described the impact as minor and initially attempted an amicable resolution, were corroborated by Mrs. Kapkusum herself in cross-examination, yet were wholly ignored. 8. Secondly, the Appellant contends that the trial court erroneously shifted the burden of proof to him by requiring him to demonstrate that he was not to blame for the accident, whereas the burden remained on the Respondent throughout to prove negligence. He submits that the Respondent failed to discharge this burden. 9. Third, the Appellant challenges the use of the police abstract as conclusive proof of his negligence, arguing that the only police officer who testified, PC Dickens Andete, was the in-charge of traffic records and had neither attended the scene nor conducted any investigation; the actual investigating officer, PC(W) Nelima, never testified, and the police officer who attended the scene, PC Peter Karanja, was identified as a witness but was equally not called. The Appellant submits that in the absence of the investigating officer’s report and testimony, the abstract amounted to hearsay. 10. Fourth, the Appellant challenges the trial court’s finding that it is always the norm for a vehicle that rear-ends another to be at fault, submitting that this was an assumption not grounded in the evidence before the court. 11. Fifth, the Appellant challenges the application of the subrogation principle, arguing that ICEA Lion General Insurance Company Limited was never a party to the proceedings, that the suit was filed solely by the Respondent in his own name, that the Respondent admitted the insurer bore the cost of repair, and that an award of Kshs. 99,778/= to the Respondent personally would therefore constitute unjust enrichment. He relies on *Kenya Power & Lighting Company Limited v Julius Wambale & Another* [2019] eKLR for the proposition that a subrogation action must be instituted in the name of the insured with his consent. 12. Sixth, the Appellant attacks the award of special damages, relying on *Hahn v Singh* Civil Appeal No. 42 of 1983 [1985] KLR 716, and *Capital Fish Limited v Kenya Power and Lighting Company Limited* [2016] eKLR, for the strict proof principle. He contends that the documents placed before the trial court were internally inconsistent, the Statement of Claim claimed repairs of Kshs. 99,228/= while the insurer’s own documents showed Kshs. 92,228/=, and that there was no independent confirmation from Isuzu East Africa Limited that the vehicle was received, repaired or that payment was made to it by EFT. He submits that the Respondent, being an employee of Isuzu East Africa Limited and the brother-in-law of the driver, was in a position to procure documents internally, casting doubt on their independence. **The Respondent’s Submissions in both Matters** 1. The Respondent, through Okong’o, Wandago & Company Advocates, filed written submissions dated 20th May 2025 on Civil Appeal No. E1001 of 2023 and further submissions dated 16th May 2025 on Civil Appeal No. E316 of 2024. 2. On the jurisdictional point, the Respondent relies on *Lumumba v Rift Gas Limited* (Civil Appeal E805 of 2022) [2023] KEHC 25998 (KLR) and *Crown Beverages Limited v MFI Document Solutions Limited* (Civil Appeal E833 of 2021) [2023] KEHC 58 (KLR), both of which held that the 60-day provision is directory and not mandatory, and that its violation does not void proceedings. 3. The Respondent submits that the Appellant’s own dilatory conduct, appearing only on 17th July 2023, already beyond the 60-day window, to seek further time substantially contributed to the delay and that it would be unjust to allow the Appellant to exploit a delay he materially caused. The Respondent further contends that the Appellant was forum shopping by filing two separate appeals from the same matter, relying on *Geothermal Development Company v Lantech Africa Limited* (Civil Application E029 of 2021) [2024] KECA 981 (KLR). 4. On the substantive grounds, the Respondent relies on *Midland Hotel v Kioko* (Civil Appeal 183 of 2022) [2024] KEHC 9709 (KLR) and the Supreme Court’s decision in *Raila Amolo Odinga & Another v IEBC & 2 Others* [2017] eKLR on the shifting of the evidentiary burden once the claimant has adduced sufficient uncontroverted evidence. He argues that the Appellant failed to file and produce supporting documents to counter the Respondent’s case and therefore had nothing to rebut the finding of liability. 5. On subrogation, the Respondent relies on *Kibe & 2 others v Martin* (Civil Appeal E182 of 2021) [2024] KEHC 12961 (KLR) and *Africa Merchant Assurance Company v Kenya Power & Lighting Company Limited* (2018) eKLR for the settled proposition that a subrogation suit is rightly instituted in the name of the insured. 6. On the police abstract, the Respondent relies on *Kibichi v Mathai* (Civil Appeal E003 of 2023) [2024] KEHC 4065 (KLR) and *Joel Muga Opija v East African Sea Foods Ltd* [2013] eKLR for the proposition that an unchallenged police abstract is admissible and sufficient evidence. 7. On special damages, the Respondent relies on *Hahn v Singh* [1985] KLR 716 and submits that the payment voucher, assessment report, re-inspection report, invoice and repairs satisfaction note were all produced in evidence and adequately proved the claim. 8. The Respondent prays that both appeals be dismissed with costs and that the judgment of the trial court be upheld. **Issues for Determination** 1. Having considered the pleadings, the record of the lower court and the written submissions of both parties in the consolidated appeals, this Court identifies the following issues for determination: 1. ***Whether the 60-day timeline under section 34(1) of the SCCA is mandatory and jurisdictional or directory, and whether the trial court erred in dismissing the Preliminary Objection.*** 2. ***Whether the trial court erred in its determination of liability specifically in its treatment of the Appellant’s witness statement, the shifting of the burden of proof, the weight accorded to the police abstract, and the finding of a presumptive norm of rear-collision liability.*** 3. ***Whether the trial court erred in applying the doctrine of subrogation on the facts before it.*** 4. ***Whether the special damages of Kshs. 99,778/= were strictly proved.*** **Analysis and Determination** 1. By consent of both parties’ advocates executed on 31st March 2026, Civil Appeal No. E1001 of 2023 and Civil Appeal No. E316 of 2024 were consolidated, with Civil Appeal No. E1001 of 2023 designated as the lead file. Both appeals unquestionably arise from the same proceedings in Milimani SCCC No. E2116 of 2023, involve the same parties, and are rooted in the same factual matrix. 2. This issue lies at the heart of Civil Appeal No. E1001 of 2023. Section 34(1) of the SCCA provides: *“All proceedings before the Court on any particular day so far as is practicable shall be heard and determined on the same day or on a day-to-day basis until final determination of the matter which shall be within sixty days from the date of filing the claim.”* The provision is best read as containing two distinct limbs. 3. The first limb, qualified by the phrase **“so far as is practicable”** addresses the daily pace of proceedings and operates as a best-endeavours standard. The second limb, **“which shall be within sixty days from the date of filing the claim”** addresses the outer deadline for final determination and is framed in peremptory language. The Appellant invites this Court to hold that the second limb is jurisdictional, so that the lapse of 60 days automatically extinguishes the trial court’s power to continue. 4. The Court is required to navigate a divergence of High Court authority. In *Kartar Singh Dhupar & Company Limited v ARM Cement PLC (In Liquidation)* [2023] KEHC 2417 (KLR), Lady Justice Gichohi held that the 60-day period is cast in stone and that a judgment delivered beyond it is a nullity. Justice Muteti in *Asachi Works Limited v Kathenge* [2024] KEHC 13167 reached the same conclusion, holding at paragraph 37 that ***the jurisdiction of the adjudicator was extinguished by operation of the law*** upon the lapse of 60 days. 5. On the other side, Justice Magare in *Biosystems Consultants v Nyali Links Arcade* [2023] KEHC 21068 (KLR) held that the 60-day period is aspirational and directory, and the late Justice Majanja in *Lumumba v Rift Gas Limited* [2023] KEHC 25998 (KLR) agreed that invalidating proceedings on the basis of the 60-day lapse would undermine the statute’s objects and cause injustice. All four decisions are co-ordinate authorities; this Court is not bound by any of them and must reason from principle. 6. The Appellant’s core argument is that jurisdiction is a creature of statute and must be applied as received.' This Court fully endorses that principle. However, the critical question is not whether the 60-day provision creates a limitation on the court’s conduct but whether the specific limitation chosen by Parliament is one that automatically terminates subject-matter jurisdiction upon its breach. 7. Jurisdictional provisions typically operate by defining the subject matter, the parties or the pecuniary value within which a court may act. Section 34(1) does none of these things. It defines a time frame for the conduct of proceedings, but it does not say, in terms, that the court’s jurisdiction over a claim is extinguished upon the lapse of 60 days. 8. The SCCA does not provide that any judgment delivered beyond 60 days is void or that the claim must be dismissed. This Court agrees with Justice Magare that the legislature deliberately omitted penal consequences for breach of the timeline. Section 34(3) and (4) of the SCCA contemplate the possibility of delay by providing for up to three adjournments in defined exceptional circumstances. The existence of that adjournment mechanism presupposes that cases may, for legitimate reasons, extend beyond the 60-day aspiration. 9. The Appellant draws analogies with the 45-day limit under section 175 of the PPAD Act and the 6-month election petition deadline. This Court is not persuaded that those analogies hold. In the case of the PPAD Act, the Court of Appeal held that the 45-day period was self-executing and jurisdiction-destroying but that was because section 175 expressly linked the timeline to the grant and exercise of jurisdiction to hear and determine the judicial review application: the court’s mandate was specifically created for that window of time. 10. Similarly, election petition timelines are anchored directly in the Constitution itself through Article 87(1), which confers a constitutionally entrenched right in narrowly defined terms. No equivalent constitutional or express statutory nexus links the lapse of the 60-day SCCA period to the extinguishment of the court’s subject-matter jurisdiction. The SCCA creates the Small Claims Court as a court of general jurisdiction over claims not exceeding Kshs. 1 million, it is the nature of the claim, not the passage of 60 days, that defines that jurisdiction. 11. This Court is equally mindful of the constitutional framework within which section 34(1) operates. Article 48 of the Constitution guarantees every person access to justice, and Article 50(1) guarantees the right to have disputes resolved by an impartial and independent tribunal. Article 159(2)(d) requires courts to administer justice without undue regard to procedural technicalities. Adopting the Appellant’s construction would transform a procedural timeline into a constitutional trip-wire. 12. The moment the 60-day clock runs out, the claim dies, regardless of the reasons for delay, regardless of the state of proceedings, and regardless of who caused the delay. Such a result would in the most acute cases elevate procedural compliance above the substantive right of access to justice that the Constitution guarantees. This Court does not read Parliament as having intended that outcome, and declines to adopt a construction that would produce it. 13. At the same time, this Court is emphatic that the 60-day provision is not a dead letter. It imposes a genuine and enforceable obligation on trial adjudicators to resolve claims expeditiously. Adjudicators must treat the timeline seriously, resist the temptation of unnecessary adjournments, and must not allow cases to linger beyond 60 days without the specific justification demanded by sections 34(3) and (4). 14. Where delays are caused purely by court congestion or institutional failure, administrative and supervisory mechanisms, rather than jurisdictional nullification, are the appropriate remedy. This Court therefore holds that the 60-day timeline under section 34(1) of the SCCA is directory as to its consequences upon subject-matter jurisdiction: its breach does not automatically void proceedings. It is, however, mandatory in the sense that it is a serious and enforceable duty imposed on the trial court, and departure from it must be justified by the circumstances specified in section 34(3) and (4). 15. The Court now applies this holding to the facts. The claim was filed on 12th May 2023. The 60-day period ran until 12th July 2023. The matter was first mentioned on 29th May 2023. On 17th July 2023, five days after the 60-day period had already expired, the Appellant himself appeared before the trial court in person, voluntarily and without compulsion, informed the court he had been away, sought two weeks to file his response and was granted seven days. He then consented to the hearing date of 28th August 2023. It was only when that hearing was imminent that, through newly-instructed counsel, he raised the jurisdictional point for the first time. 16. It would be a perversion of procedural fairness to allow the Appellant to invoke a period that had already lapsed at the time he personally participated in extending the proceedings. As the Supreme Court observed in ***Owners of Motor Vessel 'Lillian S' v Caltex Oil (Kenya) Limited* [1989] KLR 1**, jurisdictional objections should be raised at the earliest opportunity. Having elected to participate, seek indulgence and agree to a hearing date, the Appellant was not entitled to turn the jurisdictional clock against the court. The Preliminary Objection was rightly dismissed, and Civil Appeal No. E1001 of 2023 accordingly fails. 17. The Court turns to Civil Appeal No. E316 of 2024. Under section 38(1) of the SCCA, an appeal from the Small Claims Court to this Court lies on matters of law only. The Supreme Court in ***Gatirau Peter Munya v Dickson Mwenda Kithinji & 2 Others* [2014]** held that *matters of law encompass not only interpretation and application of a statutory provision but also the evaluation of a trial court’s conclusions where those conclusions are based on no evidence, are not supported by the evidence on record, or are so perverse that no reasonable tribunal would arrive at them*. 18. As the Court of Appeal affirmed in *Kenya Airways Limited v Aviation & Allied Workers Union Kenya & 3 Others* [2014] eKLR, even on a law-only appeal an appellate court may review the evidence to determine whether the trial court committed a legal impropriety in its evaluation. It is against this standard that this Court interrogates the grounds of the substantive appeal. 19. The first and most significant legal complaint in Civil Appeal No. E316 of 2024 concerns the trial court’s treatment of the Appellant’s witness statement under the section 30 SCCA. Section 30 of the SCCA provides a mechanism for the court to determine a claim on the basis of the documents, statements and evidence before it without proceeding to a full oral hearing. 20. When the matter was fixed on 1st November 2023 and the Appellant’s advocate failed to attend, the trial court proceeded under this provision, receiving the Respondent’s evidence and marking the Appellant’s case as closed. The Appellant’s witness statement had been filed on 25th August 2023 and was on record before the court. In her judgment of 2nd February 2024, the trial court held that the Appellant’s pleadings were not evidence and appeared to give them little or no weight. 21. This Court is satisfied that in so holding, the learned Adjudicator fell into a legal error that is amenable to appellate correction. Under section 30, the filed documents including witness statements constitute the evidence before the court. A witness statement is not a mere pleading; it is a testimonial document. The trial court could not legitimately treat it as a nullity. This was not a discretionary matter of weight: to treat a witness statement as non-evidence in proceedings conducted expressly on the basis of filed documents is a misdirection in law. 22. The Appellant’s witness statement contained a materially different account of the accident that Mrs. Kapkusum had suddenly applied emergency brakes in flowing traffic when a matatu joined from a side road, without warning and without allowing following traffic time to react. Several of these averments were independently corroborated during Mrs. Kapkusum’s own cross-examination before the trial court. She admitted slowing down because there was a bump ahead, she confirmed that all vehicles on both lanes were slowing down, and she confirmed that a police officer came to the scene. 23. The Adjudicator accepted Mrs. Kapkusum’s statement as evidence but dismissed the Appellant’s statement without engaging with it. This asymmetric treatment of parallel witness statements is a misdirection in law going to the fairness of the trial, and constitutes an error of law. 24. The Court next considers the shifting of the burden of proof. It is trite law, confirmed in sections 107 and 108 of the Evidence Act, Cap 80, that the burden of proof in civil proceedings rests on the party who asserts. The Respondent, as claimant, bore the legal burden of proving the Appellant’s negligence throughout the trial. While the evidentiary burden may shift as the High Court recognised in ***Midland Hotel v Kioko* [2024] KEHC 9709 (KLR)** and as the Supreme Court affirmed in ***Raila Amolo Odinga v IEBC* [2017] eKLR**, such shifting occurs only once the claimant has adduced sufficient prima facie evidence. 25. The Court finds that the trial court did not err in recognising that once the Respondent adduced prima facie evidence of a rear-end collision backed by a police abstract and documentary exhibits, an evidential burden arose on the Appellant to offer a rebuttal account. However, the trial court did err by then failing to evaluate the Appellant’s own statement before concluding that he had not discharged it. The answer to whether the burden shifted and was discharged can only be given after all the evidence on record has been considered, not after half of it has been disregarded. 26. On the issue of police abstract, this Court is guided by the Court of Appeal’s decision in ***Wellington Nganga Mathiora v Akamba Public Road Services Limited & Another* [2010]** eKLR, which the trial court itself acknowledged. A police abstract is an important piece of documentary evidence and, where unchallenged, may be relied upon as reflecting the conclusions of a police investigation. However, during the cross-examination of PC Dickens Andete, it emerged that he was the in-charge of traffic records and had neither attended the scene nor conducted any investigation. He confirmed that PC Peter Karanja attended the scene but was not called to testify, and that the investigating officer had since left the station. 27. The evidence therefore established that the abstract’s contents were the findings of officers who never testified, and the only officer called could not vouch for the investigation’s underlying basis beyond the written record itself. In ***Joel Muga Opija v East African Sea Foods Ltd* [2013] eKLR** the Court of Appeal held that an unchallenged abstract may be relied upon. In this case, however, the abstract was challenged both in the Appellant's written pleadings and in cross-examination. The abstract therefore could not bear the full weight of a conclusive finding of negligence. 28. Therefore, the trial court’s characterisation of it as conclusive proof, without engagement with the Appellant's account or with the limitations exposed in cross-examination, constitutes a misdirection in law. 29. The fourth complaint under the liability limb concerns the trial court’s statement that it is the norm for a vehicle that hits another from the rear to be to blame for the accident, all factors constant. This Court accepts that, as a general observation about traffic liability, a rear-end collision will often, in absence of evidence to the contrary, indicate a failure by the following driver to maintain safe stopping distance. However, the trial court proceeded to treat this as an irrebuttable conclusion, without acknowledging that both the Appellant’s witness statement and Mrs. Kapkusum’s own cross-examination had introduced precisely the contrary factor: a sudden, unheralded emergency brake application. 30. To hold categorically that emergency braking cannot connote negligence on the part of the leading driver, regardless of how sudden or unexpected it was and regardless of whether it was foreseeable to a following driver maintaining a safe distance, is to assume a conclusion that the evidence required the court to examine. This was a finding that went beyond the evidence and crossed the line into the assumption of facts, an error of law. 31. The Appellant’s challenge to the subrogation finding raises a distinction that is more apparent than real. The doctrine of subrogation in insurance law is settled. After compensating its insured, an insurer is entitled to step into the shoes of the insured and institute a claim against the third-party tortfeasor, but the action must be brought in the name of the insured, not in the insurer’s own name. This was clearly stated in *Africa Merchant Assurance Company v Kenya Power & Lighting Company Limited* and confirmed by Githua J. in *Kenya Power & Lighting Company Limited v Julius Wambale & Another*, where it was held that *the action must however be instituted in the name of the insured with his consent.* 32. The suit in Milimani SCCC No. E2116 of 2023 was filed in the name of Joseph Kimemia Mbae, the insured, not in the name of ICEA Lion General Insurance Company Limited. The Respondent’s statement of claim expressly pleaded the subrogation basis of the suit, ICEA’s legal assistant testified as a witness documenting the insurer’s payment and tracing expenditure, and the claim was for amounts paid by the insurer. 33. The suit was therefore squarely and correctly constituted as a subrogation action in law and in form. The Appellant’s submission that the subrogation principle was inapplicable because the insurer was not a party confuses the identity of the nominal claimant with the beneficial interest. This is precisely the structure that the law requires and endorses. This Court finds no error of law in the trial court’s application of the subrogation doctrine. 34. However, the real difficulty with the judgment below on this limb is the quantum awarded. The judgment entered Kshs. 99,778/= in favour of the Respondent, being the sum claimed in the Statement of Claim. The Appellant points to a material numerical discrepancy: the Statement of Claim stated repair costs as Kshs. 99,228/=, yet the insurer's documents all recorded the repair payment as Kshs. 92,228/=. The difference is Kshs. 7,000/=. 35. A Repairs Satisfaction Note from Isuzu East Africa was produced, but the legal assistant’s statement confirmed a payment of Kshs. 92,228/= and not Kshs. 99,228/= 36. All damages in this suit are special damages and are required that they be strictly pleaded and strictly proved. The Court of Appeal in ***Hahn v Singh* Civil Appeal No. 42 of 1983 [1985] KLR 716** laid down the enduring principle that *special damages must not only be specifically claimed but also strictly proved, and that the degree of certainty and particularity required depends on the circumstances*. The Court of Appeal reaffirmed this in ***Capital Fish Limited v Kenya Power and Lighting Company Limited* [2016] eKLR**, cautioning against allowing a party to throw figures at the trial court without any credible evidence in support thereof. The Court of appeal stated that: *“No evidence whatsoever was led by the appellant on this aspect. This,as we already stated elsewhere, was an abstract figure which was thrown to the court with a mere statement that “this is the loss the appellant has suffered. Please award it to the appellant.””* 1. The question is whether the Respondent met this standard on each of the three heads of damages claimed. 2. In respect of the tracing charges of Kshs. 18,115/= and the motor vehicle search fees of Kshs. 550/=, the Court is satisfied that the evidence was sufficient. The tracing report from Counterstrike Limited dated 4th April 2023, the invoice and the Payment Voucher No. F175636 dated 13th April 2023 confirming payment of Kshs. 18,115/= to Counterstrike Limited were produced in evidence. The motor vehicle copy of records from NTSA dated 14th March 2023, evidencing a search fee of Kshs. 550/=, was also produced. These items were adequately supported by documentary evidence. 3. In respect of the repair costs, however, the position is less straightforward. The amount pleaded in the Statement of Claim was Kshs. 99,228/= as the cost of repair. The Assessment Report prepared by ICEA’s assessor Peter Mzungu on 3rd December 2020 assessed the total repair cost at Kshs. 92,355.25. The Payment Voucher No. F135501 dated 12th January 2021 confirmed that ICEA actually paid Kshs. 92,228/= to Isuzu East Africa Limited. The statement of the ICEA legal assistant confirmed the payment was Kshs. 92,228/=. There is therefore no evidentiary support for a repair cost figure of Kshs. 99,228/=. The Statement of Claim may have been drafted in error, or the figure may have included some other component not separately identified, but the evidence on record supports only Kshs. 92,228/= as the verified repair payment. 4. The Court is not persuaded by the Appellant's broader attack on the admissibility and reliability of the documentary evidence as a whole. The Appellant’s insinuation that the Respondent, as an employee of Isuzu East Africa Limited, may have colluded to produce false documents is a bare allegation unsupported by any evidence and amounts to speculation. This Court declines to set aside findings of fact on the basis of conjecture. The vehicle was repaired; the insurer paid; the documentation is sufficiently consistent to establish the core of the claim. The only discrepancy susceptible to correction is the repair figure itself. 5. Accordingly, this Court finds that the special damages were proved at Kshs. 92,228/= (repairs) + Kshs. 18,115/= (tracing) + Kshs. 550/= (motor vehicle search) = **Kshs. 110,893/=**. 6. Finally, the Respondent filed his claim in good time, prosecuted it with reasonable diligence, and has prevailed in both appeals. The Appellant raised procedural and substantive challenges that have significantly delayed the resolution of a claim for vehicle damage arising from a 2020 accident. The principle that costs follow the event is well established. The Appellant shall bear the costs of both appeals. **Orders** 1. Accordingly, this Court makes the following final orders: 1. *Civil Appeal No. E1001 of 2023 is hereby dismissed.* 2. *Civil Appeal No. E316 of 2024 is hereby dismissed.* 3. *The Ruling of the Small Claims Court in Milimani SCCC No. E2116 of 2023 dated 28th August 2023 dismissing the Preliminary Objection is upheld.* 4. *The Judgment and Decree of the Small Claims Court in Milimani SCCC No. E2116 of 2023 dated 2nd February 2024 is upheld.* 5. *The Appellant shall bear the costs of both Civil Appeal No. E1001 of 2023 and Civil Appeal No. E316 of 2024.* 6. *The matter is remitted to the trial court for execution of the judgment in Milimani SCCC No. E2116 of 2023.* **Dated and Delivered Via Microsoft Teams at Nairobi this 11th Day of June, 2026.** **BENARD WAFULA MURUNGA** JUDGE OF THE HIGH COURT *Delivered on virtual platform in the presence of:* *N/A for the Appellant* *Ms May instructed by Kamwaro & Co. for the Respondent* *Kevin Babu - Court Assistant*