https://new.kenyalaw.org/akn/ke/judgment/keca/2026/1589

Ereng v Swisscom Logistics Ltd (Civil Application E435 of 2024) [2026] KECA 1589 (KLR) (31 July 2026) (Ruling) Neutral citation: [2026] KECA 1589 (KLR) Republic of Kenya In the Court of Appeal at Nairobi Civil Application E435 of 2024 PO Kiage, AO Muchelule & WK Korir, JJA July 31, 2026 Between Paul Nakachi Ereng Applicant and Swisscom Logistics Limited Respondent (Being an application for certification and leave to appeal to the Supreme Court of Kenya against the Judgment and Orders of this Court at Nairobi (M’Inoti, Laibuta and Gachoka, JJA) dated 26th July 2024 in Nairobi Civil Appeal No.88 of 2000) Ruling 1.The motion dated 22nd August 2024 is filed pursuant to the provisions of Articles 159 and 163(4) (b) of the Constitution, section 3A and 3B of the Appellate Jurisdiction Act, Rule 1(2), 41(2), (3) and 49(1) & (4) of the Court of Appeal Rules, 2022. The affidavit of Paul Nakachi Ereng, the applicant herein, supports it. In his affidavit, the deponent gives the background, both factual and on litigation, giving rise to the application. The applicant contends, however, that the Court failed to consider his submissions regarding the respondent’s title properly and, in particular, overlooked the absence of evidence linking the respondent to the alleged allottee of the suit property and relied on material which, according to him, did not form part of the record. He maintains that the intended appeal raises matters of general public importance concerning the legality of land acquisition processes, the evidential burden borne by registered proprietors, the powers and duties of land registrars, rectification of titles, competing titles, and the legal effect of procedural irregularities in land registration. He further avers that the proposed issues transcend the interests of the parties, raise substantial questions of law of significant public importance, have arisen in and been determined by the courts below, and require authoritative determination by the Supreme Court. He asserts that unless certification and leave are granted, he stands to suffer substantial prejudice through the loss of property rights protected under Article 40 of the Constitution. Accordingly, he seeks certification under Article 163(4)(b) of the Constitution and leave to appeal to the Supreme Court against the judgment of this Court delivered on 26th July 2024, together with costs. 2.The motion is opposed. Paul Mecha Kipchumba, the Director of the respondent, contended that the intended appeal did not raise any matter of general public importance. He deposed that the motion was merely to reopen factual disputes that have already been conclusively determined by the trial court and this Court. That the applicant’s complaint concerning the acquisition of land through an oral agreement in 1996 did not raise a novel legal issue because the law governing oral land transactions entered into before the amendment of section 3(3) of the Law of Contract Act in 2003 is settled. According to the respondent, both the trial court and this Court had applied established legal principles in evaluating the applicant’s claim and reached factual findings based on the evidence presented. The respondent similarly contended that the issue regarding the discrepancy between the consideration reflected in the transfer instrument and the consideration allegedly paid by the applicant was purely factual matter unique to the circumstances of the case and incapable of constituting a matter of general public importance. 3.With regard to the applicant’s challenge concerning the failure to conduct an official search prior to purchase, the respondent asserted that the ELC and this Court had not established any new legal principle but merely considered the applicant’s conduct as part of the evidentiary inquiry into whether he qualified as a bona fide purchaser for value without notice. The respondent further maintained that the extent of inquiry required of a purchaser seeking protection as a bona fide purchaser has already been authoritatively settled by the Supreme Court and therefore did not warrant further consideration. The respondent also contended that the applicant’s complaint concerning the failure to call the alleged vendor, Gabriel Atambo, raises no issue of public importance because it concerns the ordinary burden of proof and evaluation of evidence in a specific dispute. 4.The respondent further disputed the applicant’s contention that title was registered in favour of the respondent company without verification of its incorporation documents, asserting that the relevant company documents were supplied and verified before registration. According to the respondent, this issue is based on contested facts rather than any unresolved legal question. The respondent also contends that the issue concerning the issuance of a grant allegedly without an LR number neither arose before nor was determined by the courts below and therefore cannot form the basis for certification. Similarly, the respondent contended that this Court’s findings regarding the rectification of title merely involved the application of settled statutory provisions governing rectification under the Land Registration Act and do not raise any novel question of law. The respondent maintained that the applicant himself introduced evidence regarding the rectification process and therefore cannot legitimately complain that the issue was neither pleaded nor canvassed before the courts. The respondent further contended that the questions concerning competing titles, priority of registration and the doctrine of indefeasibility of title are governed by settled jurisprudence and that the applicant was simply seeking a re- evaluation of evidence and findings already made by the courts. Therefore, none of the proposed grounds satisfied the constitutional threshold for certification and urged the Court to dismiss the application with costs. 5.For context, Swisscom Logistics Limited, the respondent, instituted proceedings before the Environment and Land Court (ELC) claiming ownership of L.R. Nos. 13815/2 and 13815/3, being subdivisions of L.R. No. 13815 situated in Karen, Nairobi. It alleged that Paul Nakachii Ereng, the applicant, had unlawfully trespassed onto the property, demolished structures thereon and interfered with its possession. Through the evidence of Paul Mecha Kipchumba (PW2), the respondent contended that the suit property had been allocated to him in 1997 through a letter of allotment, that he complied with the allotment conditions and took possession of the land, and that the allotment was subsequently transferred to the respondent company, culminating in the issuance of Grant No. I.R. 144196 and later subdivision into L.R. Nos. 13815/2 and 13815/3. Julius Chacha Maroa (PW1), a Senior Lands Registration Officer, produced official Lands Registry records confirming that the suit property had been allocated to Kipchumba and subsequently registered in the respondent’s name, and that there was no record indicating that the property had ever been allocated to Gabriel Peter Atambo. 6.The applicant opposed the suit and counterclaimed, asserting ownership of the suit property through Grant No. I.R. 52888, later altered to I.R. 52887, which he claimed to have purchased from Col. Gabriel Peter Atambo in 1996. He maintained that the respondent’s titles were fraudulent and sought cancellation thereof. In support of his claim, he relied on his title document, an undated transfer instrument, correspondence relating to an alleged allotment to Col. Atambo, evidence that consent to transfer had been granted, and evidence that he had paid rates in respect of the property. However, under cross-examination, he admitted that there was no sale agreement between him and Col. Atambo, no official search confirming Atambo’s ownership, no evidence of assessment or payment of stamp duty, and no evidence that the transfer instrument had ever been registered. His witness, Joseph Gicovi Sammy (DW2), testified that he brokered the transaction between Col. Atambo and the applicant but did not produce documentary evidence proving that Col. Atambo had acquired a valid title or complied with any allotment conditions. 7.The ELC held that where competing titles are presented, each claimant must establish the legality of the root of title. Upon evaluating the evidence, the ELC found that the respondent had demonstrated a complete and lawful chain of acquisition from allotment to registration, corroborated by official Lands Registry records. Conversely, the ELC found that the applicant had failed to prove that the suit property had ever been allotted to Col. Atambo or that a valid title had passed from Atambo to him. The ELC further found that Grant No. I.R. 52888 related to a parcel of land situated in Kijabe, Nyandarua County and not the suit property in Karen, and that the subsequent alteration of the title number from I.R. 52888 to I.R. 52887 was irregular and unsupported by the applicable statutory procedure.Consequently, the ELC declared the respondent the lawful proprietor of the suit property, granted the injunctive reliefs sought, dismissed the appellant’s counterclaim, and directed each party to bear its own costs. 8.Aggrieved by that decision, the applicant challenged the judgment before the Court (M’Inoti, Laibuta & Gachoka, JJ.A.) contending that the ELC erred in finding that he had not established ownership through Col. Atambo; in concluding that his title related to land in Kijabe rather than Nairobi; in finding that the rectification from I.R. 52888 to I.R. 52887 was unlawful; and in holding that the respondent had established a valid title. He argued that the evidence demonstrated that Col. Atambo had been allotted the suit property, had complied with the allotment conditions, had obtained title, and had subsequently transferred the property to him. He further maintained that the discrepancy in the title numbers resulted from an inadvertent error which was properly rectified by the Lands Registry and that, because Col. Atambo’s title predated the respondent’s title, the suit property was no longer available for allocation to Kipchumba or the respondent. The respondent supported the judgment, maintaining that the applicant had failed to establish the root of title of either himself or Col. Atambo and that official Lands Registry records confirmed that the suit property had been lawfully allotted to Kipchumba and subsequently registered in the respondent’s name. 9.Upon re-evaluating the evidence, this Court identified the central issue as whether the evidence established that Col. Atambo was lawfully allotted and registered as proprietor of the suit property and whether he consequently passed a valid title to the applicant. This Court found that the applicant’s claim suffered from fatal evidentiary deficiencies. It observed that Col. Atambo, the alleged source of the applicant’s title, was never called as a witness; no letter of allotment in his favour was produced; there was no evidence demonstrating compliance with allotment conditions; and Lands Registry records contained no evidence that the suit property had ever been allocated to him. This Court further found that there was no sale agreement between Atambo and the applicant; that the transfer instrument relied upon by the applicant was undated, unstamped and unregistered; that it contained inconsistencies regarding the purchase price; and that the applicant had failed to conduct any official search before purchasing the property. 10.This Court further held that the transfer instrument relied upon by the appellant related to Grant No. I.R. 52888, which official records showed related to a parcel of land in Kijabe, Nyandarua County rather than the suit property in Karen. While the Court agreed with the applicant that the repealed Registration of Titles Act was inapplicable to the rectification question, it held that the purported alteration of the title number from I.R. 52888 to I.R. 52887 was not undertaken in accordance with section 79 of the Land Registration Act because it was effected after the respondent had already become the registered proprietor and without notice to or consent from the respondent. Applying the principles in Munyu Maina -vs- Hiram Gathiha Maina[2013] eKLR, Dina Management Ltd v. County Government of Mombasa & 5 Others, Pet. No. E010 of 2021 and Funzi Development Ltd & others -vs- County Council of Kwale [2014] eKLR, this Court concluded that the applicant had failed to prove the legality and validity of the root of his title or that Col. Atambo had lawfully acquired and transferred the suit property to him. Accordingly, this Court upheld the findings of the ELC, dismissed the appeal in its entirety, and awarded costs of the appeal to the respondent. 11.At the hearing of the application for certification and leave to appeal to the Supreme Court on 6th August 2025, learned counsel for the applicant, Ms. Mercy Munyao, submitted that the intended appeal satisfied the threshold set out under Article 163(4)(b) of the Constitution and the principles enunciated by the Supreme Court in Town Council of Awendo -vs- Nelson Oduor Onyango & 13 Others [2015] eKLR, governing certification. Counsel argued that the proposed appeal raised substantial questions of law transcending the circumstances of the parties and bearing directly upon the administration of land, the integrity of the land registration system, and the protection of property rights under Article 40 of the Constitution. 12.Counsel submitted that the dispute before the courts below was not merely a contest over ownership of a parcel of land but raised broader questions concerning the legality of the processes through which titles are issued, transferred and rectified by public officers. Referring to correspondence exchanged between the respondent and the Ministry of Lands, she contended that there were material discrepancies regarding the registration of the respondent’s title, particularly as to whether the respondent company’s incorporation documents and CR-12 had been furnished to the Lands Registry before the title was issued. According to counsel, those discrepancies raised legitimate concerns regarding the verification of documents by Land Registrars before registration and the validity of titles issued in circumstances where statutory procedures may not have been fully complied with. 13.Relying on the applicant’s written submissions, counsel further argued that the intended appeal raised important questions regarding the evidentiary burden borne by a registered proprietor whose title is challenged; the powers and duties of Land Registrars in verifying ownership documents before registration; the legality of issuing grants and subsequently rectifying registration particulars; the effect of procedural irregularities in the registration and rectification process; and the extent to which public officers may be held accountable where errors in land administration result in competing titles. Counsel also submitted that the case raised broader questions concerning the treatment of competing titles and whether, in circumstances where rival claims exist, the principle that an earlier title prevails ought to apply. In her view, these issues had arisen during the litigation before the Environment and Land Court and this Court and required authoritative determination by the Supreme Court in order to provide guidance on land administration and registration practices. 14.In support of the application, counsel maintained that the proposed questions transcended the interests of the parties and had significant implications for the public, particularly regarding the maintenance of accurate land records, the conduct of public officers charged with the administration of land, and public confidence in the land registration system. She therefore urged the Court to certify the matter for appeal to the Supreme Court. 15.Opposing the application, learned counsel for the respondent, Ms. Sherlin Kemunto, who appeared alongside Mr. Rapando, submitted that the applicant had failed to demonstrate that the intended appeal raised matters of general public importance within the meaning of Article 163(4)(b) of the Constitution. Counsel argued that the application did not satisfy the principles governing certification as set out by the Supreme Court in Hermanus Phillipus Steyn -vs- Giovanni Gnecchi- Ruscone [2013] eKLR and subsequent decisions. In her view, the applicant was merely expressing dissatisfaction with concurrent findings of fact made by the trial court and affirmed by this Court. She disputed the factual basis of the applicant’s complaint regarding the registration of the respondent’s title and maintained that the respondent had supplied the requisite incorporation documents, including its certificate of incorporation and CR-12, to the Lands Office during the registration process. Counsel further submitted that some of the issues now relied upon by the applicant had neither arisen before nor been determined by the courts below and therefore could not properly form the basis of certification. As regards the remaining issues, she contended that they were neither novel nor unsettled, having already been addressed by existing jurisprudence concerning competing titles, root of title, land registration and rectification of titles. According to counsel, the dispute remained a private contest between two parties over ownership of a specific parcel of land and did not transcend the circumstances of the case so as to warrant the intervention of the Supreme Court. She accordingly urged the Court to dismiss the application with costs. 16.In her written submissions, counsel amplified the foregoing arguments and reiterated that certification under Article 163(4)(b) is reserved for exceptional cases involving substantial questions of law whose determination transcends the interests of the parties and bears upon the public interest. She submitted that the applicant had failed to demonstrate any uncertainty in the law, conflicting judicial decisions or novel legal question requiring the intervention of the Supreme Court. Instead, the application was founded on dissatisfaction with concurrent findings of fact made by the trial court and affirmed by this Court. 17.Counsel submitted that the applicant’s complaint concerning the acquisition of land through an oral agreement in 1996 did not raise any unsettled legal issue because the law relating to oral land sale agreements entered into before the amendment of section 3(3) of the Law of Contract Act, 2003 is well settled. She argued that Kenyan courts have consistently recognized the enforceability of such agreements where possession or part performance is established. Similarly, she contended that the alleged discrepancy between the consideration reflected in the transfer instrument and the amount allegedly paid by the applicant concerned the evaluation of evidence and credibility of witnesses and therefore constituted a factual issue peculiar to the dispute. 18.Counsel further submitted that the applicant’s complaints concerning the doctrine of bona fide purchaser for value without notice, the failure to conduct an official search and the extent of inquiries required before purchase did not raise novel points of law. Relying on decisions of the Supreme Court, including Dina Management Limited -vs- County Government of Mombasa & 5 others (Petition No. 8 (E010 of 2021) [2023] KESC 30 (KLR) and Sehmi & anor -vs- Tarabana Company Limited & 5 others (Petition No. E033 of 2023) [2025] KESC 21 (KLR), she argued that the law is already settled on the extent to which a purchaser must investigate the root of title and the circumstances under which a purchaser may rely on the protection accorded to a bona fide purchaser. She likewise submitted that the applicant’s criticism of the courts for drawing adverse inferences from the failure to call the alleged vendor merely concerned ordinary evidentiary principles relating to burden and standard of proof. 19.Counsel also challenged the applicant’s assertions regarding the registration of the respondent’s title, emphasizing that the evidence demonstrated that the respondent’s incorporation documents had been presented to and verified by the Lands Office prior to registration. She maintained that the issue was therefore founded on an incorrect factual premise. As regards the contention that a grant had been issued without an LR number, counsel submitted that the issue had neither been pleaded, canvassed nor determined before the courts below and therefore fell outside the scope of certification. 20.With respect to the rectification of title, counsel submitted that this Court correctly found that the rectification complained of had been undertaken contrary to section 79(2) of the Land Registration Act in the absence of evidence of the respondent’s consent. She argued that the legal consequences of such an unlawful act are governed by settled principles and invoked the decision in Macfoy -vs- United Africa Co. Ltd 1967 3 ALL ER 1169, for the proposition that an act undertaken contrary to the law is void and incapable of conferring legal rights. Counsel further contended that the applicant could not complain that the issue of rectification had not been pleaded or canvassed because he had himself introduced evidence concerning the rectification process and the alteration of title particulars, thereby entitling both the trial court and this Court to determine the legality of the process. 21.In conclusion, counsel maintained that the applicant’s proposed issues were either factual matters already determined by the courts, questions governed by settled jurisprudence, or issues that had never been raised before the courts below. Consequently, none of them satisfied the threshold for certification under Article 163(4)(b) of the Constitution, and the application ought to be dismissed with costs. 22.During the hearing, concerns were raised as to whether all the proposed questions truly arose from, and had been determined in, the proceedings before the courts below, and whether the issues identified by the applicant transcended the facts of the dispute or merely reflected dissatisfaction with concurrent findings on ownership and title. The Court also questioned whether the proposed issues had already been addressed by existing jurisprudence and whether the dispute, viewed in its proper context, presented anything beyond a conventional contest involving competing claims to land. These concerns formed a central aspect of the parties’ arguments on whether the constitutional threshold for certification had been met. 23.The Constitution defines the Supreme Court’s jurisdiction in precise terms. The Supreme Court has jurisdiction in respect of all appeals involving the interpretation or application of the Constitution. It has ordinary appellate jurisdiction, but that jurisdiction is limited to matters certified as being “of general public importance”. It has “exclusive original jurisdiction to hear and determine disputes relating to the elections to the office of President arising under Article 140;” and lastly, it may give an advisory opinion at the request of the national government, any State organ, or any county government with respect to any matter concerning County Government. 24.Germane to the issue before us is Article 163(4)(b) of the Constitution which provides:“(4)Appeals shall lie from the Court of Appeal to the Supreme Court- …. In any other case in which the Supreme Court, or the Court of Appeal, certifies that a matter of general public importance is involved subject to clause (5).” 25.The applicant has invoked the above Article by seeking leave to appeal to the Supreme Court. In effect, we are invited to determine whether the intended appeal raises issue(s) of general public importance. Simply put, does the application meet the tests for certification? In the case of Hermanus Phillipus Steyn -vs- Giovanni Gnecchi-Ruscone [2012] eKLR, this Court held:“The test for granting a certificate to appeal to the Supreme Court as a court of the last resort is different from the test for granting leave to appeal to an intermediate court-for example, from the High Court to the Court of Appeal. In such cases, the primary purpose of the appeal is correcting injustices and errors of fact or law and the general test is whether the appeal has realistic chances of succeeding. If that test is met, leave to appeal will be given as a matter of course. (See Machira t/a Machira & Company advocates -vs- Mwangi & Ano. (2002) 2KLR 391 and The Iran Nabuvat (1990) 3 ALL ER 9) …. In contrast, the requirement for certification by both the Court of Appeal and the Supreme Court is a genuine filtering process to ensure that only appeals with elements of general public importance reach the Supreme Court. The role of a Supreme Court was succinctly stated by the House of Lords in R v Secretary of State Exp. Eastaway (Lord Bingham) (2001) 1 ALL ER 27.” 26.The Supreme Court in Malcolm Bell -vs- Hon. Daniel Torotich arap Moi and Another, Supreme Court Application No. 1 of 2013 stated the governing principle as follows:“For a case to be certified as one involving a matter of general public importance, the intending appellant must satisfy the Court that the issue to be canvassed on appeal is one the determination of which transcends the circumstances of the particular case, and has a significant bearing on the public interest;i.Where the matter in respect of which certification is sought raises a point of law, the intending appellant must demonstrate that such a point is a substantial one, the determination of which will have significant bearing on the public interest;ii.Such question or questions of law must have arisen in the court or courts below, and must have been the subject of judicial determination;iii.Where the application for certification has been occasioned by a state of uncertainty in the law, arising from contradictory precedents, the Supreme Court may either resolve the uncertainty, as it may determine, or refer the matter to the Court of Appeal for its determination;iv.Mere apprehension of miscarriage of justice, a matter most apt for resolution [at earlier levels of the] superior Courts, is not a proper basis for granting certification for an appeal to the Supreme Court; the matter to be certified for a final appeal in the Supreme Court, must still fall within the terms of Article 163(4)(b) of the Constitution;v.The intending applicant has an obligation to identify and concisely set out the specific elements of ‘general public importance’ which he or she attributes to the matter for which certification is sought;vi.Determinations of fact in contests between parties are not, by [and of] themselves, a basis for granting certification for an appeal before the Supreme Court;vii.Issues of law of repeated occurrence in the general course of litigation may, in proper context, become ‘matters of general public importance’, so as to be a basis for appeal to the Supreme Court;viii.Questions of law that are, as a fact, or as appears from the very nature of things, set to affect considerable numbers of persons in general, or as litigants, may become ‘matters of general public importance’, justifying certification for final appeal in the Supreme Court;ix.Questions of law that are destined to continually engage the workings of the judicial organs, may become ‘matters of general public importance’, justifying certification for final appeal in the Supreme Court;x.Questions with a bearing on the proper conduct of the administration of justice, may become ‘matters of general public importance’, justifying final appeal in the Supreme Court.” 26.The applicant’s case rests solely on the assertion that the issues identified in the application constitute matters of general public importance. However, the mere formulation or enumeration of issues as matters of general public importance is not sufficient. An applicant must go further and demonstrate, with precision and cogent reasoning, that the issues fall within the constitutional and jurisprudential meaning of a matter of general public importance. As this Court observed in NAI Civil Application No. E046 of 2023, the concept of public interest extends beyond matters that merely attract attention or arise from private disputes. Quoting Stroud’s Judicial Dictionary, this Court noted that a matter of public or general interest is one in which a class of the community has a pecuniary interest or an interest affecting its legal rights or liabilities. Similarly, Black’s Law Dictionary defines public interest as a matter affecting the legal rights, liabilities or interests of the community at large, as opposed to the interests of particular individuals or localities. 27.The jurisprudence of the Supreme Court has consistently underscored this distinction. In Dhanjal Investments Limited -vs- Cosmos Holidays PLC [2021] eKLR, the Supreme Court emphasized that evidentiary issues are inherently specific to the parties before the court and therefore do not qualify as matters of general public importance. Likewise, in Housing Finance Company Limited & Another -vs- Sharok Kher Mohamed Ali Hirji & Another [2021] eKLR, the Court reiterated that the Supreme Court is not a forum for the resolution of factual disputes. It follows that where the issues raised are directed at the evaluation of evidence, the credibility of witnesses, the weight accorded to particular documents, or the correctness of factual findings reached by the courts below, such matters fall outside the ambit of Article 163(4)(b) of the Constitution. 26.We have carefully considered the application, the rival submissions, the record and the applicable law. The applicant’s written submissions anchor his case on four proposed questions which he contends raise matters of general public importance. Applying the principles set out in Hermanus Phillipus Steyn -vs- Giovanni Gnecchi-Ruscone [2013] eKLR, Malcolm Bell -vs- Daniel Toroitich arap Moi & Another, Supreme Court Application No. 1 of 2013, and Town Council of Awendo -vs- Nelson Oduor Onyango & 13 Others [2015] eKLR, we are not persuaded that any of the proposed issues satisfy the constitutional threshold for certification. 27.The first proposed issue is whether a Land Registrar can register title in favour of a company without verification of its incorporation documents. While framed as a question concerning the statutory duties of Land Registrars, the issue, as it arises in this case, is founded on the applicant’s contention that the respondent’s incorporation documents and CR-12 were not furnished to the Lands Registry before registration. That factual contention was disputed by the respondent and resolved by the ELC and this Court on the evidence presented. The proposed issue therefore does not disclose a substantial question of law of general public importance but invites a re-examination of factual findings already made. As the Supreme Court observed in the Dhanjal Investments Limited case and the Housing Finance Company Limited case, evidentiary matters and factual disputes do not constitute matters of general public importance. 26.The second proposed issue is whether a Land Registrar can issue a grant without an I.R. number and subsequently affix one. The difficulty with this issue is that it was neither pleaded nor determined before the ELC or this Court. One of the settled principles in Hermanus Phillipus Steyn and Malcolm Bell is that the question sought to be certified must have arisen in, and been determined by, the courts below. An issue that did not form part of the proceedings culminating in the impugned judgment cannot properly form the basis of certification. 26.The third proposed issue concerns whether the conduct of Land Registrars in the circumstances disclosed amounts to an abdication of their constitutional obligations under Article 40 of the Constitution. Although couched in constitutional terms, the complaint ultimately stems from the applicant’s challenge to the validity of the respondent’s title and the manner in which the evidence relating to registration was evaluated by the courts below. The applicant has not demonstrated any uncertainty in the law governing the duties of Land Registrars, nor has he identified any conflicting jurisprudence requiring resolution by the Supreme Court. More importantly, he has not shown how the issue transcends the circumstances of this dispute and bears significantly upon the public interest as required by Article 163(4)(b) of the Constitution. 26.The fourth proposed issue is whether procedural lapses in the rectification of a title necessarily invalidate the title being rectified. However, this Court expressly addressed the impugned rectification and found that it had not been undertaken in accordance with section 79 of the Land Registration Act because it was effected after the respondent had become the registered proprietor and without notice to or consent from the respondent. In determining that issue, this Court applied settled statutory provisions and established legal principles. The applicant has not demonstrated any uncertainty in the law relating to rectification of title, nor any conflicting decisions warranting further intervention by the Supreme Court. What is sought is a reconsideration of the manner in which settled principles were applied to the facts of this case. 26.Beyond the four proposed questions, we note that the dispute before the ELC and this Court concerned competing claims to ownership of the suit property and the legality of the parties’ respective roots of title. In determining those questions, both courts applied settled principles governing competing titles, the burden of proving the root of title and the doctrine of bona fide purchaser for value without notice. Those principles have received authoritative treatment in decisions such as Munyu Maina -vs- Hiram Gathiha Maina [2013] eKLR, Dina Management Limited -vs- County Government of Mombasa & 5 Others [2023] KESC 30 (KLR), and Sehmi & Another - vs- Tarabana Company Limited & 5 Others [2025] KESC 21 (KLR). The applicant has not demonstrated any uncertainty in those principles or any conflicting jurisprudence requiring clarification by the Supreme Court. 26.In the final analysis, the proposed issues neither transcend the circumstances of the parties nor raise substantial questions of law bearing significantly on the public interest. Rather, they seek, directly or indirectly, a reconsideration of concurrent findings of fact made by the ELC and affirmed by this Court. As repeatedly emphasized by the Supreme Court in the Hermanus Phillipus Steyn case, Malcolm Bell case and Dhanjal Investments Limited case, determinations of fact in contests between parties do not, by themselves, provide a basis for certification under Article 163(4)(b) of the Constitution. 26.Accordingly, we are not satisfied that the intended appeal raises any matter of general public importance warranting certification. The motion dated 22nd August 2024 is therefore dismissed with costs to the respondent. It is so ordered. DATED AND DELIVERED AT NAIROBI THIS 31ST DAY OF JULY 2026P. O. KIAGE........................................JUDGE OF APPEALA. O. MUCHELULE........................................JUDGE OF APPEALW. KORIR........................................JUDGE OF APPEALI certify that this is a true copy of the original.SignedDEPUTY REGISTRAR.