[2023] KETAT 297 (KLR)

Pesapal Limited v Commissioner of Domestic Taxes (Appeal 13 of 2021) [2023] KETAT 297 (KLR) (Civ) (26 May 2023) (Judgment)

Neutral citation: [2023] KETAT 297 (KLR)

Republic of Kenya

In the Tax Appeal Tribunal

Civil

Appeal 13 of 2021

E.N Wafula, Chair, Cynthia B. Mayaka, Grace Mukuha, AK Kiprotich & Jephthah Njagi, Members

May 26, 2023

Between

Pesapal Limited

Appellant

and

Commissioner of Domestic Taxes

Respondent

Judgment

Background 1. The Appellant is a payment service provider (“PSP”) duly licensed and regulated by the Central Bank of Kenya (“CBK”) under the National Payment Systems Act, 2011 and the National Payment Systems Regulations, 2014.

2. The Respondent is a principal officer appointed under and in accordance with Section 13 of the Kenya Revenue Authority Act, and Kenya Revenue Authority is charged with the responsibility of among others, assessment, collection, accounting and the general administration of tax revenue on behalf of the Government of Kenya.

3. The Respondent reviewed the books of account of the Appellant and assessed the Appellant an additional tax liability of Kshs. 233,252,949. 00.

4. The Appellant objected vide a letter dated 27th October, 2021 and the Respondent issued its objection decision on 26th November, 2021.

5. The Appellant thereafter lodged a Notice of Appeal dated 23rd December, 2021 and filed on 6thJanuary, 2022.

The Appeal 6. The Appellant in its Memorandum of Appeal dated 5th January 2022 and filed on 6th January 2022 cited the following ground for Appeal:i.That the Respondent erred in law and in fact by charging VAT on the commission earned by the Appellant. The commission is earned as a consideration for providing financial services which are exempt from VAT in accordance with the First Schedule Part II Paragraph 1(m) of the VAT Act, 2013.

Appellant’s Case 7. The Appellant’s case is premised on the hereunder filed documents and proceedings before the Tribunal: -i.The Appellant’s Statement of Facts dated 5th January, 2022 and filed on 6th January, 2022 together with the documents attached thereto.ii.The Appellant’s written submissions dated 30th August, 2022 and filed on 1st September, 2022.

8. That the Appellant provides a financial service on behalf of its merchants on a commission basis and as such the commission is exempted from VAT in accordance with the First Schedule of the VAT Act 2013 (“the Act”).

9. That the National Payments Service (PSP) include the following criteria which the Appellant satisfies: “A person, company or organization acting as provider in relation to sending, storing or processing of payments or the provision of other services in relation to payment services through any electronic system.”

10. The Appellant contends that it is exempted from paying VAT pursuant to Part II, Schedule 1 of the Act . That Paragraph 1(m) stipulates that financial service providers which offer services listed in the Schedule, on behalf of another on commission basis, are exempted from paying VAT. That the Appellant provides a financial service on behalf of its merchants on a commission basis as envisaged in the Act and that the financial services it provides are specifically set out in Paragraph 1(b). That Paragraph 1(b) of the Act exempts services relating to: “the issue, transfer, receipt or any other any other dealing with money, including money transfer services and accepting over the counter payments of household bills, but excluding the services of carriage of cash, restocking of cash machines, sorting or counting of money.”

11. That the Appellant’s principal activity is offering online payment services through an online payment system that can integrate with bank systems, mobile e-money transfer platforms such as MPesa, Airtel money, as well as other online payment channels such as VISA card, Mastercard or American Express.

12. That the Appellant provides a financial service on behalf of its merchants on a commission basis as such the commission is exempted from VAT in accordance with the First Schedule of the VAT Act 2013 (“the Act”).

13. That in the ordinary course of business, the Appellant engages with both customers and a merchant. That the merchant is the business which offers goods or services to the customer and is registered to use the Appellant’s payment system to receive payments while a customer is the person who uses Pesapal to pay the merchant for goods and services received from the merchant. That consequently the Appellant charges the merchant a commission for every transaction or payment made through the Appellant’s infrastructure.

14. That based on the foregoing the Appellant deals with the receipt and dealing of money on behalf of its merchants on a commission basis as envisaged under Paragraph 1(b) as read with Paragraph 1(m) of the Act. That the commission is paid solely on the basis of a financial service offered on behalf of third parties who are the various merchants who have registered to use the Appellant as a PSP.

15. That, in the Appellant’s opinion, the issues for determination in this matter are as detailed below:

a. Whether the Respondent’s VAT Additional Assessment issued on 26th February 2021 relating to commissions earned by the Appellant as a consideration for providing financial services is proper in law 16. That part II, Paragraph 1(m) of the First Schedule to the VAT Act, 2013 states as follows:“The supply of the following services shall be exempt supplies –(m)The provision of the above financial services on behalf of another on a commission basis.”

17. That the Appellant has submitted in its attachments bank statements from Kenya Commercial Bank clearly showing that the Appellant was dealing with money on behalf of its merchants and not merely a technology platform for payments to be made or received as alleged by the Respondent.

18. That it is not in dispute therefore that the commission was earned from the merchants for the provision of financial services on their behalf and therefore exempt from VAT.

19. That the VAT Additional Assessment Order of 26th February 2021 assessing VAT on the commissions earned was not proper in law and not issued within the precepts of the law.

b. Whether the Appellant’s objection issued on 26th November is proper in law 20. That the objection decision issued on 26th November 2021 was in order as far as all other tax assessments are concerned except for item No. B(iii) which confirmed the assessment on applicability of VAT on commission earned by the Appellant from its merchants.

21. That the Respondent retained the argument in its Statement of Facts that its objection decision and the reasons given therein reflect a correct interpretation of the VAT Act and that the Appellant does not qualify for the exemption provided for in the First Schedule of the VAT Act.

22. That the Respondent has retained its position that the Appellant offers a payment platform which is a technology solution upon which financial services can be offered. That the Appellant does not lend money, store money or receive monies as do financial institutions but rather facilitate all those processes from a technology enabling perspective. That the Appellant provides a technology platform for payments to be made or received by parties that either hold money on behalf of clients, merchants or the customer, hence the confirmation of the assessment.

23. That the Appellant deals with the receipt and dealing of money on behalf of its merchants on a commission basis as envisaged under Paragraph 1(b) as read with Paragraph 1(m) of the VAT Act. That the commission is paid solely on the basis of a financial service offered on behalf of a third party who are the various merchants who have registered to use the Appellant as a PSP.

Appellant’s Prayers 24. The Appellant prays that the Tribunal do find:-a.The Respondent’s Assessment Order is ultra vires the VAT Act and invalid.b.The Appellant’s objection to the VAT Assessment Order is valid and proper.c.To allow the Appeal with costs to the Appellant.

The Respondent’s Case 25. The Respondent’s case is premised on the following filed documents and proceedings before the Tribunal: -i.The Respondent’s Statement of Facts dated and filed on 4th February 2022 together with the documents attached thereto.ii.The Respondent’s written submissions dated and filed on 30th August, 2022.

26. That the Respondent issued a notice of assessment upon the Appellant on 26th February 2021 that touched on various tax heads, being: Income tax, VAT, withholding tax (Withholding Income Tax and withholding VAT) and Pay as You Earn (PAYE).

27. That the Appellant was assessed on 3rd March 2021 for incomes declared in its financial statement for the period 2015 - 2019 and it objected to the assessments on 22nd April 2021.

28. That vide an email dated 25th May 2021, the Respondent invited the Appellant to rectify the objection of 22nd April 2021 and bring it to compliance with Section 52(3) of the TPA by providing the following:i.Grounds of objectionii.Reasons in support of the grounds of objectioniii.Amendments required to be madeiv.Providing all supporting documentation, and finallyv.Paying taxes not in dispute or making a payment plan for the same.

29. That the Appellant responded vide an email dated 7th June 2021 effectively bringing the objection into compliance with Section 51(3) of the TPA as had been advised by the Respondent.

30. That the Respondent engaged the Appellant on various emails requesting for documents in support of the objection. That the Respondent thereafter issued an objection decision on 26th November 2021 covering the various tax heads; VAT, withholding VAT and Income Tax. That the objection decision further provided a schedule of taxes due amounting to Kshs. 76,836,162. 00 principal tax and Kshs. 33,982,992. 00 in penalties and interest.

31. That thereafter, dissatisfied with the Commissioner’s decision, the Appellant filed a Notice of Appeal dated 26th November 2021 indicating its intention to appeal against part of the decision.

32. That subsequently the Appellant filed a Memorandum of Appeal dated 5th January 2022 listing only one ground of appeal relating to VAT.

33. The Respondent contends that the objection decision and the reasons given therein reflect a correct interpretation of the VAT Act and the Appellant does not qualify for the exemption provided in the First Schedule to the VAT Act.

34. That a study of the Appellant’s business revealed that the company offers an online payment platform that integrates with banking IT systems, mobile e-money transfer platforms (e.g. Mpesa, Airtel money, etc) as well as other online payment channels (e.g. Visa card, Master card or American Express/ Amex. That the platform is used by the following four players: customer, merchant, issuing bank and acquiring bank.

35. That to classify the service offered by Pesapal as a financial service is analogous to a banking software vendor claiming to be offering a financial service. That while Pesapal’s clients are largely financial service providers, this does not define Pesapal’s products as a financial service. That what is essentially being supplied is a technology solution upon which financial services can be offered. That Pesapal does not lend money, store money or receive money. That Pesapal enables all these processes to be undertaken seamlessly from a technology enabling perspective.

36. The Respondent further submits that Section 5 of the VAT Act provides that VAT is chargeable on a taxable supply made by a registered person in Kenya.

37. That a taxable supply is defined under Section 2 of the VAT Act, 2013 as follows:“means a supply, other than an exempt supply, made in Kenya by a person in the course or furtherance of a business carried on by the person, including a supply made in connection with the commencement or termination of a business.”

38. That the term “exempt supplies” is defined under Section 2 of the VAT Act as follows:“means supplies specified in the First Schedule which are not subject to tax.”

39. That only those supplies listed under Part II of the First Schedule to the VAT Act 2013 qualify for exemption, one of which is financial services.

40. That for the Appellant to qualify for exemption, the services offered must be exempt as at least one of the financial services listed under Paragraph 1 Part II of the First Schedule to the VAT Act as produced below:“The supply of the following services shall be exempt supplies –1. The following financial services-(a)the operation of current, deposit or savings accounts, including the provision of account statements;(b)the issue, transfer, receipt or any other dealing with money, including money transfer services, and accepting over the counter payments of household bills, but excluding the services of carriage of cash, restocking of cash machines, sorting or counting of money;(c)issuing of credit and debit cards;(d)automated teller machine transactions, excluding the supply of automated teller machines and the software to run it;(e)telegraphic money transfer services;(f)foreign exchange transactions, including the supply of foreign drafts and international money orders;(g)cheque handling, processing, clearing and settlement, including special clearance or cancellation of cheques;(h)the making of any advances or the granting of any credit;(i)issuance of securities for money, including bills of exchange, promissory notes, money and postal orders;(j)the provision of guarantees, letters of credit and acceptance and other forms of documentary credit;(k)the issue, transfer, receipt or any other dealing with bonds, debentures, treasury bills, shares and stocks and other forms of security or secondary security;(l)the assignment of a debt for consideration;(m)The provision of the above financial services on behalf of another on a commission basis;(n)deleted by Act No. 10 of 2018;(o)any services set out in items (a) to (n) that are structured in conformity with Islamic finance.”

41. That the Appellant’s contention that the business is exempt under sub-paragraph 1(m) as read together with sub-paragraph 1(b) of the First Schedule to the VAT Act, 2013 is not true.

42. That it is the Appellant’s own admission that it engages with both the customer and merchant in the ordinary course of business and deals with money transacted by both parties through its online platform then in return receives commission from the transacting parties.

43. That the service in relation to which the commission is received by the Appellant is the online payment platform (technology) and not any of the services specified under sub-paragraph 1(b) of the First Schedule to the VAT Act, 2013.

44. That the Appellant’s contention that the business falls under “any other dealing with money” as provided under sub-paragraph 1(b) of the First Schedule to the VAT Act, 2013 when it interacts with merchants and customers is erroneous.

45. That the phrase “or any other dealing with money” must be interpreted within the context of the preceding three terms “issue”, “transfer” and “receipt” (Ejusdem generis).

46. That for the Appellant to be seen to be dealing with money within the context and meaning of sub-paragraph 1(b), the Appellant must be an “authorised dealer” as defined under Section 2 of the Central Bank of Kenya Act, Cap 491 of the laws of Kenya.“authorised dealer” means an authorized bank, authorized bureau, authorized mortgaged finance company, an authorised money remittance provider or an authorised microfinance bank licensed by the Bank under section 33B.”

47. That the Appellant is not an authorised dealer but a “Payment Service Provider” licensed under the National Payment System Act, No. 39 of 2011.

48. That the VAT Act 2013 provides for exemption of the activity/ service and not the person offering the service. That it should be clear that even if the Appellant was a financial (or payment) service provider, the activity carried on by the Appellant’s business does not fall within the financial services (activity) which are exempted under the First Schedule to the VAT Act, 2013 Part II(1).

49. That Section 2 of the National Payment System Act, No. 39 of 2011 defines a payment service provider as follows:“(i)a person, company or organisation acting as provider in relation to sending, receiving, storing or processing of payments or the provision of other services in relation to payment services through any electronic system;(ii)a person, company or organisation which owns, possesses, operates, manages or controls a public switched network for the provision of payment services; or(iii)any other person, company or organisation that processes or stores data on behalf of such payment service providers.”

50. That it is important to note the use of “or” in the definition. The term “or” has a disjunctive function when interpreting provisions of the law. That this makes each of the three definitions of payment service provider independent from each other.

51. That in the case of Raila Amolo Odinga & Another vs. Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission & 4 Others, petition No. 4 of 2017, the Supreme Court under Paragraph 193 stated “… the current Elections Act (Section 83) the term used is “or” instead of “and” appearing in the English Acts. The use of the word “or” clearly makes the two limbs disjunctive under our law.”

52. That further in the case of Adrian Kamotho Njenga vs. Kenya School of Law (2017) eKLR where under Paragraph 41, the judge stated “… Furthermore, paragraph 1(a) contains the disjunctive word “or” at the end of the paragraph just before the beginning of paragraph 1(b). That means qualifications under paragraph 1(a) are distinct from those under paragraph 1(b). That can only mean one thing – that the two sub-paragraphs apply to two different and distinct categories of applicants.”

53. That from the above definition and case laws, it can be interpreted that there are 3 separate distinct categories upon which a person/institution can be licensed as a payment service provider. That further, the Respondent submits that the Act does not limit a payment service provider to an organisation or individual that provides financial services under Part II of the First Schedule of the VAT Act.

54. That an institution can be a payment service provider without necessarily having to be in the business of offering a financial service. That in summary not all payment service providers are financial service providers and being a licensed payment service provider is not in any measure, conclusive evidence that the business activity done is a financial service as contemplated under Part II of the First Schedule to the VAT Act.

55. That the Appellant’s business can be defined under Paragraph (ii) of Section 2 of the National Payment System Act. That this is because the Appellant owns and operates a publicly switched network that facilitates the provision of payment services. That the Appellant’s business is to provide an online payment platform. That at no point does the provision of the financial service switch from the clients to the Appellant. That the Appellant’s product is the technology and not the financial service.

56. That therefore the Respondent is right in assessing VAT on the Appellant’s platform. That further, the Appellant has neither demonstrated that its product is exclusively a financial service nor made the distinction between the technology and the financial service.

57. That with the above in mind, the Respondent submits that the fundamental question to be answered is “whether the provision of a technological product to facilitate payment is a financial service as envisaged under Part II of the First Schedule to the VAT Act.”

58. That in Law Society of Kenya vs. Attorney General & Another [2019] eKLR at paragraph 39 the Judge stated “Therefore intention is construed by scrutinising the language used in the provision which inevitably discloses its purpose and effect. It is the task of a court to give literal meaning to the words used and the language of the provision must be taken as conclusive unless there is an expressed legislative intention to the contrary.”

59. That the VAT Act, clearly in the definition of exempt supplies, demands that only the specific supplies listed under the First Schedule qualify as exempt supplies. That there is no ambiguity in the definition under Section 2 nor in the First Schedule to warrant a different interpretation of the First Schedule beyond what is listed.

60. That in Benard James Ndeda & 6 Others vs. Magistrates and Judges Vetting Board & 2 Others [2018] eKLR, the court stated as follows:“Paragraph 54 “It is not the duty of the Court either to enlarge the scope of the legislation or the intention of the legislature when the language of the provision is plain and meaningless. The Court cannot rewrite, recast or reframe the legislation for the very good reason that it has no power to legislate. The power to legislate has not been conferred on the courts. The Court cannot add words to a statute or read words into it which are not there… Courts decide what the law is and not what it should be. The Court of course adopts a construction which will carry out the obvious intention but cannot legislate itself.…Paragraph 56 ‘It is trite law that in interpreting the provisions of a statute the Court should apply the golden rule of construction. The plain meaning of the language in the statute is the safest guide to follow in construing the statute. According to the golden or general rule of construction the words of a statute must be given their ordinary, literal and grammatical meaning and if by doing is is ascertained that the words are clear and unambiguous, then effect should be given to their ordinary meaning unless it is apparent that such a literal construction falls within one of those exceptional cases in which it would be permissible for a court of law to depart from such a literal construction, e.g. where it leads to a manifest absurdity, inconsistency, hardship or a result contrary to the legislative intent.”

61. That the Respondent urges the Tribunal to adopt a similar interpretation of the First Schedule to the VAT Act and ask itself “Is providing a technological product that integrates with banking IT systems, mobile e-money transfer platforms (e.g. Mpesa) as well as other online payment channels a financial service as contemplated under Part II of the First Schedule of the VAT Act 2013?” That the Respondent’s submission is that it is not. That the exemption is exclusively reserved for financial services. That therefore the Appellant’s business activity is not within the purview of exempt supplies as defined under the Act hence are not exempt from VAT.

Respondent’s Prayers 62. The Respondent prayed that:a.The objection decision dated 26th November 2022 be upheld as a true reflection of the Appellant’s tax liabilities.b.The Appeal herein be dismissed with costs to the Respondent.

Issues for Determination 63. The Tribunal upon due consideration of the pleadings and documentation filed by both parties is of the considered view that the Appeal raises the following issue for its determination:Whether the Respondent erred by raising the VAT tax assessments on the Appellant.

Analysis and Determination 64. The Tribunal having ascertained the issues for determination as set out above proceeds to deal with the same as hereunder:“Whether the Respondent erred by raising the VAT tax assessments on the Appellant.”

65. This dispute arose from the Respondent’s assessment of VAT on incomes declared in the Appellant’s financial statements for the period 2015 to 2019.

66. In this regard, the Respondent sought to tax commissions earned by the Appellant for providing services that the Respondent deems to be a technology solution upon which financial services can be offered. Further, the Respondent contends that the Appellant does not lend money, store money or receive money and therefore the services it offers to its clients are not exempt as per Paragraph 1 Part II of the First Schedule to the VAT Act.

67. On its part, the Appellant contends that it deals with the receipt and dealing of money on behalf of its merchants on a commission basis as envisaged under Paragraph 1(b) as read with Paragraph 1(m) of the VAT Act. That the commission is paid solely on the basis of a financial service offered on behalf of a third party who are the various merchants who have registered to use the Appellant as a Payment Service Provider.

68. From an analysis of the two parties’ cases, the Tribunal has established that the Appellant is a Payment Service Provider (PSP) as defined under Section 2 of the National Payment System Act, No. 39 of 2011 which defines a payment service provider as:“(i)a person, company or organisation acting as provider in relation to sending, receiving, storing or processing of payments or the provision of other services in relation to payment services in relation to payment services through any electronic system;(ii)a person, company or organisation which owns, possesses, operates, manages or controls a public switched network for the provision of payment services; or(ii)any other person, company or organisation that processes or stores data on behalf of such payment service providers.”

69. The Tribunal further notes that Paragraph 1 Part II of the First Schedule to the VAT Act states as follows regarding exempt financial services:“The supply of the following services shall be exempt supplies –The following financial services-(a)the operation of current, deposit or savings accounts, including the provision of account statements;(b)the issue, transfer, receipt or any other dealing with money, including money transfer services, and accepting over the counter payments of household bills, but excluding the services of carriage of cash, restocking of cash machines, sorting or counting of money;(c)issuing of credit and debit cards;(d)automated teller machine transactions, excluding the supply of automated teller machines and the software to run it;(e)telegraphic money transfer services;(f)foreign exchange transactions, including the supply of foreign drafts and international money orders;(g)cheque handling, processing, clearing and settlement, including special clearance or cancellation of cheques;(h)the making of any advances or the granting of any credit;(i)issuance of securities for money, including bills of exchange, promissory notes, money and postal orders;(j)the provision of guarantees, letters of credit and acceptance and other forms of documentary credit;(k)the issue, transfer, receipt or any other dealing with bonds, debentures, treasury bills, shares and stocks and other forms of security or secondary security;(l)the assignment of a debt for consideration;(m)The provision of the above financial services on behalf of another on a commission basis;(n)deleted by Act No. 10 of 2018;(o)any services set out in items (a) to (n) that are structured in conformity with Islamic finance.”

70. From the parties’ pleadings, it is clear that the parties are in disagreement over what the services of the Appellant constitute and specifically whether these services are covered under Paragraphs 1(b) and 1(m) of Part II of the First Schedule to the VAT Act which exempts “the issue, transfer, receipt or any other dealing with money, including money transfer services, and accepting over the counter payments of household bills, but excluding the services of carriage of cash, restocking of cash machines, sorting or counting of money” and “he provision of the above financial services on behalf of another on a commission basis”.

71. The Tribunal thereafter sought to establish whether the VAT Act 2013 defines “supply of services”. In this regard, the Tribunal established that Section 2 of the Act states as follows regarding supply of services:“supply of services” means anything done that is not a supply of goods or money, including—(a)the performance of services for another person;(b)the grant, assignment, or surrender of any right;(c)the making available of any facility or advantage; or(d)the toleration of any situation or the refraining from the doing of any act;

72. Based on the above definition, it is clear that it is not in dispute that the Appellant is supplying a service to its clientele. Specifically, the Appellant’s business falls under (a) which is “the performance of services for another person”.

73. Further, the Tribunal is clear that the Appellant, in earning commissions for the business it undertakes, is a clear indication that the services it supplies are on behalf of other parties.

74. an analysis of the pleadings by both parties also brings out the picture that the payment processing system/platform which the Appellant has been registered by the Central Bank to provide amounts to provision of an information technology system that is intended to facilitate payments for its clients. It does not in any way amount to provision of financial service.

75. The activities that the Appellant is carrying out are therefore in tandem with the licence that was issued to it. Section 1 of the National Payment System Act has defined a payment system as follows:-“payment system’ means a system or arrangement that enables payments to be effected between a payer and a beneficiary, or facilitates the circulation of money, and includes any instruments and procedures that relate to the system.”

76. By its own admission the Appellant has conceded to being licensed under the NPS Act and produced evidence to that effect. It cannot therefore purport that it is licensed to carry out activities, like the provision of financial services, which are beyond the scope of the NPS Act.

77. The preamble of the National Payment System (NPS) Act, under which the Appellant was licensed explains the purpose and reason for the enactment of the NPS Act as follows:“‘an Act of Parliament to make provision for the regulation and supervision of payment systems and payment service providers, and for connected purposes”.

78. It is thus clear that an entity that obtains a licence under the NPS is licensed to act as a service provider for payment systems. Such a licence does not give such an entity the power to offer financial services. The only way through which the Appellant could qualify to offer financial service would be if it were to be registered as a financial institution under Section 5 of the Banking Act.

79. The Tribunal reiterates its decision in TAT 760 of 2021, Fivespot Kenya Ltd vs. Commissioner of Domestic Taxes where it held that the provision of a payment processing system/ platform, licensed under the Central Bank of Kenya, does not amount to the provision of a financial service.

80. The Tribunal is in the circumstances of the view that the Appellant is not a financial service provider as envisaged under the VAT Act and therefore does not qualify for exemption within the context and meaning of sub-paragraph 1(b) or sub-paragraph 1(m) of the Paragraph 1 Part II of the First Schedule to the VAT Act.

Final Decision 81. On the basis of the foregoing analysis the Tribunal finds that the Appeal is not merited and therefore fails. The Orders that commend themselves are as follows:-a.The Appeal be and is hereby set aside.b.The Respondent’s objection decision dated 26th November, 2021 be and is hereby upheld.c.Each party to bear its own costs.

82. It is so ordered.

DATED AND DELIVERED AT NAIROBI ON THIS 26TH DAY OF MAY, 2023………………………ERIC N. WAFULACHAIRMAN….…… ………………………CYNTHIA MAYAKAMEMBER..........................GRACE MUKUHAMEMBER………………………………ABRAHAM KIPROTICHMEMBER........................JEPHTHAH NJAGIMEMBER