[2014] KEHC 8863 (KLR)
The court found that the plaintiffs' pleadings, specifically paragraphs 5 and 6 of the plaint, disclosed a reasonable cause of action by alleging that the suit property was fraudulently registered in the name of the 1st defendant, thereby denying the plaintiffs their proprietary interest. The court held that the...
Source-derived case information.
- Citation
- [2014] KEHC 8863 (KLR)
- Parties
- Plaintiff: Peter Kipkemboi Cheruiyot; Plaintiff: Charles Arap Maiywa; Plaintiff: Cheruiyot Arap Chepkwony; Plaintiff: Esther Chelang'at; Plaintiff: Jonathan Mibei; Plaintiff: Chepchilat Arap Maina; Plaintiff: Philip Rugut; Defendant: James Finlay (K) Limited; Defendant: County Council of Kipsigis; Defendant: Attorney General
- Court
- High Court
- Court Station
- High Court at Nyandarua
- Jurisdiction
- Kenya
- Case Number
- Civil Suit 63 of 2005
- Procedural Posture
- Civil Suit / Ruling on Chamber Summons to Strike Out Plaint
- Outcome
- application dismissed
- Judges
- L Waithaka, JK Sergon
- Legal Topics
- Striking Out Pleadings, Limitation of Actions, Fraudulent Land Registration, Proprietary Interest, Summary Dismissal
- Source Language
- en
Source-derived case record
Summary, issues, holding and outcome
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Parties
Peter Kipkemboi Cheruiyot
Plaintiff
Charles Arap Maiywa
Plaintiff
Cheruiyot Arap Chepkwony
Plaintiff
Esther Chelang'at
Plaintiff
Jonathan Mibei
Plaintiff
Chepchilat Arap Maina
Plaintiff
Philip Rugut
Plaintiff
James Finlay (K) Limited
Defendant
County Council of Kipsigis
Defendant
Attorney General
Defendant
Procedural Posture
Civil Suit / Ruling on Chamber Summons to Strike Out Plaint
Legal Issues
- 1 Whether the plaint discloses a reasonable cause of action.
- 2 Whether the plaintiffs' claim is time barred under the Limitation of Actions Act.
- 3 Whether the suit should be struck out summarily for being hopeless or incurable by amendment.
Ratio Decidendi
The court found that the plaintiffs' pleadings, specifically paragraphs 5 and 6 of the plaint, disclosed a reasonable cause of action by alleging that the suit property was fraudulently registered in the name of the 1st defendant, thereby denying the plaintiffs their proprietary interest. The court held that the assertion that the land was acquired in 1926 was not supported by the plaint but was an averment in the defence, and there was no evidence before the court to support the claim that the suit was time barred. The court emphasized that summary dismissal is only appropriate where a suit is so hopeless as to be incapable of redemption, which was not the case here. Accordingly, the...
Court Disposition
application dismissed
Orders
- The chamber summons dated 6th June, 2007 is dismissed.
- Costs will be in the cause.
Full Case Text
Judgment text and source record
44 paragraphs
REPUBLIC OF KENYA
IN THE HIGH COURT OF KENYA
AT KERICHO
CIVIL SUIT NO. 63 OF 2005
PETER KIPKEMBOI CHERUIYOT…..............1ST PLAINTIFF
CHARLES ARAP MAIYWA …....................... 2ND PLAINTIFF
CHERUIYOT ARAP CHEPKWONY …............ 3RD PLAINTIFF
ESTHER CHELANG'AT …............................ 4TH PLAINTIFF
JONATHAN MIBEI …................................... 5TH PLAINTIFF
CHEPCHILAT ARAP MAINA ….................... 6TH PLAINTIFF
PHILIP RUGUT …........................................7TH PLAINTIFF
(suing as a representative capacity)
VERSUS
JAMES FINLAY (K) LIMITED………...........1ST DEFENDANT
COUNTY COUNCIL OF KIPSIGIS…….…......2ND DEFENDANT
ATTORNEY GENERAL ….......................... 3RD DEFENDANT
RULING
The Applicant, James Finlay (K) Limited filed a Chamber Summons dated 6th June, 2007 under Section 3Aof the Civil Procedure Act,Order VI Rules 13(1) (a) and Order VII Rule 2 and 3 of the Civil Procedure Rulesseeking that the plaint be struck out and the plaintiff's suit dismissed with costs. The application is made on the grounds inter alia,that the Plaintiffs claim as pleaded is not cognizable in law and does not show justiciable issues and that in any event the Plaintiff's claim is time barred.
The application came up for ruling on 22nd June, 2011 where my brother GBM Kariuki J. (as then was) vacated delivery of a ruling on the application so as to afford the plaintiffs an opportunity to be heard. He directed the applicant to serve the plaintiffs with the present application.
The Plaintiffs opposed the application. The 1st Plaintiff filed a Response dated 24th May, 2012 on the grounds inter aliathat the plaintiffs have a reasonable cause of action raising justiciable issues and that they have a right to be heard.
The parties made their oral submissions before me on the 29th August 2013. Learned Counsel, Mr. Njerusubmitted on behalf of the Applicant. Mr. Peter Cheruiyot (1st plaintiff), Charles Arap Maiywa ( 2nd Plaintiff) and Philip Ragut(7th Plaintiff) submitted for and on behalf of the plaintiffs.
The learned Counsel submitted that according to the plaint, the suit land was acquired in 1926 and therefore a claim instituted by the plaintiffs in 2005 is time barred. He further submitted that the plaintiffs do not disclose any cause of action against the 1st defendant and that the orders sought against the 1st defendant are not cognizable in law. He thus urged the court to allow the application.
In response, the plaintiffs submitted that the application is brought with the intent to defeat the ends of justice. They urged the court not to dwell on technicalities and allow the matter to proceed to full hearing. They further submitted that they had gone to great length to deposit security of costs and dismissing the matter at interlocutory stage would be greatly prejudicial.
The duty of the court when faced with an application to strike out the plaint and dismiss the suit is to determine whether there is reasonable cause of action. It is also trite law that courts ought to exercise utmost caution before striking out a suit summarily, for the reason it does not disclose a reasonable cause of action. In the decision in DT Dobie & Co vs Muchina (1982) KLR 1the court held that:
“No suit ought to be summarily dismissed unless it appears so hopeless that it plainly discloses no reasonable cause of action and is so weak as to be beyond redemption and incurable by amendment. If a suit shows a mere semblance of a cause of action, provided it can be injected with real life by amendment, it ought to be allowed to go forward, for a court of justice ought not to act in darkness without the full facts of a case before it.”
So does this suit disclose a cause of action as claimed by the plaintiffs? I have considered the application and submissions by all the parties. I have read the plaint and at paragraph 5 and 6 it states as follows;
“the plaintiffs at all material times relevant to this suit were ordinary local inhabitants of the area now occupied by the 1st Defendant measuring 6483 hectares or thereabouts.......................................
the plaintiffs state that in unknown period the said parcels of land were fraudulently registered in the name of the 1st Defendant by the 3rd Defendant under a leasehold interest, of 999 years with regard to the plaintiffs proprietary interest and or revisionary interest thereby denying the plaintiffs the use and occupation of the said parcels of land thus occasioning the plaintiffs to suffer loss and damages”.
From the extract, the gist of the plaintiffs claim is that whilst in occupation of the suit property it was fraudulently transferred in the name of the defendants without due regard of their proprietary interest and as a result seek general damages and compensation from the defendants. To my mind, they have demonstrated a reasonable cause of action.
The last issue for determination is whether the claim is time barred. Counsel submitted that the plaintiff's in their pleadings stated that the land was acquired in 1926 and therefore a claim instituted in 2005 is time barred. Having perused the pleadings, I do not find anywhere in the plaint where the plaintiffs stated the land was acquired in 1926. This is an averment by the 1st defendant in his defence. Furthermore, there is no evidence to support this assertion and therefore this Court is not in a position to decide on the matter at this stage. The matter can be revisited at a more appropriate time in the course of the full hearing.
11. For these reasons, the chamber summons filed on 6th June, 2007 is therefore dismissed.
Costs will be in the cause.
Dated, signed and delivered on this 11 day of February 2014.
L N WAITHAKA
JUDGE.
PRESENT
Judgment delivered by J.K Sergon J on behalf of Lady Justice L N Waithaka
1st & 7th Plaintiffs present in person
N/A for 2nd , 4th & 5th Plaintiffs
3rd & 6th plaintiffs deceased
Sigira holding brief for P Njeru for 1st Defendant
Sigira or 2nd Defendant
J K SERGON
JUDGE