https://new.kenyalaw.org/akn/ke/judgment/kemc/2026/328

Placid View Properties Limited t/a Ole Sereni Hotel v Kenya Power and Lighting Company Ltd (Civil Suit E4833 of 2025) [2026] KEMC 328 (KLR) (22 July 2026) (Ruling) Neutral citation: [2026] KEMC 328 (KLR) Republic of Kenya In the Milimani Commercial Chief Magistrate's Courts Civil Suit E4833 of 2025 LA Mumassabba, PM July 22, 2026 Between Placid View Properties Limited t/a Ole Sereni Hotel Plaintiff and Kenya Power And Lighting Company Limited Defendant Ruling Introduction 1.Before this Court for determination is the Defendant's Notice of Preliminary Objection dated 14th October 2025 challenging this Court's jurisdiction to entertain the Plaintiff's suit. The objection is directed at the Plaint dated 3rd March 2025, wherein the Plaintiff seeks compensation amounting to Kshs. 4,197,964.00 for alleged damage occasioned by the Defendant's negligent supply of electricity, resulting in voltage fluctuations that allegedly damaged the Plaintiff's electrical equipment. 2.The Defendant contends that the dispute falls within the exclusive statutory mandate of the Energy and Petroleum Regulatory Authority (EPRA) and the dispute resolution framework established under the Energy Act, No. 1 of 2019. It argues that the Plaintiff ought first to have exhausted the remedies provided under the Act before invoking the jurisdiction of this Court. The Plaintiff opposes the objection and maintains that the suit is an ordinary tort claim founded on negligence and is therefore properly before this Court. 3.The Court has carefully considered the Notice of Preliminary Objection, the pleadings, the Plaintiff's written submissions filed on 15th June 2026, the Defendant's Written Submissions dated 2nd June 2026, the statutory provisions relied upon and the authorities cited by both parties. The Plaintiff's Submissions 4.Counsel for the Plaintiff submitted that the Preliminary Objection is founded on an erroneous interpretation of the Energy Act and proceeds on the mistaken assumption that every dispute touching on electricity automatically falls within EPRA's jurisdiction. 5.It was submitted that the Plaintiff's claim is a common law action in negligence arising from the Defendant's alleged failure to exercise reasonable care in supplying stable electricity. The Plaintiff argued that it seeks compensation for property damage and not the determination of any regulatory issue arising under the Energy Act. 6.The Plaintiff further submitted that the Defendant has improperly conflated the statutory roles of EPRA and the Energy and Petroleum Tribunal. 7.According to the Plaintiff, Section 9 establishes EPRA while Section 10 merely outlines its regulatory functions which include licensing, inspection, regulation, enforcement of standards, consumer protection and compliance. None of those provisions empowers EPRA to adjudicate tortious claims or award damages for negligence. 8.The Plaintiff further argued that Section 36 establishes the Energy and Petroleum Tribunal whose jurisdiction is confined to disputes specifically contemplated under the Energy Act involving licensees, regulatory decisions and matters arising under the Act. Since the Plaintiff is merely a consumer alleging negligence, its claim falls outside the Tribunal's jurisdiction. 9.Counsel further submitted that the Defendant failed to identify any statutory mechanism through which EPRA receives evidence, determines negligence, assesses special damages and enters judgment for compensation. Indeed, screenshots of the electronic filing system were annexed to demonstrate that no such procedure exists. 10.Regarding jurisdiction, the Plaintiff submitted that Articles 159 and 169 of the Constitution together with Sections 4 and 7 of the Magistrates' Courts Act confer jurisdiction upon subordinate courts to determine civil claims founded on negligence. 11.The Plaintiff distinguishes the authorities relied upon by the Defendant and instead places reliance on Kenya Power & Lighting Co. Ltd & Another v Livingstone Mbugua [2022] KEHC 10154 (KLR), where the High Court upheld the jurisdiction of the Magistrates' Court in determining a negligence claim arising from electricity supply. The Plaintiff argues that this authority confirms that civil Courts routinely determine claims involving power surges, electrocution and damage to property without requiring prior recourse to EPRA or the Energy and Petroleum Tribunal. 12.The Plaintiff also argues that the Defendant's Preliminary Objection fails the test established in Mukisa Biscuit Manufacturing Co. Ltd v West End Distributors Ltd [1969] EA 696 because it is founded on disputed facts and an erroneous interpretation of the Energy Act rather than on a pure point of law. The objection therefore does not qualify as a proper preliminary objection. 13.The Plaintiff urges the Court to find that neither EPRA nor the Energy and Petroleum Tribunal possesses jurisdiction over the present negligence claim, that the Magistrates' Court is properly seized of the matter, and that the Defendant's Preliminary Objection should be dismissed with costs for being founded on a misinterpretation of the Energy Act and for failing to meet the legal threshold applicable to preliminary The Defendant's Submissions 14.The Defendant submitted that the Preliminary Objection raises a pure point of law and therefore satisfies the principles laid down in Mukisa Biscuit Manufacturing Co. Ltd v West End Distributors Ltd [1969] EA 696. 15.Counsel argued that jurisdiction is everything and once challenged must be determined before any further proceedings. 16.The Defendant submitted that disputes concerning electricity supply, voltage fluctuations, outages and power surges involve technical questions falling exclusively within the specialized mandate of EPRA established under the Energy Act. 17.According to the Defendant, Parliament deliberately established an expert regulatory body and a statutory dispute resolution framework to deal with disputes arising from electricity supply. Litigants should therefore exhaust those mechanisms before approaching ordinary Courts. 18.The Defendant relied upon Kenya Power & Lighting Co. Ltd v Albert Mbugua Ng'ang'a [2022] eKLR and John Githinji & Another v Kenya Power & Lighting Co. Ltd [2021] eKLR, where Courts emphasized the doctrine of exhaustion in disputes concerning electricity supply. 19.Counsel also relied on Owners of the Motor Vessel "Lillian S" v Caltex Oil (Kenya) Ltd, submitting that jurisdiction is the foundation of judicial authority and once absent, the Court must immediately down its tools. 20.The Defendant therefore urged the Court to uphold the Preliminary Objection, strike out the Plaint dated 3rd March 2025, direct the Plaintiff to pursue the statutory dispute resolution mechanism under the Energy Act and award costs to the Defendant. Analysis and Determination and Issues for Determination 21.Having considered the Pleadings and Rival Submissions, the Court is of the view that the following issues arise for determination:a.Whether the Preliminary Objection raises a proper Preliminary Objection in law.b.Whether this Court lacks jurisdiction to hear and determine the Plaintiff's suit.c.Whether the Plaintiff ought first to have exhausted the dispute resolution mechanism under the Energy Act before filing suit.d.Who should bear the costs of the Preliminary Objection. (A) Whether the Preliminary Objection raises a proper preliminary objection 22.The law governing Preliminary Objections is now settled. 23.In Mukisa Biscuit Manufacturing Co. Ltd v West End Distributors Ltd [1969] EA 696, Law JA stated that—"A Preliminary Objection consists of a point of law which has been pleaded, or which arises by clear implication out of pleadings, and which if argued as a Preliminary Point may dispose of the suit." 24.Sir Charles Newbold P further stated that:"A Preliminary Objection is in the nature of what used to be a demurrer... It raises a pure point of law..." 25.The Defendant's objection challenges the jurisdiction of this Court. Jurisdiction is a pure question of law. It neither requires viva voce evidence nor determination of contested facts. 26.If upheld, it would dispose of the suit in limine. 27.The Court therefore agrees with both parties that the objection satisfies the Mukisa Biscuit threshold and is properly before the Court. 28.The real issue is whether the objection has merit. (B) Whether this Court lacks jurisdiction under the Energy Act 29.The question of jurisdiction is not merely procedural; it is foundational. 30.In Owners of the Motor Vessel "Lillian S" v Caltex Oil (Kenya) Ltd [1989] KLR 1, Nyarangi JA famously held:"Jurisdiction is everything. Without it, a court has no power to make one more step." 31.The Supreme Court reiterated the same principle in Samuel Kamau Macharia & Another v Kenya Commercial Bank Ltd & 2 Others [2012] eKLR, holding that a court derives its jurisdiction only from the Constitution or statute and cannot arrogate jurisdiction to itself. 32.The Defendant argues that Sections 9, 10 and 36 of the Energy Act confer exclusive jurisdiction upon EPRA. 33.The Court has carefully examined those provisions. 34.Section 9 merely establishes EPRA as the regulator of the energy sector. 35.Section 10 enumerates its regulatory functions including licensing, inspection, enforcement, consumer protection, tariff approval and regulatory oversight. 36.Notably absent is any provision empowering EPRA to adjudicate negligence claims or award compensatory damages arising from tort. 37.Similarly, Section 36 establishes the Energy and Petroleum Tribunal and defines its jurisdiction over disputes arising under the Act, particularly those involving regulatory decisions, licensees and matters expressly contemplated by the legislation. 38.The Defendant has urged the Court to interpret those provisions broadly so as to encompass every dispute touching on electricity supply. 39.With respect, such an interpretation would amount to reading into the statute words that Parliament did not enact. 40.Where Parliament intends to oust the jurisdiction of ordinary courts, it does so expressly and in unequivocal language. 41.No such express ouster appears in the Energy Act. 42.Indeed, the Plaintiff's cause of action is founded on negligence. 43.The Court will ultimately be required to determine whether:a.The Defendant owed the Plaintiff a duty of care;b.That duty was breached;c.The breach caused damage; andd.The Plaintiff has proved its loss. 44.Those are classic elements of the tort of negligence falling squarely within the jurisdiction of civil courts. 45.The mere fact that the alleged negligence occurred in the context of electricity supply does not automatically convert the dispute into a regulatory matter. 46.Nothing in the Energy Act deprives subordinate courts of jurisdiction over common law claims for negligence merely because the Defendant is a licensed electricity distributor. 47.The Court therefore finds that the Magistrates' Court retains jurisdiction under Articles 159 and 169 of the Constitution and Sections 4 and 7 of the Magistrates' Courts Act to hear and determine the present claim. (C) Whether the Plaintiff was required to exhaust the dispute resolution mechanism under the Energy Act before instituting this suit 48.The Defendant further submits that even if the Court were to find that it has jurisdiction, the Plaintiff ought first to have presented its grievance before the Energy and Petroleum Regulatory Authority (EPRA) in accordance with the doctrine of exhaustion. 49.The doctrine of exhaustion is now firmly embedded in Kenyan jurisprudence.It is founded on the principle that where Parliament has established a specialized dispute resolution mechanism, parties should ordinarily pursue that mechanism before invoking the jurisdiction of the Courts. 50.The locus classicus on the doctrine remains Speaker of the National Assembly v Karume [1992] KLR 21, where the Court of Appeal held that: "Where there is a clear procedure for the redress of any particular grievance prescribed by the Constitution or an Act of Parliament, that procedure should be strictly followed." 51.The rationale behind the doctrine is to respect legislative intent by allowing specialized bodies to exercise the mandates conferred upon them by statute before courts intervene. It also promotes institutional efficiency, allows technical disputes to be resolved by expert bodies, and minimizes unnecessary litigation. 52.Similarly, in Geoffrey Muthinja Kabiru & 2 Others v Samuel Munga Henry & 1756 Others [2015] eKLR, the Court of Appeal observed that: "It is imperative that where a dispute resolution mechanism exists outside courts, the same be exhausted before the jurisdiction of the courts is invoked." 53.The Defendant has heavily relied upon these authorities to argue that Parliament intended disputes relating to electricity supply to be dealt with under the framework established by the Energy Act. According to the Defendant, the Plaintiff ought to have first lodged its complaint before EPRA before filing the present proceedings. 54.The Plaintiff takes a different view. It submits that the doctrine is inapplicable because neither the Energy Act nor any subsidiary legislation establishes a procedure through which EPRA hears and determines ordinary negligence claims for damages arising from power surges. Counsel further submits that the Defendant has failed to point to any statutory provision empowering EPRA to determine liability in negligence, receive oral evidence, assess damages, or enter Judgment for compensation. 55.I have carefully considered these Rival Submissions. The doctrine of exhaustion, important as it is, is not absolute. Courts have consistently recognized that it only applies where the alternative statutory mechanism is available, effective and capable of granting the relief sought by the litigant. 56.In Benson Ambuti Adega & 2 Others v Kibos Distillers Ltd & 5 Others [2020] eKLR, the Supreme Court held that although parties should generally exhaust statutory remedies, courts retain jurisdiction where the statutory mechanism does not provide an adequate remedy, where the dispute falls outside the statutory body's mandate, or where exceptional circumstances exist. 57.Likewise, in Night Rose Cosmetics (1972) Ltd v Nairobi City County & 2 Others [2018] eKLR, the Court emphasized that the doctrine only applies where the statutory body has jurisdiction to determine the dispute in question. 58.The threshold question therefore is whether EPRA has jurisdiction to determine the Plaintiff's claim. 59.The Plaintiff's claim is not one challenging a tariff approved by EPRA. It is not a dispute over licensing, compliance, enforcement, consumer tariffs or any regulatory decision made by EPRA. Neither is it an appeal from a decision of EPRA or the Energy and Petroleum Tribunal. 60.Instead, the Plaint alleges that on 23rd February 2023, the Defendant negligently supplied unstable electricity resulting in a sudden voltage surge that damaged the Plaintiff's voltage stabilizer and submersible pump. The Plaintiff seeks recovery of quantified special damages amounting to Kshs. 4,197,964. These are ordinary civil remedies founded upon the law of negligence. 61.The Court has carefully examined the provisions of Sections 9, 10 and 36 of the Energy Act. While those provisions establish EPRA and the Energy and Petroleum Tribunal and prescribe their respective mandates, none expressly provides a procedure for adjudicating negligence claims or awarding damages for destruction of private property resulting from alleged negligent electricity supply. 62.The Plaintiff also annexed screenshots of the Judiciary's electronic filing platform to demonstrate that there exists no filing category for instituting such claims before EPRA or the Tribunal. Although those screenshots are not, by themselves, determinative of jurisdiction, they lend support to the Plaintiff's contention that the statutory framework does not contemplate the determination of common law negligence claims by EPRA. 63.It is noteworthy that the Defendant has not identified any specific provision under the Energy Act empowering EPRA to receive witnesses, conduct a trial on negligence, determine questions of duty of care, causation and remoteness, assess special damages, or enter Judgment capable of execution in favour of a successful litigant. 64.The doctrine of exhaustion cannot be invoked where the alternative forum lacks the legal mandate to grant the relief sought. To do so would deny litigants access to justice while directing them to a forum incapable of determining their grievances. 65.Article 48 of the Constitution guarantees every person the right of access to justice, while Article 159(2)(a) obligates courts to administer justice to all persons without undue regard to procedural technicalities. Those constitutional principles would be undermined if parties were compelled to pursue remedies before bodies lacking jurisdiction to determine their disputes. 66.Accordingly, I find that the Plaintiff was not required to first refer this negligence claim to EPRA before approaching this Court. The doctrine of exhaustion is therefore inapplicable in the circumstances of this case. (D) Whether the authorities relied upon by the parties support the Preliminary Objection 67.Both parties cited several authorities in support of their respective positions, and it is necessary for the Court to evaluate them. 68.The Defendant placed considerable reliance on Kenya Power & Lighting Co. Ltd v Albert Mbugua Ng'ang'a [2022] eKLR, where the High Court held that disputes concerning power fluctuations and resultant fire damage ought to be subjected to the statutory dispute resolution mechanisms established under the Energy Act before recourse is had to the courts. 69.The Defendant also relied upon John Githinji & Another v Kenya Power & Lighting Co. Ltd [2021] eKLR, where the Court emphasized the importance of exhausting statutory mechanisms in disputes involving interruptions in electricity supply. 70.This Court has carefully considered those decisions. They underscore the important principle that where Parliament has provided an effective statutory mechanism for resolving disputes falling within the specialized mandate of a statutory body, litigants ought to utilize that mechanism before invoking the jurisdiction of ordinary courts. 71.However, those authorities must be understood within the factual and legal contexts in which they were decided. They cannot be read as establishing an inflexible rule that every dispute involving Kenya Power or electricity supply must invariably commence before EPRA, regardless of the nature of the cause of action. 72.On the other hand, the Plaintiff relied upon Kenya Power & Lighting Co. Ltd & Another v Livingstone Mbugua [2022] KECA 10154 (KLR), a decision of the Court of Appeal. In that case, the Court of Appeal entertained an appeal arising from a negligence claim in which damages had been awarded for destruction of property allegedly caused by electricity supplied by the Defendant. Significantly, the Court determined the appeal on its merits without suggesting that the subordinate court lacked jurisdiction or that the dispute ought first to have been referred to EPRA. 73.Being a decision of the Court of Appeal, Livingstone Mbugua is binding on this Court. To the extent that there appears to be tension between that decision and certain High Court authorities relied upon by the Defendant, this Court is bound to follow the decision of the superior Appellate Court in accordance with the doctrine of stare decisis. 74.The Court is therefore persuaded that ordinary civil courts retain jurisdiction to hear negligence claims against electricity suppliers where the dispute concerns alleged breaches of the common law duty of care and the remedies sought are compensatory damages. 75.The Defendant also relied on the celebrated case of Owners of the Motor Vessel "Lillian S" v Caltex Oil (Kenya) Ltd [1989] KLR 1. The principle in that case that jurisdiction is everything is beyond dispute. However, the question before this Court is not whether jurisdiction is important, but whether jurisdiction has in fact been ousted by statute. Having found that the Energy Act does not expressly or by necessary implication remove this Court's jurisdiction over negligence claims of this nature, the Lillian S principle does not avail the Defendant. 76.For all the foregoing reasons, I am satisfied that the authorities relied upon by the Plaintiff are more applicable to the circumstances of this case than those relied upon by the Defendant. Determination 77.Having carefully considered the Notice of Preliminary Objection dated 14th October 2025, the Plaint dated 3rd March 2025, the Plaintiff's written submissions filed on 15th June 2026, the Defendant's written submissions dated 2nd June 2026, the Constitution, the Energy Act, No. 1 of 2019, the Magistrates' Courts Act, and the authorities cited by both parties, this Court arrives at the following determination. 78.The Defendant's objection is premised on the argument that disputes relating to electricity supply, voltage fluctuations and power surges fall exclusively within the jurisdiction of the Energy and Petroleum Regulatory Authority (EPRA) and that, by virtue of the doctrine of exhaustion, the Plaintiff ought first to have pursued the statutory dispute resolution mechanisms established under the Energy Act before approaching this Court. 79.There can be no dispute that jurisdiction is a threshold issue. Indeed, courts have consistently held that once jurisdiction is challenged, it must be determined before the Court proceeds any further. The Court agrees with the Defendant that its objection raises a pure point of law and therefore satisfies the principles set out in Mukisa Biscuit Manufacturing Co. Ltd v West End Distributors Ltd [1969] EA 696. 80.However, satisfying the procedural threshold for raising a preliminary objection does not necessarily render the objection meritorious. The Court must still interrogate whether the legal foundation upon which the objection rests is sound. 81.Having undertaken a careful examination of the Energy Act, this Court is unable to agree with the Defendant's interpretation of Sections 9, 10 and 36 thereof. 82.Section 9 establishes the Energy and Petroleum Regulatory Authority as the regulator of the energy and petroleum sectors. Section 10 prescribes its regulatory and administrative functions, including licensing, approval of tariffs, enforcement of standards, inspection of energy installations, consumer protection and regulation of the energy industry. Those provisions do not expressly confer adjudicatory jurisdiction upon EPRA to hear and determine common law negligence claims or to award damages arising from destruction of private property. 83.Equally, Section 36 establishes the Energy and Petroleum Tribunal and confers jurisdiction over disputes specifically contemplated under the Act, principally those arising from regulatory decisions, licensing matters and disputes involving licensees and other matters expressly falling within the statutory framework. The Defendant has invited this Court to interpret those provisions expansively so as to encompass every dispute involving electricity supply. Respectfully, such an interpretation would amount to enlarging the statutory jurisdiction of EPRA and the Tribunal beyond what Parliament expressly enacted. 84.It is a cardinal principle of statutory interpretation that where Parliament intends to oust the jurisdiction of ordinary courts, it must do so in clear and unequivocal language. Jurisdiction cannot be taken away by implication. As the Supreme Court observed in Samuel Kamau Macharia & Another v Kenya Commercial Bank Ltd & 2 Others [2012] eKLR, a Court's jurisdiction flows only from the Constitution or legislation and cannot be inferred or expanded by judicial interpretation. 85.The Plaintiff's claim, as disclosed in the Plaint, is not a challenge to any regulatory decision made by EPRA. It is not a complaint concerning licensing, tariff approval, electricity pricing or compliance with regulatory standards. Rather, it is a claim alleging that the Defendant negligently supplied unstable electricity on 23rd February 2023, thereby causing a voltage surge which damaged the Plaintiff's voltage stabilizer and submersible pump, resulting in quantified financial loss. The relief sought is compensation by way of special damages. 86.The issues that will ultimately fall for determination at the hearing are whether the Defendant owed the Plaintiff a duty of care, whether that duty was breached, whether the breach caused the alleged damage, and whether the Plaintiff has strictly proved the special damages claimed. These are conventional questions arising in the tort of negligence and are matters that civil courts have historically and consistently determined. 87.The Defendant further argued that the Plaintiff ought to have exhausted the statutory mechanisms established under the Energy Act before approaching the Court. While this Court readily acknowledges the importance of the doctrine of exhaustion as articulated in Speaker of the National Assembly v Karume [1992] KLR 21 and Geoffrey Muthinja Kabiru & 2 Others v Samuel Munga Henry & 1756 Others [2015] eKLR, the doctrine is not absolute. It only applies where the alternative forum has jurisdiction over the dispute and is capable of granting the relief sought. 88.In the present case, the Defendant has not demonstrated any statutory provision empowering EPRA to conduct a trial on negligence, receive evidence on causation, assess special damages or enter judgment awarding compensatory damages. Nor has the Defendant identified any procedure established under the Energy Act through which such claims are determined. In those circumstances, requiring the Plaintiff to first approach EPRA would effectively deny it an effective remedy and unjustifiably impede its constitutional right of access to justice guaranteed under Article 48 of the Constitution. 89.The Court has also considered the authorities relied upon by both parties. While the decisions in Kenya Power & Lighting Co. Ltd v Albert Mbugua Ng'ang'a [2022] eKLR and John Githinji & Another v Kenya Power & Lighting Co. Ltd [2021]eKLR underscore the importance of statutory dispute resolution mechanisms, they cannot be interpreted as establishing a blanket rule that every dispute involving electricity supply falls outside the jurisdiction of ordinary civil courts. 90.More persuasive, and indeed binding upon this Court, is the decision of the Court of Appeal in Kenya Power & Lighting Co. Ltd & Another v Livingstone Mbugua [2022] KECA 10154 (KLR). In that case, the Court of Appeal entertained an appeal arising from a negligence claim against the Defendant involving damage allegedly caused by electricity supply and determined the appeal on its merits. The Appellate Court did not hold that the subordinate court lacked jurisdiction or that the claim ought first to have been referred to EPRA. As a decision of the Court of Appeal, it binds this Court and reinforces the conclusion that negligence claims of this nature remain within the jurisdiction of ordinary Civil Courts. 91.This Court is therefore satisfied that the present suit is an ordinary civil claim founded on negligence and seeking damages for alleged property damage. Neither the Constitution, the Magistrates' Courts Act nor the Energy Act deprives this Court of jurisdiction to hear and determine such a claim. 92.Accordingly, the Defendant's Preliminary Objection is founded on an erroneous interpretation of the Energy Act and cannot succeed. Conclusions & Disposition 93.For the foregoing reasons, the Court finds that although the Defendant's Notice of Preliminary Objection dated 14th October 2025 raises a proper Preliminary Objection by challenging the jurisdiction of this Court, the objection is not sustainable on its merits. 94.Having carefully considered the relevant constitutional provisions, the Energy Act, No. 1 of 2019, the Magistrates' Courts Act, and the applicable judicial authorities, the Court is satisfied that the Energy Act does not vest exclusive jurisdiction in the Energy and Petroleum Regulatory Authority (EPRA) or the Energy and Petroleum Tribunal to determine ordinary common law claims founded on negligence and seeking compensation for damage to property. 95.The Plaintiff's suit, as pleaded in the Plaint dated 3rd March 2025, is a straightforward tortious claim alleging negligence on the part of the Defendant in the supply of electricity, and such a claim falls squarely within the civil jurisdiction of this Court. 96.The Defendant has further failed to demonstrate that there exists a statutory dispute resolution mechanism under the Energy Act capable of adjudicating the Plaintiff's negligence claim and granting the reliefs sought in the Plaint. 97.Consequently, the doctrine of exhaustion is inapplicable in the circumstances of this case. 98.In the premises, the Court finds that the Defendant's Notice of Preliminary Objection dated 14th October 2025 lacks merit and is hereby dismissed. Disposition 99.Accordingly, the Court makes the following orders:1.The Defendant's Notice of Preliminary Objection dated 14th October 2025 be and is hereby dismissed.2.It is hereby declared that this Court has jurisdiction to hear and determine the Plaintiff's suit as pleaded in the Plaint dated 3rd March 2025.3.Mention 26th August ,2026 for pre trial directions4.The costs of the Preliminary Objection are awarded to the Plaintiff.30 days Right of Appeal RULING DATED, READ, SIGNED AND DELIVERED VIRTUALLY AT NAIROBI VIA MICROSOFT TEAMS PLATFORM THIS 22ND DAY OF JULY, 2026L.A. MUMASSABBAPRINCIPAL MAGISTRATE22.7.2026In the Presence of:M/s Mogeseru for the Plaintiff/ApplicantM/s Anyango for the Defendant/RespondentCourt Assistant: Phoebe