https://new.kenyalaw.org/akn/ke/judgment/kehc/2026/6763

**REPUBLIC OF KENYA** **IN THE HIGH COURT OF KENYA AT NAIROBI** **CONSTITUTIONAL AND HUMAN RIGHTS DIVISION** **PETITION NO. E047 OF 2023** **IN THE MATTER OF ARTICLES 10,23,27,28,29,41,47 & 236 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF KENYA 2010** **AND** **IN THE MATTER OF THE CONSTITUTION OF KENYA (PROTECTION OF RIGHTS AND FUNDAMENTAL FREEDOMS) PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE RULES,2023.** **AND** **IN THE MATTER OF THE PRIVATE SECURITY REGULATIONS ACT 2016** **AND** **IN THE MATTER OF CERTIFICATE OF REGISTRATION** **AND** **IN THE MATTER OF SECURITY TRAINING** **AND** **IN THE MATTER OF VIOLATIONS AND THREATENED VIOLATIONOF FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS AND FREEDOMS UNDER (INTER ALIA) ARTICLES 10,27,28,29,41,47,227 AND 236 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF KENYA 2010.** **BETWEEN** **PROTECTIVE SECURITY INDUSTRY ASSOCIATION……..PETITIONER** **AND** **FAZUL MOHAMMED………………………………………1ST RESPONDENT** **THE ATTORNEY GENERAL…………………………..….2ND RESPONDENT** **INSPECTORATE OF STATE CORPORATIONS………...3RD RESPONDENT** **JUDGMENT** 1. The Petitioner herein, Protective Security Industry Association vide its Petition dated 13th February, 2023 and filed on 15th February, 2023 describes itself as a registered association under the Societies Act Cap 108 of the Laws of Kenya and that it is also an umbrella for dozens of private security firms and other stakeholders offering and or interested in the private security and safety services within the Republic of Kenya. 2. The petitioner avers that the 1st and 2nd respondents are issuing certificates of registration and or licenses on the basis of unfair, unjust, discriminatory and openly biased manner contrary to the Bill of Rights and the provisions of the Private Security Regulations Act, 2016 (PSR Act) 3. According to the petitioner, section 24 of the Private Security Regulation Act mandates the 1st respondent to issue certificates of registration to all successful applicants following the submissions of an application that meets all the necessary requirements. 4. The petitioner sets out the requirements for eligibility for a security firm to make an application for registration to the Authority, as stipulated in section 23 of the Act as well as the requirements for registration as a corporate private security service provider as set out in section 29 (2) of the PSR Act. 5. It contends that the 1st respondent has refused and failed to issue the certificates of registration to various members of the petitioner despite submission of the applications which meet all the requirements as set out in sections 23 and 29 of the Act. Further, that the members who have submitted their applications for registration have not been provided with any specific reasons for refusal to register and or license them as required by section 30 (3) of the Act. 6. According to the petitioner, the affected members of the petitioner association have not been able to exercise their right of appeal in accordance with the law because of such refusal by the 1st and 2nd respondents to provide reasons justifying the refusal to issue them with certificates of registration, yet they have been in operation as registered private security service providers and employing thousands of Kenyans as well as providing services to various consumers of private security services. 7. The petitioner further avers that the 1st and 2nd respondents have been issuing advisories and warnings as well as notices to various clients and consumers of private security services, asking them to stay away from the private security firms that do not have the current certificates of registration and even published a list of security firms by way of notice warning consumers of the said services that they risk criminal liability and being fined Kshs 2 million for contracting private security firms which do not have registration certificates. The petitioner claims that such warnings are discriminatory and are not backed by any legal framework. 8. Additionally, the petitioner asserts that its members who are being treated unfairly are already registered but that they were only seeking the current registration certificates which they have not been issued with, despite lodging applications for such registration, with no reasons being given for such refusal to register them. 9. The petitioner avers that those consumers of services of its services have threatened to terminate the current contracts for provisions of private security services currently in pace with those consumers. 10. Consequently, it is contended that the members of the petitioner are suffering loss of business and employment by thousands of employees who depend on the petitioner’s members for their livelihoods thereby violating the right to fair labour practices as guaranteed under Article 41 of the Constitution. 11. Further, that there is no legal framework for issuance of certificates of registration and certificates of training hence there is absolutely no legal basis that warrants the non-approval of successful applications by members of the petitioner. That contrary to section 23 of the Act, the Authority has not made prescribed any manner of or the forms or guidelines for making an application nor prescribed the fees payable by applicants for certificates of registration. 12. That owing to absence of legal framework for obtaining certificate of registration, the 1st and 2nd respondents have simply been issuing applicants with letters in their sole discretion , which has created an avenue for corruption , bribery , extortion and oppression of members of private who are seeking to comply with the law, which practice has created discrimination in awards of tenders to only selected firms which promotes non-competitive practices thereby unlawfully disadvantages dozens of small and medium sized enterprises offering these services. 13. The Petitioner therefore seeks the following reliefs from this Court: 14. ***A declaration do issue that the failure by the 1st and 2nd respondents to issue certificates of registration to successful applicants is unlawful and unconstitutional*** 15. ***A declaration do issue that the actions of the 1st and 2nd respondents to issue advisories to consumers of private security services is discriminatory and illegal in the absence of a clear legal framework on obtaining of certificates of registration*** 16. ***An order of mandamus do issue directing the 1st and 2nd respondents to provide a clear legal framework on obtaining certificate of registration and certificate of training and which framework should state the fees payable*.** 17. ***A declaration do issue that the 1st and 2nd respondents have violated Article 27 of the Constitution regarding the right to equality and freedom from discrimination by unlawfully, illegally and selectively issuing letters purporting to be certificates of registration*** 18. ***In the absence of accredited institutions offering training of security personnel and a clear legal framework on issuance of certificates of registration, an order of prohibition do issue prohibiting the public procuring entities from asking and or making it mandatory requirement in so far as it touches on and or refers to a certificate of registration and certificate of training from private security Regulatory Authority, the 1st Respondent herein*** 19. ***Any other relief that this honourable court may deem just and expedient in the circumstances*** 20. ***That costs of the petition be borne by the respondents*** 21. The petition is supported by the affidavit sworn by John Mbiyu Karanja,who describes himself as a member and the trustee of the petitioner authorized by the petitioner to swear the affidavit on its behalf as evidenced by the annexed authority JMK1 given by one, Cosmas Mutava the chairman of the petitioner to the deponent and one Daniel Muriuki Mwangi dated 13th February, 2023. **Replying Affidavit and Notice of Preliminary Objection** 1. Opposing the petition, the 1st and 2nd Respondents filed a notice of preliminary objection dated 30th June, 2023 together with a replying affidavit sworn by Kevin Ngarari on the even date. 2. In the notice of preliminary objection to the petition, the 1st and 2nd respondents contend that: 3. This honourable court lacks jurisdiction to hear this matter since the petitioner has not exhausted the statutory administrative remedies set out under section 43 of the Private Security Regulations Act, 2016. 4. This case is speculative and purports to preempt the mandatory security vetting process under section 29 (2) (d) of the Act which process does not have aby statutory timelines tied to it. 5. Having alleged unfairness in the award of tenders, this court lacks jurisdiction to hear this matter since the petitioner has not exhausted the statutory/administrative remedies set out under section 167 of the Public Procurement and Asset Disposal Act. 6. The petitioner having by its own admission at paragraph 27 of its petition that some of its members are committing an offence under section 69 (1)(a) of the PSR Act, the petitioner is not entitled to any relief and or benefit on the ground of illegality of the conduct of its members. 7. Having alleged corruption, bribery, extortion and oppression, the said petition is bad in law on account that there are tax payer funded institutions established by the Constitution to investigate and prosecute such allegations and as such, the petition purports to deny the Ethics and Anti-Corruption Commission its constitutional and statutory mandate under section 11(d) of the Ethics and Anti-corruption Commission Act to investigate corruption and further purports to deny the Director of Public Prosecutions the constitutional right of directing and prosecuting the alleged corruption, bribery ad oppression. 8. That this court lacks jurisdiction to entertain the petition because the petitioner has not exhausted the statutory/administrative remedies under section 31 of the Competition Act. 9. The petition is bad in law, misconceived, vexatious scandalous and founded on generalities hence it should be dismissed in limine. 10. In the replying affidavit sworn by Kevin Ngarari the 1st respondents’ head of compliance, the 1st and 2nd respondents reiterate what is contained in their notice of preliminary objection and add that the petitioner has failed to demonstrate any particulars of any alleged violations of its constitutional rights or any rights of its members enshrined under the Constitution and that neither has the petitioner specified with particularity what the alleged cause of action is. 11. That allegations made in the petition, including discrimination, bribery, extortion, corruption and oppression have not been proved and that the only documents exhibited are a copy of an incomplete certificate of registration and a newspaper excerpt detailing what constitutes private security services. 12. That the authority is mandated by statute to, among others, under section 9 © of the Act, register and license all persons involved in or conducting private security services in Kenya. 13. According to the 1st and 2nd respondents, on 9th December, 2019, the 1st respondent issued a press statement informing private security service providers and the general public that the Government had commenced vetting and licensing of all private security service providers and that the said press statement clarified the registration requirements and documents submitted as part of the application for one to be licensed as a private security service provider. 14. That the aforesaid press statement reminded such service providers and the general public of the mandatory requirement under section 28 of the PSRA that no person shall offer private security services unless that person has been vetted and licensed by the Authority and that following that press statement, the 1st respondent received applications for registration and licensing from private security service providers across the country, which application is free of charge hence the petitioner should avail evidence of any demand for payment. 15. That as mandated by the Act at section 29, the 1st respondent received applications and vetted applicants for licensing although the process was affected by the Covid-19 pandemic in 2020/2021 until March 2022 when the vetting and licensing process commenced successfully and it then issued a legal notice PSRA/004/2023 notifying the public of the duly registered private security service providers in accordance with sections 6, 9( c), 28,29,30(1) and 31 of the Act as per the annexed legal notice which is also available on the 1st respondent’s website for access. 16. The respondents contend in deposition that 98% of the licensed private security firms are incorporate din Kenya, contrary to the assertions by the petitioner that foreign private security firms serving foreign interests are given preeminence. 17. According to the respondents, it has 103 members out of which 87 of them have submitted their applications for licensing as private security service providers and that 75 of them had already been vetted and issued with licenses hence the allegations of discrimination are far-fetched. 18. That the Act envisage the private security industry to collaborate with the national security organs for the maintenance of law and order hence the need for registration and licensing. 19. That the petitioner contradicts itself by saying that there is no legal framework yet there is an admission of existence of a legal framework regulating registration and licensing of private security service providers. 20. That section 9(o) of the Act mandates the 1st respondent to provide users with information regarding compliance with the Act by private security service providers hence the legal notice issued pursuant to statutory requirements cannot be illegitimate or illegal. 21. That the petitioner has delayed in the filing of these proceedings and the law gives the 1st respondent discretion on how to perform a public duty hence mandamus cannot issue in such circumstances to command performance of that duty in a specific way. Finally, that the petition is based on imaginary and unverified allegations hence it should not be entertained by this court as it is a waste of judicial time. The 1st and 2nd respondents pray that the petition be dismissed. **Response to the Notice of Preliminary Objection** 1. The petitioner filed a replying affidavit to the preliminary objection dated 30th June 2023. The replying affidavit is dated 11th July 2023 sworn by John Mbiyu Karanja who introduces himself as a trustee and member of the petitioner herein, reiterating depositions in the affidavit dated 13th February, 2023. 2. On alleged non exhaustion of remedies, the petitioner invokes Article 22 of the Constitution and asserts that section 43 of the Act does not bar the petitioner from seeking the reliefs herein. He denies that the petition is intended to pre-empt any of the processes to be undertaken by the respondents since the petition seeks to make the procedure for licensing made clear, predictable and accessible in line with section 9 of the Act. 3. That there is unfairness in licensing which renders awards of PSSP tenders unfair; that there is no procedure to be followed in applying for licensing and that neither is there fees prescribed and that the unfairness is also demonstrated in issuing warnings issued to consumers against taking services of certain members of the petitioner. 4. That there is no evidence of receipts for money paid for registration and that although there is no evidence of collection of bribes, there are confessions by members of the petitioner that they were extorted only that they cannot swear such affidavits. 5. That this court has jurisdiction to hear and determine the petition, which has nothing to do with the Competition Act and that the respondents have acted illegally, contrary to the law and the constitution hence the preliminary objection should be dismissed. 6. Directions were given by the Court to consider the Preliminary objection together with the main petition. This court notes that vide a notice of motion dated 7th November, 2024, the 1st and 2nd respondents filed an application urging this court to order that the petition herein has been overtaken by events, spent and therefore rendered nugatory or that in the alternative, the proceedings in this petition be stayed pending the finalization of public participation exercise being conducted by the 1st respondent on the various regulations published by the Cabinet Secretary for Interior and National Administration, pursuant to section 11(2) 70, 61 (4) and 53(3) of the Private Security Regulations Act. 7. That application was never canvassed although the application for conservatory orders appears to have been abandoned in favor of a merit determination of the Petition hence the parties filed written submissions to canvass the petition, which submissions were highlighted before me on 14th April, 2026. **The petitioner’s submissions** 1. In summary, the petitioner submits that the 1st respondent is bound by the constitutional values and principles of governance as espoused in Articles 10 and 132 of the Constitution. That it is equally bound by statute at section 9 (j) of the PSR Act to set standards for accreditation of private security service providers. That section 23 of the said Act mandates training for private security service providers. 2. That contrary to the statutory mandates, there are no standards or regulations promulgated on the form and or any prescribed fee for application for registration by the private security service providers. That the 1st respondent provides what fee to charge applicants which opaqueness has made the 2nd respondent to act outside the law since there is no clear legal framework for registration and prescribe fees payable. 3. On the 2nd issue of issuance of certificates of security training in the absence of accredited institutions and regulations. Section 23 (d) of PSR Act mandates training in security matters in an accredited institution. It was submitted that since there are no standards for accreditation, with no institutions for training, no licences can issue. 4. On the 3rd issue of whether the 1st respondent has set standards for registration and licensing of private corporate security providers, it was submitted that Section 28 of the Act mandates licencing to provide services of private security provider and that to be licensed, they have to make an application in a prescribed form and pay a prescribed fee yet to date, there is no prescribed form for application or fees payable prescribed. The petitioner urged the court to allow the petition with costs. 5. Various decisions were relied on and which this court has taken cognizance of. **The Respondents’ submissions** 1. On the part of the respondents, relying on grounds of opposition dated 4/3/2024 and submissions of 18/11/2024, as well as the preliminary objection, three issues for determination were framed. The 1st issue is exhaustion of remedies under Sections 43 and 44 of the PSR Act which provide for an appeal to the Cabinet Secretary. The respondents argue that since the licensing and registration issue is an administrative function, the petition was filed in violation of the twin principles of exhaustion and constitutional avoidance. 2. The second issue submitted on is whether the petitioner’s rights were violated and whether the reliefs sought are available. It was submitted that differential treatment is not unconstitutional while unfair discrimination is unconstitutional. That the 2nd schedule to the PS General Regulations Act provide for an annual fee payable by Corporate Private Security Providers, which amount is determined by the type and size of the security provider. That there is a listing and categorization given hence the petition is mischievous because the petitioners failed to comply with the Regulation and instead approached this court which according to the respondents, is an abuse of court process. 3. Various decided cases were relied on in the submissions and which this court has considered. 4. On costs, it was submitted that since the petition is not merited, it should be dismissed with costs to the respondents. **Rejoinder submissions** 1. In a rejoinder, the petitioner’s counsel submitted that Article 22 (1) of the Constitution allows every person the right to approach this court on infringement or violation of their rights. That the duty of the respondents is to set standards which they have failed to set standards to accredit institutions and make regulations. It was submitted that exhaustion of remedies is not absolute where there is no other alternative effective remedy. That since 2015 there have been no such standards or regulations hence the petitioner could not have appealed to the same violators. That only this court can give redress. 2. That there is no fees or regulation prescribing fees payable no regulations and that there is differential treatment amounting to discrimination. **Analysis and Determination** 1. I have considered the petition and the opposition thereto. In my view, the main issues for determination are: 2. ***Whether the petitioner has locus standi to bring this petition and therefore whether the petition is competently before this Court*** 3. ***Whether the doctrine of exhaustion applies to these proceedings*** 4. ***Depending on the answer to issues a and b above, whether the petitioner is entitled to the reliefs sought.*** 5. ***What orders should this Court make.*** 6. This Court has *suo moto* identified the first issue herein to be core to this Petition because without *locus standi* of the Petitioner to institute these proceedings, it would be a waste of judicial time to venture into the merits of the petition. 7. Articles 22 and 258 of the Constitution, whose wording is materially identical, constitute the most explicit and authoritative provisions on standing. Article 22(1) empowers ***“every person”*** to institute court proceedings ***alleging*** a violation or threatened violation of a right or fundamental freedom in the Bill of Rights, while Article 258(1) grants ***“every person”*** the right to institute proceedings *claimin*g that the Constitution “has been contravened, or is threatened with contravention. 8. These provisions deliberately broaden locus standi and remove the pre 2010 restrictive impediments that characterised the former constitutional order, thereby permitting any individual, regardless of personal prejudice, to approach the Court where a constitutional question or a matter of public interest is raised. 9. These twin provisions are clear that “every person” has the right to institute court proceedings, *claiming* that this Constitution has been contravened, or is threatened with contravention and secondly, in addition to a person acting in their own interest, court proceedings under clause (1) may be instituted by*- a) a person acting on behalf of another person who cannot act in their own name; b)* *a person acting as a member of, or in the interest of, a group or class of persons; c) a person acting in the public interest; or d)An association acting in the interest of one or more of its members.* 10. Additionally, the enactment of the Fair Administrative Action Act, 2015 has codified and expanded the principles relating to *locus standi* in administrative law. Section 7(1) expressly provides that ***“any person who is aggrieved by an administrative action or decision may apply for review of the administrative action or decision,”*** while Section 5(2) of the Act reinforces that position by providing that ***“every person has the right to administrative action which is expeditious, efficient, lawful, reasonable and procedurally fair.”*** 11. These provisions of the Fair Administrative Action Act mirror the broad standing contemplated under Articles 22 and 258 of the Constitution and affirm that any person aggrieved by an administrative action, has the right to seek judicial redress. 12. This statutory framework therefore removes any doubt that standing in administrative law and where there are allegations or claims of violation or threatened violation of the Constitution or of rights guaranteed under the Constitution, standing is intentionally wide, and not restricted to persons personally subjected to the administrative decision. 13. The aim of the Fair Administrative Action Act is to regulate administrative action, ensure that decisions of administrative, judicial or quasi-judicial bodies are confined within the law and provide a mode of access to redress. 14. In **Kenya National Commission on Human Rights v Attorney General; Independent Electoral & Boundaries Commission & 16 others (Interested Parties) (Advisory Opinion Reference 1 of 2017) [2020] KESC 54 (KLR) (Constitutional and Human Rights) (7 February 2020) (Ruling),** the Supreme Court stated as follows concerning a preliminary objection raised on *locus standi*: ***“38. The 17th Interested Party challenges this Court’s Jurisdiction on three limbs namely, that the Applicant lacks the locus standi to institute the Reference before us; that the issues raised in the Reference are sub-judice in view of Constitutional Petition No. 68 of 2017 and Constitutional Petition No. 142 of 2017, and that the Reference is an appeal of the various determined Petitions by the High Court camouflaged as an application for advisory opinion.*** 1. In **theMatemu v Trusted Society of Human Rights Alliance & 5 others (Civil Application 29 of 2014) [2014] KESC 6 (KLR) (9 December 2014) (Ruling)** case, the Supreme Court stated as follows concerning locus standi: ***[92] The Constitution enlarges the capacity to file a claim in defence of the Constitution thereby laying the basis for rights and constitutional enforcement. Article 3(1) provides that “every person has an obligation to respect, uphold and defend this Constitution.” It further defines “person” to “include a company, association or other body of persons whether incorporated or unincorporated.” The Constitution of Kenya (Protection of Rights and Fundamental Freedoms) Practice and Procedure Rules 2013, adopts the constitutional definition of person. Article 258(1) in turn provides that “every person has the right to institute court proceedings, claiming that this Constitution has been contravened or is threatened with contravention.” In constitutional adjudication therefore, the traditional strictures of locus have been broken to allow every person the capacity to file a constitutional claim. This resonates with the holding of the Court of Appeal in this very matter, at paragraph 27 that:*** ***“Moreover, we take note that our commitment to the values of substantive justice, public participation, inclusiveness, transparency and accountability under Article 10 of the Constitution by necessity and logic broadens access to the courts. In this broader context, this Court cannot fashion nor sanction an invitation to a judicial standard for locus standi that places hurdles on access to the courts, except only when such litigation is hypothetical, abstract or is an abuse of the judicial process. In the case at hand, the petition was filed before the High Court by an NGO whose mandate includes the pursuit of constitutionalism and we therefore reject the arguments of lack of standing by counsel for the appellant. We hold that in the absence of a showing of bad faith as claimed by the appellant, without more, the 1st respondent had the locus stand to file the petition. Apart from this, we agree with the superior court below that the standard guide for locus standi must remain the command in Article 258 of the Constitution…..”*** 1. This Court acknowledges that under Articles 22 and 258 of the Constitution, standing is broad, such that an Association which is an unincorporated entity may institute proceedings on behalf of its members or in the public interest. In addition, Article 260 of the Constitution defines who a *person* is and the definition includes unincorporated associations. As stated above, that position is now settled, as was affirmed in the above cited case of **Mumo Matemu v Trusted Society of Human Rights Alliance & 5 Others**. 2. However, that latitude does not dispense with the requirement of precision in constitutional pleadings, of the person suing or being sued. 3. The Court of Appeal in **Finmax Community Based Group & 3 others v Kericho Technical Institute [2021] eKLR** considered the issue of *locus standi*, referring to the above ***Mumo Matemu*** case and stated as follows: ***“Having found that the respondent did not discharge its burden of proof, we need not consider the next and final ground; the capacity of the appellants to be sued. But for the development of the law, we shall consider it nonetheless.*** ***The appellants were sued as Finmax Community Based Group, the Chairman, Treasurer and Secretary. It was readily admitted that the 1st appellant was registered, as the name shows, as a community-based Group under the Ministry of Gender, Children and Social Development. The 2nd, 3rd and 4th appellants were its officials.*** ***The question posed to the Judge was whether, in those circumstances the respondent could institute an action against appellants. In his answer, the Judge found that the 1st appellant could only be sued through its officials. But since the 1st appellant’s Chairman, Secretary and Treasurer were joined in the suit, the Judge was of the view that that was sufficient; and that to insist on the particulars of the officials would be to place technicality above substance. He also justified the joinder on the ground that, since in such community organizations high turnover of officials is expected, it is wise to sue the office and not the specific officials, who may have vacated those offices at the time an action is instituted.*** ***The 1st appellant is an unincorporated association and therefore in law is not a legal personality with the capacity to sue or to be sued. For a long time, courts have held that such bodies could not sue or be sued.*** ***However, with the advent of the 2010 Constitution, this position appears to have changed. Article 260 which is the Interpretation section of***[***the Constitution***](https://new.kenyalaw.org/akn/ke/act/2010/constitution)***defines “a person” to include; “… a company, association or other body of persons whether incorporated or unincorporated”. (Own emphasis).*** ***As regards institution of court actions, Article 50, dealing with issues of fair hearing gives;*** ***“(1) Every person …. the right to have any dispute that can be resolved by the application of law decided in a fair and public hearing before a court or, if appropriate, another independent and impartial tribunal or body”. It would seem, from the foregoing, that an association like the 1st appellant is “a person” who may institute proceedings and also be sued.*** ***However, the question today is not whether unincorporated entities may commence action or how actions against them may be commenced, but rather, the manner of commencing proceedings. It is equally also settled that they cannot maintain an action or actions brought against them in their names. Proceedings on their behalf or against them can only be through the registered officials, whose particulars, names and capacity must clearly be indicated in the suit. See Grace Mwenda Munjuri vs. Trustee of the Agricultural Society of Kenya [2014] eKLR. In this appeal, the 1st appellant, being an unincorporated organization, had no capacity to be sued in its own name. The respondent could only institute the suit as against named officials. Titles like Chairman, secretary or treasurer cannot be used as those are not legal persons against whom orders may be executed by the successful party in the proceedings. For the reasons we have given, this appeal succeeds. We accordingly allow it by setting aside the judgment and order of the High Court made on 24th March, 2015 and amended on 22nd April, 2015 and substitute it with an order dismissing the respondent’s suit”.[emphasis added]*** 1. In this petition, the petitioner is described as a duly registered association under the Societies Act Cap 108 Laws of Kenya and that the Association is an umbrella for dozens of private security firms and other stakeholders offering and/ or interested in private security and safety services within the Republic of Kenya. 2. The deponent to the affidavit in support of the petition is John Mbiyu Karanja and he describes himself as a trustee and a member of the petitioner. There is no certificate of registration of the petitioner filed in court to identify it as an association. Not a single of the dozens of private security firms and other stakeholders of the association are identified as having been denied a license, excluded from training or subjected to extortion by the 1st and 2nd respondents. 3. The petition is not brought in the name of officials of the petitioner on behalf of the association which as I have stated above, it has not been demonstrated that the petitioner is an association and therefore enforcing any orders of the court against the petitioner, including an order for costs would be impossible. No affidavits are sworn by any of the officials of the affected private security service provider firms affected by the alleged discrimination, lack of clear regulations on registration, licensing and or payment of the prescribed fees. 4. An association litigating on behalf of its members must identify those members and demonstrate how their rights have been violated or threatened with violation. Without that, as is in this present case, this Court is left without a factual foundation upon which to exercise its jurisdiction. 5. In **Republic v Registrar of Societies & another; Kenya International Freight & Warehousing Association (Nairobi Branch) (Ex parte) (Judicial Review Application E032 of 2024) [2025] KEHC 4789 (KLR) (Judicial Review) (7 April 2025) (Ruling)** the High Court, citing other decisions on the same question of *locus standi* stated as follows: ***“In***[***Kisumu Bar Owners Association v Cabinet Secretary, Ministry of Interior & Coordination of National Government & 2 others (Constitutional Petition E002 of 2024***](https://new.kenyalaw.org/akn/ke/judgment/kehc/2024/6003)***) [2024] KEHC 6003 (KLR) (27 May 2024) (Ruling) and in ELC Petition No. 15 of 2021 [2023] eKLR 9th February 2023 Ruling in Naka Residents Associates vs Ease Ltd & 33 Others. Ombwayo J in a Petition No. 15 of 2021 held as follows and I have no reason to depart therefrom. “A perusal of the Petition and annextures confirms that the Petition is a Society registered under the Society Act. Being a Society under the***[*Societies Act*](https://new.kenyalaw.org/akn/ke/act/1968/4)*, th****e issue being raised in the Preliminary Objection is whether the Petitioner can sue in its own name, as it has done. This to me is a noble legal question which goes to the root of the matter herein. It is a point of law which could dispose of the case depending on how it goes.”*** 1. The Court in the above case of ***Kenya International Freight and Warehousing Association*** (supra) case stated as follows, applying the principles espoused in the ***Mumo Matemu*** case: ***“31. There is no evidence that these judicial review proceedings herein are instituted in the public interest but for the benefit of the applicant society and its members. It follows that the applicant could bring the judicial review proceedings but in the name of its officials. This is so in view of the fact that it would be impossible to recover costs from an unincorporated body like the applicant, unlike in the Mumo Matemu case where the appellant was a Non-governmental Body and under the relevant statute, once registered, it was considered as an incorporated body which could sue and be sued in its own name. Furthermore, as correctly observed by the Supreme Court, the petition was instituted in the public interest as per the mandate of the NGO.*** ***32.Therefore, the issue is not whether the applicant can bring action in their own name especially under the Bill of rights, but that they can do so in the name of their registered officials and or in the public interest not for their own benefit or for commercial or political gain.*** ***33. The Court of Appeal in Kenya Power & Lighting Co Ltd –vs- Benzene Holdings Ltd t/a Wyco Paints [2016] eKLR, which decision was made much later than the Mumo Matemu case which latter case originated from the Court of Appeal, all the way to the Supreme Court, in discussing the institution of suits by non-juristic persons, and well aware of the Mumo Matemu Case stated thus:*** ***“This principle was emphasized as long ago as 1923 by Bankes LJ in Banque Internationale De Commerce(supra), which was subsequently in 1959 cited with approval by Templeton, J of then Supreme Court of Kenya in Fort Hall Bakery Supply Co V Fredrick Muigai Wangoe (1959) EA 474, who said:*** ***'The party seeking to maintain the action is in the eye of our law no party at all but a mere name only, with no legal existence. A non-existent person cannot sue, and once the court is made aware that the plaintiff is non-existent, and therefore incapable of maintaining the action, it cannot allow the action to proceed.'*** ***34. The Supreme Court in the recent case of Law Society of Kenya v Communications Authority (supra) Petition No. 8 of 2020 -acknowledged the Court of Appeal’s Caution in the Mumo Matemu case and stated as follows:*** ***“ The Court of Appeal in Mumo Matemu cited above-described - that ‘a person’ in this regard, includes one who acts in the public interest.”*** ***35. Mutuku S, J in Northern Nomadic Disabled Person's Organization (NONDO) v The Governor, County Government of Garissa & another (Constitutional Petition 4 of 2013) [2013] KEHC 467 (KLR) (16 December 2013) (Judgment) also acknowledged that in as much as an association had the locus standi to sue and be sued, there was caution by the Court of Appeal in the Mumo Matemu case and stated as follows:*** ***“ I need not belabor the point. Even if the petitioner was not a registered association, by dint of articles 22 and 258 of the Constitution they would still have the legal legs to stand on. The Court of Appeal however hastened to caution in the Mumo Matemu case that the person who moves the court for judicial redress in the cases of this kind must not act for personal gain or private profit, political motivation or other unspecified consideration. “*** ***36. The Court found that in the above cited case, the petitioner was not being driven by personal gain or some political millage and therefore the petitioner had locus standi to move the court in the constitutional Petition.*** ***37. See also Kuguru Food Complex Ltd v National Land Commission & another [2016] eKLR Constitutional petition NO. 359 OF 2016 where E. Muriithi J allowed the joinder of an estate association as a party to the petition only through their registered officials and stated:*** ***“ As an unincorporated body, which therefore has no capacity to sue or be sued in its name, the Rangers Court Welfare Association will be joined through its officials named in the Notice of Motion of 3rd October 2016”*** ***38. For all the above reasons, I find the preliminary objection to be validly raised. I uphold it and proceed to strike out the application herein with an order that each party shall bear their own costs of the application for judicial review since it would be impossible to recover costs from an entity with no legal standing.”[emphasis added]*** 1. In the instant case, just like in the cases that I have cited above, the petitioner, claiming to be a society registered under the Societies Act filed the petition in its own name without its officials and it asserts that it did so on behalf of its members who have been denied licenses and registration by the 1st and 2nd respondents without giving reasons and that in any event, there are no standards set for accreditation of training institutions of its members or clear legal framework for application for registration and payment of prescribed fee, there being no such fees prescribed by regulations. 2. The petitioner also claims that its members are discriminated against. In the supporting affidavit sworn by John Mbiyu Karanja on 13th February 2023 in support of the petition, it is deposed that by the 1st and 2nd respondents refusing to issue the certificates of registration and or licences to successful applicants, thereby denying various members of the petitioner a chance to do business freely and an equal access to business opportunities, is in contravention of Articles 27 and 41 of the Constitution. However, the Petition does not state whether those allegedly treated more favorably and whose names were published as being compliant with the Act as far as registration and licensing are concerned, are members of the association or not. This Court is therefore unable to determine whether any comparison is being made between similarly situated persons. 3. That said, it is clear to this Court that this is not a public interest litigation but litigation initiated for business and commercial interests of private security service providers or firms who claim that they are unable to operate because, albeit they successfully applied for certificates of registration, the 1st and 2nd respondents have refused to issue them with certificates of registration. 4. That being the case, it is expected that those firms be represented by officials whose names must be disclosed. One person swearing an affidavit as trustee or member of an umbrella body without even disclosing which are those dozens of firms that the umbrella body represents is not sufficient. 5. For the above reasons supported by the binding decisions that I have cited above, on *locus standi*, I find that the petitioner herein was incapable of initiating and sustaining the petition dated 13th February, 2023 in its own name on behalf of private security service providers and therefore that ground alone renders this petition incompetent. 6. The second issue is also a jurisdictional issue which issue was raised as a preliminary objection by the 1st and 2nd respondents. The issue is whether the petitioner, assuming that it had the *locus standi*, exhausted the remedies provided for under the Private security Regulations Act. Put differently, the question is whether the petition raises constitutional questions and therefore whether the petition was ripe for determination by this court. 7. The petitioner claims that there is no clear regulatory framework for application for registration, standards or institutions accredited for the training of its members for purposes of registration and licensing. That its members were discriminated against in favour of some foreign firms in the issuance of registration certificates and that there are no regulations for such registration and no fees is prescribed payable during registration as stipulated in the Act. 8. In response, the 1st and 2nd respondents contend that sections 43 and 44 of the Private Security Regulation Act grants a right of appeal to the Cabinet Secretary against decisions of the Authority, including those relating to licensing and registration, and that there is no evidence that this mechanism was invoked. It is contended that this court has no jurisdiction to entertain these proceedings as the invoking the doctrine of exhaustion and a constitutional avoidance, it was submitted that where a statute provides a procedure for redress, that procedure must be followed. 9. In **Mutinda v Office of the Director of Public Prosecutions & 3 others (Petition E212 of 2022) [2026] KEHC 3999 (KLR) (Constitutional and Human Rights) (26 March 2026) (Judgment)** L.N. Mugambi J had this to say and the learned Judge proceeded to determine the petition on the basis of the preliminary objection of whether the petition raise constitutional questions or the issues raised could be resolved through application of legislation or existing legal Principles: ***“If a dispute can fully be resolved by the Court either through application of legislation or existing legal principles such as common law without resorting to the Constitution, then the matter does not genuinely raise a constitutional question and in such circumstances, the Court must invoke the doctrine of constitutional avoidance and refrain from entertaining the dispute.”*** 1. At paragraphs 32 and 33 of the above cited case, the learned Judge quoted the Supreme Court and stated as follows: ***32. The Supreme Court in Communications Commission of Kenya & 5 others v Royal Media Services Ltd & 5******others [2014] eKLR elaborated on the doctrine of constitutional avoidance as follows:*** ***“[256] The appellants in this case are seeking to invoke the “principle of avoidance”, also known as “constitutional avoidance”. The principle of avoidance entails that a Court will not determine a constitutional issue, when a matter may properly be decided on another basis. In South Africa, in S v. Mhlungu, 1995 (3) SA 867 (CC) the Constitutional Court Kentridge AJ, articulated the principle of avoidance in his minority Judgment as follows [at paragraph 59]:*** ***“I would lay it down as a general principle that where it is possible to decide any case, civil or criminal, without reaching a constitutional issue, that is the course which should be followed.” [257] Similarly the U.S. Supreme Court has held that it would not decide a constitutional question which was properly before it, if there was also some other basis upon which the case could have been disposed of (Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 297 U.S. 288, 347 (1936)).”*** ***33. Equally, in Lugo v Director of Public Prosecutions [2022] KEHC 10574 (KLR) the Court observed as follows:*** ***“Courts will not normally consider a constitutional question unless the existence of a remedy depends on it; if a remedy is available to an applicant under some other legislative provision or on some other basis, whether legal or factual, a court will usually decline to determine whether there has been, in addition, a breach of the Declaration of rights. Currie and de Waal opine that the principle of constitutional avoidance is of crucial importance in the application of the Bill of Rights. The author states: - When applying the Bill of Rights in a legal dispute, the principle of avoidance is of crucial importance. As we have seen, the Bill of Rights always applies in a legal dispute. It is usually capable of direct or indirect application and, in a limited number of] cases, of indirect application only. The availability of direct application is qualified by the principle that the Bill of Rights should not be applied directly in a legal dispute unless it is necessary to do so.”*** ***11. An important and critical issue arises from the above statements by Currie and de Waal. It is a fact that every legal dispute is capable of either direct or indirect application of the Bill of Rights. Every dispute is essentially a constitutional issue when one looks at it. This arises necessarily because of the principle of constitutional supremacy. One needs to be aware, however, of the singleness of the legal system. This is embodied in the fact that the supremacy of the Constitution does not detract from the usefulness of the rest of the body of law. In essence, all other laws give full expression to the ideals of the Constitution until found to be inconsistent with it. .... The exceptions to the application of the doctrine of constitutional avoidance are: -*** ***i. where the constitutional violation is so clear and of direct relevance to the matter,*** ***ii. in the absence of an apparent alternative form of ordinary relief and*** *iii*. ***where it is found that it would be a waste of effort to seek a non- constitutional resolution of the dispute.”*** ***34. In like manner, in C O D & another vs Nairobi City Water & Sewerage Co. Ltd [2015] KEHC 7762 (KLR) the Court noted as follows:*** ***“11. Similarly, in Papinder Kaur Atwal -vs- Manjit Singh Amrit Nairobi Petition No. 236 of 2011where after considering several authorities on the issue, Justice Lenaola remarked as follows:*** ***“All the authorities above would point to the fact that the constitution is a solemn document, and should not be a substitute for remedying emotional personal questions or mere control of excesses within administrative processes..... I must add the= following; Our Bill of Rights is robust. It has been hailed as one of the best in any Constitution in the World. Our Courts must interpret it [with] all the liberalism they can marshal. However, not every pain can be addressed through the Bill of Rights and alleged violation thereof.” (Emphasis added)*** ***12. The Supreme Court of India has also held that ordinary remedies available under common law and statutes must be pursued in the ordinary manner or as provided under statute. For instance, in Re Application by Bahadur[1986] LRC (Const) the Court expressed itself as follows at page 307; “The Courts have said time and again that where infringements of rights are alleged which can be founded in a claim under substantive law, the proper course is to bring the claim under such law and not under the Constitution. This case highlights the un-wisdom of ignoring that advice.... The Constitution sets out to declare in general terms the fundamental concepts of justice and right that should guide and inform the law and the actions of men. While an infringement of the Constitution might in certain cases give rise to the redress provided for at section 14, yet, as has been proclaimed by the highest Court in the land, it is not, “a general substitute for the normal procedures for invoking judicial control of administrative action.” (See Harrikissoon v A-G [1979] 3 WLR 62). 13. It was further observed in the case of Minister of Home Affairs vs Bickle & Others (1985) LRC Const(per (Georges C.J);*** ***“Courts will not normally consider a constitutional question unless the existence of a remedy depends on it; if a remedy is available to an applicant under some other legislative provision or on some other basis, whether legal or factual, a Court will usually\ decline to determine whether there has been in addition a breach of the Declaration of Rights.”*** 1. This principle of exhaustion of remedies was espoused in **Speaker of the National Assembly v Karume (Civil Application 92 of 1992) [1992] KECA 42 (KLR) (29 May 1992) (Ruling) Speaker of the National Assembly v James Njenga Karume [1992] eKLR Neutral citation: [1992] KECA 42 (KLR**) where the Court of Appeal stated that where there is a clear procedure prescribed by law, it ought to be strictly adhered to. The same principle was reiterated in **Geoffrey Muthinja & Robert Banda Ngombe V. Samuel Muguna Henry, John Jembe Mumba, John Maroo, John Columbus Gikunda M'mwanjah, Bernard Njiru Arozon, Samuel Chivatsi Munga, James Marangu M'muketha & 1750 Others 2015) JELR 105226 (CA)**where the Court of Appeal underscored that parties must first exhaust available statutory remedies before invoking the jurisdiction of the Court. 2. According to the 1st and 2nd respondents, the circumstances of this case also call for the application of the doctrine of constitutional avoidance. Under this doctrine, where a matter may be resolved on the basis of statute or administrative processes, the Court will decline to determine it as a constitutional issue. It is a judicial principle that discourages courts from deciding constitutional issues when a matter can be resolved through statutory or ordinary legal mechanisms. 3. In **Bernard Murage v Fine Serve Africa Ltd & 3 others [2015] eKLR,** Muriithi J held that: ***“Not each and every violation of the law must be raised before the High Court as a constitutional issue. Where there exists an alternative remedy through statutory law, that route must be pursued first.”*** 1. The Supreme Court in the above cited case of **Communications Commission of Kenya & 5 others v Royal Media Services Ltd & 5 others [2014] eKLR** succinctly held: ***“The principle of constitutional avoidance entails that a court will not determine a constitutional issue when a matter may properly be decided on another basis. It is a sound judicial practice for courts to decide cases on non-constitutional grounds if that course is available.”*** 1. In **John Harun Mwau v Peter Gastrow & 3 others [2014] eKLR,** the court held that ***“The Constitution should not be turned into a general substitute for the normal procedures for adjudicating civil or criminal disputes.”*** 2. In this petition, examining the pleadings by the petitioner and the reliefs sought, the petitioner largely claims that the 1st and 2nd respondents have refused to issue its members with certificates of registration yet they were successful applicants. That absence of a clear legal framework on obtaining registration certificates and therefore the advisories made to the public not to engage with those members who have no certificates of registration is discriminatory and unconstitutional. the petitioner urges this court to issue mandamus compelling the 1st and 2nd respondents to provide a clear legal framework on obtaining certificates of registration and certificate of training and which framework should state the fees payable. 3. Before I mention the other prayer, it is important to appreciate the person who is bound by statute to make regulations under the PSR Act. I observe that although there are 4 respondents to this Petition, no single prayer is sought against the 3rd and 4th respondents. And whereas the Attorney General is a necessary party in proceedings against the national government, being the Principal Legal Advisor to the National Government, the petitioner has not attributed any blame to the Attorney General, the 4th respondent or to any other person not party to these proceedings. 4. That said, section 17 of the PSR Act provides for powers of the Cabinet Secretary as follows: **17*. Powers of the Cabinet Secretary*** ***(1) The Authority shall operate under the supervision of the Cabinet Secretary.*** ***(2) Where the Authority fails to maintain any prescribed standard in the fulfilment of its functions under this Act, the Cabinet Secretary may give general or special directions to the Authority describing the extent of the failure and stating the steps required to remedy the situation.*** 1. On the other hand, sections 43 and 44 of the Act provides that: ***43. Appeals to the Cabinet Secretary*** ***(1)Any person aggrieved by a decision of the Authority may within thirty days of such decision, appeal to the Cabinet Secretary.*** ***(2)The Cabinet Secretary shall within seven days of receipt, constitute an ad hoc committee, comprising of not more than three persons to hear and determine the appeal.*** ***(3)The Cabinet Secretary shall ensure that any appeal brought before him or her is heard and*** ***determined within thirty days of receipt.*** ***(4)The Cabinet Secretary shall within fourteen days of the hearing of an appeal under this section deliver his or her decision in writing.*** ***(5)Where an appeal is lodged under this section, the Authority shall not take any action until the appeal has been heard and determined.*** ***(6)Any person making an appeal under this section may either in person or by his or her representative make oral or written submissions to the Cabinet Secretary or the Committee established under subsection (2).*** ***44. Appeals to courts*** ***Any person aggrieved by a decision of the Authority or the Cabinet Secretary under this Act may appeal to any court of competent jurisdiction.*** 1. On who is statutorily mandated to make regulations for the better carrying out of the Act, section 70 of the Act provides as follows: ***70. Regulations*** ***(1)The Cabinet Secretary in consultation with the Authority may make regulations for the purpose of the proper administration of and giving effect to this Act.*** ***(2)Without prejudice to the generality of subsection (1), regulations made under this section may provide for—*** ***(a)the various forms to be used under this Act;*** ***(b)the procedure for applications for the grant or renewal of licences and registration certificates and any appeals under this Act;*** ***(c)the employment of personnel by registered private security firms;*** ***(d)the provision of uniforms and equipment to employees of private security firms;*** ***(e)the provision of protective gear and tools;*** ***(f)guidelines for registered private security providers; or*** ***(g)membership of private security service providers to corporate bodies.*** 1. The point that this court wishes to address is that the petitioner never enjoined the Cabinet secretary to these proceedings yet the Act empowers the Cabinet Secretary, in consultation with the Authority to make regulations for the better carrying out of the Act. Considering that Section 30 mandates that the Authority shall operate under supervision of the Cabinet Secretary, it cannot be gainsaid that the Authority does not act absolutely independently and in some instances like where regulations are to be made, the duty to make those regulations is imposed on the Cabinet Secretary, in consultation with the Authority. 2. Moreover, section 17(2) provides that ***(2) Where the Authority fails to maintain any prescribed standard in the fulfilment of its functions under this Act, the Cabinet Secretary may give general or special directions to the Authority describing the extent of the failure and stating the steps required to remedy the situation.*** 3. Section 17(2) is not couched in mandatory terms. However, where a person is of the view that the Authority has failed to act in a particular manner stipulated in the Act, that person should first complain to the Cabinet Secretary who is the supervisor of the Authority and only after the Cabinet Secretary fails to exercise his or her powers under the Act, should the person approach the Court. Section 43 then provides for an appeal mechanism from a decision of the Authority while section 70 provides for the power to make regulations, which power is bestowed on the Cabinet Secretary in consultation with the Authority. More specifically, regulations for ***(a)the various forms to be used under this Act;*** ***(b)the procedure for applications for the grant or renewal of licences and registration certificates and any appeals under this Act;*** 1. The petitioner not having enjoined the Cabinet Secretary to these proceedings, being the person mandated to make regulations under the Act, the question is whether this court can compel performance of a statutory duty to be performed by a person who is not authorized by law to perform such a duty. 2. In my view, the petitioner is asking this Court to issue an illegal order directing performance of a public statutory duty by the authority and its CEO, contrary to the stipulations of the Act at section 70 of the Act that mandates the Cabonet Secretary to make regulations in consultation with the Authority. Thus, if there is no clear, legal framework for obtaining registration certificates and certificate of training and or the setting standards for training institutions with guidelines for training of private security service providers, for application for registration, or that there are no regulations in place, including regulations prescribing fees, and which regulations have to be made by the Cabinet Secretary in consultation with the Authority, then the authorized person is the Cabinet Secretary who should have been made a party so that such orders of mandamus and even declarations as sought can be directed at him or her to comply with statutory mandates. 3. Again, there is no evidence of any application lodged by the petitioner or its alleged members, for registration, where such members were qualified for registration but were denied such registration, in which event, section 43 of the Act would then come in handy, giving the aggrieved members an opportunity to appeal to the Cabinet Secretary who would then constitute an adhoc committee to hear the appeal expeditiously within the timelines provided for under section 43 of the Act. Under section 44, a person aggrieved by the decision of the Cabinet Secretary has a right of appeal to any court of competent jurisdiction. 4. Additionally, by the Authority issuing a notice to the public advising them of those private security service providers that are registered and licensed, while warning that unregistered firms should not be found to be operating as that would be in contravention of the Act, cannot be said to be discriminatory and therefore an unconstitutional act. This is because, compliance with the law cannot be illegal or unconstitutional. Neither can this court be called upon to stop procuring entities from asking for certificates of registration of the security firms before awarding them tenders. The reasons being, first, is that those procuring entities are not parties to these proceedings and secondly, is that the Act mandates such registration at section 28 and therefore this Court cannot illegitimize or suspend enforcement of a statute and encourage its violation, absent any petition challenging the constitutionality of that statute or provision of the law. Section 28 of the Act provides: ***28. Mandatory registration*** ***A person shall not engage in the provision of private security services or offer private security services in Kenya at a fee unless that person is licensed by the Authority in accordance with this Act.*** 1. Again, under section 6 of the Act on mandatory registration, ***Any person or firm offering private security services shall be registered by the Authority in accordance with this Act.*** On the other hand, under section 9 (c) of the Act, the Authority is mandated to ***(c)register and license all persons involved in or conducting private security services in Kenya.*** 2. Section 31 on licensing provides: ***31. Licence*** ***A licence granted by the Authority under section 30—*** 1. ***shall remain in force for such period as may be specified therein not exceeding five years, subject to annual renewal; and*** 2. ***may be granted subject to such restrictions and on such conditions as may be specified in the licence.*** 3. Section 34 is on **Issuance of a licence or certificate** and it provides: ***A licence or certificate of registration issued under this Act shall be issued by the Authority in the prescribed form within fourteen days from the date of registration.*** 1. My finding is that the Petitioner who is non-suited simply wants to bypass the statutory mechanisms and invite this Court to intervene in the first instance, without demonstrating that, that mechanism provided for under the Act was inadequate. 2. Further, as stated in the decisions that I have extensively cited above, not every alleged breach of statute amounts to a constitutional violation. The Constitution is not a substitute for statutory processes. A petitioner must demonstrate, with precision, how the alleged conduct rises to the level of a constitutional infringement. That threshold has not been met in this case. 3. In conclusion, this Court must guard against the misuse of its constitutional jurisdiction. The liberal provisions on *locus standi* were intended to enhance access to justice, not to facilitate speculative or abstract litigation. 4. In the absence of identifiable members and failure to exhaust the available mechanisms provided for under the Act by way of appeals and without any demonstration that those mechanisms were inadequate, disentitled the petitioner from invoking jurisdiction of this court to resolve those disputes which have no bearing with public interest litigation. To proceed to the merits would be to engage in conjecture and to expend judicial time unnecessarily. This Court declines to do so. 5. Accordingly, the petition dated 13th February, 2023 is hereby dismissed with no orders as to costs, noting that the petitioner is non suited and pursuit of costs would be a vain venture. 6. This file is closed. **Dated, Signed and Delivered at Nairobi virtually this 14th Day of May, 2026** **R. E. ABURILI** **JUDGE**