https://new.kenyalaw.org/akn/ke/judgment/keelrc/2026/1686

Re Fraschini v Vogue Ninety-Nine Ltd (Cause E026 of 2025) [2026] KEELRC 1686 (KLR) (11 June 2026) (Judgment) Neutral citation: [2026] KEELRC 1686 (KLR) Republic of Kenya In the Employment and Labour Relations Court at Mombasa Cause E026 of 2025 K Ocharo, J June 11, 2026 Between Gianluca Re Fraschini Claimant and Vogue Ninety-Nine Limited Respondent Judgment Background 1.By his Memorandum of Claim filed herein dated 13th January, 2025, the Claimant sued the Respondent, praying against them for the following reliefs;a.A declaration that the Respondent committed an offence under Section 45(6) of the Kenya Citizenship and Immigration Act (Cap. 170);b.A declaration that the Respondent committed an offence under Section 53(1a) of the Kenya Citizenship and Immigration Act (Cap. 170);c.A declaration that the Respondent committed an offence under Section 53(1e) of the Kenya Citizenship and Immigration Act (Cap. 170);d.A declaration that the Respondent committed an offence under Section 53[1n] of the Kenya Citizenship and Immigration Act (Cap. 170);e.A declaration that the Respondent committed an offence under Section 53(1o) of the Kenya Citizenship and Immigration Act (Cap. 170);f.A declaration that the Respondent committed an offence under Section 53(1q) of the Kenya Citizenship and Immigration Act (Cap. 170);g.A declaration that the Respondent committed an offence under Section 54(1a) of the Kenya Citizenship and Immigration Act (Cap. 170);h.A declaration that the Respondent committed an offence under Section 54(1b) of the Kenya Citizenship and Immigration Act (Cap. 170);i.A declaration that the Respondent committed an offence under Section 16(4) of the Employment Act (Cap. 226);j.A declaration that the Respondent committed an offence under Section 17(10) of the Employment Act (Cap. 226);k.A declaration that the Respondent committed an offence under Section 19(5) of the Employment Act (Cap. 226);l.A declaration that the Respondent committed an offence under Section 51(4) of the Employment Act (Cap.226);m.A declaration that the Claimant was constructively terminated from his employment by the Respondent;n.The Respondent to be subjected to the penalty under Section 53(2) of the Kenya Citizenship and Immigration Act (Cap. 170);o.The Respondent to be subjected to the penalty under Section 53(3) of the Kenya Citizenship and Immigration Act (Cap. 170);p.The Respondent to be subjected to the penalty under Section 54(2) of the Kenya Citizenship and Immigration Act (Cap. 170);q.The Respondent to be subjected to the penalty under Section 60 of the Kenya Citizenship and Immigration Act (Cap. 170);r.The Respondent to be subjected to the penalty under Section 16(4) of the Employment Act (Cap. 226);s.The Respondent to be subjected to the penalty under Section 17(10) of the Employment Act (Cap. 226);t.The Respondent to be subjected to the penalty under Section 19(5) of the Employment Act (Cap. 226);u.The Respondent to be subjected to the penalty under Section 19(6) of the Employment Act (Cap. 226);v.Refund to the employee the amount deducted from the employee's wages as statutory deductions; (Four (4) Months $1951.29) = $7,805.16w.The Respondent to be subjected to the penalty under Section 51(4) of the Employment Act (Cap. 226);x.The Respondent be ordered to compensate the Claimant as itemised below:I.Payment of the wages that the employee would have earned had the notice period in their contract been duly issued; (Seven (7) Working days *$153.846) = $1,076.922II.Payment of the proportionate wages for the period worked before the completion of a payable wage period; (Nine (9) Working days *$153.846) = $1,384.614III.Settlement of any outstanding dues, accrued leave days, and other benefits due at the time of resignation; (accrued leave days; 1.75*4*$153.846) = $1,076.922IV.Reimbursement of the additional funds for insurance expenses that should have been allocated to the medical expenses as per the Employment Agreement; = $500.00V.Compensation for any loss incurred between the date of dismissal and the expiry of the notice period; (Travel and Relocation Expenses) = $626.78VI.Compensation for Constructive dismissal based on breach of contract; (Remaining probation Period; Two (2) Months $4,000) (Full employment Period; Eighteen (18) Months $4,000) = $80,000.00Total; $84,665.238y)Provision of the Certificate of Service;z)General damages;z)Cost of this suit; andaa)Interest in (y) and (z) at court rates. 2.The Respondent challenged the Claimant’s case in the Response to the Memorandum of Claim dated 28th April, 2025. The Respondent contends that the Claimant was not its employee but merely a guest undertaking familiarisation pending the issuance of the relevant immigration documents and work permit. Claimant’s case 3.The Claimant asserts that he was employed by the Respondent on or around 6th June 2024 as an Executive Chef at Chale Island Resort, with a net monthly salary of USD 4,000. He indicates that his employment included benefits such as a Kenyan work permit or special pass, fully furnished accommodation comprising a small apartment near the workplace, and an additional USD 500 allocated for insurance costs. 4.According to him, the employment arose from email correspondence between the Respondent and him, culminating in an email agreement dated 6th June 2024. Following an inquiry regarding the acquisition of a work permit, the Respondent directed him to enter Kenya using an ETA/tourist visa. 5.He avers that the Respondent, through its travel agent, applied on his behalf for the ETA, provided a hotel reservation voucher, and purported to have procured a return flight ticket to and from Mombasa. The documents were forwarded to him by email on 17th June 2024. 6.He states that upon arriving in Kenya on 23rd June 2024, he realised that the Hotel Reservation Voucher, 757/24, dated 12th June 2024, did not exist and was fake. It further dawned on him that the flight ticket's booking code was invalid and therefore legally unacceptable. 7.The foregoing prompted him to seek answers regarding the discovered state of the two documents. To his surprise, the Respondent informed him that the documents were only for his visa and entry into Kenya. 8.The Claimant further states that the Respondent requested him to start working as they endeavoured to apply for the special pass as per the email dated 6th June 2024. Subsequently, he made several requests to the Respondent to conclude the process and hand over the special permit to him, but he was met with reluctance. The Respondent never procured a work permit for him. 9.Contrary to the agreement reached between him and the Respondent, the Respondent allocated him a small guest room within one of its resorts as his accommodation. Due to the limited size and the absence of privacy and work separation, he was impeded from hosting his mother, whom he had planned to bring to reside with him for extended periods. 10.The Claimant also states that he fell ill on 16th September 2024 and took leave from 20th September 2024 to seek specialised medical care in France. He checked into the Hospital on 21st September and was advised to stop working from 24th September to 4th October 2024. At all times, he kept the Respondent updated on his health via WhatsApp. During this period of illness, he had to meet his own medical expenses. This prompted him to suspect that the Respondent was not remitting funds towards his statutory medical insurance. 11.When he inquired about his salary and medical assistance, the Respondent informed him that they had in place a new policy that did not allow them to remunerate and compensate expatriates who were not physically in the Country. Based on the response, he requested a special pass or a work permit from the Respondent so he could travel back to Kenya. 12.They advised that he would use the ETA [Tourist Visa] because they had not finalised processing either of the two documents. The Respondent, through its travel agent, went ahead and re-applied for the Tourist Visa on his behalf. They supplied him with a Hotel Reservation Voucher and round-trip flight tickets to and from Mombasa. The documents were sent by email on 2nd October 2024. Later, he discovered that voucher No. 1160/24, dated 30th September 2024, and the return ticket dated 3rd of November 2024 with Ethiopian Airlines were invalid and fake, like those shared in the email dated 17th June 2024. 13.On 4th October 2024, he inquired of the National Health Insurance Fund regarding the status of his membership and the remittances made to his account. Surprisingly, he was informed that he was not in its database and that the Respondent had not made any remittances to it. The National Social Security Fund and the Kenya Revenue Authority also gave him the same response. 14.The Claimant avers that upon resuming duty, he continued to seek clarification and resolution of the alleged breaches relating to his immigration status, accommodation, health insurance, medical expenses and salary. He states that the Respondent delayed his salary by 5 days, failed to compensate him for medical expenses, and verbally suggested that he could leave if the working conditions were unacceptable. 15.The Claimant affirms that, after obtaining legal counsel and acknowledging the ramifications of working without a valid immigration status, he resigned on 10th October 2024 in protest against the Respondent’s continued violation of the employment agreement and applicable law. 16.The Claimant’s 1st witness, Titus Kabuya Muita, like the Claimant, adopted his witness statement as his evidence in chief. The witness recalled that the Claimant contacted him in or about August 2024 to inform him of an opportunity at the Respondent's Chale Island Resort for the position of Sous Chef. He was eventually employed in that role and worked with the Claimant for approximately seven months. As the Executive Chef, the Claimant was his supervisor. 17.He stated that during his tenure, the Claimant established an Italian restaurant called “Eli’s Trattoria” as one of the establishments under Chale Island Resort. He created and introduced the menu and recipes for the restaurant. 18.Kelvin Ochieng’ Obonyo, the 2nd Respondent’s witness, stated in his witness statement that he is a chef by profession and that the Claimant informed him of an opportunity to work as a chef at Chale Island Resort. He further states that in June 2024 he joined the Claimant’s team and worked for the Respondent for about 4 months, ending in August 2024. 19.He states that during his employment, he worked under the supervision of the Claimant, who was the Executive Chef at Chale Island Resort. According to him, the Claimant occasionally guided and instructed him on the tasks he was required to perform. 20.He further states that the Claimant lived in one of the rooms at the resort on the island. 21.Kelvin also indicates that during his employment, the Respondent’s General Manager intermittently issued verbal threats of termination towards him and his colleagues, thereby contributing to a hostile working environment. Additionally, he emphasises that the General Manager frequently failed to address grievances brought to the Human Resources Manager's attention. Respondent’s case 22.The Respondent’s witness, Andrea Anelli, states that he is the General Manager at Chale Island, which is owned by the Respondent. He further states that in early June 2024, the Respondent interviewed the Claimant for the position of Executive Chef at Chale Island while the Claimant was residing in Paris. 23.He states that the agreed terms of employment were that the Claimant would earn USD 4,000 net, would be subject to a six-month probationary period, would be provided with one annual flight home from the place of employment, a company phone and credit, and would be engaged on a two-year contract with an option to extend; that he would require a work permit to work in Kenya; that the process of obtaining the work permit was to start once he was in Kenya; that he would be provided with accommodation on the island; and that he would arrange for his own insurance. 24.The witness stated that, since the process of obtaining the work permit was to start once the Claimant was in Kenya, it was agreed that, pending the acquisition of the permit, he would undertake a site tour of Chale Island to familiarise himself with the work environment and Kenyan culture, which was crucial to the effective performance of his duties. 25.He states that on 6th June 2024, the Respondent shared a contract with the Claimant as a show of commitment and good faith, because the Claimant needed assurance before commencing relocation plans to Kenya. The Claimant signed the contract on 7th June 2024, after which the Respondent processed his Tourist visa, procured a flight ticket and a hotel reservation voucher for him. These were shared with him on 17th June 2024. 26.Andrea Anelli further states that the Claimant arrived in Kenya on 23rd June 2024 and was accommodated in a hotel guest room in accordance with the hotel reservation voucher. He denies that the accommodation was inadequate and states that the room was an upgrade on the apartment the Claimant was to receive. 27.He further states that the Claimant never complained about the accommodation or requested alternative accommodation, and that he appeared to prefer that arrangement. According to him, although the Claimant’s employment contract had not yet taken effect because he had not been issued with a work permit or special pass, the Respondent nevertheless paid him a monthly allowance or maintenance of USD 4,000, equivalent to the salary he would have earned after the work permit was issued. 28.Andrea Anelli states that the Respondent paid the Claimant the monthly allowance because the Respondent had caused him to relocate to Kenya, and because the work permit could only be processed once he was in Kenya. 29.The Respondent considered it humane to compensate him during the period he was awaiting the permit's issuance, as he had personal bills and expenses. However, he states that the Respondent did not issue payslips because the payments were treated as an allowance or compensation, not as salary, since the employment contract would only commence after the work permit was issued. 30.Andrea Anelli further claims that, despite the Respondent’s goodwill, the Claimant showed signs of unfitness, incompatibility and disinterest in the Respondent’s business during the familiarisation period. He alleges that the Claimant admitted private, undocumented guests to his hotel room without the Respondent’s knowledge or consent, at the Respondent’s expense. 31.He further states that although the Claimant had been informed that he would need to open a Kenyan bank account for payment purposes, he insisted that payments be made to bank accounts in Georgia or Panama, raising concerns that the Respondent could be suspected or accused of money laundering or other illegal activities. 32.He also alleges that the Claimant began disappearing and failing to attend familiarisation sessions organised in advance of his eventual engagement as Executive Chef. 33.Andrea Anelli states that in August 2024, the Claimant informed the Respondent that he needed to travel to Italy in September to address personal matters and documentation, and that the Respondent agreed to allow him to travel for one week. 34.He states that after travelling, the Claimant demanded payment of the USD 4,000 monthly amount while he was outside Kenya and away from the hotel. The Respondent declined to pay him during that period, maintaining that the Claimant was not in Kenya, was not at the hotel, had travelled for personal reasons, and could not be regarded as the Respondent’s guest. 35.Andrea Anelli states that the Claimant returned to Kenya on 4th October 2024 and demanded his September allowance, which the Respondent paid on 10th October 2024. He further states that immediately after receiving the payment, the Claimant left, and the Respondent later received his resignation letter. 36.The Respondent’s position is that the Claimant is not entitled to the benefits claimed because no employer-employee relationship existed, and that any benefits under the contract would only accrue after the issuance of a work permit or special pass and the commencement of work under Kenyan law. 37.The Respondent also denies contravening the Kenya Citizenship and Immigration Act or committing any of the offences alleged by the Claimant. It further states that no complaint has been lodged with the relevant authority, and that no criminal charges or proceedings have been instituted against it in respect of the alleged offences. 38.The Respondent therefore prays that the Claimant’s case be dismissed with costs, contending that the claim is intended to extort money from the Respondent and to unjustly enrich the Claimant. Analysis and determination 39.I have considered the pleadings, the witness statements, the documentary evidence and the rival submissions filed by the parties. In my view, the issues to be determined are whether an employer-employee relationship existed between the parties; whether the Claimant was constructively dismissed; whether the Claimant is entitled to the remedies sought; and who should bear the costs of the suit. 40.The parties herein held opposing positions regarding whether, at all material times, the Claimant was an employee of the Respondent. The Claimant asserted, supported by his Counsel’s submissions, that he was bound by an employment contract dated 6th June 2024. Conversely, the Respondent maintained, with vigorous support from their Counsel, that although an employment contract existed between the Respondent and the Claimant, it did not become effective immediately upon the Claimant’s arrival in Kenya, due to the fact that his work permit had not been duly processed. 41.Section 2 of the Employment Act defines an employee as a person employed for wages or a salary and includes an apprentice and an indentured learner. Equally, an employer is defined as a person who has entered into a contract of service to employ an individual. The focus of the law is not merely on formal labels or administrative processes but on the substance of reality. Where a person renders services under the direction and control of another and receives remuneration for those services, an employment relationship is established, notwithstanding attempts to characterise it differently. 42.I have carefully considered the contract of employment that was admittedly a product of negotiations between the Respondent and the Claimant. In terms of content, it duly complied with the requirements contemplated under the Employment Act, including the commencement date of the contract [20th June 2024], the remuneration, and the term of the contract. In my view, the commencement of the contract was not contingent upon the proper processing of the work permit; otherwise, if it was intended to be, nothing could have been easier than the parties expressly stating so in the contract. In fact, there is nothing in the contract that even suggests it was an implied term. 43.To agree with the Respondent’s position would constitute this Court rewriting a contract for the parties, a task that this Court cannot justly and legally undertake. The foundational legal principle of freedom of contract dictates that parties are bound by the exact terms they agreed to. Courts would not rewrite, modify, or save parties from a “bad bargain’’ just because a deal proves uncomfortable for one. 44.In National Bank of Kenya v Pipe Plastic Samkolit [K]Ltd [2002], the Court of Appeal stated:“A court of law cannot rewrite a contract between the parties. The parties are bound by the terms of their contract, unless coercion, fraud, or undue influence are pleaded and proved. See also Pius Kimaiyo Langat v Cooperative Bank of Kenya Limited [2017] eKLR.” 45.In Kenya Breweries Limited & Another vs Bia Tosha Distributors Limited & 5 others [2020] eKLR, the Court of Appeal, while overturning the decision of the High Court in the matter, had this to say;“(46)We differ with the learned Judge’s conclusion that the issues of constitutional rights raised by the 1st Respondent were not suitable for arbitration, as the issues arose from the distributorship agreement. There is no way the infringement of the alleged constitutional rights can be divorced from the written agreements in which they are embedded, and which is allegedly breached. The parties are brought together by the trade agreements, the claim for unfair trade practices and payment of goodwill are emanating from the agreements. Moreover, there is a plethora of cases, some cited by the learned Judge, that reiterate the principle that parties are bound by the terms of their contracts; that a court cannot rewrite a contract between the parties, and that where there is ambiguity in an agreement, it is to be construed according to the words used by the parties. [See Section 97 of the Evidence Act] …………….” 46.There is no dispute; this is clearly borne out by the evidence of the Respondent’s witness that, during the material period, the Claimant rendered services in accordance with the contractual role and was paid the agreed salary of USD 4000 per month. The evidence of the Claimant’s two witnesses, which, in my view, was firm and unshaken, supported the fact of the Claimant’s service. 47.An employer cannot be permitted to approbate and reprobate at the same time, inviting a foreign national into the country under a negotiated employment contract, assigning duties, receiving the benefit of the employee’s labour, paying the agreed remuneration, and thereafter seeking refuge in the argument that the contract had not yet taken effect because a work permit was still being processed. 48.An employer who engages a foreign employee cannot be allowed to avoid statutory and contractual obligations by describing the period during which the employee rendered services as a familiarisation exercise” or “orientation period” where the evidence clearly demonstrates, as is in the instant case, actual performance. Courts are enjoined to look beyond nomenclature and examine the true nature of the arrangement. If the employee was assigned duties, participated in the employer’s operations, exercised responsibilities consistent with the position for which he was recruited, and was paid his agreed salary, the irresistible conclusion is that the employment relationship had commenced. 49.To hold otherwise would create a dangerous avenue for the exploitation of foreign employees. Employers would be free to enjoy the fruits of the employee’s labour while evading the obligations that ordinarily attach to employment contracts merely by asserting that administrative processes had not been concluded. Such a position would offend the principles of fairness, equity, and good faith that underpin employment law. 50.By reason of the foregoing, I come to the inescapable conclusion that the contract of employment took effect on the appointed date, in fact and in law, and that at all material times the Claimant was entitled to the full protection, rights and remedies available under the Employment Act, the law generally, and the terms of the agreement. 51.Having found as I have set out above, I now proceed to evaluate whether the Claimant was constructively dismissed. It is trite law that, where an employer's conduct evinces an intention no longer to be bound by the contract of employment, the employee may either accept the conduct or the changes made by the employer, or treat the conduct or changes as a repudiation of the contract by the employer and sue for wrongful dismissal. In the instant matter, it is clear that the Claimant opted for the latter course. 52.It becomes imperative for this Court to state that, in the context of a constructive dismissal claim, it is frequently the conduct of the employer that is the focal point, rather than that of the employee. The term constructive dismissal indicates that the dismissal is a legal construct. The employer’s act is treated as a dismissal because of the way it is characterised by law. See Potter VS-. N.B Legal Aid [2015] 1 S.C.R. 53.In determining whether the conduct of an employer evinced an intention to no longer be bound by the contract, the Court must first identify an express or implied term that has been breached, and then determine whether the breach was sufficiently serious to constitute constructive dismissal. Typically, the breach in question involves changes to the employee’s compensation, work assignments, or workplace conduct that are both unilateral and substantial. 54.In order for a claim of constructive dismissal to succeed, the Court applies the above test; it must be concluded that the employer’s conduct or unilateral change constitutes a breach of the contract of employment, and second, if it constitutes such a breach, it must be found to substantially alter an essential term of the contract. This is the test that the Court of Appeal referred to as the "contractual test" in Coca-Cola East & Africa Limited v Maria Ligaga [2015] eKLR. 55.On the other hand, the Court may find for an employee claiming constructive dismissal where the conduct of the employer more generally shows that the employer intended not to be bound by the contract. It need not identify a specific term breached; it shall be sufficient to find that the employer’s treatment of the employee made continued employment intolerable. This approach is in character retrospective. It considers the cumulative effect of the employer's past acts and whether those acts evinced an intention not to be bound by the contract. In terms of the Court of Appeal decision[supra], this is the unreasonable test. 56.One of the fundamental statutory obligations of the employer under the Employment Act is to provide accommodation for the employee[s]. In recognition of this obligation, the employment contract between the Respondent and the Claimant provided for accommodation for the Claimant. It is important to note that they agreed on the location of the accommodation [within Chale Island] and the type - a furnished apartment. The Claimant maintained that the agreement on the type of accommodation was deliberate. He needed to accommodate his mother for a while and required privacy, too. Apparently, without consulting the Claimant, the Respondent decided to accommodate him in a small room within the hotel. The Respondent regarded the room as an upgrade on the small apartment provided for in the contract. According to the Claimant, the room was small; it would not accommodate both him and his mother, and it lacked the privacy he desired. 57.Given that the type of accommodation was incorporated as a term of the agreement and a right of the Claimant, the Respondent’s action of providing a different form of accommodation without prior consultation with the Claimant constituted a unilateral act and an infringement of a fundamental contractual term. 58.The employment contract explicitly provided that the Claimant was entitled to USD 500 to help with insurance expenses. The Claimant asserted that the Respondent never made the sums available to him for the stated purpose. In my view, the amount was part of the Claimant’s remuneration, and the Respondent could not unilaterally withhold it. Again, this act was a breach of a fundamental term of the employment contract. 59.The Claimant contended that while he was in France, with the Respondent's permission, and concerned about the unresolved issues regarding his medical insurance, accommodation, and work permit, he repeatedly pressed the Respondent for an answer. In response, he received a retaliatory reaction from the Respondent. It deliberately and unjustifiably delayed his salary. The Respondent did not deny the delay. It alleged that, per the company policy, they would not pay an employee who was not within their workplace, the Claimant’s employment had not yet commenced, and that the Claimant refused to open an account with one of the local banks but insisted that his salary be paid to one of his accounts domiciled in Panama. 60.With great respect, the reasons advanced did not make any sense to this Court. An employer cannot force an employee to accept that employer’s preferred pay point; second, the alleged policy was not placed before this Court. This leads this Court to one conclusion, namely that, as the Claimant asserted, the action was retaliatory, an act that evinced that the Respondent was no longer willing to be bound by the terms of the contract. 61.Under the Kenya Citizenship and Immigration Act, the obligation to obtain a valid work permit for a foreign employee rests primarily with the employer seeking to engage that employee. If the employer neglects, refuses, or unreasonably delays processing a work permit, yet continues to retain the employee in service and permits the employee to perform work, the employer exposes both itself and the employment relationship to illegality. Such conduct is not merely an administrative lapse; it carries statutory and potentially criminal consequences under the immigration laws. 62.In such circumstances, the employee is placed in an intolerable and precarious position. The employee faces a consistent risk of immigration sanctions, arrest, prosecution, deportation, or reputational harm arising solely from the employer’s default. The law cannot reasonably expect an employee to continue serving under such conditions. 63.In conclusion, therefore, where the employer’s failure to obtain a work permit, as was the instant case, fundamentally undermines the legality, security, and viability of the employment relationship, the employee is entitled to treat the employer’s conduct as a repudiatory breach of the contract of employment, resign therefrom, and maintain a claim for constructive dismissal. The resignation in such circumstances is not truly voluntary; it is the foreseeable consequence of the employer’s unlawful conduct, which has rendered continued employment untenable. 64.In the upshot, I find the Claimant’s claim for constructive dismissal merited. 65.Constructive dismissal is an unfair dismissal. Having found that the Claimant was constructively dismissed, I now turn to consider whether he is entitled to the reliefs sought on account of the dismissal. However, I should point out that the reliefs sought fell into two categories: those dependent on the claim for constructive dismissal and those independent of it. 66.I have carefully considered the so many orders, seeking that this Court declares that the Respondent breached several statutory provisions, thus committing criminal offences. In my view, the Claimant seeks to have this Court venture beyond its jurisdictional province. This Court is neither a criminal investigation agency nor a Court that possesses criminal jurisdiction. I reject the reliefs. 67.Section 49 of the Employment Act, 2007, vests the Court with the authority to grant compensatory relief for unfair dismissal. The exercise of the authority is discretionary. It depends on the circumstances of each case. I have considered how the Claimant was recruited into the employment of the Respondent, the manner in which he exited the employment, and the length of period he was in the service of the Respondent, and hold that he is entitled to the relief to an extent of six[6] months’ gross salary, USD 24000. 68.I note that the Claimant has further sought compensation for the salary he would have earned up to the appointed expiry date of his employment contract. In other words, the salary for the remainder of the contract period. This relief is one this Court cannot award. It has no statutory underpinning. Section 49 of the Employment Act, which provides for remedies for unfair dismissal, does not provide for it. The Supreme Court of Kenya, in the case of Francis Waithaka Ngokonyo & 2 others v Telkom Kenya Limited, Petition No. E009 of 2025 expressly held that anticipatory earnings or future salary have no statutory underpinning in Kenya. 69.I have really agonised over some of the reliefs sought by the Claimant in the table under item nine of the reliefs section. Counsel for the Claimant needs to consciously ask themselves where those were picked from and whether, in the context of the Kenyan system, they are relevant. I will say no more. 70.In the upshot, judgment is hereby entered for the Claimant in the following terms;I.A declaration that the Claimant was constructively dismissed.II.Compensation pursuant to the provisions of Section 49[1][ c] of the Employment Act, six months’ gross salary, USD 24000.III.Interest on the awarded sum from the date of this judgment till full payment.IV.Costs of this suit. READ, SIGNED, AND DELIVERED THIS 11TH DAY OF JUNE 2026.OCHARO KEBIRAJUDGE