https://new.kenyalaw.org/akn/ke/judgment/kehc/2026/8701

Rentworks East Africa Ltd v Ngumbi alias Scolastica Mbithe Ngumbi & another (Civil Appeal E006 of 2026) [2026] KEHC 8701 (KLR) (19 June 2026) (Judgment) Neutral citation: [2026] KEHC 8701 (KLR) Republic of Kenya In the High Court at Makueni Civil Appeal E006 of 2026 RA Oganyo, J June 19, 2026 Between Rentworks East Africa Limited Appellant and Scolastica Mbithe Ngumbi alias Scolastica Mbithe Ngumbi 1st Respondent The Honourable Attorney General 2nd Respondent (Being an appeal against the Judgement of the Principal’s Magistrate’s Court at Tawa by Honourable.S. Jalango (Senior Principal Magistrate) delivered on 27th November 2025 in MCCC NO 167 of 2023) Judgment 1.This appeal arises from the judgment of the Learned Magistrate, Hon. S. Jalango (Senior Principal Magistrate), delivered on 27th November 2025 in MCCC No. 167 of 2023. The genesis of the underlying dispute stems from a road traffic accident that occurred on 17th April 2023 at Kikima Market along the Mbooni–Kikima Road involving motor vehicle registration number GKB 361U, which was at all material times owned by the Defendant (now the Appellant), Rentworks East Africa Limited. 2.By a Plaint dated 29th November 2023, the Plaintiff (now the Respondent), Scolastica Mbithe Ngumbi Alias Scholastica Mbithe, averred that on the material date 17th April 2023, she was lawfully standing off the road when the said motor vehicle was negligently driven by the Defendant’s servant, agent and/or employee, who lost control, veered off the road, and knocked her down, thereby occasioning the accident and resulting injuries. 3.The Plaintiff pleaded that the accident was wholly and/or substantially caused by the negligence of the Defendant’s driver acting within the course and scope of his employment, thereby rendering the Defendant vicariously liable. Particulars of negligence include driving at an excessive and dangerous speed in the circumstances, failure to stop, slow down or properly control the motor vehicle so as to avoid the accident, failure to comply with traffic rules and the Highway Code, and losing control of the motor vehicle which culminated in the accident and resultant injuries to the Plaintiff. 4.As a result of the accident, the Plaintiff sustained blunt injuries to the right hip region, degloving injuries to the dorsum of the right foot, and fracture of the third distal phalanx of the right foot, and was admitted at Machakos Level 5 Hospital for one (1) month. The Plaintiff further claims special damages of Kshs. 46,040/= and prays for general damages, costs of the suit, and interest, contending that despite demand and notice of intention to sue, the Defendant has failed, refused, and/or neglected to compensate her. 5.The Defendant opposed the suit through a Statement of Defence dated 12th March 2024 in which it denied liability and disputed that it was the registered owner of motor vehicle registration number GKB 361U at the material time, and put the Plaintiff to strict proof thereof; it further admitted only that an accident involving motor vehicle registration number GKB 361U and a pedestrian occurred on the material date and location, but denied that the said motor vehicle was being driven by its servant, agent, employee or authorized driver, or that any negligence could be attributed to it; the Defendant also denied the particulars of negligence, injuries, loss and damage pleaded by the Plaintiff and put her to strict proof thereof, while admitting jurisdiction of the Court and receipt of demand and notice of intention to sue; save as expressly admitted, the Defendant denied each and every allegation in the Plaint as if the same were set out herein verbatim and prayed that the suit be dismissed with costs. 6.During the hearing, the Plaintiff (now the Respondent) testified alongside other witnesses and relied on her filed witness statement dated 27th November 2023 as her evidence-in-chief, as well as the documents produced in support of the claim. PW1, PC Alex Orina Mose, testified that a road traffic accident occurred on 17th April 2023 at Kikima Shopping Centre involving motor vehicle registration number GKB 361U, which struck the Plaintiff, and produced a police abstract in support of the occurrence of the accident and the injuries sustained. PW2, the Plaintiff ( now the Respondent) , Scolastica Mbithe Ngumbi, testified that she was lawfully at Kikima Market when she was knocked down by the said motor vehicle, sustaining injuries for which she was treated and hospitalized, and she blamed the driver for negligence. PW3, PW4 and PW5 also testified as eye witnesses, corroborating that the Plaintiff was a pedestrian/market vendor at or near the road when the accident occurred, and that the vehicle was being driven at speed and struck her or her stall, causing injuries. The Plaintiff thereafter closed her case. 7.In response, the Defendant (now the Appellant), Mourine Owuor, its Asset Manager, who adopted her witness statement dated 21st May 2025 as her evidence-in-chief and relied on the documents produced in support of the Defence. She testified that the Defendant had leased the motor vehicle and was not in possession or control of it at the time of the accident, and denied liability on that basis. A Third-Party witness, APC Charles Otieno Leonard, the driver of motor vehicle GKB 361U, testified that he was a police officer attached to the Administration Police Service and that the vehicle was under his control during official duty, denying negligence on his part and asserting that the Plaintiff fell onto the vehicle. Upon conclusion of the hearing, the Defence and Third Party closed their respective cases. 8.In evaluating the matter, the learned trial magistrate considered the pleadings, the oral evidence tendered by the parties, and the respective submissions on both liability and quantum. Upon analysing the evidence, the court found that the Respondent had proved, on a balance of probabilities, that motor vehicle registration number GKB 361U lost control, veered off the road, and knocked her while she was standing off the road at Kikima Market. The learned magistrate consequently held the driver of the said motor vehicle wholly to blame for the accident and found the Appellant and the Third Party jointly and severally vicariously liable for the driver's negligence. 9.On liability, the learned trial magistrate expressed himself as follows:“The evidence as presented herein points to negligence on the part of the driver. He confirmed that the road was wet and congested by motorists. In such circumstances, he ought to be vigilant and take extra care of other road users. The defendant and the Third Party' claim that the plaintiff slid onto the road was not backed by any evidence. 10.In reaching that conclusion, the learned trial magistrate rejected the defence and third party's version that the Respondent had slipped onto the roadway and instead accepted the consistent testimony of the Respondent, the three independent eyewitnesses, and the investigating police officer, all of whom stated that the driver lost control of the vehicle, veered off the road, and knocked the Respondent. The court further held that although the suit motor vehicle had been leased to the Third Party under the Government Leasing Programme, the Appellant remained vicariously liable by virtue of the lease agreement and the comprehensive insurance arrangements between the parties. 11.On quantum, the learned trial magistrate found that the Respondent sustained blunt injuries to the right hip region and degloving injuries to the dorsum of the right foot. After considering the comparable authorities cited by the parties and considering the nature of the injuries and inflationary trends, the court awarded the Respondent Kshs. 700,000 as general damages for pain, suffering and loss of amenities. The court further awarded Kshs. 6,270 as special damages, having found that only that amount had been specifically pleaded and strictly proved by production of receipts. The Respondent was also awarded costs of the suit and interest. Aggrieved by the said decision, the Defendant (now the Appellant) lodged the present appeal. 12.The Appellant’s case is anchored on the grounds set out in the Memorandum of Appeal dated 22nd January 2026, and is as follows: -i.That the Learned Trial Magistrate erred in law and in fact in failing to uphold the doctrine of vicarious liability and finding that the Appellant was vicariously liable.ii.That the Learned Trial Magistrate erred in law and in fact in failing to find that there was no master-servant relationship that existed between the Appellant and the driver of the subject motor vehicle.iii.That the Learned Trial Magistrate erred in law and in fact in failing to find that the driver was not an employee/ servant and or agent of the Appellant.iv.That the Learned Trial Magistrate erred in law and in fact in failing to find that the driver was neither authorised nor acting under the instructions of the Appellant when he caused the accident.v.That the Learned Trial Magistrate erred in law and in fact and the submissions made before him by the Appellant and reached an erroneous conclusion thereby occasioning a miscarriage of Justice.vi.That the Learned Trial Magistrate erred in law and in fact in holding that the Appellant was jointly and severally liable for the accident in the absence of any evidence to support the same and by having disregard of the submissions by the Defendant/ Appellant and cited legal authorities.vii.That the Learned Trial Magistrate erred in law and in fact by awarding judgement in the sum of KSHS. 706,270/= when the same was manifestly high and by having disregard of the submissions by the Appellant and cited legal authorities.viii.That the Learned Trial Magistrate in assessing quantum of damages considered irrelevant factors and wrong principles and arrived at a wrong decision and excessive award on quantum of damages. Respondent’s Submissions 13.The Respondent respectfully submitted that the trial court correctly found the Appellant 100% liable for the accident, as the evidential record sufficiently established ownership and control of motor vehicle registration number GKB 361U in favour of the Appellant at the material time. Although the Appellant attempted to rely on a lease arrangement to distance itself from liability, the testimony of DW1 was materially inconsistent and ultimately unsubstantiated, particularly on the question of whether the lease had been validly extended beyond its expiry. The Appellant failed to discharge the legal burden under Sections 107–112 of the Evidence Act, and as correctly observed by the trial court, the statutory presumption under Section 8 of the Traffic Act that the registered owner is deemed to be the owner was not rebutted. In the absence of credible documentary proof shifting ownership or operational control, the only reasonable inference was that the Appellant remained the owner at the time of the accident, and therefore properly bore liability. 14.Further, the Appellant’s contention that there was no master–servant or agency relationship capable of grounding vicarious liability is misconceived in law and unsupported by the evidential matrix. The trial court correctly appreciated that liability in such circumstances is not defeated merely by outsourcing or leasing arrangements where residual obligations, including insurance coverage and indemnity clauses, demonstrate continuing legal responsibility for risk allocation. The lease agreement and its addenda, as analysed by the trial court, clearly showed that the Appellant remained contractually bound to insure and indemnify in respect of losses arising from the use of the vehicle, thereby reinforcing the existence of a legally cognisable nexus sufficient to sustain liability. The Appellant’s attempt to rely on submissions rather than cogent documentary evidence to negate agency or control was properly rejected, and the learned trial magistrate rightly concluded, on the authority of persuasive jurisprudence including Tsusho Capital Limited v Ngechu, that liability may properly attach notwithstanding operational deployment to a third party, with indemnity rights lying in contract rather than negation of liability. 15.On quantum, the Respondent submitted that the award of Kshs. 706,270/= was neither inordinately high nor arrived at in error of principle. The injuries sustained—blunt trauma to the right hip, degloving injury to the right foot, and fractures of multiple distal phalanges with resultant permanent incapacity were medically confirmed by both parties’ medical reports, including the Appellant’s own medical evidence which assessed a 4% permanent incapacity and noted persistent functional impairment. The trial court properly exercised its discretion by applying established appellate principles in Butt v Khan and related authorities, considering comparable awards, inflationary trends, and the long-term impact on the Respondent’s mobility and quality of life. There is no demonstration that the trial court considered irrelevant factors or ignored relevant ones; accordingly, the Respondent prays that the appeal be dismissed in its entirety with costs. Issues for Determination 16.Having considered the Memorandum of Appeal, the Record of Appeal, the judgment of the trial court, and the submissions by counsel the issues that arise for determination are: -i.Whether the learned trial magistrate erred in law and in fact in holding the Appellant vicariously liable for the negligence of the driver of motor vehicle registration number GKB 361U.ii.Whether the learned trial magistrate erred in law and in fact in assessing and awarding damages in the sum of Kshs. 706,270/=. Analysis and Determination 17.This being a first appellate court, it was held in Selle vs. Associated Motor Boat Co. [1968] EA 123 that:“The appellate court is not bound necessarily to accept the findings of fact by the court below. An appeal to the Court of Appeal from a trial by the High Court is by way of a retrial and the principles upon which the Court of Appeal acts are that the court must reconsider the evidence, evaluate it itself and draw its own conclusions though it should always bear in mind that it has neither seen nor heard the witnesses and should make due allowance in this respect. In particular the court is not bound necessarily to follow the trial Judge’s findings of fact if it appears either that he has clearly failed on some point to take account of particular circumstances or probabilities materially to estimate the evidence or if the impression based on the demeanour of a witness is inconsistent with the evidence in the case generally.” 18.Therefore, this Court is under a duty to delve at some length into factual details and revisit the facts as presented in the trial Court, analyse the same, evaluate it and arrive at its own independent conclusions, but always remembering, and giving allowance for it, that the trial Court had the advantage of hearing the parties. 19.Turning to issue one namely Whether the learned trial magistrate erred in law and in fact in holding the Appellant vicariously liable for the negligence of the driver of motor vehicle registration number GKB 361U 20.The doctrine of vicarious liability anchors responsibility upon a person or entity that stands in a supervisory or controlling position over another, commonly referred to as the principal or master over a servant or agent. It is a settled principle that an employer may be held liable for the tortious acts of its employee where such acts are committed in the course of employment or within the scope of delegated authority. 21.In this regard, vicarious liability refers to liability imposed upon a person or entity in charge of another, usually an employer, for wrongful acts committed by that other person in the course of employment or agency. It is a doctrine grounded on the existence of a legal relationship characterised by control, direction, and delegation of authority. 22.The principle has been considered in various judicial decisions. In Amalgamated Logistics International Ltd & another v MMK (2020) eKLR, the Court of Appeal reiterated the classical position in Salmond on Torts that:“A master is not responsible for a wrongful act done by his servant unless it is done in the course of his employment… it is either (a) a wrongful act authorised by the master, or (b) a wrongful and unauthorized mode of doing some act authorized by the master.” 23.Further, in Joseph Cosmas Khedivial v Gigi & Co. Ltd & Another Civil Appeal No. 119 of 1986, the Court set out the applicable test, holding that liability arises only where the driver is either a servant or agent acting on the owner’s instructions or authority.The Black’s Law Dictionary, 10th Edition, defines vicarious liability as:“Liability that a supervisory party (such as an employer) bears for the actionable conduct of a subordinate… based on the relationship between the two parties.”The Court of Appeal in Tabitha Nduhi Kinyua v Francis Mutua Mbuvi & another [2014] KECA 297 (KLR) observed that vicarious liability is strict but still dependent on the employee acting within the course and scope of employment at the time of the tort. 24.In Selle & Another v Associated Motor Boat Co. Ltd & Others [1968] EA 123, De Lestang VP emphasized that the existence of control is usually decisive in determining whether a master–servant relationship exists. 25.This position was further clarified in Board of Governors St Mary’s School v Boli Festus Andrew Sio (2020) KECA 952 (KLR), where the Court distinguished between employees and independent contractors, reiterating that liability cannot attach where the tortfeasor is outside the chain of employment or control. 26.In Shighadai v Kenya Power & Lighting Co. Ltd & Another [1988] KLR 682, the Court held that:“The matter must be looked at broadly… If the defendant’s driver acts for purposes of his employer, the defendants are liable; but if it is an act of his own, the defendants are not responsible. 27.Turning to the present matter, the evidence on record shows that motor vehicle registration number GKB 361U was under the operational control of a driver attached to the National Police Service at the material time. The Plaintiff’s case was that the driver, acting within the course of duty, negligently lost control of the vehicle, veered off the road, and caused the accident. 28.The Appellant, however, maintained that the vehicle was leased under the Government Vehicle Leasing Programme and was sub-leased to the Government of Kenya through Toyota Kenya Limited, placing it under the exclusive operational control of the National Police Service. Consequently, the Appellant had no day-to-day supervision, control, or direction over the driver or the vehicle. 29.This position is supported by the Appellant’s representative’s statement, which confirms that the Appellant is merely an asset leasing entity, and that the subject vehicle was fully under Government operational use at all material times. There existed no master–servant or principal–agent relationship between the Appellant and the driver. 30.The driver’s own statement reinforces this position. He confirms that he is an Administration Police Officer attached to Makueni Sub-County and that he was driving the subject vehicle in the course of official duty under deployment by the National Police Service. There is no evidence that the Appellant issued instructions, exercised control, or had any operational involvement in his deployment or conduct. 31.The pleadings further crystallise the dispute. The Plaint alleged that the accident was caused by the negligence of the Appellant’s servant/agent who lost control of the motor vehicle. The Appellant denied any employment, agency, or control relationship with the driver and specifically disputed any basis for vicarious liability. 32.The Defendant expressly averred that the accident was caused by a driver acting under instructions of the National Police Service, and sought indemnity and/or contribution from the State on that basis. The particulars of negligence pleaded therein are anchored on State operational control, not the Appellant’s authority. 33.The Third-Party Defence similarly denied any agency or employment relationship with the Appellant and maintained that the vehicle was under sole use, care, and control of Government agents at the material time. 34.From the totality of the evidence, a clear structural reality emerges: operational control had shifted entirely to the National Police Service under the Government leasing arrangement. The Appellant’s role was limited to asset leasing and did not extend to operational command or supervision of the vehicle or driver. 35.The critical legal question is whether there existed any master–servant or principal–agent relationship between the Appellant and the driver at the material time. The answer, on the evidence, is in the negative. There is no evidentiary nexus establishing control, instruction, or authority linking the Appellant to the driver’s actions. 36.Liability cannot be imposed where the tortfeasor is outside the chain of control, supervision, or employment. The existence of control is the decisive factor, and in this case, it was not established against the Appellant. 37.Accordingly, the learned trial magistrate erred in law and in fact by imputing vicarious liability upon the Appellant without proof of the requisite legal relationship. Instead, the third party was vicariously liable and I find so. 38.The court now turns to issue two namely, Whether the learned trial magistrate erred in law and in fact in assessing and awarding damages in the sum of Kshs. 706,270/=. 39.On the issue of quantum of general damages awarded by the trial court this court will only interfere with the issues of quantum on the circumstances stated in the case of Butt v. Khan [1981] KLR 349 where it was held as per Law, J.A that:“An appellate court will not disturb an award of damages unless it is so inordinately high or low as to represent an entirely erroneous estimate. It must be shown that the Judge proceeded on wrong principles, or that he misapprehended the evidence in some material respect, and so arrived at a figure which was either inordinately high or low.” 40.The question is whether this court should interfere with the damages awarded by the trial court. As stated above, the discretion in assessing general damages payable will only be disturbed if the trial court considered an irrelevant fact or failed to consider a relevant factor or that the award is so inordinately high that it must be wholly erroneous estimate of the damages or that it was inordinately low. 41.It must be noted that injuries will never be fully comparable to other person’s injuries. What a court is to consider is that as far as possible “comparable” to the other person’s injuries, and the after effects. 42.The Court of Appeal in Odinga Jacktone Ouma v Moureen Achieng Odera [2016] eKLR stated that “comparable injuries should attract comparable awards”. 43.On quantum, the learned trial magistrate found that the Respondent sustained blunt injuries to the right hip region and degloving injuries to the dorsum of the right foot. After considering the comparable authorities cited by the parties, the nature of the injuries, and prevailing inflationary trends, the court awarded Kshs. 700,000 as general damages for pain, suffering and loss of amenities. The court further awarded Kshs. 6,270 as special damages, having found that only that amount had been specifically pleaded and strictly proved by production of receipts. 44.The foundation of the claim is anchored in the pleadings. In the Plaint, at paragraph 4, the Respondent pleaded that she sustained blunt injuries to the right hip region, degloving injuries to the dorsum aspect of the right foot, and a fracture of the third distal phalanx of the right foot. 45.The medical evidence tendered before court substantially corroborated the pleaded injuries. The medical report dated 15th November 2023, prepared a few months after the accident of 17th April 2023 by Dr Titus Ndeti Nzina, which he stated:“Scholastica suffered main. She sustained severe multiple soft tissue injuries and fractured bone as a result of accident on 17/4/2023. This caused her pain, blood loss and suffering. Gradual complete healing is anticipated." 46.From my re-evaluation of the evidence, I find that the learned trial Magistrate referred to the relevant evidence on record. That said, it is for me to determine whether the award was consistent with comparable awards made. 47.It is sometimes difficult to obtain decisions with perfectly identical injuries, as no two cases are exactly the same. I therefore endeavoured to identify authorities involving injuries reasonably comparable to those sustained by the Respondent herein. 48.I have surveyed the following decisions where the claimants suffered similar or comparable injuries. In George Raini Atungu v Moffat Onsare Aunga [2021] eKLR (Ougo, J), the court awarded Kshs. 650,000/= for a fracture of the right tibia and fibula bones, a fracture of the left radius and ulna, and contusions to the chest and pelvis. In Nahson Nyabaro Nyandega v Peter Nyakweba Omboga [2021] eKLR (Maina, J), the claimant suffered a compound fracture of the right tibia bone, a cut wound on the right leg, and bruises on the face, and was awarded Kshs. 650,000/=. In Ndwiga & another v Mukimba [2022] KEHC 11793 (KLR) (Njuguna, J), the court awarded Kshs. 500,000/= for fractures of the tibia and fibula accompanied by tenderness and swelling of the lower limb. In Atunga v Mogambi [2022] KEHC 9854 (KLR) (Ougo, J), the injuries included fractures of the tibia and fibula bones, dislocation of the right hip joint, multiple lacerations and bruises on both upper and lower limbs, chest trauma, and head injuries, and the court awarded Kshs. 550,000/=. In Munene v Mbarire [2023] KEHC 18417 (KLR) (Njagi, J), where the claimant sustained fractures of the right tibia and fibula bones together with multiple bruises, the court awarded Kshs. 450,000/=. 49.The award of Kshs. 700,000/= by the learned trial magistrate was reasonable and well within the acceptable range of judicial discretion. In arriving at that figure, the court properly considered the nature and extent of the injuries sustained by the Respondent, which included blunt injuries to the right hip region, degloving injuries to the dorsum of the right foot, and a fracture of the third distal phalanx of the right foot. The court also considered the fact that the Respondent was hospitalized for approximately one month, a factor which reasonably points to the seriousness of the trauma and the pain and suffering endured. 50.Further, the court correctly considered comparable authorities cited by the parties and the prevailing inflationary trends, which is a relevant and accepted factor in the assessment of general damages. It is trite law that assessment of damages is not a mathematical exercise but a matter of judicial discretion guided by comparable awards and the circumstances of each case. 51.In arriving at the decision on General Damages, I have considered the purpose for award of General Damages as stated in the following passage in the case of West H. & Son Ltd. v Shephard (1964) AC 326:“But money cannot renew a physical frame that has been battered and shattered. All that Judges and courts can do is award sums which must be regarded as giving reasonable compensation. In the process there must be the endeavour to secure some uniformity in the general method of approach. By common consent awards must be reasonable and must be assessed with moderation. Furthermore, it is eminently desirable that so far as possible comparable injuries should be compensated by comparable awards. When all this is said it still must be that amounts which are awarded are to a considerable extent conventional.” 52.In the premises, and considering the authorities surveyed, the award of Kshs. 700,000/= falls comfortably within the established range for moderate soft tissue injuries with associated fractures and cannot be said to be inordinately high or manifestly excessive so as to warrant interference by this Honourable Court. 53.On special damages, it is trite law that for special damages to be awarded, they must be specifically pleaded and also strictly proved. It was held as follows in Maritim & Another –v- Anjere (1990-1994) EA 312 at 316 in this regard:“It is now trite law that special damages must not only be pleaded but must also be specifically proved and those damages awarded as special damages but which were not pleaded in the plaint must be disallowed.” 54.The court further awarded Kshs. 6,270 as special damages, having found that only that amount had been specifically pleaded and strictly proved by production of receipts. 55.From the evidence on record, the special damages strictly proved comprise the medical report by Dr Titus Ndeti Nzina at Kshs. 5,000/= together with receipts from Mbooni Sub-County Hospital in the sums of Kshs. 100/=, Kshs. 120/= and Kshs. 500/=. The total strictly proved therefore amounts to Kshs. 5,720/=. 56.The learned trial magistrate, however, awarded Kshs. 6,270/= under this head, resulting in a variance of Kshs. 550/=. To that extent, the court fell into error by awarding special damages in excess of what was strictly proved. The said error is, however, arithmetical in nature and does not affect the substantive findings of the court. Accordingly, this court would only interfere to the limited extent of substituting the award of special damages with the proved sum of Kshs. 5,720/=. 57.In the upshot, this Court finds that the award of Kshs. 700,000/= as general damages were properly grounded in law and fact, and no sufficient basis has been established to justify appellate interference. However, the Court finds that the award of special damages exceeded what was strictly proved on the evidence. The record supports a sum of Kshs. 5,720/=, whereas the trial court awarded Kshs. 6,270/=, giving rise to an arithmetical variance of Kshs. 550/=. To that extent, the trial court fell into error, necessitating a limited adjustment of the award. Accordingly, Issue Two is resolved in favour of upholding the award of general damages, subject only to a variation on the special damages component. Disposition 58.The upshot is, this Court makes the following orders:i.The appeal on liability succeeds. Instead, the 2nd Respondent is held vicariously liable.ii.The appeal on quantum partly succeeds. The award of Kshs. 700,000/= as general damages for pain, suffering and loss of amenities is hereby upheld.iii.The award of special damages is hereby varied from Kshs. 6,270/= to Kshs. 5,720/=, being the amount strictly proved by receipts and documentary evidence on record.iv.Consequently, the judgment of the trial court is set aside only to the extent of liability and substituted with a finding that the 2nd Respondent is vicariously liable and that the marginal variation on special damages is otherwise affirmed.It’s so Ordered.Right of appeal 30 days. DATED, SIGNED and DELIVERED AT NAIROBI THIS 19TH DAY OF JUNE 2026.R.A. OGANYOJUDGEIn the presence of; -Court Assistant…E, SanaMiss Wachira for the AppellantMr. Mathoga for the 1st Respondent.Miss Wachira-I pray for stay of execution for 30 days.Mr. Mathoga-No objectionOrder.There be stay of execution for 30 days.