https://new.kenyalaw.org/akn/ke/judgment/kehc/2026/8167

Republic v Cabinet Secretary, National Treasury and Economic Planning & 3 others; Murungi (Suing as the Chair of the Board of Trustees of the Centre for Multiparty Democracy Kenya) (Ex parte) (Judicial Review Miscellaneous Application E072 of 2026) [2026] KEHC 8167 (KLR) (Judicial Review) (10 June 2026) (Ruling) Neutral citation: [2026] KEHC 8167 (KLR) Republic of Kenya In the High Court at Nairobi (Milimani Law Courts) Judicial Review Judicial Review Miscellaneous Application E072 of 2026 WM Musyoka, J June 10, 2026 Between Republic Applicant and Cabinet Secretary, National Treasury And Economic Planning 1st Respondent The National Assembly 2nd Respondent The Hon Attorney General 3rd Respondent and Registrar Of Political Parties Interested Party and Hon Kiraitu Murungi (Suing as the Chair of the Board of Trustees of the Centre for Multiparty Democracy Kenya) Ex parte Ruling 1.These proceedings commenced herein by way of an ex parte chamber summons, dated 20th May 2026, seeking leave to apply for a certiorari and 3 mandamus orders, with relation to the ongoing national budgeting process, focussed on provision for the Political Parties Fund. 2.The matter was placed before me, on 21st May 2026, and I granted leave, for the filing of a substantive motion for the judicial review orders sought. I directed that that motion be served, once filed. I did not grant the stay order sought, but directed that the same be canvassed inter partes, at a hearing that was to be conducted on 9th June 2026. 3.The motion was filed, in Milimani HCJR No. E169 of 2026. It was served, as directed, for I see on record an affidavit of service, and all the persons and entities named as parties have come on record, and some of them have filed replies to the application. I have not seen any filings by the 1st and 3rd respondents. 4.The 2nd respondent filed a notice of preliminary objection, dated 8th June 2026. The issues raised are that the application is moot, as the National Assembly has already considered and approved the 2026/27 BPS; the budget-making and appropriate process for the year 2026/2027 is not yet concluded and the Appropriations Bill has not been passed, hence no issues have crystallised for determination, raising the issue ripeness of the application; the amount appropriated to the Political Parties Fund for 2026/2027 has not been determined with finality, and no ascertainable violations of sections 24 and 25 of the Political Parties Act, Cap 7D, Laws of Kenya, has arisen; the application violates the ripeness doctrine, for raising speculative, contingent and hypothetical questions that rely on future legislative actions and anticipated budget outcomes that have not yet occurred; and the application is premature and does not disclose justiciable controversy capable of being determined by the court. 5.The interested party has filed a replying affidavit, sworn by one of its officers, Joy Onyango, on 9th June 2026. She avers that the Political Parties Fund is drawn from funds allocated to it by Parliament, and released to the interested party by the 2nd respondent. She asserts that the requisite allocation for the Political Parties Fund has never been realised since enactment of the Political Parties Act. She expresses awareness of the judgement in Orange Democratic Movement (ODM) v National Treasury Secretary for National Treasury, Registrar of Political Parties & National Assembly [2019] KECA 708 (KLR), which affirmed the duty of the 2nd respondent to comply with section 24(1) of the Political Parties Act. She underscores the critical role of the Political Parties Fund in realisation of political rights. She further states that section 26 of the Political Parties Act cannot stand without comprehensive implementation of section 24 of the Political Parties Act. 6.When the matter came up on 9th June 2026, I directed that the preliminary objection raised by the 2nd respondent be argued simultaneously with the prayer for stay, with the side raising the preliminary objection being the one to start. 7.Mr. Sore urged the case for the 2nd respondent. He made a number of points. He argued that a legislative process cannot be challenged through judicial review, and that the most effective way of dealing with it should be by way of a constitutional petition, for the budget-making process culminates in an Act of Parliament. He cited Njoya & 6 others v Attorney General & 5 others (Miscellaneous Civil Application [2004] eKLR [2004] KEHC 2645 (KLR). Secondly, he submitted that the budget-making process is a mandatory time-bound sequence, with constitutional and statutory timelines, expressly provided for under Article 221 of the Constitution and section 35 of the Public Finance Management Act, Cap 412A, Laws of Kenya. He asserted that if the court halts that process, it would cause the 2nd respondent and other bodies to fall into illegality. 8.Thirdly, he argued that the order paper sought to be stayed, was not an instrument for approval by the 2nd respondent, but a mere programme of events, akin to a cause list in court practice. He submitted that no ceilings have been set or can be set through the order paper. He stated that ceilings are set under Regulation 27 of the Public Finance (National Government) Regulations, and are approved through the Budget Policy Statement, which had already been approved, but will still be considered and debated in the Appropriation Bill. 9.He stated that Article 95(4)(ii) of the Constitution empowers the 2nd respondent to appropriate funds for the National and County Governments, which power should not be stayed or stopped by the court. He argued that public participation was going on, and nothing stopped the ex parte applicant from participating in those forums, to express his views on the budget proposals. He urged that the budget-making process was ongoing, and the court should be slow to intervene in parliamentary processes that are in progress. He submitted that the opportune time for the court to intervene would be after the process is concluded, upon passage of the Appropriation Act. He cited In the Matter of the Speaker of the Senate & another [2013] eKLR [2013] KESC 7 (KLR). I was urged not to grant the stay sought. 10.Mr. Walukwe argued the case for the ex parte applicant. He started by asserting that the preliminary objection did not meet the test in Mukisa Biscuit Manufacturing Co. Ltd v West End Distributors Ltd [1969] EA 696, that it must be based on undisputed facts, yet the instant one is based on figures that are contested. He submitted that the application by the ex parte applicant was not novel, for a similar application was filed in Orange Democratic Movement (ODM) v National Treasury Secretary for National Treasury, Registrar of Political Parties & National Assembly [2019] KECA 708 (KLR), which the court entertained, where it was stated that a Judicial Review can issue, upon it being established that Parliament engaged in unconstitutionality. 11.He submitted that, although the Constitution sets up 3 funds, under Articles 203, 204 and 241, it was only the Political Parties Fund that was underfunded in successive budget-making seasons. He submitted that the Political Parties Fund was entitled to 0.3% of the amount allocated to the National Government, a percentage that the 2nd respondent had no power to make changes to. He argued that the proceedings herein were intended to prevent the 2nd respondent from carrying on an illegality. He argued that the application was not challenging the budget-making process as such, but the non-compliance with the law. 12.Mr. Wanjohi, for the 1st and 3rd respondents, threw his weight behind Mr. Sore. Ms. Kiptoo, for the interested party, took a more neutral stance, saying that the interested party would await the determination by the court, but reminding the court that the allocation to the Political Parties Fund was crucial to realisation of democracy in Kenya. 13.In his rejoinder, Mr. Sore asserted that the 2nd respondent was not disputing the figures, but the issue was that most of the budget-making processes had been concluded. He pointed out that Orange Democratic Movement (ODM) v National Treasury Secretary for National Treasury, Registrar of Political Parties & National Assembly [2019] KECA 708 (KLR) was a challenge brought after the budget-making process was concluded. He further argued that the 2nd respondent was not asserting that it could not be injuncted, but rather that the process of legislation in progress could not be stayed, until it was concluded. 14.I will start with the issue as to whether the leave granted ought to operate as a stay, for it is the easier of the 2 issues up for determination, to dispose of, then I will revert to the other more complex issue. 15.The ex parte chamber summons, dated 20th May 2026, sought leave in prayers 2, 3, 4 and 5, to apply for 1 certiorari and 3 mandamus judicial review orders. That application was modelled on the statutory statement, dated 20th May 2026, which is the originating pleading, for the purposes of these judicial review proceedings. The leave, granted on 21st May 2026, was for the 1 certiorari and the 3 mandamus orders mentioned in the statutory statement and the ex parte chamber summons. 16.Yet, when the substantive motion was filed in Milimani HCJR No. E169 of 2026, 1 of the mandamus orders was dropped, and mischievously replaced, by the surreptitious sneaking in of a prayer for prohibition. That prayer for prohibition is being sought before leave has been granted for it, and without it being pleaded or prayed for in the statutory statement. It is, obviously, sought in abuse of process, and it shall not be available for granting. What the ex parte applicant has done is to craftily re-work and re-word Prayer 6, in the ex parte chamber summons, which was for the leave granted, under prayers 2, 3, 4 and 5, to operate as a stay, and convert it into a prayer for prohibition. 17.The motion, like the ex parte chamber summons, is an interlocutory application, riding on the back of the statutory statement, and the prayers sought in it, the motion that is, must be aligned to those pleaded in the statutory statement. The disconnect between some of the prayers in the motion, dated 3rd June 2026, and those pleaded in the statutory statement, dated 20th May 2026, upon which the motion is founded, brings out the mischief. 18.The prayer, in Milimani HCJR Misc. No. E072 of 2026, for the grant of leave to operate as a stay, Prayer 6, is worded as follows:“That the grant of leave under prayers 2, 3, 4 and 5 above, do operate as stay against the 1st and 2nd Respondents, prohibiting the said Respondents from submitting, tabling, presenting, deliberating, approving and passing the budget statement and subsequent Appropriations Bill for the financial year 2026/2027 in accordance with the purported budget ceilings for the financial year 2026/2027 as approved by the 2nd Respondent vide the Supplementary Order Paper dated 5th March, 2026, in so far as it purports to allocate a budget ceiling of less than the statutory allocation of 0.3%.” 19.I doubt that Prayer 6 captures the essence of the stay order that is envisaged in Order 53 rule 1(4) of the Civil Procedure Rules, neither is it aligned to the prayer for which leave was granted. 20.Prayer 2, in respect of which the stay sought should be premised, reads as follows:“That leave be and is hereby granted to the ex parte Applicant to apply for an order of certiorari to quash the 2nd Respondent’s Supplementary Order Paper dated 5th March 2026, and consequent House Resolution in so far as it purports to illegally approve the sum of Kshs. 2,323,000,000.00 as the final budget ceiling of the Political Parties Fund to the Office of the Interested party herein for the fiscal year 2026/2027, contrary to the statutory mandatory minimum of 0.3% of national government’s revenue share in accordance with Section 24(1)(a) of the Political Party Act.” 21.There is a linkage between the leave granted and the stay sought, for the stay must be directly related to the leave. The activity, sought to be stayed, must be related to the judicial review order, for which the leave is sought and granted. It cannot relate to an activity remote to what the judicial review order, whose leave is sought, is targeted at or is about. 22.Stay, in proceedings under Order 53 of the Civil Procedure Rules, is nothing akin to or compared with an injunction, to restrain any activity that would destroy the substratum of the suit. Neither is it comparable to a stay of execution pending appeal, which is designed to prevent the subject-matter of the decree being removed, permanently, from the reach of the judgement-debtor. It is a different kind of stay. It should not be granted on the same principles as an injunction or stay of execution. It does not preserve property, but decisions. 23.Stay is only available with respect to the judicial review orders of certiorari and prohibition, according to Order 53 rule 1(4) of the Civil Procedure Rules, which provides that the “grant of leave under this rule to apply for an order of prohibition or an order of certiorari shall, if the judge so directs, operate as a stay of the proceedings in question until the determination of the application, or until the judge orders otherwise …” There is a statutory foundation for grant of stay, in judicial review. It is not statutorily available with respect to a mandamus order. 24.Certiorari is about a decision that has been made, and which is likely to be implemented or carried through. Prohibition is about either on-going proceedings where a decision is likely to be made, or projected proceedings were a decision would be made. The target of the stay order would be, in the case of certiorari, to stop the implementation of the decision, for where it is implemented, before the matter is heard and determined, there would be nothing to quash, should the ex parte applicant establish its case. With respect to prohibition, the objective would be to stop the proceedings, where the decision or action, targeted by the order, is likely to be made or taken, before the proceedings are concluded. In both cases, the objective would be to preserve the status quo or the substratum of the proceedings, to obviate the court proceedings, for judicial review, being rendered moot. 25.A mandamus order has nothing to do with an existing decision awaiting implementation, or a prospective decision likely to be made, pending conclusion of the judicial review proceedings. It is about an existing legal or statutory duty, and a failure to discharge that duty. The mandamus order is designed to compel action, by the duty-bearer, in discharge of that duty, where there has been refusal or neglect to discharge the duty. In such a situation, there would be nothing to stay. It would be illogical to seek and obtain stay, with respect to a mandamus order, in the circumstances. 26.The ex parte chambers summons herein sought leave to seek 1 certiorari and 3 mandamus orders, in prayers 2, 3, 4 and 5. Leave was granted, for all the 4 prayers. The leave granted, in this case, can only operate as stay in respect of prayer 2, the leave for the certiorari order. It cannot operate with respect to the leave for the mandamus orders. As it would appear that the intent is to obtain stoppage of the budget-making process, one would understand why the ex parte applicant is attempting to sneak in, in the motion, a prayer for the order of prohibition. 27.Should the grant of leave, in respect of prayer 2, operate as a stay of the subject proceedings, pending hearing and determination of these judicial review proceedings? The proceedings in question were the parliamentary proceedings the subject of the supplementary order paper, dated 5th March 2026, which gave rise to a house resolution of an undisclosed date. The foundation for this prayer is the supplementary order paper, dated 5th March 2026, and the house resolution of an unknown date. I have seen a copy of the order paper for 5th March 2026, which is marked as annexture KM-7, however, I have not seen the house resolution. 28.An order paper, in parliamentary language, means no more than an agenda or order of the business to be transacted by the house of parliament on a particular day, or a list or schedule of the events for that day. I agree with Mr. Sore, in judicial language it would be something akin to a cause list. In ordinary everyday language, it is just a programme of events. The parliamentary order paper is a daily menu of proceedings, to control what is debated in the house of parliament, and in which order. 29.The supplementary order paper for 5th March 2026 was, therefore, the menu of what the 2nd respondent was to handle, as the business of the day for that day. That document is of little legal significance or consequence. It does not contain a decision, which would attract judicial intervention by way of judicial review. It is not even a record of what transpired that day in the 2nd respondent. It only indicates what had been planned for that day. Whether what was planned actually happened, is a totally different matter. There would be probability that none of what is listed in that order paper was discussed or passed. It would be possible that the house was adjourned, without transacting the business listed in the order paper. In short, this document is not worth quashing, and if it is not worth quashing, there would be no value in ordering that the leave granted, to bring judicial review proceedings to quash it, do operate as a stay. 30.The more consequential document would have been the house resolution, which was, according to the order paper, to be considered, by the Committee of the Whole House, with respect to the 2026 budget policy statement. Did the whole house consider the 2026 budget policy statement? If it did, did it pass a resolution on it? Whether the whole house considered that statement cannot be gathered from a mere programme; likewise, a conclusion, as to whether a resolution was passed on it, cannot be drawn from merely looking at the contents of that order paper. 31.The evidence, as to whether the 2nd respondent sat on 5th March 2026, and that the Committee of the Whole House considered the 2026 budget policy statement, and passed a resolution on it, can only be gathered from the minutes of what transpired that day. Those minutes cannot be and are not in the said order paper, given that the order paper is not meant to be a record or minute of the business that the 2nd respondent actually conducts, but rather of what it plans to conduct. It would be a matter of common knowledge that such a record or minute is kept or maintained in the Parliamentary Hansard. A resolution, on the 2026 budget policy statement, would be found in the Hansard. I have very closely perused the bundle of annextures, attached to the affidavits filed with the ex parte chamber summons and the motion, and I have not come across evidence of a resolution passed, based on the order paper of 5th March 2026, as a copy of the Hansard for that day, or a relevant portion thereof, has not been annexed to any of the affidavits of the ex parte applicant. 32.As an order paper would be of little legal significance to the budget-making process, quashing it would be of little effect, and grant of leave to quash it ought not operate as a stay. In any event, the order paper does not carry a decision of any sort, available for quashing. Equally important, the said order paper was only relevant for that day, 5th March 2026. It became a useless piece of paper at the end of the parliamentary proceedings that it was used to guide. 33.As regards the house resolution on the 2026 budget policy statement, I have nothing before me as proof that a resolution was ever passed, based on what I have discussed above. In the absence of such proof, there would be no basis for ordering that the leave, that I granted on 21st May 2026, for bringing of the substantive motion for the certiorari order, do operate as a stay of any house resolution passed, on the 2026 budget policy statement. 34.For avoidance of doubt, the documents attached to the affidavit of the ex parte applicant are a trust deed, in respect of the organisation for which the ex parte applicant is the Chair of the board of trustees; copies of the Division of Revenue Acts, 2022, 2023, 2024 and 2025; copies of the Appropriation Acts, 2022, 2023, 2024 and 2025; the Kenya Gazette issues of 4th November 2022, 2023, 2024 and 2025, showing how political parties shared the moneys disbursed to the Political Parties Fund in those years; the 2025/2026 Estimates of Recurrent Expenditure of the Government of Kenya, for the year ending 30th June 2026; the Division of Revenue Bill, 2026; and the supplementary order paper for Thursday, March 5, 2026, at 2.30 PM, inclusive of the attached schedules, notices, amendments, limitation of debate, and notice paper. None of these annextures carry any proof that the 2026 budget policy statement was considered, debated and a resolution carried on it. 35.Let me now turn to the preliminary objection, dated 8th June 2026. The parameters for what should be a proper preliminary objection were set in Mukisa Biscuit Manufacturing Co. Ltd v West End Distributors Ltd [1969] EA 696, and have been elaborated in various other decisions thereafter. The principle point is that it should be on a pure point of law, determinable on the basis of uncontested facts. The other point is that the same should be determined on the basis of the pleadings and the material in the file, at the time the preliminary objection is raised. 36.I have some misgivings on whether the preliminary objection before me is wholly founded on pure points of law, and can be determined without looking for evidence or facts to support it, or is based on uncontested facts. 37.The first point or objection is that the order to prohibit the 2nd respondent from considering, deliberating or passing the Budget Policy Statement, for 2026/2027, is moot for that statement has already been considered and approved. There would be need to provide evidence to support that contention, for I have been unable to find relevant evidence in the bundle provided by the ex parte applicant, and the 2nd respondent has not filed any evidence, by way of an affidavit. The ex parte applicant is not a member of the 2nd respondent, and his mere averments, in an affidavit, without documentary support, would not suffice for proof that the 2026/2027 Budget Policy Statement was approved by the 2nd respondent. 38.The budget-making process is lengthy, with various stages, culminating in the passage of the Appropriation Act, which completes it, as detailed in Article 221 of the Constitution and sections 35 to 41 of the Public Finance Management Act. What, in common parlance, is known as the reading of the Budget, is but one of the stages in the process. The Budget-reading event is nothing more than making public the contents of the Budget estimates, to facilitate debate on it, prior to passage of the Appropriation Act. It cannot be said, before the Appropriation Act goes through, that a concrete final decision has been reached on the ceilings, which are the subject of these proceedings. It would, therefore, be premature to have judicial intervention, at this stage, in the manner proposed by the ex parte applicant. 39.However, the argument that the most appropriate approach for redress would be through a constitutional petition carries considerable weight. The complaint, by the ex parte applicant, is essentially that the Constitution has explicitly provided that the Political Parties Fund should be allocated a fixed percentage of the money appropriated under the annual budget of the national government. Yet, the Political Parties Fund has never been allocated that percentage, in all the Budget cycles, since that provision came into force. Article 92(f) of the Constitution provides for the enactment of legislation on the establishment and management of a political parties fund. That legislation was passed. The Political Parties Act, sets up the fund, at section 23, and provides, at section 24, that it would be entitled to 0.3% of the budget allocated to the national government. I hold the view that the most effective way to get the National Government to comply with Article 92(f) and section 24 of the Political Parties Act would be through a constitutional petition, filed under the Constitution of Kenya (Protection of Rights and Fundamental Freedoms) Practice and Procedure Rules, often referred to as the Mutunga Rules, and not judicial review, through Order 53 of the Civil Procedure Rules. 40.I am, of course, alive to Orange Democratic Movement (ODM) v National Treasury Secretary for National Treasury, Registrar of Political Parties & National Assembly [2019] KECA 708 (KLR), where proceedings by way of the traditional judicial review were entertained, founded on sections 23 and 25 of the Political Parties Act, seeking a mandamus order to compel the 1st and 2nd respondents herein to release an amount of money, which was claimed to be the 0.3% of the budget for national government for the relevant year, and that order was allowed by the Court of Appeal. The majority view, in that judgement, was that judicial review orders can issue from the traditional judicial review proceedings, or from a constitutional petition. Either of the processes would suffice to achieve that objective. 41.Orange Democratic Movement (ODM) v National Treasury, Secretary for National Treasury, Registrar of Political Parties & National Assembly [2019] KECA 708 (KLR) was not a unanimous decision. There was a departure from the majority position. My thinking is more attuned to that minority view, that proceedings premised on Order 53 would not appear to be appropriate to achieve the sort of thing that the ex parte applicant seeks in these proceedings. However, Orange Democratic Movement (ODM) v National Treasury, Secretary for National Treasury, Registrar of Political Parties & National Assembly [2019] KECA 708 (KLR) binds me, hence I have no option but to uphold these proceedings. 42.The instant proceedings stand at the heart of the doctrine of separation of powers, for the court is being invited to intervene into a purely parliamentary process. Article 165(3)(d) of the Constitution explicitly vests jurisdiction in the High Court, to determine constitutionality of any act done under the authority of the Constitution, including acts of the 2nd respondent. See Republic v National Assembly & 3 others Ex-Parte George Wang’ang’a [2017] KEHC 4081 (KLR). That power is augmented by Article 2 of the Constitution, which establishes the Constitution as the supreme law of the land, binding all State organs, including the 2nd respondent. However, that power of the High Court is balanced by the doctrine of separation of powers. 43.The doctrine of separation of powers acts to provide a significant restraint, which leads courts to refrain from intervening in parliamentary affairs in various ways. Generally, the High Court is not a supervisor of the 2nd respondent, particularly of its daily operations, institutional comity would not allow it. The courts recognise that the legislative authority of the Republic is vested in the 2nd respondent. See Mwangi Wa Iria & 2 others v Speaker Murang’a County Assembly & 3 others [2015] KEHC 7843 (KLR). Judicial intervention, into parliamentary or legislative business, should only operate as a specific check, to ensure adherence to the Constitution. See Justus Kariuki Mate & another v Martin Nyaga Wambora & another [2017] KESC 1 (KLR). The court would only intervene where there are violations of constitutional procedure, particularly those required by the Constitution; and when internal procedures breach the Constitution. See In the Matter of the Speaker of the Senate & another [2013] KESC 7 (KLR). 44.The High Court would also be reluctant to intervene, even if there is an alleged infraction, where a procedural question is not mandated by the Constitution, but it is a matter of internal management, under the standing orders of the 2nd respondent. The courts would also be hesitant, to stop an ongoing process before the 2nd respondent has reached a final decision. The usual approach is to allow the legislative process to run its course, before considering a challenge to the final outcome. See Rigathi Gachagua v Speaker of the National Assembly & 3 others [2024] KEHC 12876 (KLR) and Orwoba v Attorney General & 4 others [2025] KEHC 49 (KLR). 45.Based on the above, the principle is that courts would be hesitant to stop on-going parliamentary process. However, after the 2nd respondent has made its final decision, the court would be in a position to intervene, and review the decision, so long as the primary ground is a violation of a clear constitutional provision. Hence, I would not intervene, at this stage, into the on-going parliamentary budget-making process. 46.In view of the above, what should be the fate of the proceedings herein? I am reluctant to strike out the proceedings herein, in view of Orange Democratic Movement (ODM) v National Treasury Secretary for National Treasury, Registrar of Political Parties & National Assembly [2019] KECA 708 (KLR), and as I have already granted leave to the ex parte applicant, to agitate his case for the judicial review orders detailed in his ex parte chamber summons and the statutory statement, notwithstanding my position or opinion that the more appropriate course of action ought to be through a constitutional petition. Let the ex parte applicant have his day in court. 47.The way forward shall be that the file, in Milimani HCJR Misc. No. E072 of 2026, shall be closed, and placed inside the file in Milimani HCJR No. E169 of 2026. The motion, in Milimani HCJR No. E169 of 2026, shall be canvassed by way of written submissions, to be filed and exchanged within 21 days. The matter shall be mentioned, on 14th July 2026, for compliance, and allocation of a date for judgement. Orders accordingly. DELIVERED, VIA EMAIL, DATED AND SIGNED IN CHAMBERS, AT MILIMANI, NAIROBI, ON THIS 10TH DAY OF JUNE 2026.W MUSYOKAJUDGEMr. Hamza, Court Assistant.AdvocatesMr. Walukwe, Ms. Mutesi and Ms. Wanjiru, instructed by JW & Frank Advocates LLP and Humphrey & Company LLP, Advocates for the ex parte applicant.Mr. Wanjohi, instructed by the Attorney General, for the 1st and 3rd respondents.Mr. Sore, instructed by Mr. Joshua Kiilu, Advocate for the 2nd respondent.Ms. Kiptoo, Advocate for the 2nd interested party.