https://new.kenyalaw.org/akn/ke/judgment/kehc/2026/10621

Republic v Kenya Wildlife Service; Asunga (Representative of the Estate of Leonard Asunga Okune) (Ex parte Applicant) (Judicial Review E012 of 2025) [2026] KEHC 10621 (KLR) (17 July 2026) (Judgment) Neutral citation: [2026] KEHC 10621 (KLR) Republic of Kenya In the High Court at Siaya Judicial Review E012 of 2025 DK Kemei, J July 17, 2026 IN THE MATTER OF SECTIONS 6, 7 (a), (b), (c) (g), 19 (a), 25 (1), (2) (3) (a), 106 OF THE WILDLIFE CONSERVATION AND MANAGEMENT ACT, CAP 376 AND IN THE MATTER OF REGULATIONS 12 (1), 27, 30 (1) (a) OF THE WILDLIFE CONSERVATION AND MANAGEMENT (COMPENSATION) REGULATIONS, 2017 AND IN THE MATTER OF SECTIONS 4 (1), (6), 7, 8, 9 OF THE FAIR ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION ACT AND IN THE MATTER OF ORDER 53 OF THE CIVIL PROCEDURE RULES 2010 Between Republic Applicant and Kenya Wildlife Service Respondent and Rose Achieng Asunga (Representative of the Estate of Leonard Asunga Okune) Ex parte Applicant Judgment 1.The Ex Parte Applicants moved this Court by way of a Notice of Motion dated 26th November 2025 and based on the grounds in the statutory statement dated 26th November they sought orders inter Alia; that an order of mandamus be made to compel the Respondent to immediately release Kshs.5,000,000/= to the Applicants Advocate; costs and further incidentals to this application be provided for by the respondent; such further or other relief as the Honorable court may deem just and expedient to grant. 2.The application is supported by the Statutory Statement and a Verifying Affidavit sworn by the Ex Parte Applicants. 3.A brief background of the Ex-parte applicant’s case is that the deceased Leonard Asunga Okune met his death on 27th January 2025 following a fatal crocodile attack. The incident was promptly reported to Madiany Police Station under the jurisdiction of Rarieda Sub-County. The Applicants aver that they completed and submitted the statutory compensation claim form to the Respondent. Consequently, the Community Wildlife Conservation Committee (CWCC) for Siaya County met, assessed the claim and recommended it for compensation. 4.The Applicants assert that upon following up with the KWS County office in Siaya, they were informed that the Ministerial Wildlife Compensation Committee (MWCC) had approved an award of Kshs. 5,000,000.00/=. The Applicants argue that despite the claim being fully processed and approved, they have waited for approximately eleven (11) months without receiving payment. They contend that the Respondent's persistent delay and silence are unjustified, oppressive and constitute a failure to perform a public duty hence the prayer for an order of Mandamus. 5.The Respondent opposes the application through a replying affidavit sworn on 28th January 2026 by M/s Sheila Ochieng, the Siaya County Warden, wherein she deposes interalia; the Respondent expressly confirmed that the County Wildlife Conservation Committee sat on 17 July 2025 and made a recommendation for compensation in accordance with the applicable statute; they unequivocally admitted that the relevant Committee duly convened, considered the Applicants' claim and ultimately made a recommendation for compensation; the Respondent averred that following the incident reported in January 2025, the County Wildlife Conservation and Compensation Committee was duly constituted, sat and made its recommendation on 17 July 2025 and that the matter was currently awaiting consideration at the ministerial level; the Respondent opposed the application arguing that it was premature and misconceived because it sought to compel compensation before the statutory process had been concluded; the Respondent maintained that they did not have the statutory mandate to pay compensation under the Wildlife Conservation and Management Act 2013;they asserted that their role was strictly limited to serving as the secretariat to the County Committee; the Respondent contended that the obligation and power to approve and pay compensation rested exclusively with the Cabinet Secretary under Section 25(3) of the Act upon recommendation by the Committee and not with the Respondent itself; the Respondent asserted that the Applicants' application improperly sought to bypass the statutory framework; they further contended that the application invited the Court to assume functions reserved for administrative bodies thereby rendering the application premature, unmerited and liable to dismissal with costs. 6.Vide Court directions, parties canvassed the substantive motion application by way of written submissions. Both parties filed and exchanged their written submissions. 7.The Applicants identified the singular issue for determination arising therefrom as; whether the Honourable Court should issue an order of mandamus to compel payment of the recommended compensation. 8.The Applicants submitted that the scope and purpose of an order of mandamus were authoritatively set out by the Court of Appeal in Kenya National Examination Council v Republic; GGN & 9 others (Ex parte) [1997] KECA 58 (KLR). They highlighted that the Court of Appeal emphasized that mandamus issues to compel the performance of a public duty imposed by statute where the responsible body has failed, refused or neglected to discharge that duty to the detriment of a party with a legal right to expect its performance. They recalled the Court of Appeal's statement that those principles meant that an order of mandamus would compel the performance of a public duty imposed on a person or body of persons by a statute where that person or body of persons had failed to perform the duty to the detriment of a party who had a legal right to expect the duty to be performed. They referenced the Court of Appeal's examples including the Liquor Licensing Act, Chapter 121 Laws of Kenya where a duty is imposed on the licensing court to consider and determine applications. 9.The Applicants argued that flowing from that holding, the principles governing the grant of mandamus were clear and settled:(a)First, an applicant must establish a specific legal right matched by a corresponding statutory duty imposed on a public body;(b)Second, that duty must have crystallized, meaning it is due and enforceable and there must be a demonstrable refusal, neglect or failure to perform it;(c)Third, mandamus will only issue where there is no other adequate or efficacious remedy available; and(d)Finally, the remedy does not direct how discretion should be exercised; it merely compels the authority to act where it has unlawfully failed to do so 10.In the present case, the Applicants argued that their legal right arose directly from statute. They pointed out that the death of the deceased Leonard Asunga Okune caused by a crocodile was not contested, which brought the claim squarely within the ambit of compensable claims under the Wildlife Conservation and Management Act and the applicable Regulations. 11.They submitted that the statutory framework imposes a clear and mandatory duty upon the Respondent and its structures: The County Wildlife Conservation Committee is obligated to receive, verify, review and recommend compensation; upon such recommendation, the statutory scheme contemplates facilitation and eventual payment of compensation; and Section 25(3)(a) of the Act provides that in cases of death, the beneficiaries of such deceased shall be paid the total sum of Kshs. 5 million. 12.They observed that under the Wildlife Conservation and Management Act, the Respondent is established as a body corporate under Section 6 capable of suing and being sued and is expressly mandated under Section 7 to operationalize wildlife conservation structures, including county committees. They added that Sections 18(1A) and 19 further vest County Wildlife Conservation Committees with the responsibility to consider, review and recommend compensation for claims arising from injury, death or damage caused by wildlife. 13.Crucially, they contended that Sections 25(4) and (5) impose a clear and specific statutory duty: once a claim is lodged, the County Committee must verify, review and determine the claim and proceed to award and facilitate compensation at prevailing market rates. They asserted that this process is not a discretionary benevolence but a mandatory statutory obligation further elaborated under the Wildlife Conservation and Management (Compensation) Regulations, 2017. They maintained that once the Committee deliberated and made its recommendation on 17 July 2025, their right to compensation crystallized into an enforceable legal expectation. 14.The Applicants argued that the Respondent's contention that the obligation to pay compensation rested exclusively with the Cabinet Secretary under Section 25(3) of the Act and not with itself was misplaced and calculated to mislead the Honourable Court. They stated that the Respondent selectively relied on Section 25(3) while disregarding the express and operative provisions of Sections 25(4) and 25(5) which delineate the functional chain of the compensation process and vest implementation responsibilities within the Respondent’s institutional framework. They quoted Section 24 (4) and (5) , which provide that:“(4).Any person who suffers loss or damage to crops, livestock or other property from wildlife specified in the Seventh Schedule hereof and subject to the rules made by the Cabinet Secretary may submit a claim to the County Wildlife Conservation and Compensation Committee who shall verify the claim and make recommendations as appropriate and submit it to the Service for due consideration.(5)The County Wildlife Conservation and Compensation Committee shall review the claim and award and pay a compensation valued at the ruling market rates…” 15.The Applicants argued that these provisions, read holistically, demonstrated that the compensation process does not terminate at recommendation but extends to actual payment within the statutory structure administered by the Respondent. 16.Accordingly, they submitted that the Respondent could not lawfully abdicate responsibility by invoking the role of the Cabinet Secretary while ignoring the clear statutory scheme that places the obligation of processing, implementing and facilitating payment squarely within its mandate. They maintained that the attempt to shift liability was untenable in law and that the duty to effect payment having crystallized upon recommendation, the Respondent remained the proper party against whom an order of mandamus should issue to compel compliance. 17.The Applicants argued that the Respondent unequivocally admitted that the relevant Committee duly convened, considered their claim and ultimately made a recommendation for compensation. They submitted that this admission was conclusive and left no room for dispute as to whether the statutory process, at least up to the stage of verification, consideration and recommendation, was undertaken. 18.They asserted that once that recommendation was made, the statutory process stood concluded in all material respects leaving only the purely administrative act of implementation namely the payment of the recommended compensation. However, they pointed out that despite the completion of all requisite steps, the Respondent had neither effected payment nor offered any lawful or reasonable explanation for its inaction. They noted that there was no evidence of any ongoing process, no indication of timelines and no demonstration of any concrete steps taken toward settlement, meaning the delay had extended far beyond what could be considered reasonable. 19.In the circumstances, the Applicants contended that the Respondent’s inaction transcended mere procedural delay and amounted to unlawful administrative inertia. They submitted that it was precisely in such situations where a public body having fully exercised its decision-making mandate fails or neglects to act upon its own determination to the prejudice of an entitled party that an order of mandamus properly lies. 20.In the premises, the Applicants submitted that their substantive Judicial Review Application seeking an Order of Mandamus for the payment of the sum of Kshs Five Million was meritorious and should be allowed as prayed. 21.The Respondent identifies and submits on the following issues for determination: whether the relief of Mandamus lies where a critical action namely approval by an oversight body has yet to be undertaken; whether the Order sought ought to demand action of the Ministerial Committee to consider the Recommendation of CWCC as by law required or bypass this body and order release of the Compensation monies to the Ex-parte Applicant; whether the 1st Respondent is a proper party in these proceedings and if so, whether the orders sought against it are available to the Ex-parte Applicant. 22.It was submitted that in her replying affidavit, the 1st Respondent’s Warden confirms that the Ex-parte Applicant is indeed a client of the service having reported a Human Wildlife Conflict incident. The said incident was followed up applying resources allocated to respond to the nature of the incident and documentation geared towards presenting the claim to the County Wildlife Conservation Committee commenced promptly. The Claimant, a next of kin of the deceased was guided at every stage to ensure all required attachments were in place. Substantial human and financial resources went into this single process culminating in approval for compensation of Ksh. 5,000,000/- (Kenya Shillings Five Million). 23.It was submitted that the purpose of Judicial Review is to provide a remedy where there is maladministration. In this particular case, no evidence of laxity or undue delay has been rendered except to state that Compensation has not been paid. Indeed, this case has been fast-tracked demonstrating the commitment of the 1st Respondent to speedy redress of Human Wildlife Conflict. While this is the ultimate goal of the entire process prescribed by S. 25 of the relevant act, the same is dependent on the availability of funds from the state. No human right particularly the right to property has been violated by the delay to release funds as this does not qualify to be a debt whose non-payment has occasioned commercial loss or otherwise. 24.Further, other than being the secretary to the committee as provided for in Section 18 of the WCMA, the 1st Respondent does not make decisions regarding Human Wildlife conflict. This is a preserve of the Committee members. 25.The Respondent submitted that from the Ex-parte Applicant’s submissions, they appear to be completely oblivious to the existence of a final authority on compensation namely the Ministerial Compensation committee whose duty it is to provide oversight for the Human Wildlife Conflict fund. All claims recommended by the County Compensation Committee are to be scrutinized for documentation and fitness to be compensated. Severally, this committee has identified anomalies and deferred claimants back to the committee for rectification. It is not a dispensable entity. 26.The said Ministerial Committee is provided for under the Act and for purposes of this case has not had an opportunity to deliberate and approve claims considered by the Siaya County Wildlife Compensation Committee held on the 17th of July 2025. What is due to the Claimant is an order for the committee of the 2nd respondent to be required to constitute and consider the claim not a release of compensation funds at this stage. Payment due has not yet crystallized. 27.It is the 1st Respondent's humble submission that the 1st Respondent is an improper party in these proceedings and the reliefs sought against them cannot be granted. 28.As a basis of the above submission, it is important to understand the remedy of mandamus as sought against the 1st Respondent by the ex-parte Applicant. In Republic v County Government of Nairobi & 2 others Ex-Parte Kingpost Limited [2021] eKLR, the court stated:‘’In determining these issues, it is crucial to first lay down the principles that guide the Court when dealing with the judicial review remedy of mandamus which the Ex-parte Applicant is seeking. The Court of Appeal in Commission on Administrative Justice vs Kenya Vision 2030 Delivery Board & 2 others [2019] eKLR stated as follows:'As observed by the Judge and correctly so in the Court's view, the principle that guides the High Court when dealing with the scope and efficacy of an order of mandamus was crystallized by the Court in Kenya National Examination Council v Republic Ex Parte Geoffrey Gathenji Njoroge & 9 others (supra) namely:"The order of mandamus is of most extensive remedial nature and is in the form of a command issuing from the High Court of Justice directed to any person, corporation or inferior tribunal requiring him or them to do some particular thing therein specified which appertains to his or their office and is of the nature of a public duty. Its purpose is to remedy the defects of justice and accordingly it will issue to the end that justice may be done, in all cases where there is a specific legal right and it may issue in cases where although there is an alternative remedy, yet the mode of redress is not convenient, beneficial and effectual."'"In Republic v Kenya Vision 2030 Delivery Board & another Ex-parte Eng Judah Abekah [2015] eKLR, the Court quoted the Court of Appeal decision in Kenya National Examination Council vs Republic Ex-parte Geoffrey Gathenji Njoroge, which quoted paragraph 90 of Halsbury’s Laws of England, 4th Edition, Volume 1 at 111:"The order must command no more than the party against whom the application is made is legally bound to perform. Where a general duty is imposed, a mandamus cannot require it to be done at once. Where a statute, which imposes a duty leaves discretion as to the mode of performing the duty in the hands of the party on whom the obligation is laid, a mandamus cannot command the duty in question to be carried out in a specific way."In Republic v Kenya Vision 2030 Delivery Board & another Ex-parte Eng Judah Abekah [2015] eKLR, the court stated:In Republic v The Commissioner of Lands and Another ex-Parte Kithinji Murugu M'agere, Nairobi High Court Misc. Application No. 395 of 2012, G.V. Odunga, J explored the circumstances under which an order of mandamus can issue. The 1st Respondent begs to quote him at length as follows:“A party in a judicial review seeking an order of mandamus must show the existence of a statutory duty conferred or invested by statute upon some person, body of persons or tribunal which such person, body of persons or tribunal has failed to perform. See Republic vs. Registrar of Societies & 5 Others ex parte Kenyatta & 6 Others Nairobi HCMCA No. 747 of 2006 [2008] 3 KLR (EP) 521." 29.In its conclusion on when an order of mandamus will issue, the court in Republic v Kenya Vision 2030 Delivery Board & another Ex-parte Eng Judah Abekah [2015] eKLR stated:“From the cited decisions, it is apparent that an order of mandamus will issue to compel the performance of a statutory duty owed to an applicant. Therefore, the fulcrum of an order of mandamus is that a statutory duty must be owed to an applicant and the public officer or public body, after being asked to perform the duty, has refused or failed to discharge that duty and there is no other adequate remedy." 30.From the above decisions, the 1st Respondent humbly submits that an order of mandamus cannot issue to compel the 1st Respondent to perform a statutory duty owed to an Applicant by another institution totally different from the 1st Respondent. 31.Further, the court cannot compel such payment to be made to the Ex-parte Applicant yet no such decision has ever been issued by the committee. Section 25(3)(b) provides that such amount of compensation shall be paid in the case of injury occasioning permanent disability. There being no such decision, then the court has no basis in making such an award. 32.It was submitted that turning to the current case, the Ex-parte Applicant seeks that the 1st Respondent be compelled to pay Kshs. 3,000,000/- to the Ex-parte Applicant. It is important to note that no such decision has been made by the 2nd Respondent or the compensation committee compelling the 1st Respondent to pay the Ex-parte Applicant the said amount. There is no law providing that where such an event as this occurs, the 1st Respondent is mandated to settle such an amount with or without the existence of the decision of the 2nd Respondent. This begs the question, does the 1st Respondent owe a statutory duty to pay compensation to the Ex-parte Applicants? The 1st Respondent submits that the answer to this question is in the negative. 33.The 1st Respondent is established under section 6 of the WCMA and its functions are clearly enumerated under section 7 of the WCMA which provides:The functions of the Service shall be to—(a)conserve and manage national parks, wildlife conservation areas, and sanctuaries under its jurisdiction;(b)provide security for wildlife and visitors in national parks, wildlife conservation areas and sanctuaries;(c)set up a county wildlife conservation committee in respect of each county;(d)promote or undertake commercial and other activities for the purpose of achieving sustainable wildlife conservation;(e)collect revenue levies and charges due to the national government from wildlife and, as appropriate, develop mechanisms for benefit sharing with communities living in wildlife areas;(f)develop mechanisms for benefit sharing with communities living in wildlife areas;(g)advise the Cabinet Department on matters pertaining to wildlife policy, strategy and legislation;(h)coordinate the preparation and implementation of ecosystem plans;(i)prepare and implement national park management plans;(j)assist and advise in the preparation of management plans for community and private wildlife conservancies and sanctuaries;(k)undertake and conduct enforcement activities such as anti-poaching operations, wildlife protection, intelligence gathering, investigations and other enforcement activities for the effective carrying out of the provisions of this Act;(l)conduct and co-ordinate, all research activities in the field of wildlife conservation and management and ensure application of research findings in conservation planning, implementation and decision making;(m)advise the National Land Commission, the Cabinet Secretary and the Council on the establishment of national parks, wildlife conservancies and sanctuaries;(n)promote and undertake extension service programmes intended to enhance wildlife conservation, education and training;(o)identify user rights and advise the Cabinet Secretary thereon;(p)grant permits;(q)establish forensic laboratories;(r)monitor the compliance of terms and conditions of licences; and(s)perform such other functions as the Board may assign the Service or as are incidental or conducive to the exercise by the Service of any or all of the functions provided under this Act. 34.The 1st Respondent has listed all the functions of the 1st Respondent as these form the 1st Respondent’s statutory duties. Combing through all these duties, this Honourable Court will note that there is no duty to compensate or pay compensation on claims resulting from loss or damage caused by wildlife. Further, it is evident that the evidence annexed in the application and relied upon by the Ex-parte applicant is incomplete. There is no evidence that the committee sat and deliberated on the claim by the Ex-parte Applicant. There is also no evidence that the Compensation Committee has failed to sit and deliberate on the said claim. Therefore, such submissions by the Ex-parte Applicant are unsubstantiated and cannot be verified by this Honourable Court. 35.It was submitted that Payment of compensation on claims resulting from loss or damage caused by wildlife not being a statutory duty of the 1st Respondent, can only lead to the conclusion that the 1st Respondent is improperly joined in these proceedings and the reliefs sought against it are not only unwarranted but cannot be granted. 36.The submission by the Applicant that the 1st Respondent should take up the role of the 2nd Respondent and compensate the Applicant, is arbitrary and unlawful. This court has a duty to interpret the law as it is without any modifications whatsoever. 37.In Republic v County Government of Nairobi & 2 others Ex-Parte Kingpost Limited [2021] eKLR, the court in declining to grant orders of mandamus against the 3rd Respondent (County Executive Member, Lands and Urban Planning) stated that the 3rd Respondent not being the accounting officer (who was statutorily bound to satisfy a court decree) had no role in the proceedings and had been improperly joined. The Court stated:“Whereas the Ex-parte Applicant is correct that the 3rd Respondent is the line minister in matters land, it is apparent that he has no role in these proceedings. This is a case of mis-joinder.” 38.It is humbly submitted that the 1st Respondent is improperly joined in these proceedings. The duty in question in these proceedings is the duty to compensate for losses and damage caused by wildlife and not the duty to manage wildlife. 39.The Respondent submitted that Compensation for claims of loss and damage caused by wildlife is clearly provided for under sections 24 and 25 of the WCMA. Section 24 provides:(1)The Government shall establish a Wildlife Compensation Scheme…(2)The Wildlife Compensation Scheme shall be used for financing compensation claims for human death or injury or crop and property damage caused by wildlife.Section 25 provides:(1)Where any person suffers any bodily injury or is killed by any wildlife listed under the Third Schedule, the person injured, or in the case of a deceased person, the personal representative or successor or assign, may launch a claim to the County Wildlife Conservation and Compensation Committee within the jurisdiction established under this Act.(2)The County Wildlife Conservation and Compensation Committee established under section 18 shall verify a claim made under subsection (1) and upon verification, submit the claim to the Cabinet Secretary together with its recommendations thereon.(3)The Cabinet Secretary shall consider the recommendations made under subsection (2) and where appropriate, pay compensation to the claimant as follows—(a)in the case of death, five million shillings;(b)in the case of injury occasioning permanent disability, three million shillings;(c)in the case of any other injury, a maximum of two million shillings, depending on the extent of injury. 40.The process for compensation in claims of damage and loss caused by wildlife is clearly set out above. 41.It is thus the 1st Respondent's humble submission that the Ex-parte Applicant is not entitled to the order of mandamus as sought against the 1st Respondent. The statutory duty to sit and deliberate on compensation claims lies squarely with the CWCC and the duty to pay such compensation, if awarded, lies with the Cabinet Secretary as shall be recommended by the CWCC and not the 1st Respondent. 42.It is humbly submitted that an order of mandamus can only issue to compel performance of a statutory duty owed to an Applicant. At this juncture of the Compensation process, a critical step namely approval by the Ministerial Compensation committee is pending. This is a body with powers to defer claims if it sees fit. It has a key oversight mandate to protect the fund from abuse. It is the eyes of Kenya to ensure the funds go towards deserving cases only. To bypass this body would be preposterous. It would set a dangerous precedent. 43.The 1st Respondent has demonstrated that it has no statutory duty to deliberate upon the Compensation Claims resulting from Human - Wildlife conflict and compensate for claims of loss or damage caused by wildlife. It is also clear there has been no decision made for the 1st Respondent to compensate the Ex-parte Applicant and even if such a decision was made in favor of the Ex-parte Applicant, the duty to pay compensation for loss and damage caused by wildlife is specifically placed on the Cabinet Secretary by statute. The 1st Respondent has been improperly joined in these proceedings which seek to impose a duty on the 1st Respondent in clear disregard and contravention of section 25(3) of the Wildlife Conservation and Management Act. The Ex-parte Applicant has not demonstrated that their application is merited and it must be dismissed with costs to the 1st Respondent. 44.I have considered the application, the affidavits both in support of and in opposition to the application, the submissions for and against the grant of the orders sought and the authorities cited on behalf of the parties thereto. I find that the following issues necessary for determination:i.Whether the 1st Respondent is statutorily bound to manage national parks and reserves;ii.Whether the 1st Respondent is mandated to compensate the exparte Applicants;iii.Whether the exparte Applicants are entitled to the order for mandamus. 45.As regards the first issue, it is noted that learned counsel for the 1st Respondent has admitted that the 1st Respondent is statutorily bound to manage national parks and reserves. The said function is found in Section 7 of the Wildlife Conservation and Management Act which outlines the functions of the Kenya Wildlife Services as follows:a.Conserves and manage national park, wildlife conservation areas, and sanctuaries under its authority.b.Provide security for wildlife and visitors in national parks, wildlife conservation areas and sanctuaries. 46.From the foregoing provision, it is clear that the 1st Respondent is established to perform key functions namely conserve and manage national parks, wildlife conservation areas and sanctuaries under its jurisdiction as well as provide security for wildlife and visitors in national parks, wildlife conservation areas and sanctuaries. From those duties the 1st Respondent has the sole mandate to manage and control wildlife in Kenya. Hence, up to that point the exparte Applicants and the 1st Respondent are in agreement that it is the sole mandate of the 1st Respondent to control wildlife in Kenya. 47.Even though the 1st Respondent seems to contend that certain functions have been ceded to other organs, the truth is that the 1st Respondent is still the entity in charge of all wildlife in the country and that all issues and questions regarding the actions, damage caused by the wildlife must be placed at the doorstep of the 1st Respondent. The Supreme Court, in the case of Kenya Wildlife Service v. Rift Valley Agricultural Contractors Limited [2018] eKLR, held that the Appellant had the statutory duty to control wildlife by dint of Section 3A (1) of the Wildlife Act and held as follows:The Appellant’s obligations under Section 3A(l) could not and were not abdicated in favour of or transferred to Narok County Government. Without belaboring on this point any further, we find that the breach of Section 3A (l) imposes a liability on the Appellant to compensate for destruction of crops by wildlife. 48.As regards the second issue and as noted in issue (i), the 1st Respondent is mandated to manage national parks, wildlife conservation areas and sanctuaries under its jurisdiction. Flowing from that function, it is also its duty to compensate the exparte Applicants by dint of the provisions of Section 3A and 7 of the Act. Further, the compensation regime is found in Section 25 of the Act which provides for the procedure to be followed for payment of damages by a claimant who opts to pursue his claim under the Act as was done by the exparte Applicants which is as follows:‘’1.Where any person suffers any bodily injury or is killed by any wildlife listed under the Third Schedule, the person injured, or in the case of a deceased person, the personal representatives or successor or assign, may launch a claim to the County Wild life Conservation and Compensation Committee within the jurisdiction established under this Act.2.The County Wildlife Conservation and Compensation Committee established under Section 18 shall verify a claim made under Section 18 shall verify a claim made under sub section (1) and upon verication, submit the claim to the cabinet secretary together with its recommendation.3.The Cabinet Secretary shall consider the recommendations made under sub section (2) and where appropriate pay compensation to the claimant as follows:a.In the case of death, five million shillings.b.In the case of injury occasioning permanent disability, three million shillings.c.In case of any other injury, a maximum of two million shillings, depending on the extent of the injury. 49.That it is not in dispute the Applicant’s request for compensation has already been vetted and approved by the 2nd and 3rd Respondents in the sum of Kshs 5,000,000/=. That the 1st Respondent has maintained that it is not its duty to compensate the Applicant. That under Section 6 and 7 of the Wildlife Conservation and Management Act, 2013, the 1st Respondent has obligations under the Act and cannot run away from them. In the same vein, the duty to compensate victims arising from human-wildlife conflicts is squarely on its shoulders to discharge. 50.Section 25 of the Act provides as follows:1.When anybody suffers any bodily injury or is killed by any wildlife listed under the Third schedule, the person injured, or in the case of a deceased person, the personal representatives or successor or assign, may launch a claim to the County Wildlife Conservation and Compensation Committee within the jurisdiction established under this Act.2.The County Wildlife Conservation and Compensation Committee set up under Section 18 shall verify a claim made under Section 18 shall verify a claim made under subsection (1) and upon verification, give the claim to the cabinet secretary together with its recommendation thereon.3.The Cabinet Secretary shall consider the recommendations made under subsection (2) and, where proper pay compensation to the claimant as follows:a.in the case of death, five million shillings.b.in the case of injury occasioning permanent disability, three million shillings.c.In case of any other injury, a maximum of two million shillings, depending on the extent of the injury. 51.Since the 1st Respondent has admitted its duty under Section 7 of the Act namely to manage and conserve wildlife, I find that it is liable under the tort of negligence which incidentally attracts a duty of care on the part of the 1st Respondent to ensure that wildlife do not injure or maim human beings. I find that the 1st Respondent breached that duty of care which led to the death of the deceased. It was the duty of the 1st Respondent to ensure that the animal habitat (lake) was safe to human beings from animal attacks. The Applicants have maintained that the deceased met his death through a fatal attack by a crocodile while irrigating his crops in the lake and therefore the claim for compensation is legitimate. I find that the 1st Respondent cannot run away from its responsibility to compensate the Applicants. This is backed by the foregoing decisions of the courts. 52.Again, the Court of Appeal has said and restated that the duty to manage the National parks and reserves comes with the attendant responsibility to shoulder claims arising out of loss, injury or damage caused to property and human life by wildlife. See the case of Wildlife Service v. Joseph Musyoki Kalonzo (2017) eKLR and Joseph Boro Negra & Supa Duka Nakuru v. Kenya Wildlife Service Civil Appeal No. 71 of 1997. Further, in the case of Kenya Wildlife Service v. Rift Valley Agricultural Contractors Limited, Supreme Court Petition No. 11 of 2015 (2018) eKLR at paragraph 66 stated as follows: A global comparison of laws and jurisprudence relating to animal and wildlife management normally provides that an entity charged with such a management task also collects the revenues generated from activities relating to the same. The rationale being that such revenue supports the cost of management and any related outcomes, including compensation for damages made by animals and wildlife…. The wildlife Act gives responsibility to Kenya Wildlife Service as the park revenue collector to compensate for damages occasioned by wild animals. 53.From the foregoing authorities, it is incumbent upon the 1st Respondent to compensate the exparte Applicant since the Applicant’s claim had been approved following the laid down procedures under Section 25 of the Wildlife Conservation and Management Act as stated above. The 1st Respondent therefore owes the Applicant the amount of Kshs5000,000/= as compensation for the injury. 54.The court notes that the 1st Respondent has maintained that it has no role to play regarding compensation of the Applicants on the ground that it is supposed to be the cabinet secretary by dint of Section 25(3) of the Act. However, and as noted from the conduct of the 1st Respondent in arranging an initial payment, the exparte Applicants were entitled to approach this court for compensation since they are within their legal rights to seek the enforcement of compensation as a public duty upon the 1st Respondent who owes them an amount Kshs5,000,000/= and who has failed to satisfy the same. It seems the 1st Respondent’s objection is a smokescreen meant to evade performing its obligations and therefore it is my view that it has been properly joined into these proceedings. 55.As regards the third issue, the Exparte Applicants have sought for the order of mandamus to compel the 1st Respondent to pay them the amount already ascertained. In the case of Kenya Wildlife Service v. Awuor (Civil Appeal E013 of 2022) [2023] KEHC 3721 (KLR) (26April2023) (Judgment) and Kenya Wildlife Service v. Abraham Mangai Mitmita [2021] eKLR the courts held that:“The Appellant having been awarded an amount under the Act, further intervention in court could only have been by the appeal process following upon the provision of the section, that is to say, through the mechanism of a first appeal to the tribunal and thereafter a second appeal to the Environment and Land Court. The Respondent may have opted to pursue its claim for compensation in negligence for damages for personal injury in the civil court as an alternative to the statutory compensation mechanism. That without deciding, I would consider that the Respondent may also have pursued judicial review remedy in the High Court, if so, advised by his advocates, for the award of the full award of compensation prescribed under the Act. The Respondent may also, as he may be advised, by his legal advisors, file an application for extension of time to pursue the appeal process set out in Section 25 (6) of the Act.” 56.Applying the above principles to the present case, the exparte Applicants are within their right to file the instant judicial review to enforce the compensation. Consequently, the 1st Respondent has failed to compensate exparte Applicants and now contends that it is the cabinet secretary who ought to make the payments and not themselves. The Court of Appeal in Kenya Wildlife Service v. Joseph Musyoki Kilonzo (2017) eKLR, stipulated as follows on this issue:The Appellant admits the duty to manage and conserve wildlife. The duty comes with the attendant responsibility to shoulder any claims of loss or damage caused by the breach of that duty. The law on that point was succinctly pronounced in Joseph Boru Negra & Another v. Kenya Wildlife Service v. Rift Valley Agricultural Contractors Limited [2014] eKLR, among others is still good law on this point.The cabinet secretary referred to in the Act pays money on behalf of the Appellant. Neither the court nor the parties should concern themselves with the internal arrangements of the Appellant as to whether it is the CEO of the Appellant or the cabinet secretary who should disburse the money. 57.It is not in dispute that the 1st Respondent is liable to compensate the exparte Applicant and that it is not for them to concern themselves with the internal arrangements of the 1st Respondent as to whether the cabinet secretary should disburse the monies to the Applicants. It is my considered view that the 1st Respondent is liable to compensate the exparte Applicants and that the Applicants’ claim was approved following the laid down procedures under the Wildlife Conservation and Management Act 58.I find that the Applicants have satisfied this court that the 1st Respondent owes them an amount of Kshs5,000,000/= in the form of compensation for fatal injuries occasioned to the deceased. That Applicants have been compelled to approach the court for redress following the failure of the 1st Respondent to compensate them despite the clear provisions under the relevant Act. 59.That under the Kenya Subsidiary Legislation 2017, Legal Notice No. 245, published in September 2017, the Minister published the said regulations. Under part IV section 27(1) and (2) the Applicant’s claim was to be settled within 60 days of reporting. It is now almost 1 year 6months since the Claimants reported their claim. Despite the Respondents approving the same for payment of Ksh5,000,000/ as has been admitted by the 1st Respondent, the same is still outstanding to date. 60.In view of the foregoing observations, it is my finding that the Applicants’ application dated 27th November 2025 has merit. The same is allowed in the following terms:a.That the 1st Respondent is hereby compelled by an order of Mandamus to pay Kshs5,000,000/ = as compensation for the injuries sustained by exparte Applicants as had been already approved.b.That the costs of this application are awarded to the Applicants.Orders accordingly. DATED AND DELIVERED AT SIAYA, THIS 17TH DAY OF JULY 2026D.KEMEIJUDGEIn the presence of:Ouko…………………………….for the ApplicantsM/s Waluvengo…………………..for the RespondentMareen……………………………….Court Assistant