https://new.kenyalaw.org/akn/ke/judgment/kehc/2026/8899

 **REPUBLIC OF KENYA** **IN THE HIGH COURT OF KENYA AT NAKURU** **JUDICIAL REVIEW APPLICATION NUMBER E015 OF 2025** **IN THE MATTER OF THE LAW REFORMS ACT AS READ WITH ORDER 53 OF THE CIVIL PROCEDURE RULES, 2010** **AND** **IN THE MATTER OF AN APPLICATION FOR ORDERS OF CERTIORARI AND PROHIBITION** **AND** **IN THE MATTER OF THE FAIR ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION ACT, 2015, ARTICLES 47 AND 50(1) OF THE CONSTITUTION OF KENYA AND IN THE MATTER OF THE DECISION AND DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS UNDERTAKEN BY THE MANAGEMENT COMMITEE OF NAKURU GOLF CLUB** **BETWEEN:** **REPUBLIC…………………………………………..………………APPLICANT** **VERSUS** **MANAGEMENT COMMITEE,** **NAKURU GOLF CLUB..........................................................RESPONDENT** **ANDROBERT OBONDY…………….………….....EX-PARTE APPLICANT** **JUDGMENT** **Introduction** 1. On the 2nd December 2025 the Ex-parte Applicant moved the Court pursuant to Leave of the Court granted on the 1st December 2025, by way of notice of motion Application seeking the following relief(s) 2. ***That, an Order of CERTIORARI do issue to remove into this Honourable Court and quash the decision of the Respondent made on 29th November 2025 suspending the Applicant from membership of Nakuru Golf Club for six (6) months, together with all proceedings, actions, deliberations, and determinations leading to or arising from that decision.*** 3. ***That, an Order of PROHIBITION do issue restraining the Respondent whether by itself, its directors, agents, employees, or any person acting under its authority from enforcing, implementing, or acting upon the impugned suspension or in any manner imposing any sanctions or adverse administrative action against the Applicant based on the impugned disciplinary proceedings.*** 4. ***That, costs of this application be provided for.*** 5. The Ex-Parte Applicant anchors his application on the following grounds; 6. *That on 1st December 2025, this Honourable Court granted the Applicant leave to commence judicial review proceedings.* 7. *That notwithstanding the pendency of the leave application and the attendant requirement that leave DO operate as stay once sought, the Respondent proceeded and conducted a disciplinary hearing on 29th November 2025.* 8. *That the said proceedings were fundamentally flawed, biased, unlawful and conducted in, brazen violation of Article 47 of the Constitution and the Falr Administrative Action Act.* 9. *That key members of the Board, including the Hon. Secretary (who is the boyfriend of the complainant), Mr. Stephen Ibwaga and Mr. Enock Ogembo, sat in the disciplinary panel despite being material witnesses to the incident.* 10. *That the complainant was not a member of the Club and therefore could not lawfully lodge a direct complaint contrary to Club Constitution and practice.* 11. *That the particulars of the alleged misconduct were never formally disclosed to the Applicant prior to the hearing.* 12. *That CCTV footage which could exonerate the Applicant was withheld by the same directors who sat as adjudicators.* 13. *That the proceedings were tainted by conflict of Interest, breach of natural justice, procedural Impropriety and Irrationality.* 14. *That the disciplinary outcome is illegal, null and vold and ought to be quashed by an order of Certiorari.* 15. *That unless the orders sought are granted, the Applicant will continue to suffer Irreparable harm, reputational Injury and breach of his constitutional rights.* 16. The Ex-parte Applicant further depones as follows; 1. That, leave to commence judicial review proceedings was granted by this Court on 1st December 2025, pursuant to his Chamber Summons filed on 27th November 2025. 2. That, despite being aware of the pendency of the leave application and despite the doctrine that leave once sought Is Intended to operate as stay, the Respondent nonetheless proceeded to conduct a disciplinary hearing on 29th November 2025. 3. That, the said disciplinary hearing was fundamentally unlawful, biased and conducted in violation of his constitutional and administrative justice rights. 4. That, the Hon. Secretary, **Mr. Paul Muhia,** who is the boyfriend of the complainant, sat in the hearing, contrary to the rules of natural Justice and the rule against bias (*nemo judex In causa sua).* 5. That, **Mr. Stephen Ibwaga** and **Mr. Enock Ogembo** also sat in the panel, yet they were present during the incident and are witnesses to the events of 30th October 2025. 6. That, at no point prior to the hearing was he provided with proper particulars of the alleged complaint despite requesting clarification after receiving an ambiguous Show Cause Letter. 7. That, the complainant, being a non-member of the Club, lodged a complaint directly to her boyfriend, contrary to established disciplinary procedure requiring communication through her home club. 8. That, the Respondent also declined to avail the CCTV footage, which the Ex-parte Applicant believes would exonerate him, further demonstrating procedural unfairness. 9. That, the Respondent thereafter delivered a decision suspending him for six (6) months, a decision which is the subject of these proceedings. 10. That, the said decision is illegal, ultra vires, Irrational, unreasonable, procedurally Improper, and in blatant violation of **Articles 47 and 500** of the Constitution 11. That, unless quashed, the impugned decision will continue to subject me to unlawful punishment, reputational damage, emotional distress, and financial loss. 12. That, it is in the interest of justice that the Court Intervenes and grants the orders sought. 17. This Court Recalls the leave to institute Judicial review and relief(s) sought as follows; 18. That, this application be certified urgent and service be dispensed with the first instance. 19. ***That, the Applicant be granted LEAVE to apply for, an order of CERTIORARI to remove into this Court and quash the decision, proceedings, and intended disciplinary action by the Respondent and an order of PROHIBITION to restrain the Respondent from proceeding, conducting, or in any manner undertaking the disciplinary hearing against the Applicant.*** 20. That, leave so granted DO operate as a stay of the intended disciplinary proceedings pending the hearing and determination of the substantive motion. 21. This Court recalls the Leave to institute the proceeding being granted on the 1st December 2025 as follows; 22. Leave is granted to the applicant to file JR for the orders sought. 23. The JR to be filed and served by 16th December, 2025 24. Response to be filed by 7th January, 2026. 25. Thereafter parties to file and exchange written submissions by 27th January, 2026. 26. Mention before the Deputy Registrar on 29th January, 2026 to confirm compliance and issuance of a mention date before this Court. 27. Leave to operate as stay of any disciplinary proceedings in the event the same are yet to be conducted. 28. Leave granted to the applicant to file a further affidavit alongside the submissions if need be. 29. The Application was to be heard and determined by way of filed written submission and the same was opposed by the respondent who filed its reply as well as written submissions. **Ex-Parte Applicant’s Case and Submissions** 1. The Ex-parte Applicant submits in his filed written submissions dated 12th February 2026 on three refined issues: - 2. *Whether leave ties an ex-parte Applicant to the Reliefs sought?* 3. *Whether there was Bias and Conflict of Interest* 4. *Whether the decision of the Committee was Lawful and Properly made.* 5. That, leave in judicial review proceedings is governed by **Order 53** of the **Civil Procedure Rules** and **Section 9** of the **Fair Administrative Action Act**. the purpose of which is to filter frivolous claims; and give notice to the Respondent. 6. That the law does not rigidly lock an applicant into one remedy where the facts justify another remedy arising from the same transaction. 7. Reference is made to the case of **Republic v Kenya National Examinations Council Ex Parte Gathenji & Others [1997] eKLR,** the Court of Appeal held that judicial review remedies are discretionary and depend on the nature of the illegality complained of. 8. Further reference is made to the case of **Republic v Public Procurement Administrative Review Board & Another ex parte Selex Sistemi Integrati [2008] eKLR**, the Court held that: "*The Court is not shackled by technicalities where the substance of the complaint discloses illegality."* 9. Furthermore, **Article 159(2)(d)** of the Constitution obliges Courts to administer Justice without undue regard to procedural technicalities. 10. That although the Applicant initially sought leave to apply for orders of prohibition, the committee proceeded to make a decision before the leave ruling was delivered and once a decision has been made Prohibition becomes moot, and Certiorari becomes the appropriate remedy. 11. That this position was upheld in **Republic v Capital Markets Authority ex parte Joseph Mumo Kival [2019] eKLR,** where the Court held that judicial review remedies may evolve depending on circumstances. 12. That the Respondents' objection is therefore technical, misconceived, and contrary to **Article 159.** 13. On the second issue as to Whether the Decision of the Committee Was Lawful and Properly Made; Counsel H. Gakinya submits that, the Impugned decision is unlawful for the following reasons: *Failure to Supply the Complaint with the Show Cause Letter* *The Applicant was issued with a Notice to Show Cause dated 5thNovember, 2025 without the complaint attached and in contravention of Section 4(3)(a) of the Fair Administrative Action Act, which requires prior notice of the nature and reasons for administrative action.* *That the audi alteram partem rule was contravened.* 1. Reference is made to **Judicial Service Commission v Mbalu Mutava & Another [2015] eKLR,** the Court of Appeal held that: ***"A person must be informed of the case he is to meet with sufficient detail to enable an effective response."*** 1. That the first meeting was described as "reconciliatory," yet the Ex-Applicant had not been supplied with the complaint and could not meaningfully respond. This demonstrates procedural Impropriety and a predetermined process. 2. With regards to the 3rd issue as to whether there was Bias and Conflict of Interest, it is submitted that the Ex-parte Applicant expressly requested the Hon. Secretary to recuse himself, the said Secretary being the boyfriend of the complainant but the request was Ignored. 3. Reliance is placed on the case **R v Sussex Justices Ex-Parte McCarthy [1924] 1 KB 256**, It was famously held: "Justice must not only be done, but must be seen to be done." That the Kenyan Courts have consistently applied the reasonable apprehension of bias test. In **Porter v Magill [2002] 2 AC 357**, adopted in Kenya, the test is: Whether a fair-minded and Informed observer would conclude that there was a real possibility of bias. 4. That clearly, a complainant's romantic partner cannot sit in judgment over the accused and thus the entire process was tainted *ab Initio.* 5. On the fourth (4) issue as to whether the Ex-parte Applicant was accorded a fair hearing? Firstly, that Constitutional and Statutory Framework is provided for in **Article 47(1**) of the **Constitution**, **Article 50(1)** (right to fair hearing), **Section 4** of the **Fair Administrative Action Act,** provisions that guarantee adequate notice, disclosure of evidence, an impartial decision-maker, and reasonable opportunity to be heard 6. That the Ex-parte Applicant was denied the complaint initially; he faced a biased panel in the meeting of 28th November 2025 scheduled despite pending legal proceedings and was suspended before the Court pronounced itself on leave. 7. That in the case of **Republic v Kenya School of Law ex parte Victor Mbeve Musinga [2019] eKLR**, the Court quashed disciplinary proceedings for similar procedural breaches. 8. That, the disciplinary proceedings were procedurally flawed, biased, and unconstitutional and he was denied a fair hearing. 9. The decision of the committee ought to be quashed by an order of certiorari and costs should be awarded to the Ex-Parte- Applicant. **Respondent’s Case & Submissions** 1. The Respondent opposes the motion by filing a replying affidavit dated 8th January 2026 sworn by **Paul Muhia** contending that the Respondent is a private members' club, registered under the Companies Act and limited by guarantee. It is governed by its Articles of Association and by-laws. 2. The Respondent raises a preliminary point of law, that will determine these proceedings in limine as follows: 3. That the proceedings are premature, the dispute is between a member and a private members club, the Respondent's by-laws provide for internal dispute mechanism of dealing with the disputes and/or appeals between members or a member and the Respondent's organs. 4. That Article 19 (b) of the by-laws provides for a reconciliation and mediation as a means of solving disputes between a member and a club before taking a legal action in Court. 5. That in his chamber summons for leave, statement of facts and verifying affidavit all dated 26th November. 2025, the Ex-Parte Applicant asked the Court for leave to apply *"for an order of CERTIORARI to remove into this Court and quash the decision, proceedings, and intended, disciplinary action by the Respondent and an order of PROHIBITION to restrain the Respondent from proceeding, conducting, or in any manner undertaking the disciplinary hearing against the Applicant".* 6. That in a disingenuous manner, and in a complete departure from what the Court granted leave for, the Ex-Parte Applicant filed a substantive motion dated 1st December, 2025 with totally different prayers. 7. The Ex-Parte Applicant in this instance seeks the following relief(s): *"An order of Certiorari do issue to remove into this Honourable Court and quash the decision of the Respondent made on 29th November, 2025 suspending the Applicant from membership of Nakuru Golf Club for six (6) months, together with all proceedings, actions, deliberations and determination leading to or arising from that decision."* *"An order of Prohibition do issue restraining the Respondent whether by itself, its directors, agents, employees, or any person acting under its authority from enforcing, implementing, or acting upon the impugned suspension or in any manner imposing any sanctions or adverse administrative action against the Applicant based on the impugned disciplinary proceedings."* 1. That the proceedings herein as commenced vide the Notice of Motion dated 11th December, 2025 are improper and in violation of **Order 53** of the **Civil Procedure Rules.** 2. That, the Respondent received a complaint lodged by **Ms. Florence Ngunjiri** vide a letter dated 4th November, 2025 alleging misconduct on the part of the applicant herein. The said Ms. Florence Ngunjiri, a member of Njoro Golf Club, alleged that on 30th October, 2025, she was physically and violently assaulted by the Ex-Parte Applicant without any provocation. 3. That, Ex-Parte Applicant was invited to show-cause within two (2) days, on the alleged incident vide a letter dated 5th November, 2025. 4. That, Ex-Parte Applicant did not respond within the required time. That pursuant to the Respondent's by-laws (**Article 19),** the Respondent referred it to the Disciplinary Committee. 5. That the Ex-Parte Applicant was then invited for a disciplinary hearing on 10th November, 2025 and on the same day before the disciplinary hearing, the Ex-Parte Applicant responded to the show cause letter and also confirmed his attendance for the disciplinary hearing. 6. That after the hearing, Ex-Parte Applicant, vide a letter dated 11th November, 2025, wrote to the Respondent requesting for further clarifications on the complaint that had been lodged against him and the Respondent responded to the said letter vide a letter dated 24th November, 2025 answering the questions that had been raised by the Applicant. 7. That, on 19th November, 2025, the Disciplinary Committee met to deliberate on the hearing conducted on 10th November, 2025. The Committee resolved to recommend to the Respondent's Management Committee that the Ex-Parte Applicant be suspended from the Club for a period of three months. 8. That, the Respondent's Management Committee met on 28th November, 2025 to deliberate on the recommendations of the Disciplinary Sub-Committee. In its meeting, the Management Committee resolved to suspend the Applicant for a period of 6 months, effective 1st December, 2025 to 31 May, 2026. Thereafter the Ex-Parte Applicant was informed of the decision to suspend him from the club on 1st December, 2025. 9. That the Respondent, vide a letter dated 3rd December, 2025, also revoked the Applicant's Nomination to the Kenya Golf Union as he no longer met the eligibility requirements or standing, upon his suspension. 10. That, from the foregoing, it is clear that the Ex-Parte Applicant was accorded a chance to be heard. He was given an opportunity to Show-Cause why a disciplinary action should not be taken against him, to wit he declined to respond to. 11. That, the Ex-Parte Applicant was also accorded an opportunity to defend himself during the disciplinary hearing and given an opportunity to present his case and call witnesses. 12. That the allegations that the complainant was the Hon. Secretary’s girlfriend are baseless and at best, innuendos. 13. That, the allegations against the Ex-Parte Applicant were well elaborated and to detail as per the Show Cause letter dated 5th November, 2025. The contention therefore, that the Ex-Parte Applicant was not informed of the allegations and that particulars thereof were not brought to his attention, until the date of the disciplinary hearing are baseless. furthermore, the Ex-Parte Applicant did not list **Mr. Imbwaga, Mr.** **Ogembo** and the Hon. Secretary as his witnesses, as it had been requested of him vide a letter of invitation. There is no evidence, however, that the said two persons and the Hon Secretary ever witnessed the incident. 14. That, **Article 19 (a) (2),** of the Respondent’s By-Laws provides that all complaints must be addressed to the Secretary, who shall either deal with the matter or refer it to a disciplinary committee which procedure was followed regarding the complaint against the Ex-Parte Applicant. 15. The Respondent further in its written submissions dated 26th January 2026 submits that, the present proceedings are incompetent, premature, and devoid of merit. 16. That the Ex Parte Applicant seeks orders in the Notice of Motion that are materially different from that which leave was granted in the Chamber Summons. 17. That, the dispute before Court arises purely from disciplinary proceedings undertaken by a private members’ club pursuant to its By-Laws, following serious allegations of misconduct lodged against the Ex Parte Applicant. 18. The Respondent contends that the said Ex-Parte Applicant was accorded due process, fair administrative action, and a hearing consistent with both the Club’s By-Laws and the constitutional threshold under **Articles 47** and **50** of the **Constitution.** 19. The Respondent identifies four issues for determination. 20. ***Whether the Applicant can, at the substantive stage, seek orders in the Notice of Motion that are materially different from those for which leave was granted in the Chamber Summons.*** 21. ***Whether the Applicant exhausted the internal dispute resolution mechanisms provided for under the By-Laws of Nakuru Golf Club.*** 22. ***Whether the Applicant has met the threshold for the grant of judicial review orders; and*** 23. ***Who should bear the costs of the suit***. 24. With regards to the 1st Issue as whether the Ex-Parte Applicant can, at the substantive stage, seek orders in the Notice of Motion that are materially different from those for which leave was granted in the Chamber Summons? It is submitted, that judicial review proceedings under **Order 53** of the **Civil Procedure Rules** are special proceedings whose procedure is strictly circumscribed. 25. That the present matter, Ex-Parte Applicant, in his Chamber Summons dated 26th November 2025, sought leave to apply for “for an order of CERTIORARI to remove into this Court and quash the decision, proceedings, and intended disciplinary action by the Respondent and an order of PROHIBITION to restrain the Respondent from proceeding, conducting, or in any manner undertaking the disciplinary hearing against the Ex-Parte Applicant”. 26. That, in a disingenuous manner, and in a complete departure from what the Court granted leave for, the Ex-Parte Applicant filed a substantive motion dated 3rd December, 2025 with totally different prayers. The Ex-Parte Applicant now seeks, an order of Certiorari do issue to remove into this Honourable Court and quash the decision of the Respondent made on 29th November, 2025 suspending the Applicant from membership of Nakuru Golf Club for six (6) months, together with all proceedings, actions, deliberations and determination leading to or arising from that decision. And an order of Prohibition do issue restraining the Respondent whether by itself, its directors, agents, employees, or any person acting under its authority from enforcing, implementing, or acting upon the impugned suspension or in any manner imposing any sanctions or adverse administrative action against the Ex-Parte Applicant based on the impugned disciplinary proceedings. 27. That, in the instant case, at the time the Applicant sought leave, the disciplinary process was ongoing and no final decision had been made. 28. That it is trite, that leave of Court has to be sought before making any application for a judicial review remedy and **Order 53 rule 1 (1)** expressly provides: ***“No application for an order of mandamus, prohibition or certiorari shall be made unless leave therefor has been granted in accordance with this rule…”*** 1. That it is settled law that a party cannot, at the substantive stage, introduce new prayers or challenge decisions that were not the subject of the leave granted. Leave once granted, limits and defines the contours of the judicial review proceedings. Reference is made to the case of **Nyabira Oguta Diran Onkangi v Council of Legal Education [2016] KEHC 2440 (KLR),** where the Court emphasized on the need to stick to the reliefs in whose leave to make an application for, has been granted. The Court stated as follows: ***“It must be emphasized that the statement referred to in the above rule is required to be filed with the application for leave. Where therefore the relief intended to be sought is not set out in the statement, the applicant cannot in his subsequent Motion seek the same. In my view, once leave is granted, save for an amendment, the applicant cannot go back to the application for leave and seek orders which he did not seek in the first instance. Similarly, the applicant cannot purport to substitute an application for leave and seek to replace the orders which were granted at leave stage by way of a subsequent application. In other words, once permission to commence judicial review proceedings is granted the applicant must proceed to institute the Motion in accordance with the leave granted save for the limited avenue of amendment…”*** 1. Additionally, while emphasizing the stringent procedure in judicial review matters, the Court in the case of **Omwoyo v Attorney General [2023] KEHC 2024 (KLR)** stated as follows: ***“The requirement for leave provided for under Order 53 of the Civil Procedure Rules is a statutory requirement with a substantive purpose and not a procedural technicality.”*** ***“Counsel for the Exparte Applicant erroneously interpreted the leave as granted as allowing them to amend or modify the orders sought and introduce new Respondents and new prayers in the substantive Application.”*** 1. That light of the foregoing, the Respondent, submits that the Notice of Motion dated 3rd December 2025 offends **Order 53** of the **Civil Procedure Rules** and is incurably defective. 2. With regards to the 2nd Issue as to whether the Ex-Parte Applicant exhausted the internal dispute resolution mechanisms provided for under the By-Laws of Nakuru Golf Club. That the Respondent is a private members’ club registered under the Companies Act and governed by its Articles of Association and By-Laws. In particular, Article 19 of the Respondent’s By-Laws provides a comprehensive Internal Dispute Resolution framework. It states that all complaints must be addressed to the Secretary, who shall either deal with the matter or refer it to a disciplinary committee. That is the procedure that was followed regarding the complaint against the Ex-Parte Applicant. 3. That, **Article 19 (b) 1)** of the Club constitution further lays out a dispute resolution avenue which is available for parties in disputes involving a member and another member; or a member and the Club. The Applicant neither demonstrated that he invoked nor exhausted the internal mechanisms available to him. Accordingly, the Court should not be converted into a first port of call-in disputes where there are other available internal remedies. 4. It is submitted, that the doctrine of exhaustion is now firmly entrenched in Kenyan jurisprudence and requires parties to exhaust available internal remedies before invoking the Court’s jurisdiction, save in exceptional circumstances. Reference is made to the case of **Mutiso v Commissioner of Domestic Taxes [2023] KEHC 22421 (KLR)** where the Court stated as follows: “*This Court has on a number of occasions discussed the exhaustion doctrine. In an expanded Bench of the High Court in Mombasa High Court Constitutional Petition No. 159 of 2018 consolidated with Constitutional Petition No. 201 of 2019 William Odhiambo Ramogi & 3 others v Attorney General & 4 others; Muslims for Human Rights & 2 others (Interested Parties) (2020) eKLR, the Court stated as follows*: - ***“that the question of exhaustion of administrative remedies arises when a litigant, aggrieved by an agency's action, seeks redress from a Court of law on an action without pursuing available remedies before the agency itself. (emphasis ours)”*** 1. That the exhaustion doctrine serves the purpose of ensuring that there is a postponement of judicial consideration of matters to ensure that a party is, first of all, diligent in the protection of his own interest within the mechanisms in place for resolution outside the Courts. This encourages alternative dispute resolution mechanisms in line with **Article 159** of the **Constitution** and was aptly elucidated by the High Court in R v Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission (**IEBC) Ex Parte National Super Alliance (NASA) Kenya and 6 others [2017] eKLR,** where the Court opined thus: “That this doctrine is now of esteemed juridical lineage in Kenya. It was perhaps most felicitously stated by the Court of Appeal in Speaker of National Assembly Vs Karume [1992] KLR 21 in the following oft-repeated words: ***“Where there is a clear procedure for redress of any particular grievance prescribed by the Constitution or an Act of Parliament, that procedure should be strictly followed. Accordingly, the special procedure provided by any law must be strictly adhered to since there are good reasons for such special procedures.”*** 1. That, in view of the above, Ex-Parte Applicant has not demonstrated any exceptional circumstances to warrant exemption from the exhaustion requirement. Therefore, the Respondent submits that the application is premature and ought to be dismissed. 2. On the third issue as to whether the Applicant has met the threshold for the grant of judicial review orders the Respondent reiterates that, the Notice of Motion application is devoid of merit as the Ex-Parte Applicant failed to exhaust the internal dispute resolution avenues available to him in accordance with **Article 19 (b)** of the Respondent’s Club Constitution. Furthermore, once leave was granted, the Ex-Parte Applicant went ahead to seek the orders in the Notice of Motion, the same of which were not there in the first instance. 3. Be that as it may, the Respondent submits that the Ex-Parte Applicant was accorded a fair administrative action. Therefore, he bears the burden of demonstrating that the Respondent’s decision was tainted by illegality, irrationality or procedural impropriety. 4. Importantly, **Article 47** of the Constitution of Kenya guarantees every citizen the right to fair administrative action. It expressly provides as follows: ***“1) Every person has the right to administrative action that is expeditious, efficient, lawful, reasonable and procedurally fair.*** ***(2) If a right or fundamental freedom of a person has been or is likely to be adversely affected by administrative action, the person has the right to be given written reasons for the action”.*** 1. That from the uncontested factual matrix: formal complaint alleging serious misconduct was lodged by **Ms. Florence Ngunjiri** against the Applicant on 4th November 2025. The said Ms. Florence Ngunjiri, a member of Njoro Golf Club, alleged that on 30th October, 2025, she was physically and violently assaulted by the Ex-Parte Applicant without any provocation. 2. That, the Ex-Parte Applicant was issued with a detailed Show Cause letter on 5th November 2025. Thereafter, he was accorded adequate time to respond but failed to do so within the stipulated period. He was then invited to a disciplinary hearing on 10th November 2025 whereupon he attended, responded to the allegations, and was accorded an opportunity to call witnesses. The Disciplinary Committee deliberated and made recommendations whereby the said recommendations were considered by the Management Committee. Finally, that a reasoned decision was made. The Ex-Parte Applicant was formally notified of the outcome. 3. That Flowing from the above, it is evident that at every stage, the Respondent acted strictly within the tenets of **Article 47, 50** of the Constitution of Kenya, the Club Constitution as well as the principles of natural justice. The respondent’s administrative decision to suspend the ex parte applicant from membership of the club as well as revocation of his nomination to the Kenya Golf Union was therefore substantively and procedurally fair. 4. That the Ex-Parte Applicant’s allegations of bias, lack of particulars, or denial of a hearing are not borne out of the record. As evidenced by the Show Cause letter, the details of the misconduct of the Ex-Parte Applicant at the Respondent are well captured and very detailed. This is contrary to the Ex-Parte Applicant’s assertion that the show-cause letter dated the 5th November, 2025 is vague. 5. Furthermore, the mere fact that the Respondent’s Management Committee enhanced the recommended sanction does not amount to illegality as the said Committee is vested with final disciplinary authority under the By-Laws. 6. The Respondent concludes that, the Ex-Parte Applicant has failed to meet the threshold for the grant of judicial review orders. With the grant of judicial review orders being discretionary, urging the Court to exercise the said discretion against the grant of the orders as sought in the Notice of Motion application dated 3rd December, 2025. 7. On the fourth issue as to who bears the costs of the Application the Respondent submits that, the issue of costs is at the Court’s discretion and humbly pray that the costs of this application be borne by the Ex-Parte Applicant. 8. In Conclusion the Respondent submits that, the Ex-Parte Applicant’s Notice of Motion application dated 3rd December, 2025 is incompetent, premature, and unmerited, the same should be dismissed with costs to the Respondent. **Analysis & Determination** 1. I have considered pleadings for and against as well as arguments advance and the two main issues for my determination are: 2. **Whether the Preliminary Objection is merited.** 3. **If the answer to issue no. 1 above is in the negative, whether the Notice of Motion 2nd December 2025 is merited and therefore should the orders sought issue.** 4. It is trite that when a party raises a Notice of Preliminary Objection, the same must be determined on a priority basis before the Court can delve into any other issues raised in the suit. The law on preliminary objections is now well-established. In the locus classicus case of **Mukhisa Biscuits Manufacturing Co. Ltd vs. West End Distributors Ltd [1969) EA 696** at page 700 Pr. D-F Law JA (as he then was) defined what a preliminary objection is as follows: ***“...A Preliminary Objection consists of a point of law which has been pleaded, or which arises by clear implication out of pleadings and which if argued as a preliminary point may dispose of the suit. Examples are an objection to the Jurisdiction of the Court or a plea of limitation, or a submission that the parties are bound by the contract giving rise to the suit to refer the dispute to arbitration.”*** 1. Applying the above principles this Court finds that the Respondent raises the issue of non-justiciability and specifically, the doctrine of ripeness as the jurisdictional points of law in their Preliminary Objection that is subsumed in response to the Application. 2. The Doctrine of ripeness anticipates exhaustion by an intended Applicant of all statutory and administrative remedies before ultimately moving the Court for judicial review. 3. Order 53 Rule 1 (1) expressly provides: ***“No application for an order of mandamus, prohibition or certiorari shall be made unless leave therefor has been granted in accordance with this rule…”*** 1. In this instance the leave granted on the 1st December 2025 was; ***“For an order of CERTIORARI to remove into this Court and quash the decision, proceedings, and intended disciplinary action by the Respondent and an order of PROHIBITION to restrain the Respondent from proceeding, conducting, or in any manner undertaking the disciplinary hearing against the Applicant”.*** 1. Whereas the substantive judicial review motion filed on the 3rd January 2026 pursuant to the leave granted sought the following relief; ***“An order of Certiorari do issue to remove into this Honourable Court and quash the decision of the Respondent made on 29th November, 2025 suspending the Applicant from membership of Nakuru Golf Club for six (6) months, together with all proceedings, actions, deliberations and determination leading to or arising from that decision.”*** ***“An order of Prohibition do issue restraining the Respondent whether by itself, its directors, agents, employees, or any person acting under its authority from enforcing, implementing, or acting upon the impugned suspension or in any manner imposing any sanctions or adverse administrative action against the Applicant based on the impugned disciplinary proceedings.”*** 1. Furthermore, an Ex-Parte applicant moving the Court under **Order 53** is strictly bound by the **Law Reform Act No. 16 of 1960 Section 9(1)c,** which provides that where leave is obtained no relief shall be granted and no ground shall be relied upon except with the leave of the Court. Where leave is obtained, no relief shall be granted and no ground relied upon, except with the leave of the Court, other than the relief and grounds specified when the application for leave was made. 2. In this instance it is apparent that the Ex-Parte Applicant has moved the Court for judicial review without the leave of the Court an incurable fatality that renders the proceedings defective. 3. The Ex-Parte Applicant had an option of withdrawing the Application and moving the Court for an appropriate leave once he realized that further disciplinary proceedings had altered the nature of relief to be sought. 4. Furthermore, the alleged impugned decision made to suspend the Ex-parte Applicant for six months was never evidenced in the substantive Application and the c. 5. **Section 9(2)** and **9(3)** of the Fair Administrative Action Act strictly bar the High Court or subordinate Courts from reviewing an administrative action unless all available internal review mechanisms and statutory appeals are first exhausted. 6. The preliminary objection by the Respondent is upheld on the 1st issue and in fact the same is sufficient to conclude the proceeding with a dismissal order that the Ex-Parte Applicant prematurely moved the Court contravening the Doctrine of Ripeness 7. An unchallenged on Appeal administrative decision is considered final, binding, and ripe for judicial enforcement. If a party fails to file a statutory appeal or exhaust internal review mechanisms within the prescribed timeframe, they lose their right to challenge the merits of the decision in Court. 8. It is a fact that the Ex-Parte Applicant moved the Court immediately after being served with a notice to show cause while indicating that disciplinary proceedings had been scheduled which in his opinion was by a committee that could not afford him fair hearing as one member was allegedly a boyfriend of the Complainant, two member were allegedly present during the incident and that the three named members of the disciplinary committee were to be his witnesses and as such the intended disciplinary process was not fair and impartial. 9. The primary grounds was of want of impartiality, by three members of the disciplinary committee that firstly met on the 10th November, 2025 when the Ex-Parte Applicant was served with a complaint letter. 10. **Article 15 (c)** of the Respondent’s Constitution provides for an appellate mechanism in the Appeals Committee that would review and made decisions on all appeals on claims against the club member. 11. The Ex-Parte Applicant has failed to demonstrate that he raised his partiality claims before the disciplinary committee. 12. The Ex-Parte Applicant has failed to demonstrate that he challenged the decision to commence disciplinary proceedings or subsequently of the suspension decision, by appealing the same before the Appeals Committee. 13. It is apparent that the Ex-parte Applicant as a senior member of the Respondent was fully alive of the Appellate mechanism that was never deployed or utilized, thereby offending the doctrine of exhaustion rendering the proceedings premature. 14. The Court further observes that the Ex-Parte Applicant failed to prove in evidence the allegations of partiality or bias against the three members of the disciplinary committee. 15. Owing to the foregoing this Court is unable to the Application for judicial review dated 2nd December 2025 to be substantiated or of merit and the same is dismissed with costs to the Respondent. It is so ordered. **Signed, Dated and Delivered at Busia** **on this 19th Day of June 2026*.*** **\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_\_** **Mohochi S. M.** **JUDGE**