[2017] KEHC 2112 (KLR)

REPUBLIC OF KENYA

IN THE HIGH COURT OF KENYA

AT NAIROBI

JUDICIAL REVIEW NO. 260 OF 2017

IN THE MATTER OF PROCUREMENT OF TENDER NO. NTSA/NCB-011/2015-2016: TENDER FOR SUPPLY, DELIVERY AND INSTALLATION OF ASSET TAGGING, BAR CODING AND MANAGEMENT SYSTEM BY MS NATIONAL TRANSPORT SAFETY AUTHORITY

AND

IN THE MATTER OF AWARD OF TENDER NO. NTSA/NCB-011/2015-2016: TENDER FOR SUPPLY, DELIVERY AND INSTALLATION OF ASSET TAGGING, BAR CODING MANAGEMENT SYSTEM TO MS EXTRA SOLUTION LIMITED.

AND

IN THE MATTER OF THE CANCELLATION OF THE TENDER AWARD.

AND

IN THE MATTER OF THE PUBLIC PROCUREMENT AND ASSET DISPOSAL ACT, 2015

AND

IN THE MATTER OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF KENYA, 2010

REPUBLIC………………..............................…….............APPLICANT

VERSUS

NATIONAL TRANSPORT SERVICES AUTHORITY....RESPONDENT

EXTRA SOLUTIONS LTD …………………..EXPARTE APPLICANT

RULING ON REVIEW

1. On 25th May 2017 this Court, as duty judge in chambers received an exparte notice of motion dated 24th May 2017 under certificate of urgency seeking leave of court to institute Judicial Review proceedings challenging the decision of the procuring entity- National Transport and Safety Authority on 20th March 2017 cancelling the tender award by the procuring entity National Transport and Safety Authority(NTSA) the respondent herein.

2. The Court upon certifying the natter as urgent and as filed by the exparte applicant herein, Extra Solutions Limited, observed that time was of essence in challenging administrative decisions and that as the time for challenging the Review Board’s decision by way of Judicial Review had lapsed from 20th March 2017 to 24th May 2017 when the application for leave was lodged, the court found that the application was an overshoot as it involved the exparte applicant challenging the decision of the procuring entity directly to the High Court as opposed to filing the challenge before the Review Board.

3. The court directed that the applicant do explore the other available mechanisms under the Public Procurement and Asset Disposal Act as stipulated in Section 174 of the Act.

4. Soon thereafter the exparte applicant Extra Solutions Limited filed a notice of motion dated 12th June 2017 under certificate of urgency seeking orders that the Honourable court be pleased to review her orders by setting aside her orders made on the 25th May 2017 dismissing the application dated 24th May 2017 and replacing the same with orders granting prayers sought in the said application being prayers No. 2, 3 and 4 of the notice of motion; Costs of the application.

5. The motion is predicated on the grounds that: The 14 days within which the application challenging the breach as enshrined in Section 167 of the Public Procurement and Asset Disposal Act had already expired and the Board therefore had no jurisdiction; That Section 174 of the Public Procurement and Asset Disposal Act states as follows: The right to request a review under this part is in addition to any other legal remedy a person may have;” That the two above and other evidence to be adduced in the affidavit herein contains discovery of new important matter of law as well as evidence which after due diligence were not brought forth before the court; That it is not mandatory that a party who fails to meet the requirements of Section 167 cannot proceed to court after the day limited for taking action is already passed; That the action by the respondent was discriminatory, biased and malicious and the applicant can as well take out a judicial review to challenge the unconstitutional conduct on the part of the corporation arrived at through its administrative processes.

6. The application was also supported by the annexed affidavit of Ken Wamae sworn on 12th June 2017 deposing that the exparte applicant won the tender and before the contract was signed, the tender was cancelled by the procuring entity for reasons that one or two persons felt that the applicant was not worth awarding the tender because it may not have given a bribe to the considering committee of the respondent; That the applicant was not known by anybody sitting at the tender committee; The procuring entity was corruptly influenced after the applicant had won the tender to change their mind and restart the process to conveniently aid one of their own; That therefore the process was characterized by malice, ill intentions, bias and discrimination which is a subject of Judicial Review processes; That any other legal action is not prohibited under Section 174 of the Public Procurement and Asset Disposal Act; That they chose to come to court because the National Transport and Safety Authority kept them waiting hoping the contract would be signed upon which 14 days for challenge to the Review Board elapsed; That the respondents pretended to be holding discussions with the applicant only for time to elapse and that the applicants would be left with no remedy if the court does not give them an opportunity to be heard; That moreso, the respondent has not even notified the Director in accordance with Section 63 (2) of the Act, within 14 days of termination of the award hence their action is illegal, ultra vires their mandate; That the applicants have reliable information as to who the tender is likely to be awarded and that the issues raised are over and above what the Review Board could hear and determine as there breach was of rights of the applicant when the respondent discriminated against the applicant.

7. It was asserted that locking the applicant out would be encouraging maladministration as well as violation of the applicant’s right to access justice through the court.

8. The application was opposed by the respondent who filed a replying affidavit sworn by Patrick K. Wanjuki on 19th July 2017. The respondent’s counsels also filed a preliminary objection notice dated 19th July 2017 contending that the court lacks jurisdiction by virtue of Section 35(2),39,167(1) and 17 (c) of the Public Procurement and Asset Disposal Act, 2015; that the court lacks jurisdiction by virtue of Section 8(3) and 5 of the Law Reform Act, Cap 26 Laws of Kenya as read with Order 43 Rule 1(1) (a) and Order 45 Rule 1(1) (a) of the Civil Procedure Rules.

9. In the replying affidavit sworn by Mr Patrick K. Wanjuki the Head of Procurement of the respondent National Transport and Safety Authority, it is deposed that the applicant has not demonstrated that it has exhausted the prescribed dispute resolution procedures before commencing Judicial Review.

10. That the procurement process was above board and nothing would have been easier for the applicant to provide evidence of the alleged corruption and or present them to the Ethics and Anti-Corruption Commission or the police for investigation and or prosecution; That the applicant has not availed any evidence of malice, ill will, bias and discrimination and or that it was denied audience by the Public Procurement Administrative Review Board to justify its commencement of the Judicial Review proceedings; That the applicant was an indolent and dilatory suitor as nothing prevented it from filing a request for review before the Board within 14 days of its knowledge of the purported breach of duty by the respondent; That there is no evidence that the Board has no jurisdiction and or refused to hear and determine the purported grievances; That the applicant slept on its rights to access justice and the chamber summons could not cure the applicant’s indolence and laches; That the impugned order was issued exparte and the applicant has not annexed it hence this application is fatally defective and ought to be struck out in limine; That there is no plausible reason why the order of 25th May 2017 should be reviewed; That the applicant should have appealed against the said decision hence the application for review is frivolous, lacks merit, and fatally incompetent and ought to be struck out in limine.

11. The respondent also filed grounds of opposition dated 19th July 2017 replicating the preliminary objection filed on the same day.

12. The court did direct on 2nd October 2017 that the application be heard orally, with the preliminary objection, grounds of objection and replying affidavit forming substantive responses to the application for review by the applicant.

13. The application was heard on 17th October 2017 as scheduled with Mr Omino submitting on behalf of the applicant while Mr Gachuba advocate submitted on behalf of the respondent.

14. According to Mr Omino, the National Transport and Safety Authority is a public body and in the process of evaluating tenders, exercises quasi judicial jurisdiction so any error committed by it would be reviewed by way of Judicial Review proceedings not withstanding that the party complaining could have gone before the Tribunal.

15. It was submitted that Section 174 of the Public Procurement and Asset Disposal Act is clear that in addition to the remedies under the Act, a party can seek for other remedies through this court by way of Judicial Review, to review the actions of the Board.

16. Further, that the fact that 14 days had lapsed, the applicant did not lose the right to come before this court for an appropriate remedy and that Article 165(6) of the Constitution is clear.

17. It was emphasized that this court has the authority to look into and question actions of the respondent public body. It was submitted that if this court could have taken this factor into account, it would have arrived at a different decision.

18. Counsel for the applicant admitted that it was their error to fail to set out the problem that led the applicant to this court, which was Article 165 (6) of the Constitution.

19. Mr Omino clarified that they are not complaining that the court misunderstood the law but that they did not bring the applicable provisions of the law to the court’s attention. It was submitted that in this case, the application was not heard fully and a ruling made unlike in the Biren Amritlal Shah & Another vs Republic & 3 others [2013] e KLR case cited by the respondents.

20. Further, it was submitted that the Abdullahi Mohamud vs Mohamud Kahiye case examined different circumstances.

21. The applicant’s counsel further submitted that in the High Court Miscellaneous 13/2006 case the judge was clear that the matter did not lie before the judge but was for the Deputy Registrar.

22. Counsel maintained that a party who is aggrieved by the decision of a body can come to court even if the Review Board has not heard the dispute and that his client laments of abuse of Human Rights in the manner in which the tender was evaluated and terminated after an award.

23. In opposition to the notice of motion, Mr Gachuba counsel for the respondent submitted that there are no grounds for review based on Order 45 of the Civil Procedure Rules. That the application was brought under the Law Reform Act and Order 53 of the Civil Procedure Rules. It was further submitted that Order 43(1) (a) of the Civil Procedure Rules is clear that any order or ruling in Judicial Review proceedings can only be challenged by way of an appeal.

24. Counsel relied on the Biren Amritlal Shah & Another vs Republic & 3 Others [2013] e KLR case and Order 43 Rule 1(a) as expounded on by Honourable Mutungi J in Francis Omwenga vs Marani Land Disputes Tribunal & Others [2015] e KLR.He maintained that even if review was to be available, the applicant herein has not met the threshold for review of the court’s own orders and more specifically, that the requirements for review under order 45 of the Civil Procedure Rules have not been fulfilled.

25. It was submitted on behalf of the respondent that there is no new evidence, or new matter and that if the court misinterpreted Section 174 of the Public Procurement and Asset Disposal Act, there are many avenues under the Act including Section 35 (1) of the Act which empowers the authority to investigate the matter upon request from any person.

26. It was submitted that Section 39 of the Act provides for Judicial Review after investigations. It was submitted that the other route would be under the court’s inherent powers to seek for extension of time to file for a request for review.

27. It was submitted that even if this court was to review its own orders, there has been no reason given for failure to comply with the 14 days for filing an application for Judicial Review. Reliance was placed on Pancras T. Swai vs Kenya Breweries Ltd[2014] e KLR and the case of Abdullahi Mohamud vs Mohamud Kahiye.

28. Counsel for the applicant urged the court to dismiss the application for review with costs

29. In a brief rejoinder, Mr Omino submitted that all the remedies set out in the Act must be exhausted within 14 days but that the applicant had run out of time because the respondent kept writing to the exparte applicant saying they were looking into the matter that is why the applicant chose to come before court for redress.

DETERMINATION

30. I have considered all the foregoing and in my humble view the issues that flow for determination in this matter are

1) Whether this court has the jurisdiction to review its own orders made suo motu on 25th May 2017 and if the answer is yes,.

2) What orders should this court make?

3) Who should bear the costs of the application.

31. On the first issue of whether this court has jurisdiction to review its own orders made on 25th May 2017 the respondent contends that the court has no jurisdiction to review its own orders in Judicial Review proceedings and that the remedy for the applicant is to file an appeal as stipulated in Section 8 and 9 of the Law Reform Act, Orders 43 and 53 of the Civil Procedure Rules. The respondents counsel relied on the case of Biren Amritlal Shah & Another vs Republic & 3 Others [2013] e KLR and the case of Francis Omwenga vs Marani LDT & Others (supra) where the court found inter alia, that Judicial Review proceedings are not amenable for review but can only be challenged on appeal. This argument also formed the basis of the preliminary objection and grounds of opposition filed by the respondent to this motion for review of this court’s own orders of 25th May 2017 which struck out the motion dated 24th May 2017 for leave for being incompetent. The court of appeal in Biren Amritlal Shah & Another vs Republic & 3 Others [2013] e KLR expressed itself thus on the provisions of Section 8(5) of the Law Reform Act.

“ It is therefore quite clear that appeals in respect of orders made under Judicial Review lie with the Court of Appeal.

Therefore, in answering the question whether the High Court had jurisdiction to entertain a review application, we agree with the learned judge of the High Court that, in exercising its special jurisdiction under the law Reform Act, the High Court had no jurisdiction to review its previous order.”

32. Nonetheless, it is the same Court of Appeal, in the Nakumatt Holdings Limited vs Commissioner of Value Added Tax [2011] e KLRthat held that the Superior Court in the matter before the court had residual power to correct its own mistakes. Further, that where a mistake is shown to have been committed which is remediable by the court the same ought to be corrected by the Court in the exercise of its inherent jurisdiction.

33. It therefore follows that as the Court of Appeal in the Amritlal Shah(supra) case did not refer to its earlier case of Nakumatt Holdings when it rendered itself that the High Court has no jurisdiction to review its own orders in Judicial Review proceedings, where a mistake is shown to have been committed which is apparent and which is remediable by the court the same ought to be corrected by the court in the exercise of its inherent jurisdiction , irrespective of whether the order to be corrected or reviewed was made in the Judicial Review proceedings or not.

34. Thus, where a mistake has been brought to the attention of the court which mistake is capable of being remedied, be it by way of review or otherwise, the court’s discretion is not fettered in its exercise of inherent powers to so review its own orders in judicial review proceedings.

35. The review referred to herein which is not by invocation or Order 45 of the Civil Procedure Rules but of the inherent powers of the court in order to do justice to the parties cannot be fettered. And where, like in the instant case, the Court of Appeal in the two cited cases above has two different views taken of the jurisdiction of the High Court to review its own order in Judicial Review proceedings, this court is free to choose between the two decisions especially where it is clear like in the instance case, that the Amritlal Shah (supra) case decision was rendered by the Court of Appeal in ignorance of its former earlier decision without fully analyzing the former and thereby departing from it. This the principle espoused in the Court of Appeal decision in Major Joseph Mwateri Igweta vs Mukiri M’ethare & Another Civil Application No. 8 of 2000.

36. For the above reasons, it follows that whereas there is no specific provision allowing this court to review its own orders in exercise of judicial review jurisdiction, which then means that this court may not invoke the specific provisions of Order 45 of the Civil Procedure Rules and Section 80 of the Civil Procedure Act on review of orders made by the court under the Civil Procedure Act and Rules, this court has unfettered residual jurisdiction pursuant to its inherent powers to review its orders or correct its mistakes.

37. Thus, from the Nakumatt Holdings (supra) decision it is apparent that where a mistake is shown to have been committed which is remediable by the court, the same ought to be corrected by the court in the exercise of its inherent jurisdiction and not necessarily under Section 3A of the Civil Procedure Act which strictly speaking does not apply to Judicial Review proceedings.

38. This court has the inherent power to make such order as may be necessary for the ends of justice and inherent power is not donated by any statute or legal provisions. In Republic vs Public Procurement Complaints Review and Appeals Board and another Exparte Jacorossi Impresse Spa Mombasa HCMA 365/2006 the court made it clear and I concur fully that the court has power under its inherent jurisdiction to make orders that may be necessary for the ends of justice and to enable the court maintain its character as a court of justice and that this repository power is necessary to be there in appreciation of the fact that the law cannot make express provisions against all inconveniences.

39. Further, in the Matter of the Estate of George M’Mboroki Meru HC Succession Cause No. 357 of 2004, Ouko J ( as he then was) held that:

“ It is accepted that the court retains certain intrinsic authority in the absence of specific or alternative remedy, a residual source of power, which the court may draw upon as necessary whenever it is just or equitable to do so, in particular to ensure the observance of the due process of law, to prevent abuse of its process, to do justice between the parties and to secure a fair trial between them.”

40. In Kenya Bus Services Ltd & Others vs. Attorney General and Others [2005] 1 EA 111; [2005] 1 KLR 743 it was held:

“It is trite law that an ex parte order can be set aside by the judge who gave it or by any other judge. The Civil Procedure Rules provide for this. Our Constitution does assume the existence of supportive Civil Procedure regime in so far as the same is not inconsistent with the Constitution. There is nothing inconsistent with the Constitution in the act or principle of setting aside of ex parte orders for good reasons. If an order obtained in a Constitutional application is incompetent or improperly obtained there cannot be any valid reason why the court would not have the jurisdiction to set it aside. Setting aside would be properly justified on grounds of doing justice and fair play and good administration of justice and therefore in furtherance of public policy...Where there is no specific provision to set aside the courts power or jurisdiction would spring from the inherent powers of the court. Whereas ordinary jurisdiction stems from the Act of Parliament or statutes, the inherent powers stem from the character or the nature of the court itself – it is regarded as sufficiently empowered to do justice in all situations. The jurisdiction to exercise these powers was derived, not from statute or rule of law, but from the very nature of the court as a superior court of law, and for this reason such jurisdiction has been called “inherent”. For the essential character of a superior court of law necessarily involves that it should be invested with a power to maintain its authority and to prevent the process being obstructed and abused. Such a power is intrinsic in a superior court, its very lifeblood, its very essence, its immanent attribute. Without such a power, the court would have form but would lack substance. The jurisdiction, which is inherent in a superior court of law, is that which enables it to fulfill itself as a court of law. The judicial basis of this jurisdiction is therefore the authority of the Judiciary to uphold, to protect and to fulfill the judicial function of administering justice according to law in a regular, orderly and effective manner. The need to administer justice in accordance with the Constitution occupies an even higher level due to the supremacy of the constitution and the need to prevent the abuse of the Constitutional provisions and procedure does occupy the apex of the judicial hierarchy of values. Therefore the Court does have the inherent powers to prevent abuse of its process in declaring, securing and enforcing Constitutional rights and freedoms. It has the same power to set aside ex parte orders, which by their very nature are provisional.”

41. As was stated by Kimaru, J in Stephen Somek Takwenyi & Another vs. David Mbuthia Githare & 2 Others Nairobi (Milimani) HCCC No. 363 of 2009 concerning the court’s inherent jurisdiction and power:

“This is a power inherent in the court, but one which should only be used in cases which bring conviction to the mind of the court that it has been deceived. The court has an inherent jurisdiction to preserve the integrity of the judicial process. When the matter is expressed in negative tenor it is said that there is inherent power to prevent abuse of the process of the court. In the civilized legal process it is the machinery used in the courts of law to vindicate a man’s rights or to enforce his duties. It can be used properly but can also be used improperly, and so abused. An instance of this is when it is diverted from its proper purpose, and is used with some ulterior motive for some collateral one or to gain some collateral advantage, which the law does not recognize as a legitimate use of the process. But the circumstances in which abuse of the process can arise are varied and incapable of exhaustive listing. Sometimes it can be shown by the very steps taken and sometimes on the extrinsic evidence only. But if and when it is shown to have happened, it would be wrong to allow the misuse of that process to continue. Rules of court may and usually do provide for its frustration in some instances. Others attract res judicata rule. But apart from and independent of these there is the inherent jurisdiction of every court of justice to prevent an abuse of its process and its duty to intervene and stop the proceedings, or put an end to it”.

42. That this Court has jurisdiction to set aside leave and/or stay granted in judicial review proceedings or to review its own orders in judicial review proceedings is not in doubt. The Court of Appeal earlier on before the Amritlal Shah (supra) case made this clear in R vs. Communications Commission of Kenya & 2 Others ex Parte East Africa Televisions Network Ltd. Civil Appeal No. 175 of 2000 [2001] KLR 82; [2001] 1 EA 199where it held, in an application challenging grant of leave issued by the High Court:

“Leave should be granted if, on the material available, the Court considers, without going into the matter in depth, that there is an arguable case for granting leave. The appropriate procedure for challenging such leave subsequently is by an application by the Respondent under the inherent jurisdiction of the Court, to the Judge who granted leave to set it aside.”[emphasis added].

43. See also Njuguna vs. Minister for Agriculture Civil Appeal No. 144 of 2000 [2000] 1 EA 184.

44. Having considered the above decisions, I am persuaded that this court has inherent powers to review its decisions made in Judicial Review proceedings. In the end, I find and hold that the respondent’s preliminary objection and grounds of objection to the effect that this court has no jurisdiction to review its own orders in Judicial Review proceedings has no legal basis and the preliminary objection is hereby overruled and dismissed.

45. Having so found that this court has the inherent jurisdiction to review its own orders in these proceedings, the next issue and question for determination is whether this court should review its orders of 25th May 2017, not on the conditions stipulated in Section 80 of the Civil Procedure Act and Order 45 of the Civil Procedure Rules, but whether it should invoke its inherent jurisdiction and why it should invoke that inherent jurisdiction to review its orders made on 25th May 2017.

46. The applicant’s and respondent’s counsels have argued, fervently, relying wholly on the provisions of Section 80 of the Civil Procedure Act and Order 45 of the Civil Procedure Rules on the conditions that must be met for this court to review its orders if at all it has the necessary jurisdiction to so review.

47. However, as earlier stated, the inherent jurisdiction of this court which cannot be fettered places the burden on the court to examine its own order and determine whether it is in the interest of justice and or public policy to both parties to review and or set aside that order.

48. In this case, the order which is sought to be reviewed was made on 25th May 2017 exparte and on the court’s own motion. The court did not invite the parties to urge the application on its merits before striking out the application for leave.

49. During the hearing of this application for review, serious issues have emerged which can only be considered indepth by this court if the court were to accord both parties an opportunity to be heard on the exparte application, to be heard interparties. That is the apparent mistake that the court finds on record which this court has the residual power and inherent jurisdiction to invoke and review, by setting aside the suo motu order striking out the exparte applicant’s application dated 24th May 2017 and substituting that order of striking out the application with an order reinstating the application dated 24th May 2017 for interpartes hearing and determination on its merits.

50. By so doing, this court will have accorded all the affected parties an opportunity to be heard to ventilate their grievances fairly and justly, without, at this stage, considering whether or not the applicant ought to have been granted leave to apply, as the decision to grant or deny leave is a discretionary one which must be exercised judiciously and upon satisfying the court that the leave sough is merited.

51. Albeit the applicant has not openly complained that he was not heard before that order of 25th may 2017 was made striking out its application, having approached the court with an application seeking review of the exparte order, it is the view of this court that the applicant should be heard, on the merits of the application, while according the opposing parties an opportunity to participate in the process, notwithstanding the provisions of order 53 of the Civil Procedure Rules which empowers this court to consider the application for leave exparte in chambers while being silent on whether the court is under any duty to invite arguments from the exparte applicant.

52. The right to be heard being one of the fundamental human rights and which is generally universal and inalienable, as espoused in Article 50 of the Constitution, coupled with the right to access justice under Article 48 of the Constitution, this court has no option but to allow the application for review of the orders made on 25th May 2017 striking out the application dated 24th May 2017.

53. In M. Mwenesi v Shirley Luchhurst & another Civil Application No. Nairobi 170 of 2000, the Court of Appeal held that:

“ A court of justice has no jurisdiction to do injustice and where injustice on a party to a judicial proceeding is apparent, a court of law is under a duty to exercise its inherent power to prevent injustice.”

54. In Bremier Schiffbar and Maschinen Fabrick vs South Indian Shipping Corporation Ltd [1981], Lord Diplockin relation to inherent powers of the High Court, typified such powers as enabling the court to take necessary actions to maintain its character as a court of justice. In the words of Lord Diplock:

“ It would dampen the constitutional role of a court if as a court of justice it were not armed with power to prevent its process being misused, in such a way as to diminish its capability to arrive at a just decision of a dispute.

55. Albeit the Respondent claimed that the order sought to be reviewed is not annexed to the affidavit in support, I find that objection to be a technical objection curable by application of Article 159(2) (d) of the Constitution which espouses that justice shall be administered without undue regard to procedural technicalities. The impugned order is and can be accessed in this court file and therefore to demand that a party extracts the order and annexes it to the application for review is a mere procedural technicality which does not go to the route of the matter. That objection is therefore rejected.

56. The application for review was also brought timeously without delay.

57. Accordingly, I allow the application for review of the exparte order of this court made on 25th May, 2017 striking out the exparte applicant’s notice of motion for leave dated 24th may, 2017 and order and direct that the said application dated 24th May 2017 shall be reinstated and heard interpartes. The respondent is accordingly granted 5 days from the date of this ruling to file a response to the said application for leave, which application was filed under certificate of urgency.

58. As the parties had substantially argued some of the merits of the issues involved in the matter, I direct that they now file brief written submissions for consideration by the court.

59. The respondent shall accordingly file a response together with submissions upon which the applicant shall file a further affidavit if need be, together with written submissions within 3 days of service by the respondent.

60. The matter shall be mentioned interpartes on 20th November, 2017 to confirm compliance and for further directions.

61. Each party shall bear their own costs of this application for review.

Dated, signed and delivered in open court at Nairobi this 7th day of November 2017.

R.E. ABURILI

JUDGE

In the presence of:

Mr Omino advocate for the applicant

Mr Gachuba advocate for the Respondent

Court Assistant: George