https://new.kenyalaw.org/akn/ke/judgment/kemc/2026/288

Republic v Ojwang (Criminal Case E054 of 2026) [2026] KEMC 288 (KLR) (8 July 2026) (Judgment) Neutral citation: [2026] KEMC 288 (KLR) Republic of Kenya In the Kendubay Law Courts Criminal Case E054 of 2026 G Tawo, RM July 8, 2026 Between Republic Prosecution and Trevilla Odhiambo Ojwang Accused Judgment 1.The accused person, Trevilla Odhiambo Ojwang, was charged before this Court with two counts. 2.In Count I, the accused was charged with the offence of accessory after the fact to murder contrary to section 222 of the Penal Code. The particulars were that on the 15th day of February, 2026 at Club the Hague, Kendu Bay Township in Rachuonyo North Sub-County within Homa Bay County, knowing that George Obonyo had committed the offence of murder of Daniel Otieno Ochieng, the accused cleaned blood stains at the scene of crime and disposed of the murder weapon, namely a wooden club, in order to enable the said George Obonyo escape lawful arrest. 3.In Count II, the accused was charged with the offence of obstructing the course of justice contrary to section 117 of the Penal Code. The particulars were that on the 15th day of February, 2026 at Club the Hague, Kendu Bay Township in Rachuonyo North Sub-County within Homa Bay County, he wilfully obstructed police investigations by cleaning blood stains at the crime scene and disposing of the murder weapon, namely a wooden club. 4.The accused took plea on 23rd March, 2026. He pleaded not guilty to both counts. A plea of not guilty was entered and the matter was set down for hearing. 5.The prosecution presented six witnesses namely Everlyn Aoko (PW1), Shaban Ayub Owino (PW2), Nehemiah Ochieng Onyango (PW3), Steve Biko Odidi (PW4), No. 9654 PC Margaret Nyawira (PW5), and Dr. Rodgers Ochieng Otana (PW6) who testified and were duly cross-examined by the accused. 6.At the close of the prosecution case, the Court found that the accused had a case to answer and placed him on his defence under section 211 of the Criminal Procedure Code. 7.The accused gave sworn evidence and did not call any other witness. The Court was thereafter called upon to determine the matter on the evidence on record and the applicable law. Summary Of The Prosecution Evidence 8.PW1, Everlyn Aoko, testified that she worked at Club the Hague as a cashier. On the material night, she was on duty. At about 4.00 a.m., she asked George Obonyo to check whether there was any customer at the VIP section. Shortly thereafter, she heard a commotion and shouted at George Obonyo to stop beating someone. She stated that she continued with her work and, later while preparing to leave, saw a person lying outside near the drainage with blood on his shirt and face. The accused was standing there while George Obonyo had left. 9.PW1 further testified that she saw blood from the VIP area through to the door and on the stairs. She saw the accused cleaning or wiping blood. She stated that bouncers were not ordinarily cleaners and that George Obonyo was not before Court. 10.On cross-examination, PW1 conceded that she did not see what was happening when she heard the commotion. She stated that the distance was far and that she could not tell whether a person was being beaten or an object was being struck. She also stated that when she sent George Obonyo to the VIP section, she did not see the accused person there. 11.PW2, Shaban Ouma Ayub, testified that he received a phone call at around 5.00 a.m. and went back to the club. Upon arrival, he found the accused and a number of people who informed him that someone had been assaulted. He did not find the victim at the scene. He went to hospital and found the victim already attended to. He knew the accused as a fellow worker and security at the club. His evidence as to who assaulted the deceased was based on what he was told. 12.PW3, Nehemiah Ochieng Onyango, testified that he was at Club the Hague and heard commotion from the VIP section. He heard the waitress shouting George's name and saying words to the effect that George Obonyo should stop beating the person. PW1 later went upstairs, came back and lowered the volume of music. That is when he realized someone was being beaten and he ran outside. While outside, he saw someone lying down. He went to report to the police and when he returned, he found the accused mopping blood. He asked the accused to help him carry the injured person to hospital, and the accused did so. Upon arrival at the hospital, he was informed by the attendant that the victim had earlier been treated in that hospital. On 18th April, 2026, he was informed that someone by the name Pauline had been arrested for the murder of the victim. 13.On cross-examination, PW3 stated that he did not see the assault. He only heard commotion and drew his conclusion from the shouting. He did not hear the accused's name being mentioned during the commotion. He also confirmed that the accused escorted him to hospital and coordinated with the owner on how the victim would be treated. 14.PW4, Steve Biko Odidi, the owner of Club the Hague, testified that he received a call from PW1 informing him that there was a person outside the club. He spoke to the accused and instructed him to take the person to hospital. He sent money for transport to Gendia and later to Homa Bay. He narrated the key and fundamental roles played by the accused in ensuring that the victim received treatment. He stated that he went to the scene in the morning and that is when he was told another version of the story. He stated that the accused was a security guard and not a cleaner. 15.On cross-examination, PW4 stated that he was not present when the incident occurred. He also stated that he did not know where George Obonyo was and had not traced him. He stated that the accused never played any role in the assault. He confirmed that the accused followed up on the victim and told him that he had left the victim in safe hands. 16.PW5, Corporal Margaret Nyawira, was the investigating officer. She testified that the deceased died on 16th February, 2026 and that the body was identified at Homa Bay County Referral Hospital Mortuary. She stated that investigations revealed that the deceased had earlier been injured at Club Signature before later being injured again at Club the Hague. 17.PW5 further testified that PW3 had stated that he saw the accused mopping blood. She stated that blood swabs were collected from the scene and that photographs were taken. She formed the opinion that the accused was concealing evidence. She further stated that the accused had said he was instructed to clean blood and throw away the murder weapon. 18.On cross-examination, PW5 conceded that George Obonyo was the one alleged to have killed the deceased and that George Obonyo had not been arrested. She further confirmed that the accused gave her George's telephone number so that George could be traced. She also confirmed that the accused participated in taking the deceased from the club to hospital and that he could be viewed as a good Samaritan in his later actions. 19.PW6, Dr. Rodgers Ochieng Otana, conducted the post-mortem examination on the body of Daniel Otieno Ochieng. He observed injuries including bruises, lacerations, a fracture to the head, hematoma and cerebral oedema. He formed the opinion that the cause of death was severe traumatic brain injury caused by blunt force trauma. 20.On cross-examination, PW6 stated that he did not know where the injury occurred. His evidence established the cause of death, but not the identity of the person who inflicted the fatal injury or the exact scene where the fatal injury was sustained. 21.The prosecution closed its case and indicated that they will not be filing any submissions and would rely on the record. The accused filed written submissions dated 9th June, 2025, which the Court considered at the relevant stage. 22.Upon considering the prosecution evidence, the Court found that the prosecution had established a prima facie case against the accused. He was accordingly placed on his defence under section 211 of the Criminal Procedure Code. Summary Of The Defense Evidence 23.During the defence case, DW1, the accused, Trevilla Odhiambo Ojwang, testified on oath and stated that he was working as a security guard at Club the Hague on the night of 14th February, 2026. He reported to work at around 7.00 p.m., with work expected to start at 9.00 p.m. Other security staff, including George Obonyo, Atwech and Moses, also reported for duty. 24.He testified that George Obonyo was in charge of the upstairs VIP section, while other guards were assigned to the ground floor. According to him, at around 3.00 a.m., three customers, including a lady, came to the entrance and negotiated the entrance fee. He allowed them in after accepting a negotiated entrance fee of Kshs. 200/=, and noticed that one of them had a bandage on the head or forehead. 25.The accused stated that he later went upstairs to the VIP section and saw the three customers seated and drinking. At around 4.30 a.m., two security guards wanted to leave and he directed them to George Obonyo, who was the head of security. He then went upstairs where he found the victim sleeping on a chair while the other two had left. Later, when the club was preparing to close, he went upstairs again and found that the victim who had been sleeping there was missing, but there was blood under the table. He washed some of the blood, not to conceal evidence, but because it was the VIP section and they expected visitors at any time. 26.He further testified that when he went to the balcony, he saw George Obonyo outside appearing to search or pickpocket the injured man, who was lying down along the road. When he called George Obonyo, George allegedly ran away. The accused then went down and found that the injured person was struggling to breathe and was bleeding from the forehead. 27.The accused said he informed others, including PW1 and PW3, about what he had seen. PW3 reported the matter to the police, after which they looked for a motorcycle and took the injured man to Kendu Bay Hospital. The accused later accompanied the victim through further medical referrals, including to Gendia for a CT scan and then to Homa Bay, where the victim was admitted. 28.He stated that the club owner sent money for fuel and later sent him fare back to Kendu Bay. He later learned through the club owner that the injured person had died. On being asked to record a statement at Kendu Bay Police Station, he went there and was arrested. 29.In cross-examination, the accused admitted that he was a security guard on duty that night and that he was not the cleaner. He stated, however, that he cleaned the blood because the cleaner was not around. He denied cleaning the blood to conceal evidence. He called no other witness and closed his case. 30.At the close of the defence case, both the prosecution and the defence indicated that they would not file further submissions. The Court therefore proceeds to determine the matter on the evidence on record and the applicable law. Issues For Determination 31.Having considered the charge, the evidence, the defence and the applicable law, the following issues arise for determination:a.Whether the prosecution proved beyond reasonable doubt that the accused, knowing that George Obonyo had committed murder, assisted him in order to enable him escape punishment;b.Whether the prosecution proved beyond reasonable doubt that the accused obstructed the course of justice; andc.What final orders should issue. Analysis on count I: Accessory after the fact to murder 32.The offence in Count I is accessory after the fact to murder contrary to section 222 of the Penal Code. Guided by section 396(1) of the Penal Code and the decision in Benard Sanya Okello v Republic [2018] KEHC 7902 (KLR) I find that the prosecution was required to prove the following ingredients beyond reasonable doubt:a)That Daniel Otieno Ochieng died and that the death resulted from an unlawful act amounting to murder;b)That George Obonyo committed the murder of the deceased;c)That the accused knew that George Obonyo had committed murder;d)That the accused cleaned blood stains and/or disposed of the alleged murder weapon; ande)That the cleaning of blood stains and/or disposal of the alleged murder weapon was done with the aim or intention of assisting George Obonyo to escape punishment. 33.On the first ingredient, I am satisfied that the prosecution proved that Daniel Otieno Ochieng died. PW6 conducted the post-mortem examination and formed the opinion that the cause of death was severe traumatic brain injury caused by blunt force trauma. The death and medical cause of death were therefore proved. 34.On the second ingredient, PW1 stated that she heard a commotion and shouted at George Obonyo to stop beating someone. However, she candidly conceded on cross-examination that she did not see the assault. She also conceded that the distance was far and that she could not tell whether a person was being beaten or an object was being struck. PW3 similarly heard a commotion and heard George's name being mentioned, but he also did not see the assault. PW2's evidence as to who assaulted the deceased was hearsay. PW4 was not at the scene. PW5 relied on investigations and statements, but the alleged assailant, George Obonyo, was neither arrested nor called as a witness. 35.The Court therefore has no direct evidence that George Obonyo inflicted the fatal injury. There is also evidence from PW5 that the deceased had earlier been injured at Club Signature before he was later injured again at Club the Hague. PW6 confirmed that he did not know where the fatal injury occurred. That evidence introduces a co-existing circumstance which weakens the chain of causation and identification. 36.The prosecution was not required to secure the conviction of George Obonyo before charging the accused as an accessory after the fact. However, it was still required to prove in this case that George Obonyo committed murder and that the accused knew that fact. Suspicion that George may have assaulted the deceased is not sufficient proof that George committed murder. The Court cannot infer the accused's criminal knowledge from uncertain and unproven facts. 37.On the third ingredient, none of the prosecution witnesses stated that the accused was present during the alleged commotion or assault. The accused testified that when he went upstairs, he found the victim sleeping on a chair. He did not disturb him. He went back downstairs and later, when they agreed to close the club and the music was still playing, he went to the toilet to ensure nobody was there. When he went upstairs again, he found blood under the table with no one in the room, and that is when he cleaned the blood. 38.Further, the deceased was still alive when the accused allegedly cleaned the blood and helped take him to hospital. The evidence is that the deceased died on 16th February, 2026. The alleged cleaning occurred earlier, while efforts were being made to take the deceased to hospital. It is therefore unsafe to conclude that, at the time of the alleged assistance, the accused knew that George had committed murder. 39.From the evidence, I do not find a basis to conclude that the accused while of cleaning the blood had knowledge or reason to believe that George Obonyo had assaulted the victim in that room, or that George Obonyo had committed murder. 40.On the fourth ingredient, PW1, PW3 and PW5 testified that the accused cleaned blood stains. The accused also admitted cleaning some blood. To that extent, the physical act of cleaning blood was proved. 41.The charge also alleged that the accused disposed of the murder weapon, namely a wooden club. No witness testified to seeing the accused with the wooden club. No witness testified to seeing the accused dispose of it. The alleged weapon was not recovered or produced. There was no forensic evidence connecting the accused to the alleged weapon. That limb of the charge was therefore not proved. 42.PW5 testified that the accused allegedly stated that he was instructed to clean blood and throw away the murder weapon. Guided by the Supreme Court in the case of Republic v Mohammed & another [2019] KESC 48 (KLR), this Court treats that evidence with caution. Such an alleged statement, if intended to prove guilt or facts tending to prove guilt, would require compliance with the law governing confessions and admissions by accused persons. No properly recorded confession or admission was produced. No trial within a trial was conducted. No independent evidence was called to prove that such a statement was voluntarily and lawfully made. In the circumstances, the Court cannot safely rely on that alleged statement as proof that the accused disposed of the weapon. 43.On the fifth ingredient, the question is whether the accused's actions were aimed or intended to assist George Obonyo to escape punishment. The prosecution relied principally on the allegation that the accused cleaned or wiped blood at the scene. PW1 and PW3 stated that they saw the accused cleaning or mopping blood. The accused himself admitted that he cleaned some blood, but explained that he did so because the cleaner was not present and because the VIP section was expected to remain presentable. 44.Cleaning blood at a scene where an offence may have occurred can, in an appropriate case, amount to concealment of evidence. However, the act of cleaning blood is not automatically proof of being an accessory after the fact. The Court must examine the surrounding circumstances to determine whether the act was done innocently, negligently, foolishly, or deliberately with the criminal intention of assisting an offender to escape punishment. 45.In this case, several circumstances raise reasonable doubt. First, the accused did not flee from the scene. Secondly, he helped take the injured person to hospital. Thirdly, he accompanied the victim through further medical referrals. Fourthly, PW4 testified that the accused played an important role in ensuring that the victim received medical attention. Fifthly, PW5 confirmed that the accused gave the police George Obonyo's telephone number so that George could be traced. These acts are inconsistent with the alleged intention to help George Obonyo escape punishment. 46.If the accused's intention was to conceal evidence and assist George Obonyo to escape lawful arrest, it is difficult to reconcile that intention with his subsequent conduct of helping the victim, coordinating treatment, and assisting the police with George's phone number. The accused's testimony therefore raises a reasonable doubt on the issue of intent. 47.The prosecution case on Count I therefore rests substantially on suspicion arising from the fact that the accused cleaned blood. That suspicion is not without basis, but suspicion alone is not proof. The Court must decide the case not on suspicion, conjecture, or moral blameworthiness, but on legal proof beyond reasonable doubt. 48.I have considered the accused's sworn defence. He admitted being on duty and admitted cleaning some blood. His defence was not displaced in material respects. His testimony that the deceased had a visible head or forehead injury when he entered the club was not seriously shaken. His testimony that he later assisted in taking the injured person to hospital is supported by PW3, PW4 and PW5. His testimony that George Obonyo ran away was not independently proved, but the prosecution itself accepted George as the alleged principal suspect and confirmed that he had not been traced. 49.The prosecution proved that the deceased died from severe traumatic brain injury. It also proved that there was blood at Club the Hague and that the accused cleaned or mopped some blood. However, the prosecution did not prove beyond reasonable doubt that George Obonyo committed murder, that the accused knew that George had committed murder, that the accused disposed of the alleged wooden club, or that the accused cleaned the blood with the intention of enabling George Obonyo to escape punishment. 50.The evidence therefore falls short of the legal threshold required for conviction on Count I. The chain of circumstantial evidence is incomplete. There are co-existing circumstances consistent with innocence, including the accused's role in taking the deceased to hospital and assisting the police with information on George Obonyo. Analysis on count II: Obstructing the course of justice 51.The offence in Count II as recorded in the chargesheet is obstructing the course of justice contrary to section 117 of the Penal Code. The particulars were that on the 15th day of February, 2026 at Club the Hague, Kendu Bay Township in Rachuonyo North Sub-County within HomaBay County, he willfully obstructed police investigations by cleaning blood stains at the crime scene and disposing of the murder weapon, namely a wooden club. 52.The heading to section 117 is “Conspiracy to defeat justice and interference with witnesses.” The provision creates three distinct forms of criminal conduct:a)Conspiring with another person to falsely accuse someone or to obstruct, prevent, pervert or defeat the course of justice;b)Dissuading, hindering or preventing a person lawfully bound to appear as a witness from appearing and giving evidence; orc)Obstructing, interfering with or knowingly preventing the execution of legal process, whether civil or criminal. 53.The particulars as presented in the charge sheet does not allege that the accused conspired or entered into an agreement with George Obonyo or any other person. Conspiracy is not established merely by alleging that one person performed an act which might benefit another person. An agreement between two or more persons is an indispensable component of section 117(a). 54.The count does not allege that the accused dissuaded, hindered or prevented a witness from appearing or giving evidence. It therefore does not fall under section 117(b). 55.Neither does the count allege that the accused obstructed the execution of a warrant, summons, court order or any other legal process. A police investigation, without more, is not the execution of legal process contemplated by section 117(c). 56.The particulars therefore do not disclose any of the three offences created by section 117. 57.The Court has considered whether the expression “obstructing police investigations” can nevertheless sustain the count. It cannot. The statement of offence and its particulars must be read together. A broad description in the statement of offence cannot replace an essential statutory ingredient omitted from the particulars. 58.The acts alleged in Count II—cleaning bloodstains and disposing of a possible murder weapon—more closely correspond to section 116 of the Penal Code, which criminalizes the willful removal or destruction of a thing known to be or likely to be required in evidence, with the intention of preventing its use in a judicial proceeding. 59.The Court does not thereby find that an offence under section 116 was proved. Such an offence would require proof of its own specific elements, including knowledge that the blood or weapon was or might be required in evidence and an intention to prevent its use as evidence. 60.Section 116 and section 117 create legally distinct offences. The ingredients of destroying evidence under section 116 are not merely a smaller combination of the ingredients of conspiracy, witness interference or obstruction of legal process under section 117. 61.Consequently, section 116 is not a minor and cognate offence included in the offence charged for purposes of section 179 of the Criminal Procedure Code. Section 179 permits conviction for an uncharged minor offence only where that minor offence consists of some of the particulars forming the greater offence charged. 62.The Court cannot, at this stage, rewrite Count II or substitute section 116 for section 117. Section 214 of the Criminal Procedure Code permits amendment or substitution of a charge only before the close of the prosecution case and requires the altered charge to be read to the accused, who must plead afresh and be afforded an opportunity to recall witnesses. 63.No such amendment was sought or effected before the prosecution closed its case. To substitute the charge at judgment would deprive the accused of the opportunity to plead to the new offence and to direct his cross-examination and defence to its distinct ingredients. 64.This is not a mere typographical mistake, surplus wording or inaccurate citation which can be cured under section 382. The count alleges conduct which does not constitute any offence under the provision invoked. It exposes the accused to conviction and a sentence of up to five years for a statutory offence whose essential ingredients were never alleged. 65.The defect is therefore substantive, prejudicial and incurable at the judgment stage. accordingly, I find that Count II is fatally defective. 66.For completeness and without restating my analysis of evidence in Count 1, even if Count II were treated as though it had been properly framed, the evidence would still fall short of proof beyond reasonable doubt. 67.The acts complained of are Cleaning of blood and disposing of alleged murder weapon. 68.The particulars in the chargesheet peddled a narrative that the accused allegedly disposed of the murder weapon, namely a wooden club. This was a serious allegation and required cogent proof. 69.None of the witness testified that they saw the accused holding, carrying, hiding, throwing away or disposing of any wooden club. No wooden club was recovered. No inventory, photograph or forensic report was produced to prove the existence of the alleged wooden club as the murder weapon. No witness described where the wooden club was last seen or how it came into the accused's possession. 70.PW5 testified that the accused admitted that he was instructed to clean blood and throw away the murder weapon. However, the alleged statement was not produced as a formal admission or confession. The person who allegedly instructed the accused, PW4, the owner of the club though testified did not allude to such occurrence either in exam in chief or cross examination. The alleged weapon was not recovered. In the circumstances, the allegation that the accused disposed of the murder weapon remained unproved. 71.On the issue of cleaning some blood this Court finds that the same has been proved, However, the act of cleaning blood, standing alone, is not sufficient to establish the offence. The prosecution was required to prove that the accused cleaned the blood willfully and with the intention of obstructing investigations or defeating the course of justice. 72.PW1, did not witness the assault and did not place the accused at the scene during the alleged assault. 73.PW3 also did not witness the assault and did not hear the accused's name being mentioned during the commotion and/or alleged assault. 74.PW4, the owner of the club, was not present when the incident occurred. His evidence, however, is significant in relation to the accused's conduct after the incident. PW4 stated that he spoke to the accused and instructed him to take the injured person to hospital. He sent money for transport and confirmed that the accused played a fundamental role in ensuring that the victim was taken for treatment. 75.The prosecution was relying on PW5, the investigating officer, who formed the opinion that the accused was concealing evidence. However, an opinion by an investigating officer, however sincerely held, is not a substitute for proof. The Court must act on evidence, not suspicion or conjecture. 76.To my mind, the conduct of the accused after the incident is relevant. The accused assisted in taking the injured person to hospital. He accompanied the victim through referrals. He communicated with the club owner. He later went to the police station when asked to record a statement. PW5 stated that she collected some blood swab from the scene and further conceded that the accused gave her George Obonyo's telephone number to assist in tracing George. These acts are not easily consistent with a person who was intentionally trying to defeat investigations. 77.The accused's explanation was that he cleaned the blood because the cleaner was absent and because the VIP area was expected to receive visitors. That explanation may not have been the most prudent action at a possible crime scene, but the criminal law does not punish imprudence as obstruction unless the unlawful intent is proved beyond reasonable doubt. 78.The Court must ask whether the prosecution excluded the reasonable possibility that the accused cleaned the blood out of ignorance, panic, routine work expectations, or misguided concern for the business premises, rather than with an intention to obstruct justice. On the evidence before Court, that possibility was not excluded. 79.I also agree with the accused’s submissions during his testimony that if he indeed intended to conceal evidence, then who would have cleaned every last visible drop of blood in the club and PW5 could not have find the sample she collected days later after the incident. 80.To this end I find that the evidence against the accused on intention is largely circumstantial. The prosecution invited the Court to infer that because the accused cleaned blood, he intended to obstruct justice. That inference is not the only reasonable inference available from the evidence. 81.In summary the co-existing circumstances weakens the prosecution's proposed inference. First, the accused did not flee. Secondly, he assisted the victim to hospital. Thirdly, he communicated with the club owner. Fourthly, he gave the investigating officer George's telephone number. Fifthly, there was no proof that he disposed of any weapon. Sixthly, the prosecution witnesses themselves placed George, and not the accused, at the center of the commotion, PW5 was able to collect some blood from scene sometimes after the alleged cleaning. 82.The circumstantial evidence did not form a complete chain pointing irresistibly to an intention to obstruct or defeat justice. The accused’s conduct was capable of an explanation consistent with innocence. As the Court of Appeal stated in Sawe v Republic [2003] KLR 364, suspicion, however strong, cannot found a conviction. 83.The accused's defence displaced the prosecution theory on intention. It raised a reasonable doubt as to whether the act of cleaning was done with criminal intent. The prosecution was required to remove that doubt. It did not. 84.A court of law must not convict merely because the conduct of an accused appears suspicious or unwise. The standard is higher. The prosecution must prove every ingredient of the offence beyond reasonable doubt. In this case, the prosecution proved that the accused cleaned some blood, but failed to prove that he did so with intention to obstruct the course of justice. 85.The prosecution also failed to prove that the accused disposed of the alleged wooden club. 86.Count II equally falls short of the legal threshold required for conviction. Final Orders 87.The accused, Trevilla Odhiambo Ojwang, is hereby found not guilty on Count I of accessory after the fact to murder contrary to section 222 of the Penal Code. 88.The accused is also found not guilty on Count II of obstructing the course of justice contrary to section 117 of the Penal Code. 89.The accused is accordingly acquitted under section 215 of the Criminal Procedure Code. 90.He shall be released forthwith unless otherwise lawfully held. DATED, SIGNED AND DELIVERED AT KENDU BAY THIS 8TH DAY OF JULY, 2026.GEORGE TAWORESIDENT MAGISTRATE