https://new.kenyalaw.org/akn/ke/judgment/kehc/2026/12323

Republic v Otieno alias Daddy (Criminal Case E008 of 2024) [2026] KEHC 12323 (KLR) (27 July 2026) (Sentence) Neutral citation: [2026] KEHC 12323 (KLR) Republic of Kenya In the High Court at Kisumu Criminal Case E008 of 2024 JM Omido, J July 27, 2026 Between Republic Prosecution and Shem Akuku Otieno Alias Daddy Accused Sentence 1.The accused person, Shem Akuku Otieno alias Daddy was vide the amended information dated 30th March, 2026, charged with four (4) counts of the offence of murder contrary to Section 203 as read with Section 204 of the Penal Code, Cap 63 Laws of Kenya. 2.The particulars of the offence in respect of the first count are that on the 24th day of February, 2024, at about 1900hrs at Wagunga village in Nyangoma Location of Muhoroni Subcounty within Kisumu County, the accused person murdered Joseph Ouma Akuku. 3.In the second count, it was alleged in the particulars that on 24th February, 2024 at about 1900hrs, at Wagunga Village in Nyangoma Location, Muhoroni Subcounty, within Kisumu County, the accused person murdered Emily Adhiambo Akuku. 4.The particulars in the third count alleged that on 24th February, 2024, at about 1900hrs, at Wagunga Village, Nyangoma Location, Muhoroni Subcounty, Kisumu County, the accused person murdered Thomas Odula Nyameche. 5.It is alleged in the particulars of the fourth count that on 24th February, 2024, at about 1900hrs, at Wagunga Village in Nyangoma Location, Muhoroni Subcounty, Kisumu County, the accused person murdered Mary Kuya Otieno. 6.It is evident from the record that the accused person was initially assigned legal representation through pro bono counsel. Upon taking plea on 21st May, 2024, he denied all the charges, and pleas of not guilty were accordingly entered in respect of all four counts. 7.When the matter came up for mention on 10th February, 2026, the accused person, in the presence of his counsel, informed the court that he wished to take plea afresh. In view of that development, and at the request of his counsel, who indicated that he required further instructions from his client, the matter was adjourned. 8.On 2nd March, 2026, counsel for the accused informed the court that the parties wished to explore the possibility of resolving the matter through a plea bargain. The court accordingly granted them time to engage in plea negotiations. 9.On 17th March, 2026, when the matter came before me for the parties to report on the progress or outcome of the plea bargain negotiations, learned prosecution counsel, Ms. Muema, informed the court that no proposal had been received from the accused. Although learned defence counsel, Mr. Maua, was absent from court on that occasion, the accused person personally addressed the court in the following terms:“I want to tell the court that I killed the four deceased persons. I want to plead guilty to all the four counts.” 10.The court then issued directions in the following terms:“As counsel for the accused is not present, the matter will be mentioned on 13th April, 2026 for further orders.In the intervening period, the accused is cautioned that the maximum sentence for the offence of murder, not necessarily the only sentence, is the death sentence.” 11.On being asked whether he understood the caution regarding the maximum sentence for the offence of murder, the accused stated as follows:“I understand that it is death.” 12.The court then issued the following further orders:“Accused to be taken for psychiatric assessment and a report to be filed.Notice to Mr. Maua Advocate.” 13.The matter next came before the court on 13th April, 2026. Although counsel for the accused was once again absent, the accused person personally addressed the court and stated as follows:“The court cautioned me.I do not wish to be represented by an advocate. I know that I am entitled to one but I do not want one. I wish to proceed by myself.” 14.By then, the court had received the accused person’s psychiatric assessment report dated 7th April, 2026, which confirmed that he was fit to stand trial. 15.Once again, the court cautioned the accused person that the maximum penalty prescribed for the offence of murder, upon conviction, is death. Despite that caution, the accused maintained that he wished to plead guilty to all four counts, fully appreciating the nature of the maximum sentence. 16.The substance of the information was thereafter read and explained to the accused person, whereupon he admitted all the charges. The prosecution then outlined the facts in support of the charges, which the accused confirmed to be correct. The court consequently convicted him in line with Section 322(1) of the Criminal Procedure Code on all four counts. 17.Having convicted the accused person on his own unequivocal plea of guilty, the court is now called upon to determine the appropriate sentence. 18.At the heart of this case lies the most sacred value protected by the law: the sanctity of human life. Human life is the foundation upon which every other right and freedom rests. Once unlawfully taken, it can never be restored by any sentence a court may pronounce. 19.The poet John Donne, in his celebrated Meditation XVII, aptly observed that “Any man’s death diminishes me, because I am involved in mankind.” 20.Those timeless words remind us that every unlawful killing diminishes not only the immediate family of the deceased but also the wider human community. It is for that reason that the law has always regarded the offence of murder as among the gravest crimes known to our criminal justice system, demanding that the court approach the question of sentence with the utmost solemnity, care and fidelity to the law. 21.Sentencing is among the most solemn and exacting responsibilities entrusted to a court of law. It is the stage at which the law responds to criminal conduct by balancing the gravity of the offence, the degree of culpability of the offender, the mitigation offered by the offender, the rights and interests of victims, the legitimate expectations of society and the constitutional imperative that punishment be just, proportionate and individualized. 22.In arriving at an appropriate sentence, the court has been guided by the objectives of sentencing set out in the Judiciary Sentencing Policy Guidelines, namely retribution, deterrence, rehabilitation, restorative justice, community protection and denunciation. None of these objectives exists in isolation. The court must weigh them collectively, bearing in mind the peculiar circumstances of each case. 23.The court has given due credit to the mitigating circumstances available to the accused. He is a first offender. He eventually accepted responsibility for his actions by voluntarily expressing his desire to plead guilty and persisted in that course even after the court repeatedly cautioned him that the offence of murder carries the penalty of death, as the maximum. 24.The court also notes that he was found mentally fit to stand trial and that by pleading guilty he spared the families of the deceased the ordeal of a lengthy criminal trial and the necessity of repeatedly reliving the horrific events surrounding the deaths of their loved ones. 25.The court has equally considered the apology offered by the accused during mitigation. He stated that he was sorry to the State and to the family and friends of the deceased. 26.While the court accepts that statement as an expression of regret, it is constrained to observe that the apology was brief and was not accompanied by any explanation, acknowledgment of the enormity of the loss occasioned or any demonstrable effort towards reconciliation. In any event, however sincere, remorse cannot erase the devastating consequences of the offences committed. 27.Against those mitigating considerations stand exceptionally grave aggravating circumstances. The accused did not take one life. He extinguished four lives during a single criminal episode. Those victims were not strangers. They were members of his own family and immediate community – persons who trusted him and from whom no hostility had been demonstrated. 28.The first victim was Joseph Ouma Akuku, the accused’s own son, who was only seven years old. The law places upon every parent the solemn duty to nurture, protect and safeguard the life and welfare of his child. Instead of discharging that sacred obligation, the accused turned upon his own son and brutally cut him with a panga. The murder of one’s own child represents one of the gravest violations of parental responsibility known to the law. 29.The second victim was Emily Adhiambo Akuku, the accused’s wife, who was only twenty-six years old. She was a young woman with her life before her and every expectation of contributing to her family and society. The matrimonial home ought to have been her place of safety and refuge. Instead, it became the place where her life was violently brought to an end by the very person who had undertaken to protect and cherish her. 30.The third victim was Thomas Odula Nyameche, an elderly man aged seventy-four years, and the accused’s own uncle. The accused deceitfully induced him to accompany him under the false pretext that two of his brothers were fighting over land and required his intervention. Trusting his nephew, the deceased accompanied him, only to be mercilessly attacked and killed. The abuse of familial trust in order to facilitate the commission of murder is a particularly reprehensible aggravating circumstance. 31.The fourth victim was Mary Kuya Otieno, aged fifty-six years, who was ailing and resting in her house. The accused similarly deceived her into leaving the safety of her home before fatally attacking her. The calculated exploitation of the deceased’s trust and vulnerability demonstrates a disturbing level of deliberation and callousness. 32.The prosecution also pointed out, correctly in the court’s view, that the accused attempted to attack his sister, Monica Atieno, who only escaped because the accused fell while pursuing her. But for that fortuitous occurrence, the death toll might well have been even greater. That circumstance further illustrates the indiscriminate nature of the violence unleashed by the accused on that day. 33.The evidence accepted by the accused further demonstrates that after committing the killings, he concealed the murder weapon in a sugarcane plantation and went into hiding. Although he eventually surrendered to the police, the surrounding circumstances suggest that the decision to surrender was prompted by the realization that members of the public intended to lynch him rather than by an immediate desire to submit himself to the due process of the law. 34.The court has also considered the victim impact statements filed on behalf of the families of each of the four deceased persons. They paint an exceptionally grim picture of the aftermath of these offences. The secondary victims continue to grapple with profound grief, emotional devastation and severe psychological trauma. 35.The deaths fractured an entire extended family. Some of the surviving relatives have been left to shoulder heavy financial and social responsibilities following the loss of family members who had been their principal providers and sources of support. 36.The pain expressed in those statements vividly illustrates that murder extends its destructive reach far beyond the immediate victim and leaves enduring scars upon entire families and communities. 37.Equally significant is the pre-sentence report prepared by the Probation and Aftercare Department. It indicates that the community remains deeply traumatized, angered and distressed by the offences committed. 38.The report further concludes that a non-custodial sentence would be wholly inappropriate and that the accused himself would face a serious risk of harm if released into the community owing to the intensity of public outrage. 39.Although sentencing cannot be driven by public emotion, the report nevertheless underscores the profound societal harm occasioned by these offences and reinforces the necessity of a custodial sanction. 40.The court has also reflected upon the constitutional position regarding the sentence of death. Following the decision of the Supreme Court in Francis Karioko Muruatetu & another v Republic [2017] eKLR, the mandatory nature of the death sentence was declared unconstitutional, thereby restoring judicial discretion in sentencing. 41.The decision, however, did not abolish the death penalty itself. Death remains a lawful sentence under Section 204 of the Penal Code and may, in appropriate and exceptional cases, be imposed where the circumstances of the offence and the offender warrant its application. 42.This, in the court’s respectful view, is one such exceptional case. The offences were not the result of a momentary lapse involving a single victim. They involved the systematic killing of four persons at different locations, accomplished through deception, the abuse of familial trust, the targeting of vulnerable victims and the almost complete annihilation of an immediate family unit. Few cases can present a more aggravated combination of circumstances. 43.The court has carefully weighed the accused’s plea of guilty and his status as a first offender against the overwhelming aggravating circumstances. It has considered whether a lengthy term of imprisonment would adequately meet the ends of justice. Ultimately, however, the court is persuaded that no finite custodial sentence would sufficiently reflect the exceptional gravity of the offences, adequately denounce the conduct of the accused, vindicate the sanctity of the four lives unlawfully taken or satisfy the legitimate objectives of retribution, deterrence and protection of society. 44.Accordingly, on Count I, the accused, Shem Akuku Otieno alias Daddy, is hereby sentenced to death. 45.On Counts II, III and IV, the accused, Shem Akuku Otieno alias Daddy, is likewise sentenced to death on each count. 46.However, in accordance with the long-established practice of the courts where multiple capital convictions arise from the same proceedings, the execution of the sentences imposed on Counts II, III and IV shall remain held in abeyance for so long as the sentence of death imposed on Count I remains in force. 47.The court wishes to repeat, in conclusion, that no sentence this court can pronounce will restore the four innocent lives lost or erase the immeasurable suffering inflicted upon their families. The law, however, demands that justice be administered fearlessly, impartially and according to law. It is in faithful discharge of that duty that the foregoing sentences are imposed. 48.Right of appeal 14 days. 49.Orders accordingly. DELIVERED, DATED & SIGNED THIS 27TH DAY OF JULY, 2026.JOE M. OMIDOJUDGEAccused: Present.Ms. Muema, Prosecution Counsel for the State.Mr. Ngoge & Mr. Juma, Court Assistants.Ms. Muema: We appreciate the sentence. Justice has been served. May the souls of the four deceased victims rest in peace.Court: This file is hereby closed.JOE M. OMIDOJUDGE