[2022] KEHC 1622 (KLR)

REPUBLIC OF KENYA

IN THE HIGH COURT OF KENYA AT MACHAKOS

(Coram: Odunga, J)

CRIMINAL CASE NO. 27 OF 2019

REPUBLIC................................................................................ PROSECUTION

VERSUS

PATRICK MUTISYA MUTINDA alias KYIENI..............................ACCUSED

RULING

1. The accused person herein, Patrick Mutisya Mutinda alias Kyieni, was charged with the offence of Murder contrary to section 203 as read with section 204 of the Penal Code. The particulars were that on the 4th day of August 2017 at Mamiloki village, Kavumbu Sub-Location, Masii location in Mwala Sub-County within Machakos County, murdered Vincent Kyalo (hereinafter referred to as the deceased)

2. The summary of the prosecution’s case was that 3rd August, 2019, the accused and the deceased, together with other revellers were drinking in a Bar known as Serena Bar in Masii when a quarrel ensued between the two. According to some witnesses, the disagreement started where the duo was seated outside the bar ending up in a fight. They then entered the bar and some of the witnesses stated that the accused pushed the deceased who fell on a table and lost consciousness. Other witnesses stated that the accused and the deceased went out of the bar and the deceased was then found lying outside the door. He was picked up in the morning and taken to the Hospital but passed away while awaiting treatment.

3. In this ruling, the court is being called upon to decide whether or not the prosecution has made out a prima facie case against the accused that would warrant this court to call upon him to give his defence.

4. According to the defence counsel, Mr Mukula, there were many discrepancies and contradictions in the prosecution’s case including the name of the bar where the revellers were, the place in the bar where the accused and the deceased sat and where the fight allegedly took place. It was submitted that it was not in doubt that PW1, PW2, the Deceased and the Accused herein were drunk/intoxicated on the fateful night. It was noted that there was conflict in evidence as regards the nature and source of light at the scene. The prosecution evidence also revealed disparities as to where and how the fight took place as well as the injuries sustained by the deceased. In support of its submissions the defence relied on the case of Ramanlal Trambaklal Bhatt vs. R [1957] EA, Republic vs. Abdi Ibrahim Owl [2013] eKLR, Anthony Njue Njeru vs. Republic [2006] eKLR and Republic vs. Daniel Kazungu Karisa [2020] eKLR,

5. According to the defence, it is moot to place an accused person on his defence in the hope that he will tie up the loose ends in the Prosecution’s weak case. The Court was therefore urged to find in favour of the Accused Person and concomitantly acquit him pursuant to section 306(1) of theCriminal Procedure Code.

6. On its part the prosecution, through Mr Ngetich, learned prosecution counsel, submitted that the prosecution through the evidence adduced in court has proved a prima faciecase against the accused as explained in Remanlal Trambaklal Bhat vs. Republic (1957) EA 332, Republic vs. Abdi Ibrahim owl (2013) eKLR and Ronald Nyaga Kiuria vs. Republic (2018) eKLR.

7. According to the prosecution, the evidence adduced in this case is direct evidence showing that the accused murdered the deceased following an altercation in a drinking spree where by the accused pushed the deceased with a lot of force and he fell down hitting the floor with the back of the head and became unconscious. It was submitted that at the hearing of the prosecution’s case the cause of death of the deceased was not disputed in cross-examination or otherwise. Based on section 203 as read with Section 204 of the Penal Code, it was submitted that the prosecution's duty is bound to establish two elements, this is the Accused's unlawful act that led to the death of the deceased and that the accused had malice aforethought as defined under Section 206 of the Penal Code.

8. It was submitted, based on the witnesses’ testimonies that the evidence on record shows that the accused is the one, who assaulted the deceased, pushed him and he fell on the back, hitting the hard surface with the back of the head. To the prosecution, the accused person was determined to assault the deceased and injure him. He set upon the deceased person who and overpowered him. Such action in the mind of the accused person was clearly had an outcome of grievous harm or death of the victim. Indeed, this is what exactly happened. The deceased was fatally wounded during the assault. The accused person had unlawful intention, acted on his intention with malice aforethought thus ingredient for murder has been proved beyond reasonable doubt.

9. It was therefore contended that that the prosecution has discharged its burden in establishing a prima facie case against the accused to warrant the accused to be put on his defence under Section 306(2) of the Criminal Procedure Code.

Determination

10. I have considered the evidence so far from the prosecution’s side, the submissions made and the authorities cited. As I have stated above the issue before me at this stage is whether the evidence so far adduced warrants calling upon the accused to defend himself. In other words, does the accused have a case to answer? In Republic vs. Abdi Ibrahim Owl [2013] eKLRa prima facie case was defined as follows: -

“Prima facie” is a Latin word defined by Black’s Law Dictionary, 8th Edition as “Sufficient to establish a fact or raise a presumption unless disproved or rebutted”. “Prima facie case” is defined by the same dictionary as “The establishment of a legally required rebuttable presumption”. To digest this further, in simple terms, it means the establishment of a rebuttal presumption that an accused person is guilty of the offence he/she is charged with. In Ramanlal Trambaklal Bhatt v. R [1957] E.A 332 at 334 and 335, the court stated as follows:

“Remembering that the legal onus is always on the prosecution to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt, we cannot agree that a prima facie case is made out if, at the close of the prosecution, the case is merely one “which on full consideration might possibly be thought sufficient to sustain a conviction.” This is perilously near suggesting that the court would not be prepared to convict if no defence is made, but rather hopes the defence will fill the gaps in the prosecution case. Nor can we agree that the question whether there is a case to answer depends only on whether there is “some evidence, irrespective of its credibility or weight, sufficient to put the accused on his defence”. A mere scintilla of evidence can never be enough: nor can any amount of worthless discredited evidence…It is may not be easy to define what is meant by a “prima facie case”, but at least it must mean one on which a reasonable tribunal, properly directing its mind to the law and the evidence could convict if no explanation is offered by the defence.”

11. The Court of Appeal similarly held in Anthony Njue Njeru vs. Republic [2006] eKLR that:

“Having expressed himself so conclusively we find it difficult to understand why the Learned Judge found it necessary to put the Appellant on his defence. Was there a Prima facie Case to warrant the trial Court to call upon the Appellant to defend himself? It is a cardinal principle of law that, the onus is on the prosecution to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt and a prima facie case is not made out if at the close of the Prosecution case, the case is merely one,

‘Which on full consideration might possibly be thought sufficient to sustain a conviction’

Taking into account the evidence on record, what the Learned Judge said in his Ruling on no case to answer, the meaning of a Prima facie Case as settled in Bhatt’s Case(supra), we are of the view that the Appellant should not have been called upon to defend himself as all the evidence was one record. It seems the Appellant was required to fill in the gaps in the Prosecution case.”

12. The question that this court has to deal with and answer at this stage is therefore, whether based on the evidence before this Court, the Court after properly directing its mind to the law and the evidence may, as opposed to will, convict if the accused chose to give no evidence. It was therefore held in Ronald Nyaga Kiura vs. Republic [2018] eKLR wherein paragraph 22 it is stated as follows:

“It is important to note that at the close of prosecution, what is required in law at this stage is for the trial court to satisfy itself that a prima facie has been made out against the accused person sufficient enough to put him on his defence pursuant to the provisions of Section 211 of the Criminal Procedure Code. A prima facie case is established where the evidence tendered by the prosecution is sufficient on its own for a court to return a guilty verdict if no other explanation in rebuttal is offered by an accused person. This is well illustrated in the cited Court of Appeal case of RAMANLAL BHAT -VS- REPUBLIC [1957] EA 332. At that stage of the proceedings the trial court does not concern itself to the standard of proof required to convict which is normally beyond reasonable doubt. The weight of the evidence however must be such that it is sufficient for the trial court to place the accused to his defence.”

13. Oxford Companion of Law at pg 907 defines “prima facie” in the following terms:

A case which is sufficient to all an answer while prima facie evidence which is sufficient to establish a fact in the absence of any evidence to the contrary is not conclusive.

14. That there is a danger in making definitive findings at this stage, especially where the Court finds that there is a case to answer is not farfetched and the reasons for not doing so are obvious. As was appreciated by TrevelyanandChesoni, JJ in Festo Wandera Mukando vs. The Republic [1980] KLR 103:

“…we once more draw attention to the inadvisability of giving reasons for holding that an accused has a case to answer. It can prove embarrassing to the court and, in an extreme case, may require an appellate court to set aside an otherwise sound judgement. Where a submission of “no case” is rejected, the court should say no more than that it is. It is otherwise where the submission is upheld when reasons should be given; for then that is the end to the case or the count or counts concerned.”

15. In my view, where clearly the prosecution’s case as presented even if it were to be taken to be true would still not lead to a conviction such as where for example an accused has not been identified or recognised and there is absolutely no evidence whether direct or circumstantial linking him to the offence it would be foolhardy to put him on his defence. There is no magic in finding that there is a case to answer and a case to answer ought only to be found where the prosecution’s case, on its own, may possibly, though not necessarily, succeed. An accused person should not be put on his defence in the hope that he may prop up or give life to an otherwise hopeless case or a case that is dead on arrival. Defence case is not meant to fill in the gaping gaps in the prosecution case. It was therefore held by the Court of Appeal decision in the case of Anthony Njue Njeru vs. Republic Crim. App. No. 77 of 2006 [2006] eKLRthat:

“Taking into account the evidence on record, what the learned Judge said in his ruling on no case to answer, the meaning of a prima facie case as stated in Bhatt’s case…, we are of the view that the appellant should not have been called upon to defend himself as all the evidence was on record. It seems as if the appellant was required to fill in the gaps in the Prosecution evidence. We wish to point out here that it is undesirable to give a reasoned ruling at the close of the Prosecution case, as the learned Judge did here, unless the Court concerned is acquitting the accused.”

16. I therefore agree with the position adopted by the High Court of Malaya in Criminal Appeal No. 41LB-202-08/2013 – Public Prosecution vs. Zainal Abidin B. Maidin & Another that:

“It is also worthwhile adding that the defence ought not to be called merely to clear or clarify doubts. See Magendran a/l Mohan v PublicProsecutor [2011] 6 MLJ 1; [2011] 1 CLJ 805. Further, inPublic Prosecutor v Saimin & Ors [1971] 2 MLJ 16Sharma J had occasion to observe:

‘It is the duty of the Prosecution to prove the charge against the accused beyond reasonable doubt and the court is not entitled merely for the sake of the joy of asking for an explanation or the gratification of knowing what the accused have got to say about the prosecution evidence to rule that there is a case for the accused to answer.’”

17. The court in Republic vs. Prazad [1979] 2A Crim R 45, King CJ held the very same standard on a prima facie case in the following terms:

“I have no doubt that a tribunal, which is judge of both law and fact, may dismiss a charge at any time after the close of the case for the prosecution, notwithstanding that there is evidence upon which the defendant could lawfully be convicted, if that tribunal answers that the evidence is so lacking in weight, and reliability that no reasonable tribunal could safely convict on it.”

18. I have summarised the prosecution’s case as presented through the witnesses called by the prosecution. It is true that there are some discrepancies in their evidence. However, this is not the stage where the court is to minutely examine the said evidence and make a conclusive determination as to whether the accused stands convicted or not. In my view, the evidence as presented by the prosecution may fall short of convicting the accused with the offence charged. However, where the same may warrant a conviction on a lesser offence, the Court ought not to acquit the accused or proceed to convict him of a lesser offence without hearing him. The evidence of the accused may well exonerate him even from the conviction on the lesser offence hence it would be prudent to hear the accused before making a conclusive determination.

19. Whereas upon consideration of the totality of the evidence at the end of the trial, the court may well find that the prosecution has failed to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt, it is my view that that is not the same thing as saying that a prima facie case has not been made out. As has been said time and again a prima facie case does not necessarily mean a case which must succeed. In other words, despite finding that a prima facie case has been made out, the Court is not necessarily bound to convict the accused if the accused decides to maintain his silence. At the conclusion the Court will still evaluate the evidence as well as the submissions and make a finding whether, based on the facts and the law, the prosecution has proved its case beyond reasonable doubt, which is not the same standard applicable to the finding of existence of a prima facie case for the purpose of a case to answer.

20. In May vs. O’Sullivan [1955] 92 CLR 654 it was therefore held that:

“When at the close of the case for the prosecution a submission is made that there is no case to answer, the question to be decided is not whether on the evidence as it stands the defendant ought to be convicted, but whether on the evidence as it stands he could lawfully be convicted. This is a really question of law.”

21. The test in such matters was therefore laid down in Republic vs. Galbraith [1981] WLR 1039 in the following words:

“(1) If there is no evidence that the crime alleged has been committed by the defendant, there is no difficulty. The judge will of course stop the case.

(2) The difficulty arises where there is some evidence, but it is of a tenuous character, for example because of interment weakness or vagueness or because it is inconsistent with other evidence:

(a) where the judge comes to the conclusion that the prosecution evidence, taken at its highest, is such that a jury properly directed could not properly convict upon it, it is his duty, upon a submission being made, to stop the case.

(b) where however the prosecution evidence is such that its strength or weakness depends on the view to be taken of a witnesses’ reliability, or other matters which are generally speaking within the province of the jury and where on one possible view of the facts there is evidence upon which a jury could properly come to the conclusion that the defendant is guilty, then the judge should allow the matter to be tried by the jury.”

22. Accordingly, I will refrain from delving further in this matter. Having considered the material placed before me I am satisfied that the prosecution has established a prima facie case for the purposes of a finding that the accused has a case to answer. As to whether the said evidence on record meet the threshold for convicting the accused is a matter that will have to be considered at the end of the trial.

23. I accordingly place the accused on his defence.

24. It is so ordered.

READ, SIGNED AND DELIVERED IN OPEN COURT AT MACHAKOS THIS 15TH DAY OF MARCH, 2022.

G V ODUNGA

JUDGE

In the presence of:

Mr Mukula for the accused

Ms Njeru for the State

CA Susan