https://new.kenyalaw.org/akn/ke/judgment/kehc/2026/10879

**REPUBLIC OF KENYA** **IN THE HIGH COURT AT VIHIGA** **TRAFFIC APPEAL CASE NO. E008 OF 2026** **REPUBLIC ………………………………………………………………………………. DPP** **=VERSUS=** **VINCENT KIPKEMEI MAIYO ……………………..………………………… ACCUSED** *(Being an appeal from the Judgment of the Principle Magistrate’s Court at Hamisi delivered on 17th on 17th March 2026 by Hon. N. Moseti in Hamisi Traffic Case No. E070 of 2022).* **Coram: Justice R. Nyakundi** **M/S Cheptinga & Co. Advocates** **Mr. Leina Davies for the State** **JUDGMENT** 1. The Appellant Vincent Kipkemei Maiyo was charged with two counts namely: That of causing death by dangerous driving contrary to Section 46 of the Traffic Act Cap 403 Laws of Kenya. The particulars of the offence being that on the 26th day of February, 2022 at about 1100Hrs at Kaimosi area along Chavakali- Kapsabet road in Hamisi Sub-County, Vihiga County Western Region Being the Driver of Motor Vehicle Registration No. KCY 042 W Make TOYOTA RUSH and drove the said Vehicle on a public road in a manner which was dangerous to the public having regard to all circumstances of the case including the nature and condition use of the road and the amount of the traffic which was actually at the time or which might be reasonably be expected to be on the road where he hit motor cycle registration number KMFB 930V make TVS, causing injuries to the rider namely Collins Jikaya and pillion passenger namely Solomon Linakaya Mutalamwa both who died later as a result of the accident. 2. The Appellant denied both counts necessitating a full trial in which the prosecution summoned witnesses to proof the elements of the offence beyond reasonable doubt. 1. In a full trial before the Magistrate’s Court the Appellant was found guilty, convicted and sentenced in a judgment dated 17/3/2026 in which the Court pronounced itself as follows: *I have carefully evaluated the evidence on record while bearing in mind that I did not have the advantage to hear PW 1, PW 2, PW 3, PW 4 and PW 5. I have made due allowance of this fact. PW 1's evidence was consistent with findings made at the scene by PW 6. In this regard PW1's evidence was corroborated. Pexh 1 and Pexh 2 confirms that Collins Jokaya and Simon Linaka died as a result of the accident. From PW 1'S evidence he saw the accident occurring at close range between 5 to 6 metres ahead and the accident occurred at 11.00 am which time the weather was clear and that the accused at the material time of accident was driving on the right lane while facing Cheptulu when he ought to have drove on the left lane while facing Cheptulu from Chavakali direction. His evidence was uncontroverted. Pexh 2(a) (b) and (c) shows that the accident occurred on a bend and therefore the accused ought not to have changed lanes.* *​The accused's defence that he swerved to avoid hitting a matatu that had suddenly stopped when he himself alleged that he was driving at 60 km/hr is unreliable since he could have been able to brake the motor vehicle and bring it to a stop if it was to be so. I hereby dismiss the accused's defense. I find that the accident of 26/2/2022 was occasioned by a fault on the part of the accused. I therefore hold that the prosecution has proved the charges against the accused beyond reasonable doubt. On the second issue having found that the prosecution has proved the Traffic counts herein beyond reasonable doubt, It then follows that the accused who was the driver of motor vehicle registration NO. KCY 042 W which caused the accident culpable for the offence of causing death by dangerous driving contrary to section 46 of the Traffic Act Cap 403 laws of Kenya under section 215 of the criminal procedure code. I hereby convict him of the two counts. This judgment was delivered at Hamisi on 17th day of March 2026.* 1. Subsequent to this conviction, the learned trial Magistrate ordained himself with regard to sentence as follows: *Records: 1st offender* *M/s Cheptinga Advocate for the accused* *Mitigation: The accused is remorseful. He is a father who has children and the wife does not work. The accused is not permanently employed. He works at Ampath and the accused's income is uncertain bearing in mind that the donor funding is not regular. I pray that the accused be considered for a non-custodial sentence or a fine of Kshs 80,000. The families of the two victims were compensated Kshs 900,000 each.* *Court: I have considered the accused's records and mitigation while bearing in mind that two lives were lost as a result of the accident. Accordingly, I hereby order that the accused do pay a fine of Kshs 130,000 for each count in default to serve 2 years imprisonment for each count. The sentences shall run concurrently. Additionally, I hereby cancel his driving license for a period of 3 years effective from the date hereof. This order shall be served upon NTSA for implementation. R/A 14 days* 1. The Appellant being aggrieved with the conviction and sentence filed a memorandum of appeal dated 23rd March 2026 in which he asserted as follows: 2. *The Learned Magistrate erred in law and in fact by condemning Appellant to pay fine of Kshs. 130,000 for each victim of the accident and thereafter have the Appellant's driving license suspended for a period of 3 years.* 3. *The Learned Magistrate erred in law and fact in failing to appreciate that the fine already meted upon the Appellant is just and sufficient under the circumstances since the Appellant is a first time offender.* 4. *The Learned Magistrate erred by imposing double punishment upon the Appellant to wit a fine of Ksh. 260,000 and a suspension of the Appellant's driving license for a period of three years despite imposing the fine thereby denying him the right since he is employed as a driver the right to work, right to adequate standard of living and protection of means of subsistence contrary to Articles 6 and 11 of the International Convention on Economic Social and Cultural Rights.* 5. *The Learned Magistrate erred in law and in fact by failing to apply the relevant and pertinent judicial principles, precedents and trends arriving at the decision.* 6. *The learned magistrate ignored the accused defense specifically by expecting the accused to remember the vehicle registration number plate of the public service vehicle that obstructed him yet under the circumstances of the accident he would not be expected to recall this since the vehicle drove away.* 7. *The Learned Magistrate grossly misdirected himself by treating the evidence and submissions before him superficially and consequently punishing the Appellant twice without any basis in law or fact.* 8. *THE Learned Magistrate erred in fact by failing to appreciate that the driving license so impounded/ caveated is the sole source of income and the basis of employment of the Appellant and thus, denies him his only means of survival* 9. *The Learned Magistrate erred in law and in fact by failing to consider the mitigation submitted before him and more so, by failing to consider the fact that the Appellant is the sole bread winner of his family and relies on the driving license to fend for his family and thus the decision to suspend his license greatly prejudice and sabotage the socio economic rights of the Appellant.* 10. *The accused is not able to afford the repayment of the debt incurred of Kshs. 260,000/=being the Court fine besides the legal and other related incidental costs (double jeopardy). His salary is a meagre Kshs 46,938 before tax.* 11. *Reasons wherefore - the Appellant prays for Orders that:* 12. *The appeal be allowed and the Suspension of his driver's license be set aside and/or quashed forthwith* 13. *The costs of this Appeal be awarded to the Appellant.* 14. It is against this background the Appellant canvassed the appeal by way of written submissions dated 16th May 2026 in which Learned Counsel argued and submitted that in the totality of the sentence imposed it is manifestly excessive, disproportionate and fails the test of totality and proportionality under the provisions of Section 46 of the Traffic Act. In the contention of the learned Counsel on behalf of the Appellant, the disqualification of the Appellant for 3 years from being licenced as a driver by NTSA was an overreach in so far as sentencing parameters are concerned. On this ground of proportionality Learned Counsel invited the Court to be persuaded by the principles in *Amos Odhiambo Okoth v Republic [2020] KEHC 4524 (KLR) and Timothy Orwenyo Missiani v Republic [1979] KLR 285*. The Learned Counsel further submitted that the learned Trial Magistrate erred in law by failing to appreciate that the fine already meted upon the Appellant was sufficient and just without the condition of disqualification of being a driving licence holder in Kenya for 3 years. He proceeded to influence the Court to be guided by the laid down principles in: *Peter Nguu v Republic [2021] KEHC 8860 [KLR], Rimba v Republic [2024] KEHC 10371 (KLR), Charles Korir v Republic [2016] KEHC 6701 (KLR) and Francis Karioko Muruatetu & Another v Republic [2017] eKLR.* In keeping view of these issues surrounding this appeal Learned Counsel still maintained that the fine of Kshs 260,000/= already exceeds the nuanced of the doctrine of proportionality in sentencing. 15. From the perspective of the Appellant through his Learned Counsel, the trial Court not only failed him in passing a disproportionate sentence but also erred in both law and fact by failing to apply the relevant and pertinent facts to the judicial principles, precedents and trends before arriving at the decision on conviction. Learned Counsel majorly highlighted to this Court the discrepancies and conflicting evidence between PW1 and other witnesses which rendered the entire decision a misdirection of law. In this respect, the following case law formed the basic structure for this appeals Court to set aside the conviction according to the Appellant Counsel: *Quelicline Makonjiro V Republic [DPP] (Criminal Appeal E041 of 2021) [2022] KEHC 11680 (KLR), Richard Munene v Republic [2018] eKLR, Timothy Orwenyo Missiani v Republic [1979] KLR 285, Amos Odhiambo Okoth v Republic [2020] KEHC 4524 (KLR), Wilkinson Mwanjara Mwamburi v Republic [2017] KEHC 4321 (KLR), Rimba v Republic [2024] KEHC 10371 [KLR] and Njogu v Republic v Republic [2022] KEHC 10034 (KLR)*. According to Learned Counsel, this omission and erroneous facts render both conviction and sentence a misdirection in law. 16. The burden of proof in a criminal matter must be beyond reasonable doubt. A contradiction of material facts as to how an accident occurred particularly the number of motor cycles, or vehicles or pedestrian involved should lead to an acquittal of the accused. The burden of proof rests entirely on the prosecution the legal principle of *onus probandi*, which must establish the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. The accused is presumed innocent until proven guilty, and the burden only shifts to the defense in specific statutory exceptions. 17. This doctrine has been expounded in the following cases: * ***Woolmington v Director of Public Prosecutions [1935] UKHL 1:****The foundational House of Lords case that firmly established the "golden thread" of English criminal law—the presumption of innocence and the prosecution's duty to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. [*[*1*](https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/pdf/10.1177/00220183241274920?download=true)*,*[*2*](https://dokumen.pub/due-process-and-victims-rights-the-new-law-and-politics-of-criminal-justice-9781442674127.html)*,*[*3*](https://soolegal.com/cdn.dynamic.soolegal.com/document-center/95512/judgements/acchar_singh-converted-converted.pdf)*]* * ***Miller v Minister of Pensions [1947] 2 All ER 372:****This English case provided the classic, widely-cited definition of "beyond a reasonable doubt," stating the evidence must be of such a convincing character that a reasonable person would not hesitate to rely upon it in the most important of their own affairs. [*[*1*](https://www.coursehero.com/file/p5m4gna/25-The-Industrial-Relations-Act-Chapter-269-of-the-Laws-of-Zambia-26-The/)*]* * ***Miller & Another v The People (Kenya):****A prominent East African appellate precedent reinforcing that a mere suspicion, regardless of how strong, cannot substitute for the strict standard of proof in criminal trials.* * ***State v Maqoma (South Africa):****A key regional jurisprudence example detailing that the burden of proving all elements of an offense lies strictly with the state, and the accused has no obligation to prove their innocence.* 1. In considering this appeal, the standard of proof, which must be established beyond reasonable by the prosecution, is significantly the threshold, which must be screened with the evidence so that the complete chain on causation of the accident is within Section 46 of the Traffic Act. 2. I consider Learned Counsel’s submissions to this appeal to importing the application of the principles on a case proved beyond reasonable doubt for her arguments are that this threshold was never discharged by the prosecution for the appellant to be found guilty of the offence of causing death by dangerous driving contrary to Section 46 of the Traffic Act. 3. The other legal perspective, which could have been of significance, is the views taken by the State in so far as this appeal is concerned. However, that does not mean that the State could suffer prejudice for non-filing of submissions which is implicit of conceding to the appeal. That is not the case here for submissions deal with point of law which also the court acknowledges as having the competence to apply the law. **Legal Analysis and Decision** 1. This is a first appeal from the Subordinate Court in which jurisdiction is well laid out in the case of *Pandya v Republic [1957] EA 336* pg 37 in which it was stated as follows: *“On first appeal from a conviction by a Judge or Magistrate sitting without a jury the appellant is entitled to have the appellate court’s own consideration and views of the evidence as a whole and its own decision thereon. It has the duty to rehear the case and reconsider the materials before the judge or magistrate with such other materials at it may have decided to admit. The appellant court must then make up its mind not disregarding the judgement appealed from but carefully weighing and considering it. When the question arises which witness is to be believed rather than another and that question turns on a manner and demeanour, the appellate court must be guided by the impression made on the judge or magistrate who saw the witnesses but there may be other circumstances, quite apart from manner and demeanour which may warrant a court in differing from the judge or Magistrate even on a question of fact turning on the credibility of witnesses whom the appellate court has not seen……”* 1. The primary foundation for the first criminal appeal’s court is outlined in the Criminal Procedure Code. In furtherance to this, the Court is guided by established legal principles requiring the Judge to weigh conflicting evidence and arrive at its own independent conclusions while making allowances for the trial Magistrate’s advantage of seeing the witnesses testify. 2. This jurisdiction of the first appeals Court was also reiterated in the decision of ***Okeno v Republic [1972] EA 32*** where the Court said: *“An appellant on a first appeal is entitled to expect the evidence as a whole to be submitted to a fresh and exhaustive examination (Pandya v. R., [1957] E. A. 336) and to the appellate court's own decision on the evidence. The first appellate court must itself weigh conflicting evidence and draw its own conclusions. (Shantilal M. Ruwala v. R., [1957] E.A. 570). It is not the function of a first appellate court merely to scrutinize the evidence to see if there was some evidence to support the lower court's findings and conclusions; it must make its own findings and draw its own conclusions. Only then can it decide whether the magistrate's findings should be supported. In doing so, it should make allowance for the fact that the trial court has had the advantage of hearing and seeing the witnesses, see Peters v. Sunday Post, [1958] E. A. 424.”* 1. There are two issues which arise out of this appeal although in the memorandum of appeal Learned Counsel seems to unpackage them into various grounds of appeal to demonstrate the grievances and dissatisfaction with the impugned judgment. As for this Court, the first question to address is whether the finding of guilty and conviction for the offence of causing death by dangerous driving by the Appellant was well founded by the trial Court. **The Law** 1. The offence of causing death by dangerous driving under Section 46 of the Traffic Act Cap 403 Laws of Kenya occurs when a person causes death by driving recklessly, at a dangerous speed, or in a manner dangerous to the public taking into account all road circumstances and traffic levels. The Kenyan Courts usually face variety of cases under the Traffic Act including those which fall within the provisions of Section 46 of the Act. From the interpretation of the law key principles have been laid down to define as to what constitutes this offence: * **Objective Standard of Fault:** The mere occurrence of an accident is not enough; the prosecution must prove the driver significantly departed from the standard of care expected of a reasonably prudent driver. As established in *Atito v Republic*, there must be objective danger and specific fault by the driver. * **No Deliberate Intent Required:** "Fault" does not require deliberate misconduct or intent. An objective failure to handle a vehicle safely suffices. * **Manner of Driving:** In cases like *John Akama Machuchu v Republic*, overtaking in blind spots (such as on a bridge) was deemed dangerous driving. Speed, failure to yield, and disregard for road conditions are heavily scrutinized. * **Emergency Situations:** The courts acknowledge that external factors can create sudden emergencies. In *Njeru v Republic*, a conviction was overturned because the driver was avoiding a head-on collision caused by another vehicle, which meant the resulting impact was not the driver's fault. * **Obstruction:** The offense can also be constituted by leaving a vehicle in a position or condition dangerous to the public. 1. The penalties for causing death by dangerous driving are severe and according to the legislative scheme a maximum prison sentence of 10 years with a mandatory driving disqualification for a minimum of two years and extended retest before one regains his or her driving license so that he or she can go back to the driver’s seat. This is what the Court articulated in the case of **Shah vs Republic [1969] EA** in which it was construed that Section 46 of the Traffic Act cumulatively constitutes four key ingredients and any one of them or as a combination can form part of the indictment in a decision to charge by the Director of Public Prosecution under Article 157 (6) (7) of the Constitution as read with Section 46 of the Traffic Act. Thus I have in mind the elements of recklessly, or at a speed, or in a manner, or by leaving a vehicle on a road in such a position or manner or in such a condition as to be dangerous to the public. 2. In my view, proving any criminal offence is a matter of evidence and it is for the Prosecution to establish any of the elements beyond reasonable doubt that the driver’s dangerous conduct was the substantial cause of the death. What this means is that the nature of dangerous driving can be both reckless, at high speed or after a driver conducts himself or herself recklessly he or she places that vehicle in a position which may be dangerous to other road users. It must be appreciated that driving is not a one off event. It is a chain of causation issues underpinned in the range of the reckless conduct and the range of the speed in which the vehicle was being driven and ultimately there is a fatal accident involving a third party who did not contribute to the cause of the accident. When one talks about dangerous driving, it is that driving which must fall grossly below the standard of a prudent and competent driver. This includes actions like driving unroadworthy vehicles, excessive speeding, distracted driving and reckless overtaking without adequate visibility. It is the duty of the Prosecution to explicitly by way of evidence to link the dangerous driving to the victim’s death. This is a strict liability statutory offence under the realm of criminal negligence though the dangerous manner of driving imports intentional or reckless acts in which it is foreseeable that such a traffic offence was likely to occur beyond the probability metrics. 3. In this respect, the trial Court was faced with the indictment in which the prosecution adduced evidence of PW1 by the name Silas Kiprigut who told the Court on 26/2/2022 when his boss called him to get him some documents from the office and he proceeded to do so by using his own motor vehicle. That is when along the way at Cheptur area he slowed down and motor cycle riders overtook him but there was oncoming motor vehicle from Shamakhokho and incidentally it rammed on the motor cycles and was a head on collision with another motor vehicle. It was at this scene when to fatalities occurred involving two human beings. On cross-examination by Counsel for the Appellant, PW1 confirmed that he was driving motor vehicle registration No. KAZ 365W which he purchased in 2021. He also confirmed to the trial Court that traffic was clear and the motor cycles were ahead of him about 15 metres away and the passenger on the motor cycle fell off the road to the left side as one faces Shamakhokho and the other motor cycle had a collision with the oncoming motor vehicle. 4. The other witness of importance at the trial Court is PW3 Henry who introduced himself as a security guard at Friends Boys Kaimosi. His evidence was to the effect that Solomon one of the deceased happened to be his uncle but he never said anything more about the occurrence of the accident. This was also the evidence of PW4 one Kennedy whose evidence was on identifying the deceased one Collins as part of the victim of that accident. These chain of circumstantial evidence turned on to point directly to the appellant as the one who triggered the proximate cause of the accident. 5. The investigation of this accident proceeded in earnest as stated by PC Murkomen of Vihiga Police Station. He presented before Court the sketch plans, legends and measurements of the scene, the motor cycle inspection reports and also the motor vehicle which was also mentioned as part of the main chattels involved in this accident. He therefore formed the opinion and recommended that the Appellant be charged with the offence of causing death by dangerous driving contrary to Section 46 of the Traffic Act . 6. The Appellant answered the issues involved in this collision in which two persons lost their lives. According to the Appellant on 26th February 2022 he was driving from Kisumu to Eldoret when his motor vehicle registration number KCY 042W was involved in an accident. It was his defence that this accident was majorly caused by a motor vehicle from Eldoret direction which was being driven in high speed and there was a motor cyclist also om the same road. It was the motor cyclist which had a collision with the motor vehicle and because the surroundings were not very clear he was not able to swerve towards the side of the pedestrians. He therefore blamed the matatu driver as the originator of the accident. 7. In considering the evidence, learned trial Magistrate conclusively established that the elements of causing death by dangerous driving and all causation issues with regard to the provisions of Section 46 of the Traffic Act fell squarely at the doorstep of the Appellant. The learned Counsel for the Appellant submitted that on manifestation of contradictions and inconsistencies with regard to the evidence by the Prosecution and in piecing together the case it was wrong for the learned magistrate to rule that the Prosecution discharged the burden of proof of beyond reasonable doubt as to the nature of driving by the Appellant on the material day. However, in my view there was sufficient evidence which included that of the Investigating Officer who visited the scene after the accident and also the Vehicle Inspection Officer report who tested the subject vehicles and came to the conclusion that the accident was not caused by any mechanical defect. The testimony of the Appellant was disbelieved and the Prosecution’s perspective on what transpired when the two victims lost their lives carried the day within the standard and burden of proof as stipulated in Section 107(1), 108, 109 and 112 of the Evidence Act. The rough and fair sketch plan drawn by the Police at the scene of the accident were intended to show graphically the effect of the accident and not an actual account of how the accident occurred. This evidence was admitted in Court to show the position of the vehicles during the accident and after the accident occurred. It is very clear from the evidence that the trial Court found the Appellant guilty of causing death by dangerous driving based on the element of reckless driving in view of the facts that he was on the wrong lane if the record of the trial Court is anything to go by. 8. I hold the view that the above represents the facts and the law on the matter as at now and therefore binding. Having regard to the position of the law, and the evidence as captured by the Learned Trial Magistrate I arrive at a conclusion that I find no merit in this appeal with regard to a finding of guilty and subsequent conviction against the Appellant for the two counts of causing death by dangerous driving contrary to Section 46 of the Traffic Act Cap 403 Laws of Kenya. 9. The second cluster, which forms the grounds of appeal, constitutes the issue of sentence. The law is now well settled as to the jurisdiction of an appeals Court to interfere with the decision of the trial Court on the sentence imposed. I therefore reiterate the principles in the Court of Appeal Case in the ***Benard Kimani Gacheru vs. Republic [2002] eKLR:*** *“It is now settled law, following several authorities by this Court and by the High Court, that sentence is a matter that rests in the discretion of the trial Court. Similarly, sentence must depend on the facts of each case. on appeal, the appellate court will not easily interfere with sentence unless, that sentence is manifestly excessive in the circumstances of the case, or that the trial court overlooked some material factor, or took into account some wrong material, or acted on a wrong principle. Even if, the Appellate Court feels that the sentence is heavy and that the Appellate Court might itself not have passed that sentence, these alone are not sufficient grounds for interfering with the discretion of the trial court on sentence unless, anyone of the matters already stated is shown to exist.”* 1. The major complaint by the Appellant is with the effect that the sentence imposed by the trial Court was punitive, excessive, harsh and runs foul with the doctrine of proportionality. The doctrine of proportionality dictates that a criminal sentence must fit the gravity of the offence, balancing the severity of the crime with the offender’s culpability. It prevents both excessive and arbitrarily lenient punishments, ensuring sentences are just, consistent and reflective of the harm caused. In the modern theory of punishment, within our statutory regime under the Traffic Act as toned with the Sentencing Policy Guidelines 2023 it is classified as either retributive or deterrent. The justification of punishment in our criminal justice system flows directly from the person’s desert. There is an obligation by Courts handling criminal cases under the classification of serious offences like causing death by dangerous driving to punish sufficiently and to speak out against the offence and the intention of Parliament is to ensure that the offender has got to be rightly punished as punishment honors them as a rational being with intrinsic value. 2. The circumstances of this offence called for scaling of punishment in relation to the offence in which Article 26 of the Constitution on the right to life was violated and within the findings of the Trial Court, this fatal accident was avoidable if the Appellant had taken evasive measures in the course of his driving along the Eldoret-Kisumu road. From the facts of this case, I consider the sentence imposed by the trial Court to reflect the gravity of the offence relative to other offences and the various degrees of seriousness in the range of the conduct of the offender covered by the offence on the fateful date of 26th February 2022 in broad daylight at 1100hrs. 3. It is within this framework, proportionality is primarily concerned with measuring sentence imposed and its severity to facilitate fairness, consistency, parity and predictability in sentencing in one of the major offences committed in our roads and innocent Kenyans right to life is terminated prematurely by an offensive conduct which could be avoided at all levels. For instance, the Appellant is complaining about being disqualified to hold a driving licence for the next 3 years. In his submissions this was punitive, harsh and excessive punishment rendering him to be subjected to double jeopardy and therefore pleaded with the appeals court on account of that to redress that violation by setting aside the verdict by the trial Court. It should be borne in mind that factors relevant to the determination of a sentence within the laid down objectives and principles under our Sentencing Policy Guidelines depend on the chosen objective of sentencing by the trial Court such as deterrence, rehabilitation, reparation or public protection. This was not vengeance on the part of the Court but retribution for the heinous crime in which two citizens lost their lives in circumstances which are not excusable or justifiable. This is what retribution stands for in a criminal context. It represents an objective, reasoned and measured determination of an appropriate punishment which properly reflects the moral culpability of the offender and in our case the Appellant having regard to the intentional risk taking by the Appellant and the consequential harm caused by his conduct on the material day. This was a fit sentence proportionate to the seriousness of the offence and the legislative scheme of disqualification of such a driver, now convict so as not to hold a driving licence for the next 3 years is mandatory and the logic of it is central and at the heart of just desert based proportionality for the offence of causing death by dangerous driving under Section 46 of the Traffic Act. 4. Curiously, my understanding of the doctrine of proportionality in sentencing serves a dual function. First, the principle promotes justice for victims and insures public confidence and secondly it ensures justice for the offender. Notwithstanding the ongoing debate as to the inherent differences as to what justice means to the victims and in equal measure to the public and the moral blameworthiness of the offender. Given this background and with finality the gravity of the offence and the degree of culpability renders this Court not to exercise discretion to review both the findings on conviction and the orders on the verdict which touch on sentence. As I consider it to be individualized and attended to individualized dimension of the Appellant. 5. For those reasons, the appeal stands dismissed for want of merit. 14 days right of appeal explained. Orders accordingly. **DATED AND DELIVERED THIS 20TH DAY OF JULY 2026.** **…………………………………….** **R. NYAKUNDI** **JUDGE**