https://new.kenyalaw.org/akn/ke/judgment/keca/2026/1151

Mumira v Murigu (Sued as the Clerk of the Nyandarua Presbytery of the Presbyterian Church of East Africa (PCEA) and on behalf of PCEA Nyandarua Presbytery) & 3 others (Civil Application E017 of 2026) [2026] KECA 1151 (KLR) (12 June 2026) (Ruling) Neutral citation: [2026] KECA 1151 (KLR) Republic of Kenya In the Court of Appeal at Nakuru Civil Application E017 of 2026 JM Mativo, PM Gachoka & MB Kairaria, JJA June 12, 2026 Between Rev Geoffrey Kenneth Mumira Applicant and Rev Sttephen Ndoria Murigu (Sued as the Clerk of the Nyandarua Presbytery of the Presbyterian Church of East Africa (PCEA) And On Behalf Of Pcea Nyandarua Presbytery) 1st Respondent Rev Gladys Wangui (Sued as the Moderator of Nyandarua Presbytery of the Presbyterian Church of Africa (PCEA) and on behalf of PCEA Nyandarua Presbytery) 2nd Respondent Rev Dr Robert Ngugi Waihenya (Sued as the Principal Clerk of the 20 General Assembly, Secretary of the Business Committee, and the Secretary-General of the Presbyterian Church of East Africa (PCEA) 3rd Respondent Rt Reverend Patrick Thegu Mutahi (Sued as the Moderator of the General Assembly, Chairman of the Business Committee, and Chairman of the Appointments Committee of the Presbyterian Church of East Africa (PCEA) 4th Respondent (Being an application from the ruling of the High Court of Kenya at Nyandarua (Kiarie, J.) dated 3rd February 2026 in HCC Pet. No. E003 of 2025) Ruling 1.Rev. Geoffrey Kenneth Mumira (the applicant) in his application dated 9th February 2026 is beseeching this Court to issue a conservatory order and/or an injunction staying/suspending and or restraining implementation of the ruling delivered on 3rd February 2026 in Nyandarua HCCHR PET No. E003 of 2025, Rev. Geoffrey Kenneth Mumira vs. Rev. Stephen Ndoria Murigi, Rev. Gladys Wangui Kamau and 2 Others pending the hearing and determination of the applicant’s intended appeal against the said decision. The applicant also prays for a conservatory order and/or injunction restraining the respondents or their servants, from inducting, installing, commissioning, deploying, or permitting Reverend Charles T. Gichimu (or any other replacement minister) to take up or continue to occupy the ministerial position at PCEA New Njabini Parish, and/or otherwise taking any step that would defeat the status quo and render the appeal nugatory. The applicant also prays for an order strictly preserving the status quo as directed by the High Court on 7th August 2025 pending the hearing and determination of his intended appeal. The applicant also prays for an order that his intended appeal be heard on a priority basis and the Record of Appeal be filed/served within such time as the Court may direct. Lastly, the applicant prays that the costs of this application do abide the outcome of the appeal. The application is brought under Rule 5 (2) (b) of the Court of Appeal Rules, 2022. 2.The key grounds in support of the application as we gather them from the application and the supporting affidavit can be summed up as follows: (a) his intended appeal is arguable; (b) his appeal raises bona fide points of law and constitutional interpretation deserving consideration by this Court. It is the applicants’ case that the substratum of the appeal concerns the lawful occupation and exercise of ministerial office at PCEA New Njabini Parish, which is presently under threat of irreversible alteration, therefore, the prejudice that may arise absent of stay cannot be compensated by way of damages. 3.The application is opposed vide the replying affidavit dated 20th February 2026 sworn by Rev. Stephen Ndoria Murigi, the 1st respondent on behalf of himself and his co- respondents. The salient averments are: (a) the application is untenable; (b) the applicant seeks a negative order, therefore, there is nothing to stay; (c) by the time the applicant filed his application before the trial court, the decisions sought to be stayed had been executed; (d) on 13th July 2025, the Nyandarua Presbytery Court passed a resolution deposing the applicant and the decision was formally communicated to him; (e) by the time the applicant approached the trial court the status quo had changed; (d) the applicant has introduced new matters in this application, namely, he is now seeking to prohibit Charles T. Gichimu from assuming his duties as the Minister of the New Njabini Parish, which was not canvassed before the trial court; (e) the applicant has not demonstrated he has an arguable appeal or that the appeal will be rendered nugatory; (f) the applicant has not demonstrated that the deployment is irreversible if his appeal succeeds; (g) the application has not been brought in good faith. 4.The applicant filed a further affidavit dated 24th February 2026 essentially disputing the contents of the respondent’s replying affidavit and inter alia urging that as at 7th August 2025 when the order preserving the status quo was issued, his replacement had not been done. 5.In support of the application, the applicant’s counsel filed written submissions dated 24th February 2026 which he adopted and highlighted briefly. Citing Stanley Kangthe Kinyanjui vs. Tony Keter & 5 Others [2013] KECA 378, and Cabinet Secretary, Ministry of Health vs. Aura & 13 Others, [2024] KECA 1195 (KLR) (20 September 2024) (Ruling) counsel submitted that the applicant has demonstrated that the intended appeal is not frivolous but it is arguable. 6.Regarding the question whether absent of stay, his appeal will be rendered nugatory, counsel cited Haki na Sheria Initiative vs. Inspector General of Police & 2 others; Kenya National Human Rights and Equality Commission (Interested Party) [2021] KESC 22 (KLR) in support of his assertion that absent of stay, in the event his appeal succeeds, it will be rendered nugatory. Counsel stated that this appeal concerns the applicant’s removal from pastoral office and subsequent deployment of a replacement minister to PCEA New Parish after the delivery of the impugned ruling, hence, damages cannot adequately compensate his loss in the event his appeal succeeds, therefore, it will be rendered worthless. In support of the foregoing, counsel cited Sigei vs. Jackson [2023] KECA 480 (KLR). 7.The respondent’s counsel maintained that the applicant’s intended appeal is not arguable, that the decision sought to be appealed against was dismissed, therefore, incapable of being stayed and that the applicant has not demonstrated that his appeal will be rendered nugatory. 8.A key ground urged by the respondent is that the order sought to be stayed has already been implemented. At paragraph 7 of the respondent’s replying affidavit, it is clearly averred that by the time the applicant filed his application dated 30th July 2025 before the trial court, the two decisions contained in the letters dated 29th April 2025 and 14th April 2025 had already been executed. It is also averred that the decision to depose the applicant was passed on 13th July 2025, and communicated to him, therefore, by the time the applicant approached the court, he had been removed from office. That was the prevailing status quo. It is also averred that in his application, the applicant never sought orders stopping the deployment of another minister to his previous parish, therefore, the status quo as per the High Court order did not affect the deployment of Rev. Charles Gichimu. 9.In support of his application, the applicant at paragraphs 10 and of his supporting affidavit averred that: 10.“That on 7th August 2025, upon hearing my application, the High Court issued interim orders directing that the status quo prevailing at the time be maintained pending the hearing and determination of my Notice of Motion.… 12.That the said status quo orders were subsequently extended by the High Court on several occasions as follows: (a) extended to 13th October 2025; (b) further extended to 6th November 2025; (c) further extended to 15th December 2025; (d) lastly extended to 3rd February 2026, being the date scheduled for delivery of the impugned ruling. 10.We have read the orders issued on 7th August 2025. Paragraph (d) of the order reads “status quo to obtain till then.” As stated earlier, the respondent’s position is that as at the time this order was issued, the impugned decision had been implemented. In the replying affidavit there are documents attesting to these changes. Even if we were to entertain any doubt and believe the applicant’s version, the above order does not define the status quo as at 7th August 2025. A court order must be clear, unambiguous, and capable of practical enforcement on its face, meaning a generic directive to "maintain the status quo" without defining the exact parameters of that status quo is legally defective and unenforceable. Court orders are strictly required to be clear and unambiguous. The operative terms of an order must speak for themselves. A party, or a subsequent court, should not have to sift through volumes of affidavits or oral arguments just to deduce what the court intended to preserve. 11.The court’s intention must be ascertained primarily from the specific restrictive language used in the order itself. If an order merely reads "the status quo is to be maintained," it invites conflicting subjective interpretations. One party may view the status quo as the state of affairs before a dispute, while the other views it as the state of affairs on the day they went to court. The order must explicitly declare the specific date or state of facts being locked in time. When issuing an interim interdict, which is defined as an order “preserving or restoring the status quo pending the final determination of the rights of the parties,” the recording judge must detail the precise boundaries of that status quo to ensure clarity and avoid future disputes. 12.Other than the ambiguity in the orders, it is nevertheless clear that by the time the status quo order was granted, the impugned decisions had been implemented. Similarly, by the time the ruling sought to be stayed was issued on 3rd February 2026, the impugned decisions sought to be stayed had long been implemented. While there is no doubt that this Court can stay a contemplated execution before it starts, we must clarify that the purpose of stay under Rule 5 (2)(b) is to prevent an appeal from becoming infructuous. Therefore, it is logical to say that if what is sought to be stayed has already taken place, the stay itself is what becomes infructuous. This Court has consistently held that it cannot grant a stay of execution under Rule 5 (2)(b) for an action that has already been completed. This is because a "stay" is intended to suspend an ongoing or future process to preserve the subject matter of an appeal; it is not a tool to reverse or undo a fait accompli. (See Civil Application No. E134 of 2025, Andrew Mudibo vs. Independent Boundaries and Electoral Commission & others, (Ruling delivered on 15th May 2025). 13.This Court in David Nkanata Magiri vs. Bernard Benedict Mungania & 4 Others [2012] eKLR unequivocally stated that an application for a stay of execution cannot be granted where execution had already taken place by the time the application was made. Similarly, in Kamindi Self Fridges Supermarkets Limited vs. Kiambu Murutani Company Limited (Civil Application E360 of 2022) [2024] KECA 10 (KLR) (25 January 2024) (Ruling), this Court declined to grant an order of stay maintaining that what the applicant was seeking was to "reverse or undo what had already taken place." It asserted that Rule 5 (2)(b) does not contemplate such a situation, because the jurisdiction is meant to preserve the status quo, not restore it after it has been changed. Also, in United Insurance Co Ltd vs. Mercedes Sanchez Ru Tussel [2012] eKLR, the Court declined to grant a stay after it was established that where the decretal amount had already been paid, the application for stay was "overtaken by events," therefore, there was no longer anything to stay. 14.A reading of decided cases leaves no doubt that the primary purpose of Rule 5 (2)(b) is to prevent an appeal from being rendered nugatory (meaningless) by preserving the status quo. In this case, what is sought to be stayed took place long before the impugned ruling was delivered on 3rd February 2026. There is nothing to stay. A stay under this rule is purely preventive. On this ground alone, this application collapses. 15.Having arrived at the above finding, it would be superfluous to address the question whether the applicant’s appeal is arguable and whether in the event his appeal succeeds, absent of stay, the appeal will be rendered nugatory. Accordingly, we dismiss the application dated 9th February 2026, with costs to the respondents. DATED AND DELIVERED AT NAKURU THIS 12TH DAY OF JUNE 2026.J. MATIVO................................... JUDGE OF APPEALM. GACHOKA C.Arb, FCIArb................................... JUDGE OF APPEALMURUNGI B. KAIRARIA................................... JUDGE OF APPEALI certify that this is a true copy of the original.Signed.DEPUTY REGISTRAR.