https://new.kenyalaw.org/akn/ke/judgment/keca/2026/1473

Rimoi & 2 others v Republic (Criminal Appeal 21 of 2020) [2026] KECA 1473 (KLR) (24 July 2026) (Judgment) Neutral citation: [2026] KECA 1473 (KLR) Republic of Kenya In the Court of Appeal at Eldoret Criminal Appeal 21 of 2020 JM Mativo, MB Kairaria & AI Hassan, JJA July 24, 2026 Between Richard Rionongura Rimoi 1st Appellant Benson Losianyang Muketiang 2nd Appellant Wilson Parmola Lemreng alias Chemogh 3rd Appellant and Republic Respondent (Being an appeal from the judgment of the High Court of Kenya at Kapenguria (R. N. Sitati, J.) dated 25th September 2019 in Criminal Case No. 5 of 2018) Judgment 1.Richard Rionongura Rimoi, Benson Losianyang Muketiang and Wilson Parmola Lemreng alias Chemogh (the appellants) were jointly charged with the offence of murder contrary to Section 203 as read with Section 204 of the Penal Code at the High Court of Kenya at Kapenguria in HCCR Case No. 5 of 2018. It was alleged that on 28th December 2017 at Chepkukui Village in Ptokou Sub-Location within Pokot Central Sub-county of West Pokot County, jointly with others not before the Court, they murdered Ringetiang Tomeluk. They denied the charges and a trial ensued. At the conclusion of the trial, they were found to be culpable and each sentenced to serve 25 years imprisonment. 2.The appellants have appealed to this Court seeking to overturn both the conviction and sentence. The mandate of this Court in a first appeal is clearly stipulated under Section 379 (1) of the Criminal Procedure Code. In a nutshell, we are legally bound to conduct a complete, independent and critical rehearing of the entire case and arrive at our own independent conclusions. In doing so, we must remain alive to the fact that we did not have the opportunity to hear and observe the witnesses as they testified in order to observe their demeanour. Therefore, we must give room to that fact. (See Dickson Mwangi Munene & Ano. vs. Republic [2014] eKLR). Accordingly, we must strike a precise balance between acknowledging the trial court's unique advantages and fulfilling our own constitutional duty to independently evaluate the record and arrive at our own conclusions. In line with our above stated mandate, we will re- examine the evidence tendered before the trial court. 3.The prosecution case stood on the testimony of 7 witnesses. Dr. Jotham Mukhola, the Medical Superintended at Kapenguria County Hospital, performed the autopsy on 3rd January 2018. He testified that the body had suffered 60% burns, it had a depressed fracture of the frontal bone measuring about 3cm in diameter, and on the lower mandible, there were multiple bruises on both lower and upper limbs and on other parts of the body. On opening chest, he noted carbon deposits in the lungs due to inhalation of smoke. Also, he noted 3rd degree burns on the nostrils, a ruptured spleen with blood in abdomen cavity and inside the head, there was epidural hematoma over the frontal and parietal lobes. 4.In his opinion, the cause of death was acute abdominal and intracranial hemorrhage over the frontal and parietal lobes. He produced the deceased’s death certificate number 0751086 filled by himself and the postmortem report. On cross-examination, he maintained that the cause of death was due to severe bleeding in the abdomen and in the head, and the burns also contributed to the death. In his view, the internal bleeding was caused by a raptured spleen. 5.PW2, Elizabeth Chesang Pelanya stated that on 28th December 2017, at about 5.00pm, at Runo village, she was present at a gathering which was hearing a case involving allegations of witchcraft leveled against one Muketiang. According to her, the appellants were among the 8 people who assaulted the deceased. She stated that the 1st appellant tied the deceased's hands with the help of the 2nd appellant, and, the 3rd appellant lit the match stick that set the deceased ablaze. PW2 said she knew all the appellants, and that, it was the 2nd appellant who convened the meeting. Answering questions during cross examination, she stated that the police tried to intervene but the appellants together with others pelted the police with stones. 6.PW3, Samson Klatau Ringetiang testified that he was also at the meeting. He said the meeting was convened by Losianyang Muketiang (the 3rd appellant) for the purpose of hearing a case involving witchcraft allegations against Muketiang. PW3 stated that after Muketiang was thoroughly beaten, he mentioned the deceased as one of the villagers who also practiced witchcraft. The deceased was then fetched from his house and brought to the venue where he was ruthlessly beaten alongside Muketiang. PW3 hid himself at a vantage point from where he could observe the beating. The deceased and Muketiang were put together and had their hands tied by the 1st and 3rd appellants and the 2nd appellant lit the match stick and set the two men ablaze after petrol had been sprinkled on them. He stated that the police tried to intervene, but they were pelted with stones by the crowd. PW3 identified all the appellants who were known to him. PW4, Kibet Abraham, a grandson to the deceased attended the postmortem and identified the body to the pathologist. 7.PW5, Festus Eyer Domokamar, aged 17 years, a grandson to the deceased, recalled that on 28th December 2017, he was at a baraza which had been called to help sort out a case between Losianyang, Rionongura and Chemogh on the one hand and their father on the other hand. The allegations were that the deceased was a witch, and, that after Muketiang was brought to the baraza, Rionongura and Chemogh got hold of the deceased and tied his hands. He stated that at about 7.00pm, the police arrived at the scene, but they were pelted with stones, and after the police retreated, the deceased and his colleague were set ablaze. He identified all the appellants and stated that the 1st and the 3rd appellants are the ones who tied the hands of the two victims while the 2nd appellant is the one who lit the match stick and set them ablaze. Lastly, he stated that some of the people who participated in the attack were still at large. 8.PW6, PC Serbian Odongo from DCI Pokot Central testified that on 28th December 2017, on arrival at the scene, they found many people attacking the deceased, but on seeing them, they became rowdy and started pelting them with stones forcing them to retreat and return to the police post. The Investigating Officer (PW7), testified that at the scene, they found bodies, which had been burnt beyond recognition. Postmortem was conducted on only one body whose face was partially burnt and the body was identifiable. He only arrested the appellants because the rest of the suspects went into hiding. 9.Upon being put on their defence, each of the appellants gave a sworn defence. The 1st appellant stated that on 24th December 2017, he had gone to bring a herd of 35 cows from Wakori in Ortum areas which were to be transported in a lorry to Nairobi. He stated that they arrived in Nairobi at 5.00pm on 25th December 2017 and they stayed in Nairobi until 28th December 2017 when they left Nairobi at around 9.00am and arrived at Makutano at about 10.00pm on that same day where they spent the night and the next day he boarded a Probox and arrived at Sigor at around 11.00am where he boarded a motor cycle to his home where he was informed that Ringetiang and Muketaing were burnt on Thursday night. He went to the scene on same day on Friday at around 12.00pm, where he saw footprints and ashes. He stated that he was arrested at Sigor Market in August 2018 long after the incident. Answering questions on cross- examination, he stated that he could not recall the number of the lorry he used to transport the cattle to Nairobi or the name of the driver, nor did he have receipts for the transport he used. 10.The 2nd appellant stated that he is a cattle trader and that on 25th December 2017, he was at home and he did not hear anything about witchcraft. Further, on 28th December 2017, he was at home until about 5.00pm with his children and his wife. He then went to Lodagari, a distance of nearly 40km away, and, at the home of one Lorenge, he looked after cattle until Saturday and returned home on Saturday at 8.00am. He walked the entire distance and arrived home at 8.00pm. Later he was informed that his father Murietang had been burnt on allegations that he was a witch. He said he was arrested on 2nd August 2018. 11.The 3rd respondent stated that on 28th December 2017, he was at home in Ptokou area looking after his children since his wife had gone to their home. At about 9.30pm, he heard over the radio that some witches had been burnt at Chepkukui. He said he was arrested on 12th August 2018. 12.The 1st appellant called DW4, Lomelo Kangura as his witness.His evidence was that on 28th December 2017, the 1st appellant told him that he was taking cattle to Nairobi on 24th December 2018, though he was not sure of the dates. He said on 24th December 2017 together with the 1st appellant they took cattle to Nairobi using a lorry, and they arrived in Nairobi on Monday evening. They sold the cattle from Tuesday morning to Wednesday evening, and, on Thursday, they left Nairobi and arrived at Makutano in the night where they slept. On Friday morning, they booked a Probox to Sigor where he parted with the appellant, though he could not recall the date they parted. He said he knew nothing about the murder. 13.The 2nd appellant called DW5 Lorengoi Nguriakomol as his witness. He testified that a cattle trader whose name he did not know came to buy cattle from his place in Sigor but he could not recall the date, month or year, but it was on a market day. He said the cattle trader bought 2 cows and hired him to look after them. He stated that the said cattle trader is the 2nd appellant. However, he knew nothing about the charges against the 2nd appellant. 14.In the impugned judgment dated 25th September 2019, the learned judge was satisfied that the prosecution had proved the charge of murder against each of the three appellants beyond reasonable doubt and convicted each one of them. On 20th November 2019, after considering each of the appellants’ mitigation and pre-sentence report, the learned judge sentenced each of the appellants to serve 25 years in prison. 15.The appellants are now before this Court challenging both the conviction and sentence basically faulting the learned judge for:a.failing to find that the identification evidence was insufficient to sustain a conviction; (b) failing to find that the actual culprits who committed the offence escaped arrest; (c) convicting the appellants on contradictory evidence; (d) failing to find that the murder was as a result of mob justice; (e) failing to consider the outcome of public inquest; (f) failing to consider the 1st and 3rd respondents’ alibi; and, (g) failing to find that the charge sheet was faulty since it contained only one count yet there were 2 deceased persons. 16.In support of the appeal, the appellant’s counsel relied on his written submissions dated 17th March 2025. Addressing the question whether it is the appellants who caused the deceased’s death, counsel maintained that it was caused by a mob, therefore, the prosecution was obligated to pin point the appellants as the ones who caused the death. In support of this assertion, counsel referred to the evidence of PW2 who stated that 5 people ran away but he did not mention the appellants’ names. Counsel maintained that PW5’s evidence on identification was unreliable considering that the offence was committed at night. He faulted the learned Judge for failing to find that the actual culprits were not arrested since the people who committed the offence and fled were named. Counsel described the prosecution evidence as contradictory. In support of this assertion, counsel referred to PW2’s testimony who stated that “people were assaulting Muketiang and asking him to remove his witchcraft. Jackson, Kakatiang and Ritengura are the ones who were assaulting him.” According to counsel, these are two different versions, therefore, it is not clear who was assaulting the deceased. Counsel referred to PW2’s evidence and submitted that it is not clear who called the meeting or who spoke at the meeting. Counsel also stated that there was a contradiction in the witness’s evidence regarding who between the 1st appellant and the 3rd appellant lit the match stick. Also, counsel cited the testimony of PW5 who stated that the incident took place at Runo and the same witness stated that it was at the road near the river. 17.Counsel submitted that the trial court failed to consider the outcome of a public inquest, in particular the evidence of the investigating officer who stated that during the inquest the appellants were at their homes while 5 others fled soon after the incident. Lastly, counsel maintained that the trial court failed to consider the appellants alibi and that failing to find that the charge sheet was faulty because it contained only one count yet two people died. 18.The respondent’s counsel filed written submissions dated 5th May 2025 mainly contending that the appellants were properly identified. The respondent’s counsel referred to the evidence of PW2, PW3 and PW5 who stated that the appellants were all neighbours and they were well known to them. Addressing the appellant’s assertion that the prosecution evidence was contradictory, the respondent maintained that the prosecution evidence was compelling and sufficiently corroborated. The respondent also maintained that the offence of murder was proved to the required standard. 19.The germane question in this appeal is whether the offence of murder was proved to the required standard. Section 203 of the Penal Code defines the offence of murder as follows: “Any person who of malice aforethought causes death of another person by an unlawful act or omission is guilty of murder.” A reading of this section shows that to succeed in a murder case, the prosecution must prove the following ingredients: (a) the death of the deceased; (b) that the death was caused by an unlawful act or omission on the part of the accused; (c) that in causing the death of the deceased, the accused had malice aforethought. (See this Court’s decision in Titus Ngamau Musila Katitu vs. Republic [2020] eKLR). It is common ground that the death is not disputed, therefore, the first pre-requisite is not in issue. We will focus on the remaining ingredients. 20.First, we will address the question whether malice aforethought was proved to the required standard. Malice aforethought is a critical element of the crime that distinguishes the offence of murder from other types of homicide cases, such as manslaughter. Malice aforethought refers to an intentionally harmful act that typically leads to someone's death. As was held by this Court in Odio vs. Republic (Criminal Appeal 228 of 2019) [2024] KECA 1544 (KLR)), malice aforethought shows the following:(a)the killer's state of mind at the time of the murder;b.the killer thought about the murder before committing it; and,b.the killer took specific steps to facilitate the murder. 21.This Court in Odio vs. Republic (supra) stated that malice aforethought may be express or implied. Express malice aforethought refers to when a deliberate intention is manifested to take away the life of a person unlawfully. Implied malice aforethought applies when no considerable provocation appears or when the circumstances attending the killing show a reckless and wicked heart. To be convicted of murder, malice aforethought must be proved. Malice aforethought cannot be imputed to an accused person based solely on their participation in a crime. If it is shown that the killing resulted from an intentional act with express or implied malice aforethought, no other mental state need be shown to establish malice aforethought. 22.This Court in Nzuki vs. Republic [1993] eKLR defined malice aforethought as:“…a term of art and is either an express intention to kill, as could be inferred when a person threatens another and proceeds to produce a lethal weapon and uses it on his victim; or implied, where, by a voluntary act, a person intended to cause grievous bodily harm to his victim and the victim died as the result. See the case of Regina v Vickers, [1957] 2 QB 664 at page 670. An intention connotes a state of affairs which the person intending does more than merely contemplate: it connotes a state of affairs which, on the contrary, he decides, so far as in him lies, to bring about, and which, in point of possibility, he has a reasonable prospect of being able to bring about, by his own act of volition. See the case of Conliffe v Goodman, [1950] 2 KB 237.” 23.The threshold for determining malice aforethought is provided in Section 206 of the Penal Code, which provides:“206.Malice aforethought Malice aforethought shall be deemed to be established by evidence proving any one or more of the following circumstances—a.an intention to cause the death of or to do grievous harm to any person, whether that person is the person actually killed or not;b.knowledge that the act or omission causing death will probably cause the death of or grievous harm to some person, whether that person is the person actually killed or not, although such knowledge is accompanied by indifference whether death or grievous bodily harm is caused or not, or by a wish that it may not be caused;c.an intent to commit a felony;d.an intention by the act or omission to facilitate the flight or escape from custody of any person who has committed or attempted to commit a felony.” 24.In Nzuki vs. Republic (supra), this Court stated:“Before an act can be murder, it must be aimed at someone and in addition it must be an act committed with one of the following intentions, the test of which is always subjective to the actual accused:i.The intention to cause death;ii.The intention to cause grievous bodily harm;iii.Where the accused knows that there is a serious risk that death or grievous bodily harm will ensue from these acts, and commits those acts deliberately and without lawful excuse the intention to expose a potential victim to that risk as the result of those acts.It does not matter in such circumstances whether the accused desires those consequences to ensue or not and in none of these cases does it matter that the act and the intention were aimed at a potential victim other than the one who succumbed.Without an intention of one of these three types, the mere fact that the accused’s conduct is done in the knowledge that grievous harm is likely or highly likely to ensue from his conduct is not by itself enough to convert a homicide into the crime of murder. See the case of Hyam v Director of Public Prosecutions, [1975] AC 55.” 25.This Court in Odio vs. Republic (supra) was emphatic that because a court cannot directly read an accused person's mind, courts routinely rule that malice aforethought (or criminal intent) can be conclusively inferred from the objective medical evidence, specifically the nature, location, severity and multiplicity of the injuries inflicted on the deceased. In Rex vs. Tubere s/o Ochen [1945] 12 EACA the East African Court of Appeal in this landmark decision explicitly laid down a four-factor checklist for courts to deduce malice aforethought from a deceased’s body: (a) the nature of the injuries: violent, devastating, or deep wounds speak directly to the assailant’s frame of mind; (b) the part of the body targeted: intentionally striking highly vulnerable, vital organs (such as the brain, neck, or heart) demonstrates a clear expectation of a fatal outcome; (c) the weapon used: deploying an inherently lethal instrument (e.g., a firearm, heavy machete, or iron bar) to cause those injuries signals malicious intent; (d) the manner of infliction: repeated, persistent actions, as opposed to a single, accidental blow, indicate a determined will to kill. This Court in Musimbi vs. Republic [2023] KECA 287 was categorical that death by ligature strangulation or manual asphyxiation serves as absolute proof of malice aforethought. Strangulation requires sustained, continuous physical pressure over minutes, showcasing a pure intention to end the deceased's life. 26.As decided cases suggest, malice aforethought can be inferred from the peculiar circumstances of the case. This Court in Odio vs. Republic (supra) stated that when a court is asked to infer malice aforethought in cases of this nature, the court weighs the findings using a two-step judicial inquiry: (a) the Objective Inquiry (Post-Mortem): The court analyzes the pathologist's report to isolate the exact cause of death, the force required to break bone or sever tissue and the number of distinct impact sites. (b) The Subjective Inference: The court asks: could a person inflict these precise injuries without realizing that death would be the natural and probable consequence? If the answer is no, malice aforethought is legally established. (See the High Court decision in Republic vs. Koskei alias Nicholas Korir [2025] KEHC 2686 (KLR)). 27.Earlier in this judgment, we highlighted the evidence tendered by the pathologist. It will suffice for us to state that the beatings inflicted on the deceased were not only severe but incessant lasting several hours. The injuries as disclosed by the pathologist which include 60% burns, a depressed fracture of the frontal bone measuring about 3cm in diameter, injuries on the lower mandible, multiple bruises on both lower and upper limbs and on other parts of the body, setting the deceased on fire while he was still alive, a ruptured spleen and severe head injuries attest to not only the brutality unleashed upon the deceased, but also a conscious intention to kill. Accordingly, we find that malice aforethought and an intention to kill was clearly established in this case. 28.The next question is whether it was established beyond reasonable doubt that the appellants caused the deceased’s death. PW2, PW3 and PW5 testified that they all hailed from the same locality with the appellants and they knew each of the appellants. Therefore, this was evidence of recognition. This Court has consistently held that evidence of recognition (that is, where a witness identifies an assailant previously known to them) is more reliable, satisfactory and reassuring than the identification of a stranger. As Madan, JA (as he then was) plainly put it in Anjononi and Others vs. Republic [1976-80] 1 KLR 1566 at page 1568:“…This, however, was a case of recognition, not identification, of the assailants; recognition of an assailant is more satisfactory, more assuring, and more reliable than identification of a stranger because it depends upon the personal knowledge of the assailant in some form or other.” 29.However, the Court balances this rule by maintaining that recognition is not infallible and the prosecution must still prove that the surrounding conditions (like lighting and time) allowed for mistake-free recognition. The appellants did not dispute the fact that PW2, PW3 and PW5 knew them and that they all hailed from the same neighborhood. There is uncontroverted evidence that the deceased person was frog matched to the place where the meeting took place during day time. The evidence that grilling and brutal beatings started during day time and continued until darkness started setting stood uncontroverted. The three witnesses not only gave an eye witness account of what they personally saw, but they even witnessed the police being repulsed with stones, a fact which was corroborated by the police. These were eye witnesses. Undeniably, direct eyewitness evidence serves as a foundational pillar in the prosecution of criminal cases. Unlike circumstantial evidence, which requires the court to draw a chain of logical inferences, a credible eyewitness account provides direct, first-hand proof of the identity of the offender and the commission of the crime. 30.PW2, PW3 and PW5 gave a clear eye witness account of how the deceased was brutally beaten, his hands were tied by the 1st and 3rd appellants and the 2nd appellant lit the match stick setting the bodies which had been dozed with petrol a blaze. The three witnesses were clear that they watched the events as they unfolded up to the time the deceased were burnt. When multiple eyewitness testimonies align and corroborate each other smoothly, the Court views it as overwhelmingly persuasive. We have no reason to doubt the vivid account tendered by these three eye witnesses who gave a first-hand account of what they saw with their own eyes. 31.The appellants’ counsel argued that the prosecution evidence was marred by contradictions and picked specific parts of the testimony of PW2, PW3 and PW5 as highlighted earlier. However, contradictions in evidence of a witness that would be fatal must relate to material facts and must be substantial. It is not every trifling inconsistency in the evidence of the prosecution witness that is fatal to its case. It is only when such inconsistencies or contradictions are substantial and fundamental to the main issues in question before the Court and therefore necessarily create some doubt in the mind of the trial court that an accused is entitled to benefit there from. (See Erick Onyango Odeng' vs. Republic [2014] eKLR). Nevertheless, we have carefully considered the excerpts cited by the appellants’ counsel in support of his assertion that the prosecution evidence was contradictory. The cited parts are in our view not contradictory at all. Conversely, counsel is trying to isolate some sentences from the context within which the witnesses were speaking. A holist reading of the evidence reveals consistency. In conclusion, we are satisfied that the appellants’ conviction was safe. 32.The appellants’ counsel faults the trial court for failing to find that the charge sheet was defective because two people were killed and the charge sheet only mentioned one. Our understanding of a defective charge sheet is a formal written accusation that contains fatal errors, omissions or irregularities, failing to comply with the strict statutory requirements for charging an accused person. (See Peter Ngure Mwangi vs. Republic [2014] KECA 405 (KLR)). The argument that the charge sheet was defective is far-fetched. The charge sheet clearly discloses an offence in respect of the death of the deceased person named therein. Each death constituted an independent count. Therefore, even if the charge sheet was in respect of the two deceased persons, there would have been two distinct counts. Each count requires evidence to prove. Survival of one count does not depend on the survival of the other count.Therefore, the fact that the prosecution did not prefer charges in respect of the other deceased persons does not affect the charge sheet against the appellants. Therefore, this ground of appeal collapses. 33.The appellants’ counsel argued that the trial court failed to appreciate that the real culprits escaped arrest. Granted, 5 of the suspects went into hiding after the incident. But the three before us were arrested. The charge sheet reads “jointly with others not before the Court.” The prosecution evidence clearly demonstrated that 5 of the suspects escaped arrest. The failure to charge the 5 persons together with the appellants did not in any manner prejudice the prosecution case. 34.The other ground urged by the appellants is that their alibi was not considered. Granted, a trial court has a duty to weigh the evidence adduced in court by all the parties in totality and make a finding on the culpability or otherwise of the accused. This is the basic calling of every court without exception. However, by requiring the trial court to consider and weigh the appellants’ alibi does not mean that the judgment of the trial court must include a complete embodiment of the appellants’ alibi, as if it comprises a transcript of the proceedings. In other words, in order to determine the merit of the appellants’ contention, this Court must consider the lower court’s record and juxtapose it against the judgment, and finally determine whether there is any basis for interfering with the judgment. 35.We have read the impugned judgment. At paragraph 42 of the judgment the learned judge stated:“42.I have considered the alibi defence by the accused persons and find the same wanting. First of all, there was no indication during cross-examination of the prosecution witnesses that any of the accused persons was elsewhere during the material time. Secondly, the stories given by the accused persons did not punch any holes in the prosecution case against them. In any event, the alibi defence was not raised at such a time as would give the prosecution the opportunity to challenge the same. I accordingly dismiss those defences.” 36.The above paragraph dislodges the appellants’ counsel’s submission that the appellants’ alibi was not considered. What must be borne in mind, is that the conclusion which is reached (whether it be to convict or to acquit) must account for all the evidence. Some of the evidence might be found to be false, some of it might be found to be unreliable, and some of it might be found to be only possibly false or unreliable, but none of it may simply be ignored. The best indication that a court has applied its mind in the proper manner is to be found in its reasons for judgment including its reasons for the acceptance and the rejection of the respective witnesses. The learned judge weighed the appellants’ alibi against the prosecution evidence and found it to be wanting. We find no reason to fault the conclusion arrived at by the learned judge in the above cited excerpt because we are not persuaded that the appellants’ alibi rebutted the evidence adduced by the prosecution. It follows that the appellants’ ground that their alibi defences were no considered by the trial judge fails. 37.Lastly, the appellants’ counsel argued that the trial court failed to consider the outcome of a public inquest, in particular the evidence of the investigating officer who stated that during the inquest the appellants were at their homes while 5 others fled soon after the incident. This argument is fundamentally flawed.In the criminal justice systems, the fundamental purpose of an inquest is fact-finding, not fault-finding. It is a judicial inquiry conducted by a magistrate to investigate the circumstances surrounding a sudden, violent, suspicious or unexplained death. An inquest is not a criminal trial. There are no accused persons, no charges are read and the court does not have the power to convict or punish anyone. Instead, it serves as a preliminary truth-seeking mechanism to determine whether a crime was committed. In any event, it is a fact that 5 of the suspects escaped after the violent killing of the deceased, thus, evading police arrest, while, the appellants remained in their homes where they were arrested. We fail to see how this could have assisted the appellants before the trial court or in this appeal. 38.While passing sentence, the learned judge stated that she considered the nature of the offence and the pre-sentencing report and the appellants’ mitigation and sentenced each appellant to serve 25 years in prison. This, in our view is a very lenient sentence bearing in mind that a life was lost and in a very brutal manner. We find no reason to interfere with this sentence.The upshot of the foregoing is that the appellants’ appeal against both conviction and sentence fails and is hereby dismissed. DATED AND DELIVERED AT ELDORET THIS 24TH DAY OF JULY, 2026.J. MATIVO..................................JUDGE OF APPEALMURUNGI B. KAIRARIA...................................JUDGE OF APPEALAHMED ISSACK...................................JUDGE OF APPEALI certify that this is a true copy of the original.Signed.Deputy Registrar