Ritzen v Kinyanjui & 3 others (Environment and Land Case E125 of 2025) [2026] KEELC 5262 (KLR) (27 July 2026) (Ruling)

**REPUBLIC OF KENYA** **ENVIRONMENT AND LAND COURT** **AT KWALE** **ELCLC CASE NO. E125 OF 2025** **LEONARDUS MARTINUS JOZEF MARIA RITZEN .…… PLAINTIFF** * **VERSUS -** **MARY WAMBOI KINYANJUI ……...... DEFENDANT/RESPONDENT** **THE LAND REGISTRY KWALE ……..……. 1ST INTERESTED PARTY** **DAMIANA NTHAMBI DISSING ……..……. 2ND INTERESTED PARTY** **SEVEND DISSING …………..………………. 3RD INTERESTED PARTY** **RULING** 1. **Introduction** 2. The Ruling before this Court is rather interesting – where both the Applicant and the 1st Respondent, who were at some point intimate partners - were now vigorously seeking for restraining orders in order to preserve the same property. 3. Hence, before the Honourable Court for its determination are two Notices of Motion applications. One is dated 24th November, 2025 filed by *Leonardus Martinus Jozef Maria Ritzen* the Plaintiff herein. It sought injunctive and access orders in respect of Kwale/Diani Beach Block/1711, 1002, and 1003. The said application was supported by the affidavit of *Leonardus Martinus Jozef Maria Ritzen,* the Plaintiff. 4. The second one is dated 21st February, 2026 filed by *Mary Wamboi Kinyanjui,* the Defendant hereinwhich sought for injunctive orders restraining the Plaintiff from dealing with Kwale/Diani Beach Block/1711, directing that rent be deposited into court, and restraining the Plaintiff from interfering with the Defendant's occupation and management of the suit property. 5. Upon service of the Notice of Motion Application, dated 24th November, 2025 the Defendant filed a Replying Affidavit sworn by *Mary Wamboi Kinyanjui* on 11th December, 2025 opposing the application and a Further Replying Affidavit sworn still by May Wamboi Kinyanjui dated 10th March, 2026. The Plaintiff responded with a Further Affidavit in response to the Defendant’s Further Replying Affidavit dated 10th March 2026. 6. **The Notice of Motion dated 24th November, 2025 by the Plaintiff** 7. The first application is dated 24th November, 2025 was brought pursuant to the provision of Order 40 Rules 1, 2 and 4 of the Civil Procedure Rules, 2010, Sections 33, 71, 76 and 80 of the Land Registration Act, No. 3 of 2020 and all other enabling provisions of the law. 8. Through the said application, the Plaintiff principally sought for the following orders:- 9. ***That pending hearing and determination of this suit, a temporary injunction do issue in the same terms.*** 10. ***That pending the hearing and determination of this application and/or the suit, this Honourable Court be pleased to order that the Plaintiff, together with his employees, agents, contractors, or caretakers, be granted immediate access to the properties known as Kwale/Diani Beach Block/1711, 1002, and 1003 for purposes of inspection, making necessary repairs, maintenance, management and preservation of the said properties.*** 11. ***That pending the hearing of this application and/or the suit, the Plaintiff be granted unrestricted access to and use of the residential house being Villa/House B situated on Kwale/Diani Beach Block/1003, his machines stored there in and motor vehicle registration number KBE 444L Toyota Prado parked therein whenever he is in Kenya.*** 12. ***That the Defendant be restrained from denying, obstructing, threatening, intimidating, or otherwise interfering with the Plaintiff, his contractors, caretakers, employees or agents in the exercise of the above access rights.*** 13. ***That the Land Registrar – Kwale be directed to enter restrictions on all three parcels pending determination of the suit.*** 14. ***That the Land Registrar be directed to produce certified copies of the white card for Kwale/Diani Beach Block/1711, 1002, and 1003 for use at trial.*** 15. ***That Costs of this application be in the cause.*** 16. The application was premised on the grounds, facts and testimony on the face of the application and further supported by the 24 Paragraphed Supporting affidavit of LEONARDUS MARTINUS JOZEF MARIA RITZEN the Plaintiff herein, where he averred as follows that:- 17. He was the Plaintiff/Applicant herein. 18. The Defendant/Respondent was his girlfriend and partner at the time of the official search, purchase and execution of the sale agreements but made no financial contribution to its acquisition. 19. He negotiated and entered in a separate written agreement for the purchase price of the suit properties with the 2nd and 3rd Interested Parties during a meeting in Denmark around March, 2025 and paid a down payment of 20,000/= Euros. 20. He wired the balance of the purchase price along with monies for other purchaser items on or around 3rd April, 2025 to the Defendant and told her to hold onto the funds until when he came to Kenya to see the suit properties and parties have signed the sale agreement. 21. The Defendant entered into a Sale Agreement with the 2nd and 3rd Interested Parties on 14th April, 2025 for the sale of Kwale/Diani Beach Block/1711 and1003 for a sum of Kenya Shillings Nineteen Thousand (Kshs.19,000,000/=) in her capacity as a representative purchaser. 22. He authorized the transfer of leasehold interest for the parcel of land under title number Kwale/Diani Beach Block/1711 in her name temporarily for convenience and Certificate of Lease issued on 23rd April, 2025 but they later on had a fall out on or about June, 2025 and they were no longer in a romantic relationship. 23. From April, 2025 to date, he financed the full purchase of Kwale/Diani Beach Block/1711 and partially financed the purchase of Kwale/Diani Beach Block/1002 and Kwale/Diani Beach Block/1003. 24. He retained all supporting documentation including sale agreements, payments, bank transfers, certificate of lease, official searches and correspondence.(Annexed and marked as “LMJMR – 1” were the said documents) 25. The Defendant with his knowledge entered into a loan agreement with 2nd Interested Party for a sum of Kenya Shillings Twenty One Million Nine Hundred Thousand (Kshs.21,900,000/=) in connection with the Sale of Kwale/Diani Beach Block 1002 and 1003 on 25th April, 2025. (Annexed and marked as “LMJMR – 2” was a copy of the Loan Agreement dated 25th April, 2025) 26. Kwale/Beach Block/1711 was registered with his authority in the Defendant’s name while Kwale/Beach Block/1003 was registered in the Defendant’s name with out his authority. (Annexed and marked as “LMJMR – 3” were copies of the Land Registry search and Certificates of Lease). 27. Around August, 2025 in a bid to protect his financial and proprietary interests in the suit properties, he approached the 2nd and 3rd Interested Parties and informed them of his intention to proceed with the purchase of the suit properties under title number Kwale/Diani Beach Block/1002 and 1003 and have the properties registered in his name. 28. The reason why the suit property under Kwale/Diani Beach Block/1003 featured again as a sale property was because the purchase price in the Sale Agreement between the Defendant and the 2nd and 3rd Interested Parties was for the 42-bedroom Apartments and one 1 -bedroom Penthouse erected on it and not the villa or main house - House B located therein. 29. The second Sale Agreement was between the himself and the 2nd and 3rd Interested Parties dated 1st August, 2025 was for House A and B located on the suit properties under title numbers Kwale/Diani Beach Block/1002 and 1003 respectively for a total cost of a sum of Kenya Shillings Twenty Million Nie Hundred Thousand (Kshs.20, 900,000/=). 30. The 2nd and 3rd Interested Parties and himself entered into a sale agreement for Kwale/Diani Beach Block/1002 and 1003 with the former executing the agreement on 1st August, 2025 and the later executing on 21st October, 2025. 31. The parcels Numbers Kwale/Beach Block/1002 remained registered in the names of the 2nd and 3rd interested parties as payment for the it was ongoing. (Annexed and marked as “LMJMR – 4” was a copy of the Sale Agreement for Kwale/Diani Beach Block/1002 and Kwale/Diani Beach Block/1003). 32. The Assets Recovery Agency (ARA) summoned the Defendant in June, 2025 following receipt of funds from the Plaintiff to her bank account in connection with the purchase of the suit properties and she recorded a statement with the agency in the month of July, 2025 that corroborated most of the averments he had made herein and the manners he went about making payments in connection with the purchase of the suit properties.(Annexed and marked as “LMJMR – 5” was a copy of the ARA Summons and the Statements he recorded with the Agency) 33. The Defendant had since dismissed and evicted the Plaintiff’s employees/caretakers, changed locks to the residential house and taken permanent possession of the other houses situated on the parcel of land under title number Kwale/Diani Beach Block/1711 and 1003 which indicate she intends to deprive him access and use of the suit property. 34. He feared the Defendant may purchase and/or charge or dispose off the parcels to defeat his interests and he would prefer the Court direct the Land Registrar -Kwale to defaulted loan and she be given six months and for this reason I would prefer the Court direct the Land Registrar-Kwale to enter restrictions to restrict any further dealings pending the hearing and determination of this suit and produce certified copies of the white cards for use at trial. (Annexed and marked as “LMJMR – 6” were copies correspondence between the Defendant and the 2nd and 3rd Interested Parties' advocates) 35. The Defendant had also left some of the houses situated in Kwale/Diani Beach Block/1711 in a state of disrepair and his employees informed him that some of the houses had leaking roofs and faulty plumbing. 36. It was just and fair under the circumstances being the beneficial owner/financier and the Defendant holding the suit properties for him in a resulting trust that he be granted unrestricted access to the residential house situated on Kwale/Diani Beach Block/1711 whenever he was in Kenya. 37. Further to the unrestricted access for himself he requested for the Defendant to be restrained from denying, obstructing, threatening, intimidating, or otherwise interfering with him, his contractors, caretakers, employees or agents in the exercise of the above access rights. 38. No prejudice whatsoever shall be occasioned on the Defendant if interim injunction orders do issue restraining her or her agents and assigns from selling, transferring, charging, leasing or otherwise dealing with Kwale/Diani Beach Block/1711, 1002, and 1003 pending the hearing and determination of this instant application and suit. 39. It was just and necessary that this Honourable Court issues the said preservation orders. 40. What was deponed herein was true to the best of his knowledge, information and belief save where sources have been disclosed. 41. **The responses by the Defendant** 42. The Defendant, responded to the Application through a Replying Affidavit sworn on 11th December, 2025 by MARY WAMBOI KINYANJUI, wherein the Affiant averred as follows that: * 1. She was the Defendant/Respondent in this suit and therefore competent to swear this Affidavit. 2. She swore this Affidavit based on facts within her knowledge and whose sources she had disclosed, and regarding matters of law, based on advice received from her Advocates on record. 3. She had read and had explained to her by her Advocates on record the Plaintiff/Applicant's Application dated 24th November, 2025 and wish to respond as follows:- 4. The Plaintiff/Applicant and her were previously engaged in a personal relationship where he voluntarily made financial contributions to her. 5. Any monies the Plaintiff may have spent during their past personal relationship were purely voluntary contributions and were not made pursuant to any agreement that the properties would be jointly owned or held in trust for him. 6. Contrary to the allegations in the Plaintiff/Applicant's Application, the Plaintiff was not the beneficial owner, financier, or actual purchaser of the suit properties and she denied that she held the titles in trust for him in any manner whatsoever. 7. The suit properties known as Kwale/Diani Beach Block/1711 and Kwale/Diani Beach Block/1003 are registered in her name. 8. She was the registered proprietor of the suit parcels of land and she annexed hereto copies of the current title documents and Marked as “MWK – 1” was the Certificate of Lease for KWALE/DIANI BEACH BLOCK/1711 and “MWK – 2” was the Transfer of Lease for KWALE/DIANI BEACH BLOCK/1003) 9. The Plaintiff/Applicant had never been registered as proprietor of the suit properties and had no written agreement or registered instrument creating any legal or beneficial interest in his favour, as required under the Land Registration Act, No. 3 of 2012. 10. Any transaction and registration involving the suit properties was done lawfully and with full compliance with the Land Registration Act. Annexed and Marked as “MWK – 3” was the Sale Agreement dated 14th April, 2025) 11. The Plaintiff/Applicant's alleged beneficial interest had unsupported by any registered instrument and his claims was based on informal arrangements that did not confer legal ownership. 12. The Plaintiff/Applicant's access to the properties was revoked following the breakdown of our personal relationship, and his persistent insistence on access amounted to harassment and trespass. 13. She denied that she unlawfully dismissed or evicted the Plaintiff's caretakers or employees from the house on Kwale/Diani Beach Block/1711; the workers on the properties had at all material times been her employees under her sole control and she was entitled to engage such staff as she deemed fit. 14. She denied ever constructing, threatening, intimidating or harassing the Plaintiff, his alleged caretakers, contractors or agents and state that any security measures or restrictions she had put in place were legitimate steps taken by a property owner for the protection of their properties. 15. The motor vehicle registration number KBE 444L Toyota Prado was lawfully registered in her name and any past use by the Plaintiff/Applicant was with permission during the personal relationship, which permission had since been withdrawn. 16. The Plaintiff/Applicant's allegations of imminent disposal or charging of the properties and speculative, and no such transactions had been initiated. 17. The Plaintiff/Applicant had not demonstrated any irreparable harm or urgency warranting the orders sought, which was oppressive and solely intended to exert control over properties lawfully registered in her name. 18. The Plaintiff/Applicant had not established any basis for an interim injunction to restrain her from dealing with her own properties. 19. The Plaintiff/Applicant's Application dated 24th November, 2025 be dismissed with costs. 20. What was deponed herein above was correct and true to the best of her knowledge, information and belief, save the sources quoted. 43. The Defendant further filed a Further Replying Affidavit where she deponed as follows that:- She had been shown her Replying Affidavit filed by her previous advocate, sworn on 11th December, 2025, prepared and filed by her said erstwhile advocate M/s. Matheka & Wandai and she had understood its contents and where necessary it had been explained to her. She saw that it never reflected the true facts as explained to her then advocate nor what she expected to inform Court. When she was served with summons and the application, she approached her advocate who she had earlier instructed to reply to a demand letter from the 3rd and 4th Interested Parties to deal with the matter or respond to it. She discussed the matter fully with Mr. Matheka who was a senior advocate in the Law firm of Messrs. Wandai & Matheka, who after listening to her carefully referred her to a young advocate by the name Brian. When she sat with Brian to explain to him the facts of the case, he did not seem to get the facts very well and within about thirty (30) minutes or so, he informed her that he had grasped the facts and that he was good to go in preparing documents for her to file. She was a little bit surprised that he was so fast in understanding all the facts but since he confirmed that he had understood, she left him to prepare. On 9th December, 2025 she received a draft affidavit from Brian asking her to comment about it. She then received a call from him and she raised her concerns about the facts in the affidavit, including the proposal that the Plaintiff had made to her for a settlement. She received the fallowing text from her said advocate Brian which said inter-earlier that:- *"Ordinarily what happens with replying affidavit is that we respond to grounds and claims raised in the other party's application. We don't necessarily argue out broader facts and particulars of the case... However, don't worry, I shall bring up the same with Mr. Matheka and seek guidance on the same. I will consult with Mr. Matheka in the morning."* THAT From there she understood that the affidavit was not important, it did not matter what it stated because it was a matter of formality and that the true facts would be argued later. Not being an advocate, she had to agree with Counsel. Annexed hereto and marked as "MWK - 1" was a true screenshot of the conversation between her former advocate and herself. However, for reasons whose details she could not explain in this affidavit, she decided to appoint a new firm of advocate to take over the matter from the Law firm of Messrs, Wandai & Matheka Company Advocates, who proceeded to file a memorandum of appearance dated 15th December, 2025, and upon her accessing Replying Affidavit on the CTS and Counsel, went through the affidavit and she realized that there were very many facts that were not correct and may not assist the court to reach a fair finding and accordingly instructed her new advocate to withdraw that affidavit and to file a fresh one, or alternative to file a further affidavit to correct the anomalies and hence this further Affidavit. The true and correct reply to the application dated 24th November, 2025 was: The application was based on falsehoods, half-truths and outright lies, in that the Plaintiff/Applicant has concealed the true facts and created false facts in order to achieve his goal. From the onset she did admit that the Plaintiff financed the purchase of all the properties subject of the suit, which was Kwale/Diani Beach Block/1711, Kwale/Diani Beach Block/1002 and Kwale/Diani Beach Block/1003, and that at all times she handled the funds channeled to her by the Plaintiff/Applicant with utmost honesty and sincerity, therefore at no time did the Plaintiff/Applicant complain about her mishandling the funds or defrauding him. At no time did she restrict or deny the Plaintiff entry to the properties subject of this suit as alleged at all, because at the time of going to court the Plaintiff was already living in the property and had full access, and she was away. She left the suit premises because the Plaintiff joined hands with the staff, the 3rd and 4th interested parties and some foreign tenants, creating disturbance and danger to my safety. The Plaintiff was not the beneficial owner of Kwale/Diani Beach Block/1711 since it was a gift given to her for her contribution to the Plaintiff despite not being monetary. He did not transfer any property to her name without the Plaintiff's authority. She had no intention of selling, charging or transferring any of the suit property, nor had she made any such intention known. The Plaintiff's intention was to take away the gift given to her while they had a relationship, and to give it to his new girlfriend by the name Linet Daniel, with whom he was currently living in the suit property, and who caused their parting ways. At the commencement of her relationship with the Plaintiff, they became friends and in the year 2023 he traveled to Kenya, she hosted him in her house for the period he was on holiday. They continued dating as boyfriend and girlfriend and he fell for Kenya and of course with her. He promised to marry her and she introduced him to her parents and siblings, who had no objections. At that time she was running a boutique business in Malindi, and living in her own rented house fully furnished. In the year 2024, the Plaintiff indicated to her that since they were getting married she should find a property to put up their matrimonial home, so that when they got married, they would not have to live in a rentals. In the year 2024, the Plaintiff never came for holiday in Kenya as he was trying to sell his property in the Netherlands so that he could buy property in Kenya where they would live together. They were in touch all along, in December 2024 the Plaintiff told her he was ready to buy property in Kenya and therefore she could start scouting for one. His preference was between Malindi and South Coast. In early January and February, 2025, the Plaintiff informed her that he had seen property for sell on Jiji.com in South Coast. He then sent her a link to enable me trace the property, view it and give him her comment as to whether it was good for them to buy or not. From Jiji.com she got the contact of the caretaker whom she contacted and he gave her the telephone number of the owners who happened to live in Denmark. The Plaintiff visited them and they agreed to sell the property. The Plaintiff informed her that he would send her money for the purchase of the property through her account but she should not spend till he came. When he came he was so impressed with her not spending his money as instructed, and he told her that she was going to be in charge of the dealings, including construction, renovation, letting and general management of the property on her and his behalf. He would start by giving her a gift to cement their relationship, and this gift was Kwale/Diani Beach Block/1711 while he would retain Kwale/Diani Beach Block/1003 and later Kwale/Diani Beach Block/1002. As his fiancée she took everything very seriously when he personally ordered Kwale/Diani Beach Block/ 1711 transferred to her, not to hold in trust but absolute. At the lawyer's office the Plaintiff instructed that plot Kwale/Diani Beach Block/1711 be registered in her name, and not as alleged. Everything that she did was according to his instruction and above board, and up to now, all he said was that it was love for her that was no longer there but trust was. Knowing that she had personnel stake in the properties, one of them being hers, she put her best leg forward to carry out his instructions to the letter in his absence. Hе acknowledged severally that Kwale/Diani Beach Block/1711 was hers. And therefore, it was not true that the property was registered in her name as a trustee or for his benefit. Both him, her and even her family were aware of this arrangement. In the Plaintiff's absence she employed staff, to maintain all the properties. She supervised the construction and procurement of building and construction materials by paying for them at various hardwares. She paid the constructors and ensured security of the property, and rented out some of the suit properties, all on the Plaintiff's instructions, and there was never a single complaint in the manner in which she carried out the work. Basically, they were doing quite well and there was no dispute, and each of them knew that they were headed for marriage and making a family, thus living happy ever after, until one lady by the name Linet Daniel came into their lives when the Plaintiff met her at a spare parts shop in Ukunda. In June the Plaintiff cheated on her with said lady. He later apologized and said he had let go, which she later on found out not to be true. In September when she was visiting her family in Malindi, she was informed by the caretaker that a lady came, walked into the compound in her absence, took pictures and video clip left. She asked the caretaker to describe the lady and she suspected it was the one called Linet Daniel who had previously cheated with the Plaintiff. When she inquired from the Plaintiff, he denied it but eventually he confirmed that it was her, because she was the one that he trusted. Out of this, they exchanged various WhatsApp messages, true screenshot copies were annexed hereto and marked as "MWK - 2". In some, he expressly admitted that Kwale/Diani Beach Block/1711 was hers. In or about 2nd September when the Plaintiff admitted that he had been sending Linet Daniel to inspect the compound, she told him that if she ever saw her in that compound she would call the police, and that was when he told her via the message that he would not entertain her anymore and that it was over between them. In October while she was visiting her family in Malindi, the Plaintiff came into the country without notice; he kept on entertaining Linet in their house. He instructed one of the workers by the name of Kennedy to cut the padlock to Kwale/Diani Beach Block/1003. He then went back to Netherlands without informing her, although he had indicated that he was coming in December. She also discovered from tenants that the Plaintiff had told them not to pay rent to her and actually changed the Mpesa Paybill number. He went further to cancel her agreement with the tenants by canceling her name and entering his name as the landlord. He also changed her telephone number and entered his own. Annexed hereto and mark as "MWK - 3" was a true Photostat copy of the "Rental contract/management agreement" of one of the tenants. At the time he visited Kenya secretly he broke the bedroom door and accessed the land documents in her drawer and took the Loan Agreement, copies of Sales Agreement and assorted receipts. However, he did not find the original title deed of her plot Kwale/Diani Beach Block/1711, as she had kept it separate from the other documents. She found out that the Plaintiff had turned the staff that had personally employed against her, and being unable to stay with people who were against her, she decided to suspend them. These were Augustine and Kenneth, her main caretakers. She did not know that they had been instructed to kick her out of the property, as they went on to call members of public and some tenants to throw her out collectively, which she resisted, and they threatened to burn down the house if she did not leave. Because of the threats she had to engage Crest Security, a security Company to protect her not to bar the Plaintiff from accessing the property. The 3rd and 4th Interested Parties, acting in cahoot with the Plaintiff, sent her a letter dated 10th November, 2025 through their advocate demanding that she pays the loan of a sum of Kenya Shillings Twenty Two Million Five Fifty Seven Thousand (Kshs. 22,557,000/=) or she vacates the properties or they would commence proceeding against her. This was with their knowledge that although she entered into the loan agreement of purchasing Kwale/Diani Beach Block/1002 and Kwale/Diani Beach Block/1003, the person who was to pay was the Plaintiff. She was informed by the caretakers, which information she verily believe to be true, that the Plaintiff, the 3rd and 4th Interest Parties had agreed with the Plaintiff to change the loan to the Plaintiff's name and therefore the notice was a mere excuse to kick her out, which she understood they had already done. Annexed hereto marked as "MWK - 4" was a new agreement between them, a copy of which was sent to her by the Plaintiff and she did not object. After the serious disagreement in September, the Plaintiff started to persuade her to give up Kwale/Diani Beach Block/1711 so that he could own all the properties himself in order that they did not live close to each other having broken up. The Plaintiff proposed to her to give up the house that he bought for her in exchange for something else so that they would not close, she offered that he buys her out with a sum of Kenya Shillings Fifteen Million (Kshs. 15,000,000/=), which he said was too high. He counter -offered that she takes all the household goods and the car after he fixed it, and to buy her a 3 - bedroom house in Malindi. He went ahead to send her a picture from Facebook of a 3 - bedroom house in Malindi. Eventually, she agreed that he fixes the car, she takes all the household goods, buys her another house in Malindi and that he gave her a sum of Kenya Shillings One Million Five Hundred Thousand (Kshs. 1,500,000/=) to start a business. He responded to that offer by saying that if she needed the said cash, then the price of the house must go down. Basically, he agreed that he buys her out (see Page 1 of the screenshots annexed hereto as "MWK - 2"). Subsequent to the discussions on settlements, in October 2025, the Plaintiff sent her a draft agreement, in which he had revised his proposal, he offered to pay her a sum of Kenya Shillings Five Million (Kshs. 5,000,000/=) payable within 6 months, and also that she takes the Toyota Land Cruiser and a sum of Kenya Shillings Two Hundred Thousand (Kshs. 200,000/=) to enable her repair it. He further said I would retain all movable household goods excluding all fixtures and fittings permanently built into the property. Annexed hereto was a true photostat copy of the draft agreement drawn by the Counsel currently on record for the Plaintiff, marked as "MWK - 5". She rejected that offer for among other reasons, that in clause No.5 of the draft agreement, the Plaintiff was trying to restrict her from having any business in Malindi or anywhere else without telling her how she would survive during the period of the contract. And it was a further condition that if he found that she was carrying out any business or residing in Malindi, the contract would be nullified, which she found unconscionable and in bad faith. Finally, the agreement provided that after purchasing her the house, he would have free access despite of them having parted ways, which she believed would interfere with her private life and future. On Sunday, 30th November, 2025, the Plaintiff wrote a message to her mother via her telephone No. 0798941528, which read as follows:- *"Good evening, I have no idea what is going on with your daughter, she talks that she wants to settle the matter between us but she doesn't want to talk to me or my lawyer, her lawyer is also unresponsive. Please understand I have no bad intention to her, so please talk with her or give me some idea what she wants."* Therefore, she swear this affidavit to oppose the Plaintiff's application for injunction dated 24th November, 2025, as being vexatious as it is tainted with malafides. What was deponed to herein above was to the best of her information, knowledge and belief, save where otherwise stated. 1. **The responses by the Applicant to the Further Replying Affidavit** 2. The Plaintiff/Applicant filed a further affidavit in opposition to the 1st Respondent’s Further Replying Affidavit. The affidavit is sworn by LEONARDUS MARTINUS JOZEF MARIA RITZEN on 14th April, 2026 wherein he deposes as follows that:- He was the Plaintiff/Applicant herein and thus competent to swear this Further Affidavit response to the Defendant/Respondent’s Further Replying Affidavit sworn on 10th March, 2026. He had read and understood the Replying Affidavit dated 11th December, 2025 and the Further Replying Affidavit dated 10th March, 2026 all sworn by the Respondent and wish to respond as follows. The Respondent’s sudden "correction" of facts from her previous legal representation suggested an attempt to backtrack on earlier admissions to defeat the ends of justice. He opposed the contents of Paragraph 1 to 5 of the Respondent’s Further Replying Affidavit and contend her sudden "correction" of facts from her previous legal representation suggested an attempt to backtrack on earlier admissions to defeat the ends of justice, in particular:- 1. She stated at Paragraph 4 of her Further Replying Affidavit it was upon her then advocates advise that the Replying Affidavit was a formality and that true facts would be argued later meaning that she swore to facts that were false as per her knowledge. 2. His advocates verily inform him that an affidavit was a sworn statement akin to a person giving evidence on oath in open Court on the witness stand therefore the Respondent had admitted to perjuring herself in her Replying Affidavit when she deponed to questionable or uncorroborated statements. 3. His advocates further verily inform him that the Respondent’s credibility was in question and as such her evidence should be treated with an abundance of caution and put under strict scrutiny. 4. In the first instance at Paragraph 2 of her Replying Affidavit she swore the affidavit based on facts within her knowledge and upon the advice of her advocates on record then the question becomes which set of facts are true? the ones stated in Replying Affidavit or the ones stated in the Further Affidavit? 5. In the second instance she had stated that she was Replying to the Application dated 24th November, 2025 upon the advice of her advocates and upon reading and understanding the contents of the aforementioned application, the question becomes which set of facts deponed to herein are true or false? Is the Respondent’s evidence credible? 6. The Respondent at Paragraph 5 of her Further Replying Affidavit has admitted that “very many facts (in her Replying Affidavit) were not correct and may not help the Court reach a fair finding” and hence instructed her advocate to withdraw the previous affidavit or file a Further Affidavit to correct the anomalies and hence the said Further Affidavit. The question then became was the Replying Affidavit withdrawn and the Further Replying Affidavit the sole reply to his application or was it still in operation as a Response? The Further Replying Affidavit had not shown what anomalies its correcting because the Respondent did not want to admit to perjury. He took issue with the Respondent’s claim that his application was full of lies, half truths and false facts created to achieve a goal as stated Paragraph 6 (i) of her Further Affidavit and contend that the only reason this matter was before the courts was the fact that the Defendant refused to transfer the suit properties in his name after they ended their relationship and instead chose to deprive him of the ownership, possession and access of it through her actions as stated in his Notice of Motion Application and averred in his Supporting Affidavit. The Respondent’s admission in Paragraph 6 (ii) of her Further Replying Affidavit that he financed the purchase of all three suit properties was a material fact that confirmed his beneficial interest in the properties along with the resulting trust that existed between them while they were never admitted in her Replying Affidavit sworn on 11th December, 2025. The Respondent’s admission at Paragraph 6 (ii) confirmed she perjured herself at Paragraphs 5 and 6 of her Replying Affidavit where she had earlier made claims that she voluntarily contributed and assisted her to acquire the suit properties which was false the idea to purchase the properties was his and not hers. He contended in opposition to Paragraph 6 (iii) of the Respondent’s Further Affidavit averred and reiterated that it was some time after of filing this suit that the Respondent left the suit properties as she claimed but it was her actions prior to leaving the said properties - that of dismissing his caretakers and staff, changing locks to deny him and his staff access and acquiring one of the suit properties without his authorization that necessitated the filing of this suit. Regarding the Respondent's claim at Paragraph 6 (iv) of her Further Affidavit that of being "evicted" or "disturbed," he maintained she left of her on volution on 30th November, 2025 with his household items to Malindi as he came know learn later on which was after instituted this suit and it was the Respondent who dismissed his employees and changed locks to deprive him of access to his residence in the suit properties which he fully financed. He categorically deny the Respondent’s claim at Paragraphs 6 (v) and 6 (viii) that Kwale/Diani Beach Block/1711 was a gift to her during the pendency of their relationship as a result of her so called non-monetary contribution. At no point did he intend to surrender his entire financial investment as an absolute gift; rather, the property was registered in her name for convenience and as a representative purchaser while they were in a relationship. He observed from their WhatsApp conversation which she shared as part of her evidence that she at one point gave him a list of her demands which was simply a shakedown of what she wanted in order to transfer the suit properties in his name. Therefore, he reiterate and averred she could not claim the property was a gift while she had already accepted to return the so called “gift” (which was property held in a resulting trust) upon certain conditions being met. The Respondent's assertion that she did not transfer property without authority was contradicted and reiterated by the fact that Kwale/Diani Beach Block/1003 was registered in her name without his knowledge or consent as he averred at Paragraph 10 of his Supporting Affidavit dated 24th November, 2025. In opposition to Paragraph 6 (vii) of the Respondent’s Further Affidavit, he averred and reiterated Paragraph 18 of his supporting affidavit and the annexure marked as “LMJMR – 6” being correspondences of letters dated 10th November, 2025 and 18th November, 2025 between the 2nd and 3rd Interested Parties advocates and her then advocates (the advocates she replaced for reasons she could not express in her Further affidavit) therein which showed that the Respondent had taken a loan facility of a sum of Kenya Shillings Twenty One Million Nine Hundred Thousand (Kshs. 21,900,000/=) with the 2nd and 3rd Interested Parties and had defaulted on the said loan facility and her previous advocates responded to the Demand for payment of the loan facility seeking an extension of six (6) months to conclude the transaction a clear indication she not only intended to charge and transfer but she had succeeded in providing a security for the intended loan facility to facilitate the transfer of Kwale/Diani Beach Block/1002 into her name. He was a stranger to the contents of Paragraph 6 (viii) and put the Respondent to strict proof thereof and instead reiterated that none of the suit properties were intended to be or were a gift to her as she was only a representative purchaser to hold the properties which were of commercial nature (as there were residential rental properties on them) in an implied trust as he regularized his government papers in particular his Kenya Revenue Authority Personal Identification Number (KRAPIN) and work/residence permits. (Annexed and marked as “LMJMR – 1” was his Land Rates Payment Receipts for the suit properties that he paid earlier this year) He opposed and denied the contents of Paragraphs 7 and 9 of the Respondent’s affidavit to the extent that he had promised to marry her and put her to strict proof thereof. He opposed and denied the contents of Paragraph 13 of the Further Replying Affidavit and put the Respondent to strict proof thereof instead he averred and reiterated that Kwale/Diani Beach Block/1711 one of the suit properties was never intended to be gifted to her and wonder why if it was a gift she first chose to change the locks and thereafter when this suit was filed she left the house situated within the said property in the middle of the night with the household items and car that he purchased and went to Malindi causing him to report her at Diani Police Station for stealing his household items and the Toyota Prado he bought. (Annexed and marked as “LMJMR – 2” was a copy of the Occurrence book slip number OBNO. 31/24/12/2025) He opposed and denied the contents of Paragraph 14 of the Respondent’s Further Replying Affidavit in particular the Respondent’s claim that she was his fiancée as he never at any point engage her as she was trying to claim and could not purport the suit property under title number Kwale/Diani Beach Block/1711 was registered in her name in her capacity as a fiancée. Instead, he reiterated it was registered in her name as a representative purchaser/nominee to hold in trust for him as he regularized his KRA Pin and work/residence permits. He opposed the contents of Paragraphs 16 and 17 of the Respondent’s Further Replying Affidavit and reiterated the contents of Paragraphs 10, 17 and 18 of his supporting affidavits dated 24th November, 2025 and Paragraphs 9 and 12 of this instant affidavit which show that it was her untrustworthy behaviour of registering one of suit properties in her name without his knowledge, dismissing and evicting his employees and changing locks that led him to institute this suit and instant application. He opposed the contents of Paragraphs 18 and 19 of the Respondent’s Further Replying Affidavit and instead he reiterated the contents of Paragraphs 9 and 10 of this instant affidavit noting that there was nowhere in the WhatsApp chats between them that indicated he specifically confirmed that he gifted or gave her a house or the suit property under title number Kwale/Diani Beach Block/1711 was hers or was a gift to her. He denied the contents of Paragraphs 21, 22, 23, 24 and 25 of the Respondent’s Further Replying Affidavit and put her to strict proof of the allegations she had made and he reiterated the contents of Paragraph 17 of his Supporting Affidavit dated 24th November, 2025 and aver that it was her own behaviour of getting security guards to “guard” the suit properties that confirmed her intention was to deprive him access and use of the said properties. He contended in response to Paragraph 22 that he was well within his rights as the beneficial owner and true purchaser of the property to recover possession and control of the rental incomes which was the same that paid the caretakers and staff that the Respondent had dismissed in a bid to take full control and possession of the suit properties. In response to Paragraph 26 of the Respondent’s Further Replying Affidavit instead he reiterated Paragraphs 10, 11 and 12 of my Supporting Affidavit and averred that the Respondent’s allegations that he was to pay though technically true (because of his separate sale agreement with the 2nd and 3rd Interested Parties in August, 2025) then why would the 2nd and 3rd Interested Parties demand of her and not him to pay a loan facility in connection with the purchase of Kwale/Diani Beach Block/1002 and Kwale/Diani Beach Block/1003? which only meant she did enter into a separate sale agreement with the 2nd and 3rd Respondent’s and it would be infer able that the Respondent may have secretly charged Kwale/Diani Beach Block/1711 to raise funds for purchase of Kwale/Diani Beach Block/1003 which was registered in her name without his authority or consent. He denied the allegations the Respondent had raised at Paragraph 27 of her Further Replying Affidavit and instead reiterate Paragraphs 10 to 15 of his Supporting Affidavit to this instant application dated 24th November, 2025 and averred that the Respondent was trying to deprive him the ownership and use of the suit properties through her prior actions while also unjustly enriching herself. He partially denied the allegations raised in Paragraphs 28, 29 and 30 of the Respondent’s Further Replying Affidavit. Instead, he reiterated that the Respondent was not giving up Kwale/Diani Beach Block/1711 as the same was held in a resulting trust for him the beneficial owner/true purchaser until he got his government papers in order and he averred that there were negotiations in good faith for her to release possession of and transfer the suit properties already in her name to him in exchange for a token of appreciation for aiding in the purchase of the suit properties as a representative purchaser He partly admitted the contents of Paragraphs 31 and 32 and denied paragraph 33 of the Respondent’s Further Replying Affidavit in its entirety and instead averred that the Respondent had claimed that she had sold her business and terminated her lease agreement at her previous residence in Malindi in order to come and reside in Diani so for him to provide her with a sum of kenya Shillings Five Million (Kshs. 5,000,000/=) he needed for her to confirm that this was actually the case but it turned out to be false and explained why she rejected the agreement with clause 5 in it as she knew she was not being honest about her living and work conditions in Malindi as she came back after he left Kenya briefly in November, 2025 and removed household goods from his residence in the suit properties and transported them to Malindi which amounted to stealing an incident he reported at Diani Police Station as explained at Paragraph 17 of this affidavit. (Annexed and marked as “LMJMR – 3” were 2 video clip recordings of the household goods being removed by the Respondent in his absence with moving truck on standby.) He admitted the contents of Paragraph 34 of the Respondent’s Further Affidavit but not for the intention it was put therein and averred that he made effort to have their issues resolved amicably instead by her own admission and actions as demonstrated in this affidavit she had forced this matter to be decided through the Courts hence wasting precious judicial time for a matter that could be resolved amicably. He reiterated that the Respondent held these properties in a resulting trust for his benefit, given that the entire purchase price was provided by him. What was deponed herein was true to the best of his knowledge, information, and belief. **The Notice of Motion application dated 21st February, 2026 by the 1st Defendant** 1. The Second application was the Notice of Motion application dated 21st February, 2026 by the Defendant. It was brought under the provision of Order 40 Rules 1,2,3 and 5 of the Civil Procedure Rules, Sections 1B, 3A, 63 (e) of the Civil Procedure Act, Cap. 21. 2. The 1st Defendant principally sought for the following orders:- ***Spent*** ***An injunction be issued to restrain the Plaintiff by himself, his servants*** ***or by agents from trespassing upon or entering into or in any manner dealing with plot KWALE/DIANI BEACH/BLOCK 1711 pending hearing of the suit.*** ***The Plaintiff be restrained from interfering with the Defendant's occupation and dealing of KWALE/DIANI BEACH/BLOCK 1711 pending hearing of the suit*** ***The Plaintiff be directed to deposit in court the rent from the tenants in occupation of the suit property known as KWALE/DIANI BEACH/BLOCK/1711 W.E.F the month of October, 2026 to date.*** ***Temporary injunctions be issued against the Plaintiff, his agents, and servants stopping him from interfering with the Defendant's ownership by collecting rent from the current tenants, leasing out to new tenants, demolition of any part of the premises, renovating or dealing with suit property in any manner without consent, authority or directions of the Defendant.*** ***Any other orders the court will deem fit to make.*** ***Costs be provided for.*** 1. The application was premised on the grounds, facts and testimony on the face of the application and further supported by the 19 Paragraphed Supporting affidavit of MARY WAMBOI KINYAJUI, the 1st Defendant herein, where she averred as follows that:- She was the Defendant herein and well versed with the facts of the case and hence competent to swear this affidavit. She was the registered owner of all that parcel of land KWALE/DIANI BEACH BLOCK/ 1711 one of the subject properties in the suit which was registered in her name as a gift by the Plaintiff out of love and all the support she gave him during acquisition and construction of that properties known as KWALE/DIANI BEACH/1002 and 1003. (Annexed and marked as “MW "A" was a true Photostat copy of the title). The Plaintiff herein was his boyfriend for a period of 3 years since the year 2023 having met online initially then he came visiting in the year 2023 when she housed him in her rental house in Malindi for the period of his holiday. He was so happy that he told him that apart from being in love with her, he had fallen for the country. He asked her to introduce him to her family since he intended to marry her to start their family. She agreed and the introduction was done. Eventually, the Plaintiff decided to re - locate to Kenya for the sake of starting a family with her. He later proposed that they invest in hotel industry but she advised him against that due to the state of tourism and volatility of the industry and especially due to lack of management experience. He eventually agreed with her. He again proposed a Tuk tuk transport business which she advised him against, but eventually without her knowledge, he bought 2 of them, which he operated to date but in other persons' name. However he did regret investing in the said Business and said she was right. She then advised that investing in rentals would be an appropriate investment and he took up her advise and eventually he sold his property in Netherlands or so he said and entrusted her with all his monies through her account in the sum of Kenya Shillings Twenty Eight Million (Kshs. 28,000,000/=) to purchase 3 properties. She did not misuse any money and he was very happy. She took charge of the management of the properties including negotiations, purchasing of construction materials, supervision, employment of workers, payment for the construction materials and renovation of the suit properties single handedly. The Plaintiff, considering her efforts, advise and that he needed to make her to be certain that she was or would be a beneficiary of the project, he offered her one property which he said would be her personal and that he would not retract the same. Later on they disagreed over his incessant cheating with another woman by the name Linet Daniels whom he carelessly brought into their home and kind of started to manage the properties while she was present and active. When she sought explanations as to what was going on, the Plaintiff threw tantrums and said their relationship was over. (Annexed herein and marked as “MW “B” was a true copy of the Whatsapp messages that was self-explanatory). He eventually offered to buy her out of the property known as LR. No. KWALE/DIANI BEACH BLOCK/1711 by offering her a sum of Kenya Shillings Five Million (Kshs. 5,000,000/=) but his other terms were not acceptable. ( Annexed herein and marked as “MW "C" was a true Photostat copy of the agreement prepared by his advocate and sent to her by the Plaintiff himself while he was in Netherlands, they however did not sign it because of certain unfair terms he included, e.g, that she should not have any business in Malindi and that she should not move out of Diani. The Plaintiff also offered to purchase for her a 2 bedroom house in Malindi, on its own compound with good security, though he again insisted that he be allowed unconditional access which was not possible. Towards that end, he sent her a sample house that was in Malindi and on sale. In his message by Whatsapp the Plaintiff said: *"As for me you can take all household goods and the car fixed is also yours and I do not want you that you will be homeless because before you leave I want to be sure you have something in Malindi that is yours like but no rental. Its yours"* The Plaintiff eventually started threatening her by inciting her staff and the foreigners who sold them the properties. They ganged against her until she had no peace at all. He returned into the country without her knowledge and changed the mode of rent payment from her as the landlady to himself.( Annexed herein and marked as “MW "D" was true Photostat copy of the one of the agreement that he changed so that she did not receive the rent and instead that it would be paid into his account. She had video clips where the Plaintiff explained that plot 1711 was hers but having taken in a new girlfriend, he wanted to snatch it from her. Since the month of October 2025 the Plaintiff broke into her said house, changed locks and started to collect rent that she was entitled to and which he had severally acknowledged as being her right. She had now learnt that the Plaintiff through his new girlfriend had broken certain section of her house and were in the process of changing the nature of the premises without her consent or permission during the pending of this proceeding. Unless the Plaintiff was restrained by an order of the court he shall damage the suit property by changing to what he wants and she would suffer irreparable loss and damages. What was deponed to herein above was true to the best of her knowledge, belief and information. **Replying Affidavit by the Plaintiff to the Notice of Motion Application dated 21st February, 2026** 1. The Plaintiff, responded to the Application through a Replying Affidavit sworn on 18th May, 2026 by LEONARDUS MARTINUS JOZEF MARIA RITZEN, wherein the Affiant averred as follows that:- He was the Plaintiff/Respondent herein and the primary beneficial investor behind the disputed properties. He was fully familiar with the financial and historical facts of this suit and thus competent to deconstruct and answer the Defendant's application. He had read the Defendant’s Supporting Affidavit sworn on 21st February, 2026 and categorically deny every malicious allegation raised against his character, status, and legal ownership claims. In specific response to Paragraph 2 of the Defendant’s affidavit, he denied that all that parcel known as Kwale/Diani Beach Block/1711 was a "gift" out of love and affection. The property was purchased entirely with his personal funds. The registration in her name was a temporary arrangement for administrative convenience while he finalized payments for the remaining properties. In response to Paragraphs 3, 4, and 5, I admit the existence of their past romantic relationship but denied that their investment strategies were guided by her advice or hotel expertise. He was an individual who chose to invest his life savings in Kenya based on his own economic planning, utilizing her presence solely to handle logistical movements on the ground. In response to Paragraph 6, he state that the Tuk-tuk business mentioned was entirely separate, non-residential, and completely irrelevant to the determination of land ownership before this Honourable Court. In specific response to Paragraphs 7, 8, and 9, he admitted that he transferred substantial capital from his personal funds into the country, but vehemently denied that these funds were sent to be used or retained as an unconditional personal endowment for the Defendant. To expose the systemic untruth of the Defendant's "gift" narrative, he invited this Court to look at the official financial trail attached to his primary applications: Around March, 2025, he personally traveled to Denmark, met with the 2nd and 3rd Interested Parties, and cleared an initial commitment fee of 20,000 Euros. On 3rd April, 2025, he dispatched international SWIFT remittances totaling 200,000 Euros split into four equal instalments directly from his bank account in the Netherlands to the Defendant’s bank account at I & M Bank, Malindi Branch. He confirmed these funds were structurally handled as an investment trust for property procurement. This was supported by the fact that when the Assets Recovery Agency (ARA) summoned the Defendant in June, 2025 to clarify this sudden influx of foreign capital, she recorded a statutory statement in July, 2025 explicitly stating that the funds were provided as a loan from myself to her. Her present attempt to construct a "gift" narrative is a direct contradiction of her formal admissions to state investigative agencies. In explicit response to Paragraph 10, he denied throwing tantrums or carelessly displacing her. Their disagreement arose from the discovery of her unauthorized financial mismanagement and her attempted to lock him out of properties he spent his life savings to own and improve. In specific response to Paragraphs 11, 12, and 13, the draft settlement agreement she relied upon was an un-executed, highly conditional out – of - court peace offer extended through his advocates in October, 2025. It was an attempt to settle their separation amicably and recognize her initial local help. Because she rejected and ignored the draft, its conditional proposals collapsed entirely and could not be relied upon as proof of legal admission. In specific response to Paragraphs 14, 15, and 16 - where the Defendant claimed he broke into the house, changed locks, and unlawfully evicted her in October, 2025 - he denied these allegations as complete fabrications calculated to mislead this Honourable Court. He urged this Honourable Court to let the physical records speak for themselves. There was clear, uncontroverted video evidence dated 30th November, 2025 showing the Defendant packing household items into a moving truck and relocating out of the villa at night on her own free will and volition. (Annexed and marked as “LMJMR1” were 2 video clips together with their Certificate of Electronic Evidence confirming their authenticity showing the Defendant moving out of the villa located on the parcel known as Kwale/Diani Beach Block/1711 on the night of 30th November, 2025) Upon inspecting the house after her voluntary departure, when he came back to Kenya for Christmas on 23rd December, 2025, he discovered that she had not only stripped the house of shared household furniture but had also taken his highly personal belongings that he brought with him directly from Holland to Kenya. Because her actions amounted to outright criminal theft, he formally reported the matter to the Diani Police Station, where the criminal case was taken up and an official Occurrence Book (OB) number 31/24/12/2025) was issued. The assertion that she was forcefully dispossessed was completely debunked by the active police records. (Annexed and marked as “LMJMR - 2” was a copy of the occurrence book number 31/24/12/2025 at 1200 hours). In response to Paragraphs 17 and 18, he denied that he or his agents have broken down or degraded any section of the house. On the contrary, the Defendant left several units on Kwale/Diani Beach Block/1711 in a severe state of structural neglect, including leaking roofs and compromised plumbing, which required urgent preservation and maintenance to protect the property value. The urgency of the Defendant's application was entirely self - made. She claimed she was facing irreparable emotional and material injury, yet she had already engineered the secret registration of the parcel of land known as Kwale/Diani Beach Block/1003 into her sole name without her approval or signature. Block 1003 currently held an active of a sum of Kenya Shillings Twenty One Million Nine Hundred Thousand (Kshs. 21,900,000/=) debt exposure under her name via a loan agreement dated 25th April, 2025 with the 2nd Interested Party - which she had completely defaulted on and for which an active demand letter from their advocates was pending. The balance of convenience heavily tilted toward protecting the subject matter of the suit. Freezing the property titles through strict court-ordered restrictions was the only logical step to prevent the Defendant from transferring or charging these properties to unsuspecting third parties before a full trial determines the root of the title. What was deponed to herein was true to the best of his knowledge, information, and belief. **Grounds of Opposition by the Plaintiff** 1. Additionally, upon service the Plaintiff filed Grounds of Opposition dated 18th May, 2026 opposing the Notice of Motion application dated 21st February, 2026 on the following grounds that:- The Defendant’s application sought parallel injunctive reliefs concerning property that was already heavily litigated under the Plaintiff's active application dated 24th November, 2025. This amounted to a multi-layered attempt to force an interim determination on ownership threshold that was strictly the preserve of a full trial. The Defendant/Applicant approached this court of equity with unclean hands, having voluntarily vacated the suit premises on her own volition while simultaneously carting away the Plaintiff's personal and household assets. Equity would not assist a party whom would represents facts to manufacture a state of victimization. The Defendant’s primary claim that the property Kwale/Diani Beach Block/1711 was an absolute "gift inter vivos" was heavily rebutted by her own admissions to the Assets Recovery Agency (ARA), where she formally structuralized the fund inflows as a temporary loan configuration from the Plaintiff. Since the Plaintiff remained the absolute source of financial capital - maneuvering 20,000 Euros out of Denmark and a subsequent 200,000 Euros tranche via ABNAMRO Bank on 3rd April, 2025 - the legal presumption of a resulting trust under Kenyan land jurisprudence applied directly in favor of the Plaintiff. The Defendant had already registered Kwale/Diani Beach Block/1003 into her personal domain entirely without the Plaintiff’s mandate or authorization. Granting an injunction to shield her control over Block 1711 stripped the beneficial owner of the capability to protect the properties from structural degradation and financial strip-mining. The Defendant's claimed concerning motor vehicle registration number KBE 444L Toyota Prado fell outside the specific subject - matter jurisdiction of this Environment and Land Court. 1. **Submissions to the Notice of Motion Application dated 24th November, 2025** 2. While all the parties were present in Court, directions were given to have the two applications be canvassed by way of written submissions. Subsequently, all the parties obliged. The Honourable Court reserved a date for the delivery of the Ruling accordingly. * + - 1. **The Written Submissions by the Plaintiff /Applicant in support to the Notice of Motion application dated 24th November 2025** 3. The Plaintiff/Applicant, through the Law Firm of Messrs. Joram Wang’ombe & Associate Advocates, filed written submissions in support of the Notice of Motion application dated 24th November, 2025, urging this Honourable Court to grant temporary injunctive orders preserving Land Parcels Kwale/Diani Beach Blocks 1711, 1002 and 1003 pending the hearing and determination of the suit. Mr. Wang’ombe Advocate commenced his submissions by stating that the Applicant was the primary financier and beneficial owner of the suit properties, having personally negotiated the purchase with the 2nd and 3rd Interested Parties in Denmark and paid the purchase price through the Defendant/Respondent, with whom he was then in a romantic relationship. 4. According to the Learned Counsel, the Defendant/Respondent admitted in her Replying Affidavit that she had been in a relationship with the Applicant and that the Applicant had made substantial financial contributions. However, she attempted to characterize those contributions as gifts. Counsel argued that such a defence was untenable considering the magnitude of the transaction involving the acquisition of an entire property portfolio and was unsupported by any credible evidence. 5. The Learned Counsel further submitted that the Defendant/Respondent's Further Replying Affidavit disclosed that her earlier Replying Affidavit, filed through her previous advocates, did not reflect the true facts as allegedly explained to counsel. It was contended that this material shift in her position amounted to an attempt to retract earlier admissions, thereby undermining her credibility before the Court and demonstrating inconsistency in her defence. 6. It was the Applicant's contention that the Defendant/Respondent had already evicted the Applicant's employees from the residential house situated on Kwale/Diani Beach Block 1711 and had caused Kwale/Diani Beach Block 1003 to be transferred into her name without the Applicant's authority. The Learned Counsel argued that unless restrained by an order of injunction, the Defendant/Respondent was likely to dispose of, transfer, charge or otherwise alienate the remaining suit properties, thereby rendering any eventual Judgment in favour of the Applicant nugatory. 7. The Learned Counsel asserted that three issues arose for determination, namely: whether the Applicant had established a prima facie case with a probability of success; whether the Applicant stood to suffer irreparable injury incapable of compensation by an award of damages; and whether the balance of convenience favoured the grant of the injunctive orders sought. 8. On whether the Applicant had established a prima facie case. The Learned Counsel relied on the celebrated decision in the now famous case of:- “***Giella – Versus – Cassman Brown & Co. Limited [1973] EA 358”***, submitting that an applicant seeking interlocutory injunctive relief must satisfy the three well -established principles, namely the existence of “***a prima facie case”*** with a probability of success, irreparable injury and the balance of convenience. 9. The Learned Counsel further averred that the provision of Section 10 of the Land Registration Act, No. 3 of 2012 recognises that land may be held in trust for another person, while Section 76 of the same Act empowers the Court to issue restrictions to safeguard proprietary interests pending the determination of disputes. The Counsel argued that the Applicant had demonstrated the existence of a resulting trust over the suit properties. 10. To buttress this argument, the Learned Counsel relied on the decision in the case of:- “***Charles K. Kandie – Versus – Mary Kimoi Sang [2017] KECA”***, wherein the Court of Appeal held that where one party provides the purchase price for property registered in another person's name, a resulting trust is presumed and the burden shifts to the registered proprietor to establish that the transfer constituted a gift or advancement. The Learned Counsel submitted that the Applicant had produced documentary evidence including wire transfer records and sale agreements demonstrating that he solely financed the acquisition of the suit properties. 11. The Learned Counsel further relied on the case of:- “***Mutiso – Versus – Mutiso [1988] KECA 119 (KLR)***” and submitted that although the presumption of advancement may arise in certain relationships, such presumption was rebuttable upon production of evidence establishing the parties' true intention. The Counsel maintained that the Applicant's financial involvement in negotiating and paying for the properties effectively rebutted the Respondent's assertion that the monies were gifts and established a strong prima facie case founded upon a resulting trust. 12. On whether the Applicant would suffer irreparable injury. The Learned Counsel submitted that land possesses a unique character and that damages would not constitute an adequate remedy where proprietary interests are threatened. The Counsel relied on the decision in “***Nguruman Limited – Versus – Jan Bonde Nielsen & 2 Others [2014] eKLR”****,* wherein the Court of Appeal emphasized that the purpose of an interlocutory injunction was to preserve the subject matter of litigation so that the ultimate judgment is not rendered nugatory. 13. Learned Counsel argued that the Applicant had demonstrated actual interference with his proprietary interests through the eviction of his employees from Block 1711 and the unilateral transfer of Block 1003 into the Defendant/Respondent's name. Counsel submitted that there existed a real and imminent risk that the remaining suit properties could similarly be alienated or encumbered to innocent third parties, thereby permanently extinguishing the Applicant's proprietary rights. It was therefore submitted that monetary compensation would not adequately remedy such loss. 14. On the issue of the balance of convenience. The Learned Counsel submitted that the Court ought to compare the prejudice likely to be suffered by each party depending on whether the injunction was granted or refused. The Counsel referred to Order 40 Rule 1 of the Civil Procedure Rules, 2010, which empowered the Court to grant temporary injunctions for the purpose of preventing the waste, damage or alienation of disputed property pending determination of a suit. 15. The Learned Counsel submitted that the Applicant was the undisputed financier of the acquisition of the suit properties whereas the Defendant/Respondent admitted having made no financial contribution and merely claimed ownership on the basis that the monies advanced constituted gifts. The Counsel contended that preserving the status quo through temporary injunctive orders would occasion no prejudice to the Defendant/Respondent while safeguarding the subject matter of the dispute pending trial. Conversely, refusal of the orders would expose the Applicant to the risk of losing his entire investment should the properties be alienated before the hearing of the suit. 16. In conclusion, Learned Counsel urged the Honourable Court to grant the prayers sought from the Notice of Motion application dated 24th November, 2025, by issuing a temporary injunction restraining the Defendant/Respondent from selling, transferring, charging, leasing or otherwise dealing with Kwale/Diani Beach Blocks 1711, 1002 and 1003 pending the hearing and determination of the suit; directing the Land Registrar, Kwale to register restrictions against the titles of the suit properties; granting the Applicant access to the suit properties for purposes of their preservation; and awarding the costs of the application to the Applicant. 17. **The Written Submissions by the 1st Defendant/Respondent** 18. The Defendant/Respondent, through the Law Firm of Messrs. Mouko & Company Advocates, filed written submissions dated 17th April, 2026 in opposition to the Plaintiff/Applicant's Notice of Motion application dated 24th November, 2025. Mr. Muoko Advocate informed the Court that the Plaintiff sought various interlocutory orders, including temporary injunctions restraining the Defendant/Respondent from selling, transferring, charging, leasing or otherwise dealing with Kwale/Diani Beach Blocks 1711, 1002 and 1003, orders granting the Applicant access to the suit properties, directions requiring the Land Registrar to register restrictions against the titles and produce certified copies of the white cards, together with costs of the application. 19. The Learned Counsel submitted that although the Defendant/Respondent had initially filed a Replying Affidavit sworn on 11th December, 2025 through her former advocates, she subsequently obtained leave of Court to file a Further Replying Affidavit sworn on 10th March, 2026. Consequently, the earlier Replying Affidavit was abandoned and the Defendant/Respondent elected to rely entirely upon the Further Replying Affidavit in opposing the application. 20. According to the Learned Counsel, the Plaintiff and the Defendant/Respondent had been involved in a romantic relationship spanning approximately three years from the year 2023. During the subsistence of the relationship, the Defendant/Respondent actively assisted the Plaintiff in identifying suitable properties, negotiating their purchase, supervising construction works, sourcing building materials, paying workers and managing the developments, thereby ensuring that the suit properties remained in good condition. 21. The Learned Counsel asserted that as a gesture of love, affection and appreciation for the Defendant/Respondent's support during the acquisition and development of the properties, the Applicant voluntarily gifted her Plot No. Kwale/Diani Beach/1711, which was subsequently registered in her name. Thereafter, the Defendant/Respondent managed the apartments erected thereon and collected rental income from the tenants. 22. It was the submission of Learned Counsel that following the breakdown of the parties' relationship, the Plaintiff introduced another lady to manage the properties and assumed control over rental collections, despite the Defendant/Respondent having previously managed the developments. The Counsel further submitted that the Plaintiiff later proposed purchasing the Defendant/Respondent's interest in Plot No. Kwale/Diani Beach/1711, while offering to purchase for her a house in Malindi together with repairs to her motor vehicle. 23. The Learned Counsel argued that the draft settlement agreement exchanged between the parties clearly referred to a single property registered in the Defendant/Respondent's name. The Counsel emphasized that although the title number had not been completed in the draft agreement, the language employed therein unmistakably acknowledged that the subject property was legally registered in the Defendant/Respondent's name. 24. According to Learned Counsel, Clause 2 and Clause 3 of the draft settlement agreement further demonstrated the Plaintiff’'s recognition of the Defendant/Respondent's proprietary rights by providing that she would continue residing in the house pending settlement and expressly acknowledging that the property was legally registered in her name while indicating that the Applicant had financed its acquisition and development. 25. The Learned Counsel further relied upon WhatsApp conversations exchanged between the parties, wherein the Applicant allegedly assured the Defendant/Respondent that household goods, repairs to her motor vehicle and a house in Malindi would belong to her. The Counsel submitted that the Plaintiff further declined a request for additional financial assistance while discussing the proposed settlement, thereby demonstrating that the negotiations centred upon compensation rather than recovery of ownership of Plot No. Kwale/Diani Beach/1711. 26. Therefore, it was the Learned Counsel's submission that both the draft settlement agreement and the parties' electronic communications unequivocally established that the Plaintiff had consistently acknowledged the Defendant/Respondent as the lawful registered proprietor of Plot No. Kwale/Diani Beach/1711. The Counsel asserted that nowhere within the correspondence or the draft agreement did the Plaintiff alleged that the Defendant/Respondent had fraudulently or unlawfully procured registration of the property in her name. 27. The Learned Counsel nevertheless observed that despite these acknowledgements, the Plaintiff had approached the Court seeking injunctive relief against the Defendant/Respondent in respect of Plot No. Kwale/Diani Beach/1711, notwithstanding that she remained the registered proprietor whose proprietary rights were protected under Article 40 of the Constitution of Kenya, 2010. 28. The Learned Counsel identified three issues for determination, namely: whether the Applicant was the rightful owner of Kwale/Diani Beach Blocks 1711, 1002 and 1003; whether the Plaintiff had satisfied the legal principles governing the grant of interlocutory injunctions; and who should bear the costs of the application. 29. On the first issue. The Learned Counsel submitted that whereas ownership of Plots Nos. Kwale/Diani Beach/1002 and 1003 was not disputed, the Defendant/Respondent maintained that she was the lawful and indefeasible registered proprietor of Plot No. Kwale/Diani Beach/1711. The Counsel argued that the Plaintiff himself had admitted this position through the draft settlement agreement and was therefore estopped from asserting otherwise. 30. On whether the Defendant/Respondent was the lawful proprietor of Plot No. Kwale/Diani Beach/1711. The Learned Counsel relied on the provision of Section 26 (1) of the Land Registration Act, No. 3 of 2012, submitting that a Certificate of Title issued by the Registrar constituted “***prima facie evidence”*** that the person named therein was the absolute and indefeasible owner of the property. The Counsel argued that such title could only be impeached upon proof of fraud, misrepresentation to which the registered proprietor is a party, or where the title was acquired illegally, unprocedurally or through a corrupt scheme. 31. The Learned Counsel averred that the Applicant had neither pleaded nor demonstrated any of the statutory grounds capable of impeaching the Defendant/Respondent's title. On the contrary, the Counsel maintained that the Defendant/Respondent consistently explained that the suit property had been gifted to her by the Applicant as an expression of love and appreciation after she had assisted him in identifying, acquiring and developing the property. 32. To buttress this argument, Learned Counsel relied on the decision in the case of:- “***Munyu Maina – Versus – Hiram Gathiha Maina [2013] eKLR’,*** wherein the Court of Appeal held that once the root of a registered proprietor's title is challenged, such proprietor bears the burden of demonstrating the legality of the acquisition and proving that the title was lawfully obtained. The Counsel submitted that the Defendant/Respondent had satisfactorily discharged that burden by producing evidence demonstrating the circumstances under which the property was transferred and registered in her name. 33. According to Learned Counsel, the Defendant/Respondent had further annexed WhatsApp messages exchanged with the Plaintiff, wherein the Plaintiff proposed purchasing for her a three-bedroom house in Malindi, allowing her to retain household goods and repairing her motor vehicle. The Counsel submitted that these communications constituted admissions by the Plaintiff that the Defendant/Respondent possessed proprietary and financial rights arising from their relationship. The Counsel further pointed to the draft settlement agreement in which the Plaintiff acknowledged that the Defendant/Respondent had financial and proprietary claims deserving settlement. 34. The Learned Counsel further submitted that the Plaintiff had even communicated with the Defendant/Respondent's mother expressing his desire to resolve the dispute through advocates, thereby demonstrating that he recognized the Defendant/Respondent's interest in the disputed property and sought to negotiate rather than challenge her title. 35. On the doctrine of “***gift inter vivos***”, the Learned Counsel relied on the decision “***in Re Estate of M'raiji Kithiano (Deceased) [2017] KEHC 1970 (KLR)”,*** wherein the Court discussed the legal requirements governing gifts made between living persons. The Counsel further cited the case of:- “***Re Estate of the Late Gedion Manthi Nzioka (Deceased) [2015] eKLR***, where the Court held that a valid gift inter vivos may be perfected through a registered transfer, declaration of trust or resulting trust, and once completed becomes irrevocable provided the donor has done everything necessary to divest himself of ownership. 36. The Learned Counsel opined that the evidence before the Court demonstrated that the Plaintiff voluntarily purchased Plot No. Kwale/Diani Beach/1711 from the 2nd and 3rd Interested Parties and caused it to be registered in the Defendant/Respondent's name as a completed gift motivated by love, affection and appreciation. The Counsel argued that having voluntarily divested himself of ownership, the Plaintiff could not subsequently revoke the gift merely because the relationship between the parties had broken down. 37. The Learned Counsel further submitted that the WhatsApp conversations produced by the Defendant/Respondent also revealed that the Plaintiff expressly agreed that she would retain motor vehicle bearing registration numbers KBE 44L Toyota Prado. The Counsel argued that any dispute relating to ownership of the motor vehicle fell outside the jurisdiction of the Environment and Land Court and was therefore irrelevant for purposes of determining the present application. 38. It was therefore the Learned Counsel's contention that the Defendant/Respondent had established that she was the lawful and indefeasible proprietor of Plot No. Kwale/Diani Beach/1711, having acquired the property lawfully through a completed gift and having been issued with a Certificate of Lease. Consequently, the Plaintiff had failed to establish any legal basis upon which the Court could interfere with her proprietary rights protected under the provision of Article 40 of the Constitution of Kenya, 2010. 39. The Learned Counsel submitted that the Plaintiff's own proposal to purchase the suit property from the Defendant/Respondent further constituted an admission that she was its registered owner. The Counsel argued that granting the injunctive orders sought would amount to an unjustified limitation of the Defendant/Respondent's constitutional right to acquire, own and enjoy property as guaranteed under the provision of Article 40 of the Constitution. 40. Turning to the second issue. The Learned Counsel opined that the Plaintiff had failed to satisfy the well-established principles governing the grant of interlocutory injunctions. The Counsel relied on the decision in the cases of “***Hezron Kamau Gichuru – Versus – Kianjoya Enterprises Limited & Another [2022] eKLR”***, “***Giella – Versus – Cassman Brown & Co. Ltd [Supra);*** and “***Nguruman Limited – Versus – Jan Bonde Nielsen (Supra)”***, wherein the Courts reaffirmed that an applicant must establish a prima facie case, demonstrate irreparable injury and show that the balance of convenience tilts in his favour. 41. The Learned Counsel emphasized that the three requirements for the grant of an interlocutory injunction were separate, distinct and cumulative hurdles which every applicant must satisfy before equitable relief could issue. It was submitted that failure to satisfy any one of the principles was sufficient to disentitle an applicant to the orders sought. 42. On whether the Applicant had established a prima facie case. The Learned Counsel submitted that the Plaintiff had failed to demonstrate any legally recognizable right capable of protection by way of an interlocutory injunction. The Counsel argued that whereas the Defendant/Respondent had produced her Certificate of Lease evidencing her ownership of Plot No. Kwale/Diani Beach/1711, the Plaintiff had failed to establish that he was the registered proprietor of the said parcel or that the Defendant/Respondent's title had been unlawfully acquired. Accordingly, the injunctive orders sought against the Defendant/Respondent in respect of the property were untenable. 43. The Learned Counsel relied on the decision of the Court of Appeal in “***Mrao Limited – Versus – First American Bank of Kenya Limited & 2 Others [2003] eKLR”***, wherein a prima facie case was defined as a case which, on the material presented before the Court, discloses an apparent infringement of a right requiring an explanation or rebuttal from the opposite party. The Counsel submitted that the Plaintiff had failed to satisfy this threshold since no evidence had been tendered demonstrating any infringement of a legal right in respect of Plot No. Kwale/Diani Beach/1711. 44. It was the Learned Counsel's submission that the Defendant/Respondent had, on the other hand, demonstrated that she was the lawful registered proprietor of the suit property and that her constitutional right to peaceful possession and enjoyment of the property deserved protection. Consequently, granting the orders sought would unjustifiably interfere with her proprietary rights guaranteed under the provision of Article 40 of the Constitution of Kenya, 2010. 45. On the question of irreparable injury. The Learned Counsel submitted that the Plaintiff had failed to demonstrate how he would suffer injury incapable of compensation by an award of damages should the application be declined. The Counsel argued that having failed to establish ownership over Plot No. Kwale/Diani Beach/1711, the Plaintiff could not reasonably contend that he would suffer irreparable harm if restrained from exercising rights over property registered in the Defendant/Respondent's name. 46. The Learned Counsel further relied on the decision in the case of:- “***Paul Gitonga Wanjau – Versus – Gathuthi Tea Factory Co. Limited & 2 Others, Nyeri HCCC No. 28 of 2015”***, wherein irreparable loss was described as injury or harm incapable of adequate compensation by an award of damages and which is continuous in nature. The Counsel submitted that the Plaintiff had not demonstrated any such injury and therefore failed to satisfy the second limb of the principles governing interlocutory injunctions. 47. The Learned Counsel accordingly submitted that the Plaintiff would suffer no prejudice if the orders sought were declined, whereas the Defendant/Respondent, being the registered proprietor of the property, stood to suffer unwarranted interference with her proprietary rights should the injunction be granted. 48. On the issue of the balance of convenience. The Learned Counsel contended that the balance overwhelmingly favoured the Defendant/Respondent. The Counsel submitted that granting the temporary injunction would unjustifiably curtail the Defendant/Respondent's constitutional right to peacefully own, occupy and enjoy her property notwithstanding that she remained the registered proprietor thereof. It was therefore urged that the Court ought to preserve the Defendant/Respondent's proprietary rights pending the hearing and determination of the suit. 49. Regarding the issue of costs. The Learned Counsel submitted that costs ordinarily follow the event and that a successful litigant is entitled to recover the costs of litigation unless the Court, for good reason, orders otherwise. The Counsel argued that the Defendant/Respondent had incurred substantial expense in defending the application and should therefore be awarded the costs thereof. 50. In support of this submission, Learned Counsel relied on the decision in the case of:- “***Benedict Matheka Mulei – Versus – George Kinuthia [2017] eKLR”***, wherein the Court, while citing the case of:- “***Orix Oil (Kenya) Limited – Versus – Paul Kabeu & 2 Others [2014] eKLR”***, reaffirmed the principle that costs ordinarily follow the event and should be awarded to the successful party unless exceptional circumstances exist to justify a departure from that general rule. The Learned Counsel submitted that no such exceptional circumstances had been demonstrated in the present application. 51. On the burden and standard of proof, Learned Counsel submitted that the Plaintiff bore the legal burden of proving the allegations contained in the application. The Counsel relied on Section 107 of the Evidence Act, Cap. 80, which placed the burden of proof upon the party who asserts the existence of a fact. It was submitted that the Plaintiff had failed to discharge this statutory burden. 52. The Learned Counsel further referred the Court to Black's Law Dictionary (9th Edition) on the meaning of the standard of proof, Halsbury's Laws of England, 4th Edition, Volume 17, together with the decisions in the cases of:- “***Hellen Wangari Wangechi – Versus – Carumera Muthini Gathua [2005] eKLR”***, “***Rheir Shipping Co. S.A. – Versus – Edmunds [1955] 1 WLR 948”***, “***Britestone PTE Limited – Versus – Smith & Associates Far East Limited [2007] 4 SLR (R) 855”***, and “***Miller – Versus – Minister of Pensions [1947] 2 All ER 372”***, all of which emphasize that the legal burden remains upon the party asserting a fact and that civil claims must be proved on a balance of probabilities. Counsel submitted that the Plaintiff had failed to meet this evidentiary threshold. 53. In conclusion, Learned Counsel submitted that the Plaintiff had approached the Court after taking possession of Plot No. Kwale/Diani Beach/1711, changing the property's management and collecting rental income therefrom, thereby seeking equitable relief with unclean hands. The Counsel maintained that the Defendant/Respondent had established that she was the lawful registered proprietor of the suit property and that the Plaintiff had voluntarily transferred the property to her as a completed gift. The Court was therefore urged to find that the Plaintiff had failed to establish any basis for the grant of the interlocutory orders sought, dismiss the Notice of Motion application dated 24th November, 2025 with costs to the Defendant/Respondent, and uphold the Defendant/Respondent's constitutional right to the peaceful ownership and enjoyment of her property. **Analysis and Determination** 1. I have carefully considered the two (2) rival Notices of Motion applications dated 24th November, 2025 and 21st February, 2026 respectively, the affidavits in support thereof, the Replying Affidavits, the Further Affidavits, the rival written submissions filed by Learned Counsel for the respective parties, the myriad of authorities cited, the Constitution of Kenya, the relevant statutory provisions and the applicable principles of law. 2. In order to reach an informed, just, reasonable and fair decision, Honourable Court has crafted the following five (5) salient issues for its determination in relation to the instant application. These are: - 3. ***Whether the Plaintiff has established a case warranting the grant of interlocutory injunctive orders in the Notice of Motion application dated 24th November, 2025.*** 4. ***Whether the Defendant has established a case warranting the grant of interlocutory injunctive orders in the Notice of Motion application dated 21st February, 2026.*** 5. ***Whether orders relating to access, possession, preservation of the suit properties, restrictions against the titles and rental income should issue pending the hearing and determination of the suit.*** 6. ***Who should bear the costs of the two applications.*** ***ISSUE No. a). Whether the Plaintiff has established a case warranting the grant of interlocutory injunctive orders in the Notice of Motion application dated 24th November, 2025.*** 1. Under this sub – heading, the Honourable Court will endeavour to examine whether the Plaintiff/Applicant should be granted interlocutory injunctive orders as sought or not. The law regarding grant of interlocutory injunctions is found in the provision of Order 40 Rule 1 of the Civil Procedure Rules, 2010 which provide as follows:- **“Where in any suit it is proved by affidavit or otherwise:** 1. **That any property in dispute in a suit is in danger of being wasted, damaged or alienated by any party to the suit or wrongfully sold in execution of a decree;** 2. **That the Defendant threatens or intends to remove or dispose of his property in circumstances affording reasonable probability that the Plaintiff will or may be obstructed or delayed in the execution of any decree that may be passed against the Defendant in the suit, the court may by order grant a temporary injunction to restrain such act, or make such other order for the purpose of staying and preventing the wasting, damaging, alienation, sale, removal, or disposition of the property as the court thinks fit until the disposal of the suit or until further order.”** 3. Further, the principles upon which an interlocutory injunction may be granted are well settled in the famous case of ***“Giella – Versus - Cassman Brown & Co Limited (Supra)”.*** A litiganthas to establish “***a prima facie case”*** with a probability of success and an interlocutory injunction will not normally be granted unless the applicant might otherwise suffer irreparable injury which would not adequately be compensated by an award of damages. If in doubt, the court will decide the matter on a balance of convenience. 4. This is buttressed by the Court of Appeal in the case of “***Nguruman Limited – Versus – Jan Bonde (Supra)”****,* where they posited that the three limbs were sequential. The Court stated as follows: - ***“In an interlocutory injunction application, the applicant has to satisfy the triple requirements to;(a) establish his case only at a prima facie level, (b)demonstrate irreparable injury if a temporary injunction is not granted, and(c)ally any doubts as to (b) by showing that the balance of convenience is in his favour. These are the three pillars on which rests the foundation of any order of injunction, interlocutory or permanent. It is established that all the above three conditions and stages are to be applied as separate, distinct and logical hurdles which the applicant is expected to surmount sequentially. See the case of:- “Kenya Commercial Finance Co. Limited – Versus - Afraha Education Society [2001] Vol. 1 EA 86”. If the applicant establishes a prima facie case that alone is not sufficient basis to grant an interlocutory injunction, the court must further be satisfied that the injury the respondent will suffer, in the event the injunction is not granted, will be irreparable. In other words, if damages recoverable in law is an adequate remedy and the respondent is capable of paying, no interlocutory order of injunction should normally be granted, however strong the applicant’s claim may appear at that stage. If prima facie case is not established, then irreparable injury and balance of convenience need no consideration. The existence of a prima facie case does not permit “leap-frogging” by the applicant to injunction directly without crossing the other hurdles in between.”*** 1. The first test is the issue of a prima facie case. The words prima facie are derived from the Latin words “***prima facies”***, meaning first appearance or on the face of things**.** Oxford Dictionary of law – 7th Edition 2009 – Oxford University Pages 422 defined the term prima facie as ‘***a case that has been supported by sufficient evidence for it to be taken as proved should there be no adequate evidence to the contrary’*** 2. The Honorable Court is guided by the definition melted down in the case of “***MRAO Limited – Versus - First American Bank of Kenya Limited & 2 others (2003) KLR 125***”, whereby it stated:- ***“So what is a prima facie case, I would say that in civil cases it is a case in which on the material presented to the court a tribunal properly directing itself would conclude that there exists a right which has apparently been infringed by the opposite party as to call for an explanation or rebuttal from the latter”*** 1. Similarly, under the same breath, Court in the case of:- “***Mbuthia – Versus - Jimba credit Corporation Limited 988 KLR 1”,*** held that:- ***“In an application for interlocutory injunctions, the court is not required to make final findings of contested facts and law and the court should only weigh the relative strength of the party’s cases.”*** 1. Additionally, in the case of:- “***Edwin Kamau Muniu – Versus - Barclays Bank of Kenya Limited***” the court stated that:- ***“In an interlocutory application to determine the very issues which will be canvassed at the trial with finality All the court is entitled at this stage is whether the applicant is entitled to an injunction sought on the usual criteria.”*** 1. The Plaintiff's case is that he solely financed the purchase of all the three suit properties, negotiated directly with the vendors in Denmark, transferred all the purchase monies to the Defendant for purposes of facilitating the transactions and only caused one parcel of land known as LR. No. Kwale/Diani Beach Block/1711, to be temporarily registered in the Defendant's name as his nominee pending regularization of his immigration documentation and KRA registration in Kenya. He further contends that Block No.1003 was transferred into the Defendant's name without his authority nor consent. Thus, the Defendant therefore holds the properties in a resulting trust. 2. On the other hand, the Defendant does not seriously dispute that the Plaintiff financed the acquisition of the suit properties. Indeed, what is striking is that in her Further Replying Affidavit she expressly admits that the Plaintiff financed the purchase of all the properties. Nonetheless, her defence is that instead that Parcel No.1711 was voluntarily gifted to her by the Plaintiff as an expression of love, appreciation and gratitude for her contribution towards identifying, supervising and managing the acquisition and development of the properties. 3. Consequently, this Court observes that one of the most fundamental facts in dispute has substantially narrowed. There is little controversy that the Plaintiff was the source of the purchase funds. The real dispute is the legal effect of those payments. Did they create a resulting trust as alleged by the Plaintiff, or did they amount to a completed gift as asserted by the Defendant? 4. In the Court's considered view, that question cannot possibly be answered at the interlocutory stage. That it cannot be conclusively determined on affidavit evidence alone. The determination on this significant legal issue will require intensive interrogation and evaluation of oral testimony, examination of the parties' intention at the time of registration, scrutiny of the surrounding circumstances, analysis of the documentary evidence including the sale agreements, bank transfers, WhatsApp communications and the conduct of the parties before and after registration. That can only be practical during a full trial of the matter. 5. The Court also notes that both parties have exhibited extensive WhatsApp conversations which each party interprets differently. Whereas the Defendant relies upon those communications as demonstrating acknowledgment of a gift and subsequent negotiations to purchase her interest, the Plaintiff contends that the same communications merely constituted attempts at an amicable settlement after the Defendant refused to transfer properties allegedly held in trust. Whether those negotiations amounted to admissions against interest or were merely without-prejudice attempts at settlement once more can only be determined after evidence is led during the trial. 6. Similarly, the Defendant has argued that the Plaintiff acknowledged her ownership by preparing a settlement agreement proposing to purchase another house for her in Malindi together with other benefits. The Plaintiff, however, explains that those proposals were merely consideration for the Defendant relinquishing property held in trust. Again, these competing explanations cannot be conclusively resolved at this interlocutory stage. 7. More importantly, this Court takes judicial notice that under Kenyan law, registration of property in one person's name does not automatically extinguish equitable interests that may arise by operation of law. The provision of Sections 24, 25 and 28 of the Land Registration Act recognize overriding interests including trusts, while Section 107 of the Land Registration Act preserves the jurisdiction of courts to determine questions relating to trusts affecting registered land. 8. Equally, it is now settled law that where one person provides the purchase price while title is registered in another person's name, equity may, depending on the evidence, presume the existence of a resulting trust unless the circumstances demonstrate that the transfer was intended as a gift or advancement. Whether such presumption ultimately arises is itself a matter for trial. 9. Having considered the affidavits in their entirety, this Court is satisfied that the Plaintiff has demonstrated an arguable equitable claim over the suit properties. His assertion that he solely financed the acquisition has not been frivolously made and indeed finds partial support in the Defendant's own averments. Likewise, the Defendant has raised an equally arguable defence founded upon “***the doctrine of gift inter vivos”.*** 10. In the Court's respectful view, the existence of these competing equitable claims is itself sufficient to disclose a serious triable issue. The Plaintiff need not establish at this stage that the resulting trust actually exists. It is enough that the material placed before the Court demonstrates an apparent legal right requiring investigation during the substantive hearing. 11. Consequently, this Court finds that the Plaintiff has established a prima facie case with a probability of success within the meaning of the principles laid down in the case of “***Giella – Versus - Cassman Brown”*** and ***“Mrao Limited (Supra)”***. 12. Having found that the Plaintiff has established a prima facie case with a probability of success, this Court now proceeds to examine the second requirement for the grant of an interlocutory injunction, namely whether the Plaintiff has demonstrated that unless the orders sought are granted, he stands to suffer irreparable injury which cannot adequately be compensated by an award of damages. 13. The judicial decision of: “***Pius Kipchirchir Kogo – Versus - Frank Kimeli Tenai (2018) eKLR***” provides an explanation for what is meant by irreparable injury and it states:- ***“Irreparable injury means that the injury must be one that cannot be adequately compensated for in damages and that the existence of a prima facie case is not itself sufficient. The Applicant should further show that irreparable injury will occur to him if the injunction is not granted and there is no other remedy open to him by which he will protect himself from the consequences of the apprehended injury.”*** 1. In the case of:- “***American Cyanamid Co v Ethicon Ltd [1975] AC 396”*** (adopted and applied by Kenyan courts including in the case of:- “***Stanley Kangethe Kinyanjui – Versus - Tony Ketter & 5 others [2013] eKLR)”***, it was held that where damages would be an adequate remedy and the respondent is in a position to pay them, the court should not normally grant an injunction. 2. The Plaintiff contends that he solely financed the acquisition of the three suit properties and that the Defendant has already demonstrated an intention to deprive him of his proprietary interests by changing locks, dismissing his caretakers, assuming exclusive possession, collecting rental income and registering one of the properties in her own name without his consent. He further deposes that unless restrained, the Defendant may dispose of, transfer, lease, charge or otherwise alienate the properties thereby defeating his beneficial interest before the suit is heard and determined. 3. The Defendant, on the other hand, argues that there is no imminent threat of disposal of the properties. She maintains that she has no intention of selling, charging or transferring the properties and therefore the Plaintiff's fears are speculative. She further submits that being the registered proprietor, she merely seeks to enjoy the proprietary rights guaranteed under Article 40 of the Constitution and that any financial loss suffered by the Plaintiff can adequately be compensated by damages should he ultimately succeed. 4. The Court has carefully considered these competing positions. It is true that the Defendant has expressly denied any present intention of disposing of the suit properties. However, it is equally true that this denial alone cannot conclusively eliminate the risk complained of by the Plaintiff. Courts exercising equitable jurisdiction are required to evaluate not merely the present assurances given by parties but also the surrounding circumstances and the conduct exhibited before commencement of the litigation. 5. The material placed before this Court demonstrates that the relationship between the parties has irretrievably broken down. It is not disputed that they were previously in a romantic relationship which has since come to an end. The affidavits disclose allegations and counter-allegations of breach of trust, removal of household goods, replacement of caretakers, change of locks, interference with rental collections, engagement of private security personnel, police reports, proposed settlement agreements and complete collapse of communication between the parties. These facts paint a picture of parties whose mutual confidence has completely evaporated. 6. In the Court's assessment, once trust has broken down to such an extent, the possibility of unilateral dealings with the suit properties cannot be dismissed as fanciful or remote. Indeed, each party accuses the other of taking steps to assert exclusive control over the properties. The Plaintiff accuses the Defendant of secretly registering Parcel No.1003 in her name, while the Defendant accuses the Plaintiff of taking over management, changing tenancy arrangements and diverting rental income. These allegations underscore the existence of a real contest over possession, management and ownership of the suit properties. 7. It is also noteworthy that two of the suit properties comprise developed residential and rental units generating rental income. Such income-producing properties are not merely parcels of land in the abstract. They constitute commercial investments whose ownership, possession, management and goodwill may substantially change during the pendency of litigation if adequate preservation measures are not put in place. 8. This Court is alive to the long-settled principle that land occupies a unique position in Kenyan jurisprudence. Unlike ordinary commercial goods, land possesses a special character arising from its permanence, uniqueness and constitutional protection. It is for this reason that Courts have consistently held that damages are not always an adequate remedy where proprietary rights over land are threatened. 9. The provision of Article 40 of the Constitution guarantees every person the right to acquire and own property of any description in any part of Kenya. Correspondingly, the Environment and Land Court is constitutionally mandated under Article 162(2)(b) and Section 13 of the Environment and Land Court Act to safeguard rights and interests in land pending the determination of disputes. Preservation of disputed property therefore forms an integral aspect of the Court's constitutional mandate. 10. In the present case, the Plaintiff claims not merely a monetary investment but an equitable proprietary interest arising from his alleged financing of the acquisition of the suit properties. Such an interest, if ultimately established at trial, would not merely entitle him to reimbursement of monies expended but could confer upon him beneficial ownership over the disputed properties. Consequently, reducing the dispute solely to one of financial compensation would prematurely determine substantive issues reserved for trial. 11. Furthermore, should the Defendant alienate, charge or transfer any of the suit properties to third parties during the pendency of the suit, the litigation would undoubtedly become more complicated. The Court may be required to determine the rights of innocent purchasers for value without notice, financiers or other third parties who are presently not before the Court. Such eventualities may render the final determination of the suit exceedingly difficult and may substantially prejudice whichever party ultimately succeeds. 12. The Court is equally persuaded that the Plaintiff's apprehension cannot be dismissed merely because the Defendant has stated that she presently has no intention of disposing of the properties. Human intentions are capable of changing, particularly where parties are involved in highly contested litigation touching on substantial investments and where their personal relationship has irretrievably collapsed. It is precisely for such situations that interlocutory preservation orders exist—to maintain the subject matter of litigation intact until the Court pronounces itself finally. 13. That said, this Court must also exercise caution not to equate every allegation concerning land with irreparable injury. Where the dispute is purely one of monetary reimbursement, damages may indeed suffice. However, where, as here, the dispute concerns competing claims of legal and beneficial ownership over developed income-generating properties and where both parties assert proprietary rights founded upon entirely different legal doctrines—resulting trust on one hand and gift inter vivos on the other—the potential prejudice transcends mere financial loss. 14. The Court further observes that one of the substantive prayers in the Plaint seeks declarations relating to ownership, trust and proprietary rights over the suit properties. If, before those questions are determined, the properties are transferred, encumbered or otherwise substantially altered, the substratum of the suit may be irreversibly affected. Such a result would undermine the very purpose of the pending proceedings. 15. In the circumstances of this case, this Court is satisfied that the Plaintiff has demonstrated a real risk that the subject matter of the litigation may be altered or dissipated before the suit is heard. Such injury, once occasioned, may not be adequately remedied by an award of damages alone, particularly where proprietary interests in land and equitable rights are directly in issue. 16. Accordingly, this Court finds that the Plaintiff has satisfactorily demonstrated that unless appropriate preservatory orders are granted, he stands to suffer irreparable injury incapable of adequate compensation by an award of damages. The second limb of the Giella principles is therefore equally satisfied. 17. Having found that the Plaintiff has established both a prima facie case with a probability of success and that he stands to suffer irreparable injury, this Court now turns to the third consideration, namely whether the balance of convenience tilts in favour of granting or refusing the interlocutory reliefs sought. That issue shall now be considered. 18. In the case of:- “***Butt – Versus - Rent Restriction Tribunal [1982] KLR 418’***, the Court held:- ***"In considering the balance of convenience, the court must have regard to the strength of the respective cases and the likely outcome of the main suit."*** 1. In the case of “***Pius Kipchirchir Kogo (Supra)”*** which defined the concept of balance of convenience as:- ***“The meaning of balance of convenience will favour of the Plaintiff' is that if an injunction is not granted and the Suit is ultimately decided in favour of the Plaintiffs, the inconvenience caused to the Plaintiff would be greater than that which would be caused to the Defendants if an injunction is granted but the suit is ultimately dismissed. Although it is called balance of convenience it is really the balance of inconvenience and it is for the Plaintiffs to show that the inconvenience caused to them will be greater than that which may be caused to the Defendants. Inconvenience be equal, it is the Plaintiff who will suffer.*** ***In other words, the Plaintiff has to show that the comparative mischief from the inconvenience which is likely to arise from withholding the injunction will be greater than that which is likely to arise from granting”.*** 1. Further, in the case of:- “***Paul Gitonga Wanjau – Versus - Gathuthis Tea Factor Company Limited & 2 others (2016) eKLR”,*** the court dealing with the issue of balance of convenience expressed itself thus:- ***“Where any doubt exists as to the Applicants’ right, or if the right is not disputed, but its violation is denied, the court, in determining whether an interlocutory injunction should be granted, takes into consideration the balance of convenience to the parties and the nature of the injury which the Respondent on the other hand, would suffer if the injunction was granted and he should ultimately turn out to be right and that which the Applicant, on the other hand, might sustain if the injunction was refused and he should ultimately turn out to be right... Thus, the court makes a determination as to which party will suffer the greater harm with the outcome of the motion. If Applicant has a strong case on the merits or there is significant irreparable harm, it may influence the balance in favour of granting an injunction. The court will seek to maintain the status quo in determining where the balance of convenience lies.”*** 1. The decision of “***Amir Suleiman – Versus - Amboseli Resort Limited [2004] eKLR”*** where the learned judge offered further elaboration on what is meant by **“balance of convenience”** and stated:- ***“The court in responding to prayers for interlocutory injunctive reliefs should always opt for the lower rather than the higher risk of injustice.”*** 1. Where the Court is in doubt, the grant of an injunction is determined on the balance of convenience. This means the Court weighs the relative harm that would be suffered by each party if the injunction were granted or refused. 2. In the case of:- “***Nguruman Ltd – Versus - Jan Bonde Nielsen & 2 others (Supra)”***, the Court of Appeal stated: ***"The balance of convenience test is applied only if the court is unable to make a determination on the first two Giella tests. It is a residual test. It entails a weighing of the harm that would be caused to each party by a refusal or grant of the injunction."*** 1. The doctrine of balance of convenience becomes particularly relevant where granting or refusing an injunction may occasion hardship to either party. It requires the Court to weigh the comparative inconvenience likely to be suffered by each side and determine which course best serves the interests of justice pending the final hearing of the suit. 2. The guiding objective is not to determine the substantive rights of the parties but to preserve the subject matter of the dispute in a manner that minimizes prejudice to either party until the issues in controversy are finally resolved. In this regard, the Court must adopt the course that is least likely to occasion injustice. 3. This dispute presents an unusual factual scenario. Unlike the ordinary land dispute where one party is in exclusive possession and the other merely seeks preservation, the present dispute concerns parties who each claim proprietary interests over the same developments, each accuses the other of unlawful interference and each seeks exclusive control over the properties pending trial. 4. The Plaintiff asserts that he financed the acquisition of all the suit properties and therefore possesses the beneficial interest therein. Conversely, the Defendant maintains that Parcel No. Kwale/Diani Beach Block/1711 was voluntarily gifted to her and that she has since managed the developments and enjoyed the incidents of ownership. The Defendant further contends that the Plaintiff has unlawfully assumed management of the rental units and diverted rental income. 5. Consequently, this Court is not confronted with a situation where only one party stands to suffer prejudice. Both parties have demonstrated that they have substantial interests requiring protection pending the hearing of the suit. 6. The Court has equally considered that Parcel Nos. Kwale/Diani Beach Block/1002 and Kwale/Diani Beach Block/1003 appear to remain the subject of ongoing contractual arrangements with the Interested Parties, while Parcel No. Kwale/Diani Beach Block/1711 is already registered in the Defendant's name. Further, all three parcels comprise developed residential premises generating rental income and requiring continuous maintenance, supervision and management. 7. It follows therefore that an order granting either party exclusive control over all the suit properties at this interlocutory stage would substantially determine rights that remain hotly contested and which ought properly to await the full hearing of the suit. 8. Courts exercising equitable jurisdiction have consistently emphasized that interlocutory applications should never be used as instruments for obtaining final relief before trial. The Court must therefore avoid making orders which, though interlocutory in form, effectively determine the substantive dispute. 9. The Plaintiff has sought unrestricted access to Villa/House B, authority to undertake repairs, maintenance, management of the suit properties and unrestricted use of the residential premises whenever he is in Kenya. On the other hand, the Defendant seeks orders completely excluding the Plaintiff from entering Parcel No.1711 while simultaneously recognizing herself as the exclusive recipient of rental income. 10. If this Court were to grant the Plaintiff unrestricted access as prayed, the Defendant's claim that she is the lawful proprietor of Parcel No.1711 would effectively be undermined before trial. Equally, if the Court were to restrain the Plaintiff entirely from accessing or participating in the management of the developments, his claim as the alleged financier and beneficial owner would equally suffer prejudice before the issues are determined. 11. The Court must therefore strike a delicate balance between protecting the registered legal interest presently held by the Defendant and preserving the equitable proprietary interest asserted by the Plaintiff. Equity demands that neither party be permitted to obtain an unfair tactical advantage during the pendency of the proceedings. 12. The Court has also taken into account that the Plaintiff is admittedly the person who provided the financial resources for the acquisition of the properties, a fact substantially admitted in the Defendant's Further Replying Affidavit. At the same time, the Defendant remains the registered proprietor of Parcel No.1711 and asserts that she personally supervised the acquisition, renovations, construction, employment of workers and day-to-day management of the developments over an extended period. 13. These competing interests reinforce the Court's conclusion that preservation, rather than conferment of exclusive possession upon either party, best serves the ends of justice. 14. This Court is guided by the overriding objective under the provision of Sections 1A and 1B of the Civil Procedure Act, Cap. 21 and Section 3 of the Environment & Land Court Act, No. 19 of 2011 which obligates the Court to facilitate the just, expeditious, proportionate and affordable resolution of disputes. Granting either party unrestricted control over the suit properties at this stage would likely escalate the existing conflict, increase hostility between the parties and potentially generate additional satellite litigation concerning possession, management and rental collections. 15. Thus, preserving the existing state of affairs while preventing either party from alienating, charging, transferring or otherwise substantially altering the status of the suit properties best protects the competing interests pending the hearing of the suit. 16. The Court also bears in mind the equitable maxim that where the rights of parties remain uncertain, the safest course is to preserve the property in dispute until those rights are finally determined. Such preservation ensures that the eventual Judgment of the Court is not rendered nugatory. 17. In the present case, the greatest prejudice would arise not from maintaining the status quo but from permitting either party to exercise unfettered proprietary powers capable of permanently altering the ownership, possession or financial structure of the disputed properties before trial. 18. It is therefore the considered finding of this Court that the balance of convenience overwhelmingly favours preservation of the suit properties in their present condition pending the hearing and determination of the suit. Such preservation adequately protects both the Plaintiff's alleged beneficial interest and the Defendant's registered legal interest without prematurely determining the substantive issues in controversy. 19. Consequently, this Court is satisfied that the Plaintiff has met all the three requirements governing the grant of interlocutory injunctive relief as set out in the case of:- “***Giella – Versus – Cassman Brown (Supra)*** and subsequently re - affirmed in he case of:- “***Nguruman Limited (Supra)”*** 20. However, the Court hastens to emphasize that the injunction to be granted shall not amount to a declaration of ownership in favour of the Plaintiff nor an endorsement of the Defendant's claim of “***gift inter vivos***”. Rather, it shall serve the limited purpose of preserving the subject matter of this litigation until the parties' respective claims founded upon resulting trust, beneficial ownership, gift inter vivos and legal title are fully ventilated through oral evidence at the trial. 21. Having reached the foregoing conclusion regarding the Plaintiff's application, the Court shall now proceed to consider the Defendant's Notice of Motion application dated 21st February, 2026, which seeks competing injunctive reliefs against the Plaintiff. The determination of that application necessarily calls for consideration of whether the Defendant has independently satisfied the legal threshold for the grant of an interlocutory injunction. ***ISSUE No. b) Whether the Defendant has established a case warranting the grant of interlocutory injunctive orders in the Notice of Motion application dated 21st February, 2026.*** 1. As indicated, having determined the Plaintiff's application dated 24th November, 2025, this Court now turns to the Defendant's Notice of Motion application dated 21st February, 2026. Through the said application, the Defendant principally seeks orders restraining the Plaintiff from entering upon or interfering with Parcel No. Kwale/Diani Beach Block/1711, directing the Plaintiff to deposit rental income into Court, restraining him from collecting rent or managing the premises, together with other consequential reliefs pending the hearing and determination of the suit. 2. Although the Defendant is the Respondent in the Plaintiff's application, she assumes the position of an Applicant in her own Motion. Consequently, the burden lies upon her to independently satisfy the well-established principles governing the grant of interlocutory injunctions as enunciated in “***Giella – Versus – Cassman Brown & Co (Supra)”*** and elaborated in “***Nguruman Limited (Supra)***. 3. It is therefore incumbent upon the Defendant to establish: that she has a prima facie case with a probability of success; that she stands to suffer irreparable injury incapable of compensation by damages if the orders sought are declined; and where doubt exists, that the balance of convenience tilts in her favour. 1. The Defendant's application is substantially premised on four principal grounds. First, that she is the registered proprietor of all that parcel of land known as LR No. Kwale/Diani Beach Block/1711. Secondly, that the Plaintiff voluntarily gifted the property to her during the subsistence of their romantic relationship. Thirdly, that following the breakdown of the relationship, the Plaintiff unlawfully entered the premises, interfered with her possession, assumed management of the rental units and diverted rental income. Lastly, she contends that unless restrained, the Plaintiff will continue interfering with her constitutional right to peacefully own and enjoy the property. 2. This Court has anxiously weighed the Defendant's application against the threefold test in the case of:- ***Giella – Versus – Cassman Brown & Co. Ltd (Supra)***. On the first limb, the starting point is the undisputed fact that, currently the Defendant is the registered proprietor of Parcel No. Kwale/Diani Beach Block/1711, holding a Certificate of Lease issued on 23rd April, 2025 which she has exhibited before this Court. 3. The provision of Section 24 (a) of the Land Registration Act, No. 3 of 2012 provides that the registration of a person as the proprietor of land vests in that person the absolute ownership of that land together with all rights and privileges belonging or appurtenant thereto. Under the provision of Section 25 (1) of the same Act declares that the rights of a registered proprietor are not liable to be defeated except as provided in the Act and shall be held free from all other interests and claims whatsoever, subject only to the leases, charges and encumbrances shown in the register and to such overriding interests as are declared under Section 28. Further, Section 26(1) commands that the certificate of title shall be taken by all courts as prima facie evidence that the person named as proprietor is the absolute and indefeasible owner, subject only to challenge on the grounds of fraud or misrepresentation to which the person is proved to be a party, or where the certificate has been acquired illegally, unprocedurally or through a corrupt scheme. 4. At this interlocutory stage, this Court is neither required nor permitted to investigate the root of the Defendant's title. As was correctly observed by the Court of Appeal in “***Munyu Maina – Versus – Hiram Gathiha Maina [Supra)***, the burden of demonstrating the legality of acquisition only crystallizes for final determination once the root of title is put in issue at the trial. For present purposes, it suffices that on the face of the material presented, the Defendant holds a registered legal interest which the law presumptively protects and which enjoys the constitutional guarantee of Article 40 of the Constitution of Kenya, 2010. 5. Significantly, the Plaintiff does not deny that, from about October, 2025, he assumed control of the rental units erected on Parcel No. 1711, altered the tenancy and management arrangements, changed the mode and destination of rent payment and has since been collecting the rental income. Indeed, in his Further Affidavit sworn on 14th April, 2026, the Plaintiff expressly asserts that he was *“well within his rights as the beneficial owner and true purchaser of the property to recover possession and control of the rental incomes.”* These admitted acts of self-help, exercised against property registered in the Defendant's name, constitute, on the test enunciated in the case of:- “***Mrao Limited (Supra)”***, an apparent infringement of the Defendant's registered proprietary rights calling for an explanation or rebuttal from the Plaintiff. 6. The Plaintiff's rebuttal is, of course, his claim of a resulting trust. But that claim is precisely what awaits determination at the trial. Just as this Court has declined to treat the Defendant's registration as conclusive against the Plaintiff's equitable claim, it must, by parity of reasoning, decline to treat the Plaintiff's trust claim as conclusive against the Defendant's registration. The two propositions cut in the same direction: at this interlocutory stage, each party enjoys an arguable and apparently protectable interest in the suit property. 7. Consequently, this Court finds and holds that the Defendant has equally established a prima facie case in respect of Parcel No. Kwale/Diani Beach Block/1711. The Court however hastens to repeat the caveat expressed earlier in this Ruling: this finding is not, and shall not be construed as, a determination that the property was a completed gift inter vivos, any more than the corresponding finding in the Plaintiff's favour amounted to a declaration of a resulting trust. 8. Turning to the second limb, the question is whether the Defendant has demonstrated that she stands to suffer irreparable injury incapable of adequate atonement by an award of damages should the orders sought be withheld. Insofar as the Defendant's complaint concerns the diversion of rental income. This Court observes that rental income is, by its very nature, readily quantifiable in monetary terms. Should the Defendant ultimately succeed at the trial, an order for an account of all rents received, together with interest, would substantially restore her to the position she would otherwise have occupied. Guided by the decision in the case of “***Pius Kipchirchir Kogo – Versus – Frank Kimeli Tenai (Supra),*** the diversion of rent, standing alone, would not amount to irreparable injury. 9. The Defendant's complaint is, however, not confined to rent. She deposes that the Plaintiff, acting through his agents, has broken certain sections of the premises and is in the process of changing the nature and character of the developments without her consent. The Plaintiff, for his part, denies any demolition and maintains that the only works undertaken were urgent preservation repairs occasioned by leaking roofs and compromised plumbing which the Defendant allegedly left unattended. Whether the works in question amount to necessary repairs or to unauthorized structural alterations is a contested question of fact incapable of resolution on affidavit evidence. What is beyond argument, however, is that the physical alteration of developed premises, if indeed it is occurring, is capable of irreversibly changing the character and identity of the suit property in a manner that no award of damages could fully undo. 10. Moreover, the continued exclusion of a registered proprietor from property registered in her name engages considerations beyond the merely pecuniary. It touches upon the constitutional guarantee under Article 40 of the Constitution and upon this Court's mandate under the provision of Article 162(2)(b) of the Constitution and Section 13 of the Environment and Land Court Act to safeguard interests in land pending the resolution of disputes. 11. This Court therefore entertains genuine doubt on the second limb: the monetary component of the Defendant's grievance is compensable in damages, while the risk of physical alteration of the substratum is not. In accordance with the sequence prescribed in the case of:- “***Giella – Versus – Cassman Brown (Supra)”,*** where the Court is in doubt, the application falls to be determined on the balance of convenience. 12. On the balance of convenience, the analysis undertaken at the contents of Paragraphs 110 to 127 of this Ruling applies with equal force, in reverse, to the Defendant's application. To grant the Defendant's prayer excluding the Plaintiff entirely from Parcel No. 1711 would effectively prejudge and defeat the Plaintiff's trust claim before it is heard. Conversely, to leave the Plaintiff with an unfettered hand over the premises and the rental income would effectively nullify the Defendant's registered interest before her Statement of Defence and Counter - Claim of “***gift inter vivos”*** is heard. Neither outcome would serve the interests of justice. 13. The just and equitable middle course, consistent with the preservation approach this Court has already adopted, is that neither party should collect and apply the rental income from the suit properties as of right during the pendency of this suit. The income constitutes fruits of the very substratum in dispute and ought itself to be preserved so that it abides the outcome of the trial and follows whichever party is ultimately vindicated. 14. In this connection, the Court has noted that prayer (e) of the Defendant's Motion seeks the deposit of rent “with effect from the month of October, 2026.” It is evident from the body of the Supporting Affidavit, and in particular paragraph xvi thereof wherein the Defendant deposes that the Plaintiff began collecting rent from October, 2025, that the reference to October, 2026 is a typographical error. This Court, in the exercise of its discretion and in keeping with the overriding objective under Sections 1A and 1B of the Civil Procedure Act, Cap. 21 shall read and treat the prayer as referring to October 2025. 15. As regards the Defendant's implicit prayer for restoration of exclusive occupation and management of Parcel No. 1711, this Court declines the invitation. It is common ground that the Defendant physically left the suit premises on or about 30th November, 2025; whether she departed voluntarily, as the Plaintiff contends and as the video recordings exhibited are said to show, or under duress and threats, as she contends, is itself a hotly contested issue reserved for trial. An order restoring possession at this interlocutory stage would not preserve the status quo; it would alter it, and in so doing would determine contested questions of fact and law prematurely. 16. Accordingly, and applying the counsel of prudence in the case of “***Amir Suleiman – Versus – Amboseli Resort Limited (Supra)”*** that the Court should always opt for the lower rather than the higher risk of injustice, this Court finds that the Defendant's Notice of Motion application dated 21st February, 2026 succeeds in part, to the extent of the preservatory and rent-deposit orders hereinafter appearing, and fails to the extent that it seeks the total exclusion of the Plaintiff from the suit property and the recognition of the Defendant as the exclusive recipient of the rental income pending trial. ***ISSUE No. c)* *Whether orders relating to access, possession, preservation of the suit properties, restrictions against the titles and rental income should issue pending the hearing and determination of the suit.*** 1. The two rival applications, considered together, converge upon a single destination: the preservation of the suit properties, their titles, their physical condition and their income, pending the trial. The Court shall therefore craft a composite set of orders that holds the ring evenly between the parties. 2. First, as to the three ( 3 ) titles. The provision of Section 76(1) of the Land Registration Act, 2012 empowers the Registrar, on the order of the Court, to register a restriction prohibiting or restricting dealings with any land, lease or charge where it is necessary to prevent fraud or improper dealing or for any other sufficient cause. In view of the competing claims of resulting trust and gift inter vivos, the broken-down relationship between the parties, the admitted default under the loan agreement of 25th April, 2025 in respect of which a demand has issued, and the risk of alienation or encumbrance to third parties, this Court is satisfied that sufficient cause exists for the entry of restrictions against all three titles. The restrictions shall bind both parties equally. 3. Secondly, as to the white cards. The production of certified copies of the parcel files and Green cards for LR. No. Kwale/Diani Beach Block/1711, 1002 and 1003 will assist the Court at the trial in tracing the history of the registrations, including the impugned registration of Parcel No.1003 in the Defendant's name. The Land Registrar, Kwale shall accordingly be directed to avail the said vital documents. 4. Thirdly, as to the rental income. All rent accruing from the developments erected on Parcel Nos. Kwale/Diani Beach Block/1711 and 1003 from the date of this Ruling shall be deposited into a joint interest-earning account to be opened in the joint names of the advocates for the Plaintiff and the Defendant in a reputable commercial bank, which account shall abide the outcome of this suit. The Plaintiff, having admitted collecting rent from October, 2025 to date, shall render and file a full and accurate account, supported by documents, of all rents collected from the suit properties from 1st October, 2025 to the date of this Ruling. 5. The Court is alive to the fact that the suit properties are developed, occupied and income-generating, and that they require continuous maintenance, security, utilities and the settlement of statutory outgoings such as land rent and rates. Provision shall therefore be made for the defrayment of such necessary outgoings from the joint account, but only upon the written concurrence of both counsel or, in default of concurrence, with the leave of the Court. 6. Fourthly, as to occupation and access. The status quo presently obtaining, namely that the Plaintiff is in occupation of Villa/House B on Parcel No. Kwale/Diani Beach Block/1003 and the existing tenants remain in occupation of their respective units, shall be maintained. Neither party shall evict, exclude or interfere with the existing tenants, nor let out any vacant unit to new tenants, nor terminate any existing tenancy, without the written consent of the other party or the leave of the Court. The Defendant shall be at liberty to access the suit properties for purposes of inspection upon issuing forty-eight (48) hours' written notice to the Plaintiff through counsel, and shall not be obstructed in so doing. Neither party shall carry out any demolition, structural alteration, renovation or change of user upon the suit properties, save for urgent and necessary repairs undertaken with the written consent of the other party or the leave of the Court. 7. Fifthly, both parties, their agents, servants, employees and assigns shall be and are hereby mutually restrained on “***the doctrine of Lis Pendens”*** from selling, transferring, charging, leasing, sub-dividing, or in any other manner alienating or encumbering the suit properties pending the hearing and determination of this suit, and shall further refrain from threatening, intimidating, harassing or otherwise interfering with each other, their respective employees, agents or the tenants in occupation. 8. Sixthly, as to motor vehicle bearing the registration number KBE 444L Toyota Prado. This Court agrees with the Plaintiff's Grounds of Opposition and with the submission of Counsel for the Defendant on this point: the ownership of a motor vehicle does not fall within the jurisdiction conferred upon this Court by Article 162(2)(b) of the Constitution and Section 13 of the Environment and Land Court Act, which is confined to disputes relating to the environment and the use and occupation of, and title to, land. No orders shall therefore issue in respect of the motor vehicle, and the parties are at liberty to pursue that grievance before a court of competent jurisdiction. 9. Finally, the Court observes that the interlocutory orders herein necessarily curtail the freedoms of both parties over substantial investments. It is therefore in the interest of both parties, and consonant with the overriding objective, that this suit proceeds to trial with expedition. Directions towards that end shall issue. ***ISSUE No. d).*** ***Who should bear the costs of the two applications.*** 1. Under this sub ‑ heading the Honourable Court will decipher whether costs should be awarded to the Applicants or the Plaintiff/Respondent, and the principles guiding such determination. The Proviso of Section 27 (1) of the Civil Procedure Rules Cap. 21 holds that Costs follow the events. By the event, it means outcome or result of any legal action. This principle encourages responsible litigation and motivates parties to pursue valid claims. See the cases of ***“Harun Mutwiri – Versus - Nairobi City County Government [2018] eKLR”*** and ***“Kenya Union of Commercial, Food and Allied Workers – Versus - Bidco Africa Limited & Another [2015] eKLR”***, the court reaffirmed that the successful party is typically entitled to costs, unless there are compelling reasons for the court to decide otherwise. In the case of ***“Hussein Muhumed Sirat – Versus - Attorney General & Another [2017] eKLR”***, the court stated that costs follow the event as a well-established legal principle, and the successful party is entitled to costs unless there are other exceptional circumstances. 2. In the present matter, both parties sought costs of their respective applications. The Plaintiff, in his Notice of Motion application dated 24th November 2025, urged the Court to grant the preservatory orders sought together with the costs of the application. On the other hand, the Defendant, through her Notice of Motion application dated 21st February, 2026, similarly prayed that her application be allowed with costs, contending that she was the registered proprietor of Kwale/Diani Beach Block/1711 and that the Plaintiff had unlawfully interfered with her proprietary rights and management of the suit property. 3. Having carefully analysed both applications, this Court has found that neither party has succeeded wholly nor failed entirely. The Plaintiff has succeeded in obtaining preservatory orders restraining dealings with the suit properties and directing the registration of restrictions over the titles. Equally, the Defendant has succeeded in persuading the Court that the status quo concerning the management and preservation of the properties should be maintained and that neither party ought to enjoy exclusive possession or management pending the hearing of the main suit. Conversely, each party has failed in respect of the more far-reaching and exclusive injunctive reliefs sought against the other. 4. It is therefore evident that the orders ultimately issued by this Court are neither a complete victory for the Plaintiff nor for the Defendant. Rather, the Court has exercised its equitable jurisdiction to fashion balanced preservatory orders aimed at safeguarding the suit properties, preserving the rental income, maintaining the status quo, and protecting the competing legal and equitable interests of both parties pending the final determination of the substantive dispute. These orders are not determinative of the parties' respective proprietary rights but are intended solely to preserve the subject matter of the litigation. 5. In the circumstances of this case, this Court finds no successful or unsuccessful party in the strict sense contemplated under Section 27(1) of the Civil Procedure Act. The competing applications arose from the same factual matrix and each application has succeeded in part and failed in part. More importantly, the Court has deliberately fashioned preservatory orders that hold the scales evenly between the parties pending the hearing and determination of the suit. 6. Accordingly, and in the exercise of the discretion conferred upon this Court under Section 27(1) of the Civil Procedure Act, this Court finds that the interests of justice will best be served by directing that the costs of both Notice of Motion applications shall abide the outcome of the main suit, where the successful party shall ordinarily be entitled to recover such costs unless the trial Court orders otherwise for sufficient cause. This order, in the Court's considered view, fairly reflects the partial success achieved by each party while avoiding the premature penalization of either litigant before the substantive issues in controversy have been finally adjudicated. **Conclusion and Disposition.** 1. Ultimately, having carefully considered the two Notices of Motion applications dated 24th November, 2025 and 21st February, 2026, the rival affidavits together with the annextures thereto, the comprehensive written submissions filed by Learned Counsel for the respective parties, the applicable constitutional, statutory and equitable principles, as well as the judicial authorities cited herein, this Honourable Court is satisfied that the justice of this case lies not in determining the parties' proprietary rights at this interlocutory stage, but in preserving the suit properties and maintaining the status quo pending the hearing and final determination of the substantive suit. Consequently, and for the foregoing reasons, the Honourable Court hereby makes the following orders:- 2. **THAT the Notice of Motion application dated 24th November, 2025 by the Plaintiff herein be and is hereby allowed only to the extent that preservatory orders are necessary for the protection of the suit properties pending the hearing and determination of the main suit.** 3. **THAT the Notice of Motion application dated 21st February, 2026 by the Defendants be and is hereby allowed only to the extent that preservatory orders are necessary to safeguard the suit properties and maintain the prevailing status quo pending the hearing and determination of the suit.** 4. **THAT pending the hearing and determination of this suit, along with “*the Doctrine of Lis pendens”*, the a temporary injunction be and is hereby issued restraining both the Plaintiff and the Defendant, whether by themselves, their servants, agents, employees or any other persons acting under their authority, from selling, transferring, charging, leasing, mortgaging, sub - dividing, alienating, wasting, or in any manner whatsoever dealing with Land Parcel Numbers Kwale/Diani Beach Block/1711, Kwale/Diani Beach Block/1002 and Kwale/Diani Beach Block/1003 without the prior leave of this Honourable Court.** 5. **THAT pursuant to the provisions of Sections 76 and 78 of the Land Registration Act, No. 3 of 2012, the Land Registrar, Kwale County, be and is hereby directed to forthwith register restrictions against the titles to Kwale/Diani Beach Block/1711, Kwale/Diani Beach Block/1002 and Kwale/Diani Beach Block/1003 prohibiting any registration of transfers, charges, leases, cautions, subdivisions or any other dealings therewith without an order of this Honourable Court pending the hearing and determination of the suit.** 6. **THAT pending the hearing and determination of this suit, neither party shall interfere with the existing occupation of the tenants, terminate tenancy arrangements, appoint or dismiss caretakers or employees, substantially renovate, demolish, alter, waste, damage or otherwise interfere with the existing management and preservation of the suit properties except with the leave of this Honourable Court or by mutual written consent of the parties.** 7. **THAT all rental income generated from the suit properties shall first be applied strictly towards the payment of legitimate operational expenses, including statutory outgoings, staff salaries, utilities, repairs, maintenance and preservation of the developments, and any net surplus remaining thereafter shall be deposited into a joint interest-earning account to be opened and operated in the joint names of Messrs. Joram Wang’ombe & Associates Advocates and Messrs. Muoko & Company Advocates for the Plaintiff and the Defendant WITHIN THIRTY (30) DAYS from the date hereof, pending the hearing and final determination of the suit.** 8. **THAT each party shall be at liberty, upon giving not less than FORTY-EIGHT (48) HOURS' prior written notice through their respective advocates, to access the suit properties solely for purposes of inspection, preservation and maintenance, provided that such access shall not interfere with the peaceful occupation of the tenants or occasion any breach of peace.** 9. **THAT for purposes of ensuring the expeditious disposal of this matter, the parties shall fully comply with the provisions of Order 11 of the Civil Procedure Rules, 2010 WITHIN SIXTY (60) DAYS from the date hereof.** 10. **THAT there shall be a mention on 21st October, 2026 for purposes of confirming compliance with Order 11 of the Civil Procedure Rules, 2010, and the matter shall be heard on 10th February, 2027 before ELC No. 1, Kwale preferably through PHYSICAL MEANS.** 11. **THAT the costs of the two (2) Notice of Motion applications dated 24th November, 2025 and 21st February, 2026 shall abide the outcome of the main suit.** **IT IS SO ORDERED ACCORDINGLY.** **RULING DELIVERED THROUGH MICROSOFT TEAM VIRTUAL MEANS, SIGNED AND DATED AT KWALE THIS……27TH……DAY OF ……… JULY .……..……..2026.** **..……………………..…………………….** **HON. MR. JUSTICE L. L. NAIKUNI,** **ENVIRONMENT AND LAND COURT** **AT** **KWALE** **Ruling delivered in the presence of:** 1. Mr. Daniel Disii, the Court Assistant. 2. Mr. Wang’ombe Advocate for the Plaintiff/Respondent/Applicant. 3. No appearance for the Defendant/Applicant and for the 1st 2nd and 3rd Interested Parties.