[2023] KEELC 21290 (KLR)

[2023] KEELC 21290 (KLR)

The court held that the plaintiff's occupation of the suit property prior to its registration in the defendant's name in 2015 was occupation of public land, which is excluded from the computation of time for adverse possession under Section 41(1)(a) of the Limitation of Actions Act and Article 62(1)(d) of the...

Source-derived case information.

Citation
[2023] KEELC 21290 (KLR)
Parties
Plaintiff: Mathew Kiprono Rotich; Defendant: Abigael Letting aka Appy J. Metto
Court
Environment and Land Court
Court Station
Environment and Land Court at Kapsabet
Jurisdiction
Kenya
Case Number
Environment & Land Case E001 of 2021
Procedural Posture
Environment and Land Case / Judgment
Outcome
suit dismissed with costs to the defendant
Judges
MN Mwanyale
Legal Topics
Adverse Possession, Limitation of Actions, Public Land Registration, Title to Land
Source Language
en
Land and Property Civil Procedure Adverse Possession Limitation of Actions Public Land Registration Title to Land

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Parties

Mathew Kiprono Rotich

Plaintiff

Abigael Letting aka Appy J. Metto

Defendant

Procedural Posture

Environment and Land Case / Judgment

  1. 1 Whether the plaintiff's claim for adverse possession over land parcel Nandi/Legemet/323 has crystallized given the date of registration of the property.
  2. 2 Whether the period of occupation prior to registration as public land counts towards adverse possession.
  3. 3 Whether the plaintiff has proven continuous, open, and exclusive possession for the statutory period required under Kenyan law.

Ratio Decidendi

The court held that the plaintiff's occupation of the suit property prior to its registration in the defendant's name in 2015 was occupation of public land, which is excluded from the computation of time for adverse possession under Section 41(1)(a) of the Limitation of Actions Act and Article 62(1)(d) of the Constitution. Time for adverse possession could only begin to run from 19 January 2015, the date of registration. Since the suit was filed in January 2023, only 8 years had elapsed, falling short of the required 12-year statutory period. The court found that the plaintiff's right to claim adverse possession had not crystallized and dismissed the suit with costs to the defendant.

Court Disposition

suit dismissed with costs to the defendant

Orders

  • The plaintiff's suit is dismissed.
  • The plaintiff shall bear the costs of the suit.