Kombe v White Unicorn Ltd & another (Environment and Land Case 195 of 2018) [2026] KEELC 5267 (KLR) (30 July 2026) (Judgment)

 **REPUBLIC OF KENYA** **IN THE ENVIRONMENT AND LAND COURT AT MALINDI** **ELC CASE NO. 195 OF 2018** **RUTH KABIBI KOMBE…………………………………………………...PLAINTIFF** **VERSUS** **WHITE UNICORN LIMITED…………………………………….1ST DEFENDANT** **KILIFI LAND REGISTRAR……………………………………...2ND DEFENDANT** # JUDGMENT # The Plaintiff herein brought this suit seeking the following orders: * + 1. **An order restraining the 1st and 2nd Defendants from entering, subdividing, and/or transferring land Parcel Number Chembe/Kibabamshe/386 to any other individual.** 2. **An order cancelling the 1st Defendant’s title and instructing the 2nd Defendant to amend the register to accurately reflect the name of Kanze Lewa Kache as the registered owner of Number Chembe/Kibabamshe/386.** 3. **Costs of the suit and interest**. 1. The 1st Defendant filed a Defence dated 8 November 2018 2. The 2nd Defendant filed its Statement of Defence on 10 December 2018, seeking dismissal of this suit. 3. The case rests primarily on the testimony of the Plaintiff, Ruth Kabibi, who appeared as PW1. She confirmed her witness statement and maintains that the 2nd Defendant unlawfully, fraudulently, and/or irregularly transferred the suit land, identified as LR. No. Chembe/Kibabamshe/386, to the 1st Defendant, who is now the registered owner of the property. 4. The land was originally allocated to Kanze Lewa Keche, the late mother of the Plaintiff. She testified that her family still lives on and farms the land. The National Land Commission verified ownership multiple times in 2014, 2015, and 2016. The latest gazette notice confirms the land belongs to Kanze Lewa Keche and should be registered in her name as the administrator of her mother's estate. 5. At some point in 1986, the Government placed an embargo on the suit property, along with all other parcels of land within the Chembe/Kibabamshe registration section, thereby prohibiting any dealings in the suit property. The embargo was not lifted until 2017, by Gazette Notice No. 6862 of 2017, which was later amended by the Corrigenda of 9th November 2018. 6. In accordance with the documentation she provided, she asserts that the land was under the Settlement Fund Trustee programme, as evidenced by the letter of offer she presented. Furthermore, she submitted evidence from the local administration indicating that her mother was in possession of the suit property. Additionally, a bill issued in 2019 by the SFT demonstrates that the SFT recognised her mother as the owner of the suit property, subject to the issuance of a discharge of charge in her favour. Moreover, the remaining balance of the monies was paid in 2024. 7. On the other hand, the 1st Defendant, through the evidence of its director, Samson Charo Lewa, averred that it lawfully purchased the suit property from Pijey Investment Limited, which in turn had purchased it from the original allottee, who had been allocated the land under the adjudication programme. 8. The Land Registrar, Ms. Pamela Lisasa, who appeared as DW2, presented the register for the contested property. She further stated that, according to their records, the land was originally acquired through the land adjudication process in 1977. Subsequently, the land was transferred from the original allottees to Pijey Investment, and thereafter to the 1st Defendant by purchase. She also confirmed that the land is duly registered in the name of the 1st Defendant and that there is no record of any claim by the Plaintiff. Consequently, the 1st Defendant is the lawful owner of the disputed property. 9. The Land Registrar conceded that the adjudication history was unclear and that it was not possible to determine who the 1st allottee was. She also admitted that she was not aware of the two Gazette Notices issued by the NLC, but acknowledged that the latest could take precedence. 10. Regarding the two conflicting claims, she expressed the view that, to regularise the entire record, the relevant allocating authorities would be best placed to clarify the appropriate stance. 11. I received submissions from counsel for the Plaintiff and the 2nd Defendants, but not from counsel for the 1st Defendant. 12. I appreciate the submissions from the counsel, particularly those concerning the conflict over which registration regime was applicable in this matter, whether adjudication or the SFT programme. 13. I also appreciate the parties’ counsel’s submissions and the judicial authorities cited on the reckoning of the root of title, 14. Having reviewed and considered the materials and submissions before me, the primary issues in this matter are: who is the rightful owner of the suit property, and who should bear the costs associated with this litigation? 15. From the outset, it should be recognised that the Chembe / Kibabamshe Registration Section has experienced its fair share of setbacks, including double allocations, mixed-grill registration, and the land acquisition regime applicable. In jest, this Court, in **Republic v Chief Land Registrar; Kamau (Ex parte Applicant); Guyo & 4 others (Interested Parties) (Judicial Review 2 of 2022) [2023] KEELC 21242 (KLR) (2 November 2023) (Judgment)**, asserted that: ***"There is this current slang going around in social media that for you to buy land in Kenya, you will need a good lawyer, a surveyor, and a drunkard from that local area to tell you whether you will be purchasing “air”. The latter person will likely mirror the title better than the Land Registries! The titles arising from the Chembe/Kibabamshe Adjudication Section are worse!"*** 1. This well-known quotation in paragraph 26 of the judgment emphasizes the deficiencies in record-keeping within contemporary Kenyan land registries, which may lead a formal search to indicate a clear title that, in reality, may be fraudulent. This Court incorporated a popular Kenyan social media joke into established legal discourse, thereby demonstrating the erosion of the once-robust principle of indefeasibility of title. 2. Historically, under Kenyan law, a title deed was considered absolute and "indefeasible"—a concept known as the "curtain principle," indicating that verification beyond the registry was deemed unnecessary. The ruling highlights that official land registers can no longer be regarded as reliably accurate without question. 3. The "drunkard" standard of due diligence, though presented humorously, raises significant legal concerns. A "local drunkard" represents the unfiltered, oral local history of land—an individual without a financial interest who can provide a buyer with honest information about the existence of family disputes or subsequent transactions, in contrast to officials or sellers. 4. It is in this scenario that I turn to answering the question of who, between the Plaintiff and the 1st Defendant, should be the rightful owner of the suit property. 5. The counsel representing the Plaintiff contends that, although possessing a title deed to a parcel of land generally provides prima facie evidence of ownership under Section 26 of the Land Registration Act (Cap. 300), the same provision allows for the owner’s title to be challenged on various grounds, including unprocedural acquisition. This stance was reaffirmed by the Court of Appeal in Malindi in **Bandi v Dzomo & 76 others [2022] KECA 584 (KLR)**, by the Court of Appeal in **Danchi Kiptugen v Commissioner of Lands & Others [2015] eKLR**, and by the Supreme Court in **Dina Management Ltd v County Government of Mombasa & 5 others [2023] KESC 30 (KLR)**. 6. Counsel contends that a preliminary review of the documents submitted by the Defence reveals that the suit property was allegedly first registered in the names of five members of the Kalume family, namely Rebecca Kalume, Hilda Kalume, Kenneth Kalume, Dorcas Kalume, and Barnie Kalume. The 2nd Defendant has attached what is labelled as adjudication records from 1977, which purportedly demonstrate that the suit property was initially allocated to these members of the Kalume family. However, the very documents upon which the Defence intends to rely are marred by significant inconsistencies and omissions that undermine their credibility and render them insufficient to substantiate the Defendants' claim of lawful allocation. 7. The counsel avows that the adjudication record fails to meet the criteria for a proper adjudication record, as it was neither signed nor approved by the Director of Land Adjudication. Land adjudication is a process strictly regulated by the Land Adjudication Act (Cap. 284), with the Director of Land Adjudication bearing a pivotal responsibility for ensuring its legality and finality. Pursuant to Sections 26A and 27 of the Act, once the adjudication register is compiled and all objections are resolved or the objection period lapses, the Director is obliged to certify that the adjudication register has reached finality. Only upon this certification may the adjudication register be transmitted to the Chief Land Registrar for initial registration in accordance with Section 28. Until such certification is issued by the Director, the adjudication register remains provisional and cannot underpin a lawful first registration. 8. The counsel emphasises that, in the present case, the allocation of the property in question to the Kalume family lacks any supporting evidence of the Director’s certification of finality. There is no documentation showing that a No Objection Register has been certified, nor any proof that the Director approved the alleged allocation before its registration in their names. As a result, any registration in favour of the Kalumes was carried out without legal authority, violating the mandatory provisions of the Land Adjudication Act, and is consequently invalid, void, and legally unenforceable. 9. Counsel asserts that the Director of Land Adjudication's failure to approve the allotment of the suit property to the Kalume family is conclusively supported by the Letter of Offer dated 18th December 2002 from the Ministry of Lands and Settlement via the Department of Land Adjudication and Settlement, in which the Director of Land Adjudication and Settlement extends the offer of the suit property to Kanze Lewa Keche. 10. It is submitted that Defendants' evidence reveals a startling omission: they have produced neither a Letter of Offer nor any formal documentation of allotment in respect of the suit property. More tellingly, the title documents relied upon by the Defendants make no mention of any encumbrance in favour of the Settlement Fund Trustees (SFT), despite the property originating from settlement land. This glaring absence strongly indicates that the acquisition and registration of the suit property were conducted outside proper legal channels, through clandestine or irregular arrangements. In other words, the Defendants' title is a product of procedural sleight of hand, lacking the essential legal underpinnings that would render it valid, enforceable, and defensible before this Court. See the reasoning of Olola J. in **Katana Mdzomba Kabani (Suing as the administrator of the Estate of the late Tuva Mdzomba Kabani, the deceased) v Grace Kabibi Keah (Sued as the administrator of the Estate of the late Mathias Benedict Keah, the deceased) & 2 others [2018] KEELC 4006 (KLR).** 11. It is further contended that the Plaintiff introduced into evidence the letter of allotment. Additionally, the Plaintiff submitted the letter of offer dated 18th December 2002, along with evidence indicating that the Department of Land Adjudication and Settlement prepared an invoice for the Plaintiff's mother, Kanze Lewa Keche, for the purpose of settling the claim on the property in question. This invoice, dated 30th June 2017, has been annexed to the Plaintiff's compilation of documents. Furthermore, the Plaintiff has included the receipt for the repayment of the aforementioned invoice, dated 22nd May 2024, confirming that the property was duly discharged by the Plaintiff's mother. 12. Notwithstanding the foregoing, the illegality of the allocation to the Kalumes is further substantiated by the failure of the National Land Commission to endorse or acknowledge it. In fact, the NLC asserts that the land was originally allotted to the Plaintiff's mother, Kanze Lewa Keche. 13. Adopting the line that the NLC has recognised the Plaintiff as the proprietor of the suit property, it is submitted that the letter dated 18th April 2018, authored by the Chairman of the National Land Commission to the Chief Land Registrar, must be understood. The letter unequivocally confirmed that the original allottee of the suit property was the Plaintiff's mother, Kanze Lewa Keche; that a title had been issued to her in 1978; and that it directed the revocation of any titles issued contrary to the original adjudication allocation. Far from being an extrajudicial opinion, the said letter was a lawful exercise of the Commission's powers under Section 14(5) and (6) of the Act. Equally, the Gazette Notice issued in 2017, being No. 6862 of 2017, which proposed that the land be registered in the name of the Kalumes, and, more importantly, the corrigenda published on 9th November 2018, directing that the suit land be registered in the name of the Plaintiff's mother, fall squarely within the Commission's obligation under Section 14(11), which mandates that *"the Commission shall publish in the Gazette all determinations made under subsection (4)."* 14. The corrigenda correcting the earlier Gazette Notice No. 6862 of 2017, which reflect that the suit property ought to be allocated to the Plaintiff, represent the Commission's final determination following review. When read together with the Ground Status Report of 22nd February 2018, which confirms that the Plaintiff's family was in actual physical possession and occupation of the suit property, the Gazette publications and the Chairman's letter constitute a lawful, complete, and statutorily sanctioned review process, the effect of which is that any title held by the Kalume family and subsequently transferred to other parties is defeated by operation of statute. 15. Counsel for the Plaintiff concludes that, under the **Dina Management Limited** test (supra), once the legality of a title is questioned, a court of law must examine the root of that title and the process by which it was generated. Applying that principle to the present case, the Plaintiff has demonstrated that the initial allocation of the suit property to the Kalume family was irregular and lacked statutory foundation. We reiterate that the lawful and proper allottee of the suit property, as confirmed by the adjudication process and the findings of the National Land Commission, was the Plaintiff's mother, Kanze Lewa Keche. In these circumstances, the Kalumes could not pass a valid proprietary interest to Pijey Investments Limited, and, by extension, no good title could subsequently pass to the 1st Defendant herein. 16. It was further submitted that there was an embargo on dealings in the Chembe/Kibabmshe adjudication section, and that any dealing before the embargo was lifted rendered the Defendants' transactions relating to the suit property null and void. 17. It is asserted that the Plaintiff has demonstrated that the land was inherited as family property and should be transferred to her in her capacity as the administrator of her mother's estate. The relevant government agencies have consistently affirmed this. Collectively, the letter of offer, the SFT discharge bill dated 30th June 2017, and proof of payment form a continuous chain of documentary evidence establishing lawful allocation, official recognition, and the fulfilment of statutory obligations by the Plaintiff's deceased mother. These documents are coherent, mutually corroborative, and originate from the authority specifically authorised to allocate and manage settlement scheme land. In the absence of any evidence indicating revocation, reallocation, or fraudulent activity by the allottee, the only reasonable inference this Court may draw is that the Plaintiff's deceased mother was the lawful owner of the subject property. 18. It is concluded that the orders sought ought to be granted in the circumstances. 19. Conversely, the counsel for the 2nd Defendant asserts that the case concerns two gazette notices issued by the National Land Commission. The first gazette notice, numbered 6862, pertains to the regularization of the suit property to Kalume’s. These individuals are recorded as the initial allottees in the records maintained at the offices of the Second Defendant. The individual present at the hearing was Kanze Lewa Keche, the mother of the Plaintiff in the current matter. The most significant aspect pertains to the allocation status, which indicates that the property was originally allocated to Albert Samini, and that Kanze Lewa did not possess any documentation. 20. The next gazette notice is Number 11710. Once again, Kanze Lewa Keche (deceased) appeared. The National Land Commission, this time, determined that, according to the adjudication records (which have not been produced in this case), the suit property was originally allocated to Albert Samini, and that Kanze Lewa had a letter of offer and resided on the property. The National Land Commission further directed that the Chief Lands Registrar issue title to Ruth Kabibi Kombe, the surviving daughter of the deceased, and that any other title purported to have been issued earlier be revoked. 21. Counsel asserts that, although the two gazette notices contradict each other in their determinations, they agree on one fact: Albert Samini was the original allottee, but in the first instance regularised the property to Kalume’s, and then regularised it in favour of the Plaintiff’s mother. Nothing has been brought forward to substantiate any claim by Albert Samini, and he has not been sued. 22. Records at the Lands Registry recognise the Kalumes as the original allottees, as evidenced by the adjudication record. In the absence of evidence supporting Albert Samini's claims to the property, it remains possible that the original allottees were indeed the Kalumes, whose title was erroneously revoked by the 1986 gazette notice—an action that numerous Court decisions have declared unconstitutional. 23. The counsel contends that, in the presence of two conflicting gazette notices, the Court ought to take steps to resolve the confusion; see Njoroge J. in **Shah & another v Chief Land Registrar & 4 others [2026] KEELC 62 (KLR).** 24. Counsel states that the title granted to Albert Samini was rescinded, and that the National Land Commission confirmed the titles of the initial allottees, who subsequently transferred the property to the 1st Defendant herein. Regarding the Plaintiff, any title issued to her would constitute a double allocation; the earlier title would take precedence, as it pertains to the Kalumes. 25. Further, counsel proffers that in Malindi **ELCC E042 of 2022, Murage (suing as the Administrator of the Estate of Bernard Chiori) v Land Registrar, Kilifi County & another; KCB Bank Kenya Limited (Interested Party) [2025] KEELC 6488 (KLR)**, Njoroge J. also restated the unconstitutionality of the 1986 gazette notice, as follows: ***“Thirdly, Gazette Notice Number 2505 of 1986 was declared unconstitutional in Mbugua & Another (Suing as Administrator of The Estate of Simon James Mbugua) Versus the Attorney General Petition Number 2 of 2021 (2022) KEELC 3063 (KLR). The government, through Gazette Notice Number 2505 of 30th May 1986, as well as letters to title holders within Kilifi Jimba, Chembe Kibabamshe, Kilifi Madeteni and Kilifi Matsangoni, stated that the earlier adjudication of lands in those Sections under the Land Adjudication Act Cap 284 was erroneous, since it was government land, and cancelled the titles issued over land parcels in those areas. In the Mbugua case (supra), Naikuni J stated as follows: "... it is quite clear the deceased was the absolute and legal owner of all that suit land with indefeasible title right and interest vested on it. Therefore, for the government to have taken it away on the pretext that it was their land which was allocated by mistake under the Land Adjudication Act and that they would be re-allocating it to him was erroneous, illegal, wrongful.... The procedure for the cancellation of title deed Section 79 of the Land Registration Act is for rectification of the register with the consent of the proprietor and not cancellation. Cancellation cannot be through publication of a notice in the Kenya Gazette. That was illegal improper and wrongful. Cancellation can only be through a court order under Section 80 of the LRA. That did not happen at all."*** 1. Counsel pours cold water on the assertion that her mother was allocated this land. The Plaintiff had indicated in Paragraph 5 of her plaint that the suit property was adjudicated to her in 1979, without providing any proof. The gazette notice thus contradicts the position in the pleadings and should be disregarded. 2. Counsel further raises the issue that the Plaintiff brought this suit without locus standi. The suit was filed on 17th October 2018, while the Grant ad litem was obtained on 26th September 2025, almost 5 years after the suit was filed. This clearly demonstrates that the Plaintiff lacked capacity to sue when instituting the suit. 3. The Plaintiff asserts a claim to the suit property based on a letter of offer from the SFT issued to her mother, together with long occupation of the suit property and her status as an original settler. 4. The Settlement Fund Trustees (SFT) is a statutory body corporate established to manage the Land Settlement Fund, with the primary mandate to acquire, plan, and allocate land to landless citizens and squatters in Kenya. 5. The Land Act, 2012 (and Land Regulations, 2017): Specifically, Part IX (Settlement Programmes) and Regulation 37 of the 2017 Regulations set out the modernised administration of settlement schemes. The Agriculture Act (Cap 318) historically established the legal foundation for the Settlement Fund Trustees (Legal Notice No. 352/63). The Constitution of Kenya, 2010: Article 60 outlines the principles of land policy (equity, efficiency, and transparency), while Article 62 governs the management of public land. 6. In **Kurere (Suing as a Legal Personal Representative of the Estate of the Robert Kiptalam Cheberek - Deceased) v County Land Adjudication & Settlement Officer, Trans Nzoia & 4 others; Managing Director, Agricultural Development Corporation & 3 others (Interested Parties) (Environment and Land Petition 3 of 2024) [2025] KEELC 6665 (KLR) (1 October 2025) (Judgment)**, the ELC set out the step-by-step acquisition of land under an SFT programme: ***“In Kide & Another -vs- Sawe & Others ELC E007 of 2024 [2025] E007 of 2024 [2025] KEELC 2902 KLR (26th March 2025) (Judgment), this court said that the law relating to the creation of a settlement scheme before the enactment of the Land Act 2012 was the repealed Agriculture Act, the retired Registered Land Act, and its regulations. The court said that under Legal Notice No. 352 of 1963 made under Cap 318, the Settlement Fund Trustees would receive monies from the government to acquire land that would then be planned, surveyed, subdivided and given to settle landless Kenyans on loan or standard premium until it was discharged or transferred to an allottee upon full payment of the premium, or through a one-off payment, whichever applied. The court set out the process of applying for land by a landless person and the conditions to follow once the committee verifies the application, followed by payment of the 10% deposit, and the issuance of receipts and statements. The court said that allocation of land in a settlement scheme entailed three things, namely, the ground, the map, and numbering. The court further discussed the role of the Land Adjudication and Settlement Office as well as the Survey Department, both in the allocation, recall, and cancellation of the letter of offer.*** ***76. In*** ***Green & Another -vs- Kazungu & Others Civil Appeal E017 of 2020 [2023] KECA 991 KLR (23rd September 2022) (Judgment), the court held that the doctrine of legitimate expectation could not be invoked where an allottee did not comply with the terms and conditions of the offer since legitimate expectation cannot override the law and that a letter of offer was subject to revocation by the offeror. The court further held that an offer letter may not be used to cancel, through the back door, a certificate of title, since Section 26 of the Land Registration Act is specific on when a title deed can be impeached.”*** 1. The 1st Defendant's claim is based on a purchaser's interest, with a history in which the original allotees sold and regularised this land to Pijey Investment Limited, which later sold it to the 1st Defendant. According to the evidence on record, the original allotees acquired the land through the adjudication process. 2. In Kenya, the process of acquiring land through land adjudication entails the identification and documentation of existing unregistered rights and interests in land—commonly under customary tenure—thereby facilitating their conversion into absolute private or community ownership. 3. The primary law governing this process is the Land Adjudication Act (Cap 284), read together with Section 7(b) of the Land Act, 2012, and the Community Land Act, 2016. 4. The process of land acquisition proceeds through a systematic series of steps, commencing with the declaration of an Adjudication Section. The Cabinet Secretary for Lands issues a Gazette Notice to designate an area as an adjudication section formally. In accordance with Section 5 of the Act, this notice effectively suspends all land transactions and civil litigation about land rights within the specified section, unless the Adjudication Officer grants specific permission. 5. Officers and local committees are subsequently appointed. The Adjudication Officer (AO) assumes oversight of the entire operation; Demarcation and Recording Officers are assigned to delineate boundaries and record pertinent information; and an Adjudication Committee comprising at least ten local residents familiar with the area’s customary laws and history is constituted. 6. Claim submission requires claimants to appear at the site or be duly represented to assert their interest in land parcels within the adjudication section. The Recording Officer issues a public notice inviting all interested parties to submit claims. Claimants must demonstrate ownership or interest and provide supporting evidence. During Demarcation and Survey, the Demarcation Officer, in the presence of claimants and the local committee, delineates each parcel's boundaries. Subsequently, the Survey Department prepares a Registry Index Map (RIM) using aerial photography or ground survey methods. 7. In cases of disputes concerning boundaries or ownership, the Dispute Resolution process is initiated. The adjudication committee first hears the dispute and seeks to resolve it in accordance with local customary practices. If any party is dissatisfied with the outcome, they retain the right to appeal to the Arbitration Board. 8. Following the resolution of claims and disputes, a provisional Adjudication Register is compiled, listing parcel numbers, sizes, maps, and owners. The Adjudication Officer publishes a notice stating that the register is open to public inspection for a mandatory 60-day period, during which objections may be lodged. 9. Under Section 26, any individual aggrieved by an entry in the register may submit a written objection to the Adjudication Officer. The AO shall hear the parties and make any necessary corrections to the register. If dissatisfied, the parties have a further 60 days to appeal to the Cabinet Secretary for Lands under Section 29 of the Act. 10. Once all objections and appeals are resolved, the Director of Land Adjudication issues a Certificate of Finality. The register is then forwarded to the Chief Land Registrar, who formally registers the land and issues individual Title Deeds in accordance with the Land Registration Act, 2012. 11. Having outlined both Plaintiff’s history regarding her ownership claim and that of the 1st Defendant, the matter ultimately hinges on whether this Court can lawfully rescind the 1st Defendant’s title and order the 2nd Defendant to register the Plaintiff as the absolute owner. 12. In Kenya, Courts have the authority to cancel or revoke a land title under Sections 26 and 80 of the Land Registration Act 2012, read with Article 40(6) of the Constitution of Kenya. Although a title deed typically serves as *prima facie* evidence of lawful ownership, the ELC may order the cancellation of such titles if it is shown that the registration process was compromised or unlawful. 13. Section 26(1) of the Land Registration Act, 2012 is the primary statutory provision for impeaching a title. It provides that the certificate of title may be challenged and cancelled if it is proven that the person holding the title was a party to, or had knowledge of, fraud, forgery, or intentional misrepresentation. It also applies where the title was acquired illegally, contrary to established legal procedures, through bribery, or via structural corruption. 14. Section 80(1) of the Land Registration Act, 2012, explicitly confers upon the court jurisdiction to direct the Land Registrar to cancel a registration or rectify the land register. While the internal powers of the Land Registrar are strictly limited to correcting clerical errors or minor mistakes, only a court of law possesses the authority to order the full cancellation where a party’s substantive property rights are impacted. 15. Article 40(6) of the Constitution of Kenya provides that the Constitution safeguards the right to private property under Article 40; however, Article 40(6) explicitly excludes this protection for property unlawfully acquired. 16. The Supreme Court of Kenya has consistently held that a property title cannot be sustained if the *"root of the title"* is compromised by illegality. Kenyan jurisprudence has definitively established that a land title is not an absolute shield when the process of its acquisition was marred by corruption, illegality, or procedural irregularities. 17. The leading case, as cited by counsel for the Plaintiff, concerning the annulment of land titles in Kenya is the Supreme Court decision in **Dina Management Case**(supra). The Superior Court determined that the doctrine of an innocent *"bona fide purchaser for value without notice"* does not afford protection to a buyer if the original land allocation was unlawful. The Supreme Court acknowledged that a title represents the culmination of a process; if the *"root of the title"* is flawed or procured irregularly, the title is invalid and cannot be shielded by the Constitution. 18. In **Maina v Maina [2013] KECA 94 (KLR),** the Court of Appeal emphasised that when a title deed is contested, the owner cannot merely produce the certificate and remain silent. Instead, the holder bears an active burden to *"go beyond the instrument"* and substantiate the legality of their acquisition—including a detailed tracing of its initial allotment. 19. In **Frank Logistics Limited v Golden Lion Real Estate Company & 6 others [2025] KECA 1471)**, the Court of Appeal clarified that under Section 26(1)(b) of the Land Registration Act, a court may cancel a title solely on the basis that it was obtained *"unprocedurally or illegally."* The claimant need not demonstrate high-level criminal fraud; evidence of significant statutory violations or procedural irregularities in the registry suffices to annul the title. 20. In **Super Nova Properties Ltd & another v District Land Registrar Mombasa & 2 others; Kenya Anti-Corruption Commission & 2 others (Interested Parties) [2018] KECA 17 (KLR),** the Court of Appeal ruled that under Sections 79 and 80 of the Land Registration Act, only a court of law is empowered to cancel a title on grounds of fraud or illegality. The Land Registrar's powers are strictly confined to correcting typographical, minor, or clerical errors. Addressing complex issues of substantive ownership rights requires comprehensive court proceedings. 21. Guided by the record, the Plaintiffs' claim traces to an offer by the SFT dating back to 2002 and to an alleged adjudication dating back to 1978. The offer by the SFT was never perfected, as shown by the documentation produced, which indicates that, as at 2019, the Plaintiff had not settled the SFT monies. It is said to have been paid in 2024, well after the Plaintiff's mother had died. The Plaintiff, in any event, did not produce a discharge of charge from the Director of Land Adjudication and Settlement addressed to the 2nd Defendant showing the discharge of the encumbrance over that land. The Land Registrar testified that, in any event, there was no record on the register to support the Plaintiffs' claim. 22. Conversely, the title of the 2nd Defendant was substantiated by records in their possession, demonstrating that the land was subject to adjudication and that the original owners transferred it to Pijey Investment Limited, which subsequently sold it to the 1st Defendant. 23. The Plaintiff asked about the adjudication records maintained by the 2nd Defendant. I have outlined elsewhere in this judgment the procedures for acquiring land and subsequent titling under the SFT, as well as for adjudication. The obligation to produce such documents rests with the Director of Land Adjudication and Settlement; the 2nd Defendant is not responsible for their provision. The role of the 2nd Defendant in law is confined to land registration, the issuance of titles, and the upkeep of land records. 24. Whereas the Plaintiff emphasized the infirmity of the origin of the title held by the 1st Defendant and, as confirmed by the NLC, should have established the history of this land and the root of the title held by the 1st Defendant through joining them in these legal proceedings or by summoning the land-allocation and administration authorities along with the NLC as witnesses. In this matter, the Director of Land Adjudication and Settlement was to be responsible for providing evidence in this Court regarding whether the case pertains to an SFT Programme or adjudication. Both processes cannot be conducted simultaneously involving the same land, as I have demonstrated in this judgment, due to the differing applicable laws. This judgment cannot provide a definitive resolution without the primary records from the land-allocation and administration authorities. This constitutes a procedural failure on the part of the Plaintiff. 25. If we accept the Plaintiff's theory, her case shows that she has not perfected her acquisition of the suit property under the SFT (**see Green & Another -vs- Kazungu & Others, Civil Appeal E017 of 2020 [2023] KECA 991 KLR (23rd September 2022) Judgment**, as cited with approval in **Kurere (Suing as a Legal Personal Representative of the Estate of the Robert Kiptalam Cheberek - Deceased) v County Land Adjudication & Settlement Officer, Trans Nzoia & 4 others; Managing Director, Agricultural Development Corporation & 3 others (Interested Parties) (Environment and Land Petition 3 of 2024) [2025] KEELC 6665 (KLR) (1 October 2025) (Judgment)**). The cancellation of the 1st Defendant's title would be based on an abstraction – the SFT offer was and has not been perfected by the Plaintiff under the SFT programme and cannot be used as the basis for cancellation. 26. Consequently, having undertaken the above journey, the Plaintiff's suit must fail and is hereby dismissed, with costs. **Dated, signed, and delivered electronically in Nyeri on this 30th day of July, 2026.** **E. K. MAKORI** **JUDGE** **In the presence of:** **Ms. Mubassu H/B for Ms Onyango for the Plaintiff** **Mr. Ojwang for the 2nd Defendant** **Denis: Court Assistant** **In the absence of:** **Mr. Kandia for 1st Defendant**