[2020] KEHC 10370 (KLR)

REPUBLIC OF KENYA

IN THE HIGH COURT OF KENYA AT NAIROBI

CONSTITUTIONAL AND HUMAN RIGHTS DIVISION

PETITION NO. 208 OF 2019

CONSOLIDATED WITH

PETITION NUMBERS 185 OF 2019 AND 339 OF 2019

BETWEEN

SALARIES AND RENUMERATION COMMISSION............1st PETITIONER

OKIYA OMTATAH OKOITI...................................................2ND PETITIONER

VERSUS

PARLIAMENTARY SERVICE COMMISSION..................1st RESPONDENT

CLERK OF THE SENATE....................................................2nd RESPONDENT

JUSTIN MUTURI..................................................................3rd RESPONDENT

DR. NAOMI SHABAN...........................................................4th RESPONDENT

BETH MUGO..........................................................................5th RESPONDENT

ADAN KEYNAN......................................................................6th RESPONDENT

BENSON MOMANYI..............................................................7th RESPONDENT

GEORGE KHANIRI.................................................................8th RESPONDENT

AISHA JUMWA........................................................................9th RESPONDENT

AARON CHERUIYOT...........................................................10th RESPONDENT

DR. LORNA MUMELO.........................................................11th RESPONDENT

JEREMIAH NYEGENYE.....................................................12th RESPONDENT

THE CLERK OF THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY..............13th RESPONDENT

THE CONTROLLER OF BUDGET....................................14th RESPONDENT

THE CABINET SECRETARY,

NATIONAL TREASURY......................................................15th RESPONDENT

THE HON. ATTORNEY GENERAL...................................16thRESPONDENT

AND

PARLIAMENT............................................................1st INTERESTED PARTY

MEMBERS OF PARLIAMENT..............................2nd INTERESTED PARTY

TRANSPARENCY INTERNATIONAL-KENYA..3rd INTERESTED PARTY

KATIBA INSTITUTE...............................................4th INTERESTED PARTY

LAW SOCIETY OF KENYA....................................5th INTERESTED PARTY

JUDGMENT

Introduction

1. This judgment disposes three consolidated Petitions, namely, Petition Nos. 185 of 2019, 208 of 2019, and 339 of 2019. The 1st Petitioner in the consolidated Petitions is the Salaries and Remuneration Commission (hereinafter referred to as the SRC), a constitutional commission established under Article 230 (1) of the Constitution.

2. The 2nd Petitioner, Okiya Omtatah Okoiti is a resident of Nairobi City County. He states that he is a law-abiding citizen, a public-spirited individual, and a human rights defender. He is the Executive Director of Kenyans for Justice and Development (KEJUDE) Trust, a legal entity whose objective is to uphold the rule of law and constitutionalism, defending human rights, promoting democratic governance, and agitating for sustainable economic development for the prosperity and well-being of the general population.

3. The 1st Petitioner and the 2nd Petitioner are the Petitioners in Petitions Nos. 208 of 2019 and 185 of 2019 respectively.

4. At the time of consolidation of the Petitions, the court designated the Controller of Budget, The Cabinet Secretary, National Treasury and the Attorney General who had initially been sued as Interested Parties in Petition No. 208 of 2019, to be Respondents. In addition, Parliament and Members of Parliament, who initially had been sued as Respondents in Petition No. 185 of 2019, were designated as Interested Parties.

5. The 1st Respondent in the consolidated Petitions is the Parliamentary Service Commission (hereinafter referred to as the PSC), a constitutional Commission established under Article 127(1). The PSC is the Petitioner in Petition No. 339 of 2019.

6. The 2nd Respondent in the consolidated Petitions is the Clerk to the Senate appointed under Article 128 (1). By dint of Article 127 (3), he is the Secretary to the PSC.

7. The 3rd to the 12th Respondents in the consolidated Petitions are members of the PSC. It is alleged they exercised State authority in a manner that is not authorized by the Constitution and usurped the constitutional powers of the SRC.

8. The 13th Respondent is the Clerk to the National Assembly appointed under Article 128 (1). He is sued in his capacity as the Accounting Officer of the National Assembly.

9. The 14th Respondent is the Controller of Budget appointed under Article 228 (1),and has the constitutional mandate to oversee the implementation of the budgets of the national and county governments, and to ensure that all withdrawals from public funds are authorised by law.

10. The 15th Respondent is the Cabinet Secretary, National Treasury appointed under Article 152 (2) of the Constitution, and whose responsibilities and functions are specified in Article 225and section 12 of the Public Finance Management Act.[1]

11. The 16th Respondent is the Attorney General who by virtue of Article 156 (4) is the principal legal adviser to the Government and inter alia represents the national government in civil proceedings.

12. There are a number of Interested Parties in the consolidated Petitions. The 1st Interested Party is Parliament which is established under Article 93(1). It consists of the National Assembly and the Senate.

13. All the Members of Parliament (hereinafter referred to as MPs) who had been sued individually in Petition No. 185 of 2019 were made the 2nd Interested Party in the consolidated Petitions. The MPs are elected in accordance with Article 101 of the Constitution.

14. The 3rd Interested Party, Transparency International-Kenya, is a not-for-profit organisation with the aim of developing a transparent and corruption-free society through good governance and social justice initiatives.

15. The 4th Interested Party, Katiba Institute is incorporated as a non-profit company limited by guarantee under the Companies Act. Its objective is to improve and implement the understanding of the Constitution.

16. The 5th and last Interested Party is the Law Society of Kenya, a statutory corporate established under section 3of the Law Society of Kenya Act.[2]

17. The common thread between the three consolidated Petitions is that they all relate to a decision by the PSC to set, approve and pay house allowance to MPs. The point of departure is that whereas Petitions Nos. 208 of 2019 and185 of 2019 seek to invalidate the said decision, Petition No. 339 of 2019 seeks to sustain it.

18. In order to bring out the factual and legal foundation of each Petition, we shall proceed to summarize the respective parties’ cases therein.

The Petitioners’ Cases

Petition No. 185 of 2019

19. The Petitioner in Petition No. 185 of 2019, Mr. Okiya Omtatah Okoiti, states that the PSC, without the knowledge and approval of the SRC, secretly resolved to pay a monthly house allowance of Kshs. 250,000/= to each of the 418 MPs backdated to August 2018. Further, that it paid backdated house allowances of Kshs. 2. 25 million in April 2018 to each MP.

20. Mr. Omtatah states that the said payment will cost taxpayers over KShs.1. 2 billion annually. He further contends that the payment is a double benefit as house allowance is already included by SRC in MPs’ gross pay. He states that no state officer is paid a house allowance outside their gross pay, hence, any payment of house allowance outside the gross pay is unconstitutional. He also states that MPs are entitled to a mortgage of Kshs. 20 million per term to cater for their housing needs, therefore, any further house allowance would be unreasonable.

21. Mr. Omtatah avers that only the President, the Deputy President, governors and deputy governors are entitled to a housing benefit because of the State functions they perform. In addition, he states that the allowances awarded to MPs will create inequity in remuneration and benefits for other State Officers, thus lead to demands for house allowance by other State Officers. Therefore, Mr. Omtatah contends that all the monies already paid to the MPs as house allowances should immediately be recovered with interest.

22. As a result of the foregoing, Mr. Omtatah prays for: -

a)A DECLARATION THATthe SRC is the only State organ empowered to determine the salaries and remuneration of all State officers and, as a consequence, MP’s have no capacity under the Constitution to determine their salaries and allowances.

b)A DECLARATION THATthe decision by the PSC to pay MP’s house allowances is unconstitutional and, therefore, invalid, null and void ab initio.

c)A DECLARATION THATthe MP’s are not entitled to house allowances.

d)AN ORDERCOMPELLINGthe PSC, the Cabinet Secretary, National Treasury, The Controller of Budget and the Hon. Attorney General to recover all the money paid to MPs as house allowance.

e)AN ORDERCOMPELLING the PSC/Parliament to pay the costs of this suit.

f)Any other relief the court may deem just to grant.

Petition No. 208 of 2019

23. The SRC, the Petitioner in Petition No. 208 of 2019 dated 29th May 2019, states that on 31st January 2019 the PSC wrote to it asking it to approve house allowance to be paid to each MP at the rate of Kshs. 250,000/= per month, to enable them to rent houses within Nairobi in locations befitting an MP. Further, that the reasons given by the PSC in support of their request were that firstly, Governors and Deputy Governors enjoy a housing benefit, hence MPs too must be paid a housing allowance and that the failure to pay them a housing benefit discriminates against them.

24. Secondly, that section 31 of the Employment Act[3] requires an employer to provide an employee with reasonable housing accommodation near the place of employment. Thirdly, that in other jurisdictions, MPs are paid an allowance to enable them hire a hotel room or lease a house where Parliament is located. Lastly, that a house allowance of Kshs. 250,000 per month had been budgeted for each MP in the 2018/2019 financial year.

25. The SRC further states that on 23rd February 2019, the PSC wrote again justifying the request for the house allowance, and on 13th March 2019, the SRC replied, advising that most of the issues raised in the Memorandum were subject of pending court cases, hence, it could not decide on issues under litigation.

26. The SRC avers that it cannot approve the house allowance because: -

a)“The housing benefit that SRC has prescribed for a selected group of State Officers-such as the President, Deputy President, Speakers of the National Assembly and Senate, the Chief justice, Deputy Chief Justice, County Governors, County deputy Governors and Speakers of County Assemblies-is distinct from a house allowance.

b)Thata housing benefit is the physical building/house that is provided by the Government using taxpayers’ funds to house a State Officer due to the unique nature of their work that require hosting of State functions. The costs of constructing and maintaining the house is borne from public coffers within the limits set by SRC. A house allowance on the other hand is paid as a cash benefit through the payroll. This benefit is available mostly to public officers whose pay is not consolidated.

c)Vide Kenya Gazette Notice of 2886 of 2013, the SRC communicated its determination that MPs earn a consolidated pay in which the basic salary and house allowance are combined and under section 31(2) of the Employment Act, a house allowance cannot be paid where an employee receives a consolidated pay.

d)Thatthe justification by PSC to pay MPs house allowance is not merited, and that SRC has set additional benefits to MPs in form of mortgages at affordable interest rates to buy houses to address their housing needs.”

27. The SRC explained that the decision to set the remuneration and benefits of State Officers is highly technical, and involves high policy considerations and the polycentric factors set out in Article 230 (5). SRC also states that MPs earn a consolidated pay, which includes a house allowance. Moreover, MPs benefit from numerous allowances paid from the public coffers.

28. It is the SRC’s case that in mid-May 2019, it learnt about a decision by the PSC made on 24th April 2019 to pay MPs house allowance of Kshs. 250,000/= per month backdated to October 2018. Later it obtained correspondence in which the National Treasury advised the PSC among other things to get approval from SRC before paying MPs the house allowance. It also states that the National Treasury advised the Accounting Officer of the PSC not to incur any expenditures unapproved by the SRC. According to the SRC, it later obtained correspondence showing that despite the concerns raised by the National Treasury that the expenditure from public coffers must be lawful and approved by SRC in accordance with its mandate under Article 230 (4) (a), the PSC went ahead and paid the MPs the said house allowance.

29. The SRC contends that MPs are State officers by virtue of Article 260, hence, their remuneration and benefits including allowances must be set and approved as required by Article 230(4) (a). Its case is that it has not set or approved the disputed payment, hence, the payment violates Articles 1(1), 1(3), 2(1), 2(2), 2(3), 2(4), 3(1), 10, 73(1), 74, 94(1) & (2), 95, 96, 127, 201, 226(5), 228(4), (5), 230(4),and259 (11).

30. The SRC also states that the PSC’s decision has resulted in the loss of public funds in excess of Kshs 99,500,000/= per month, and Kshs. 1. 194 billion annually, hence, the said decision is a perverse exercise of State power that sets a dangerous precedent in the management of public funds.

31. The SRC further states that the housing benefit afforded to certain State Officers was necessitated by the nature of their work which requires hosting of State functions; hence, it is not discriminatory, irrational, or unfair. It also averred, that it explained to PSC in a letter dated 12th June 2015 that the housing benefit for the Speakers of Parliament was not remunerative, and the PSC should provide houses for the Speakers.

32. The SRC referred to the rationale for its establishment and its guiding principles, which include the management of the fiscal sustainability of the public wage bill, ensuring equity in remuneration and benefits, and fairness and transparency in the setting of remuneration and benefits in the public service. It is therefore the SRC’s case that its position on the payment of house allowance to MPs is aimed at having a wage bill that is fiscally sustainable. Furthermore, the capping of allowances at 40% of the consolidated pay for all State Officers was necessitated by the need to manage the rising wage bill.

33. The SRC therefore prays for the following orders: -

a)Declarations that by the decision of the Respondents to set, approve, and pay MPs a house allowance outside the Constitutional structure of Remuneration and Benefits of all State Officers in Parliament that is set and communicated by the SRC, and in disregard to the constitutional mandate of SRC;

i.the Respondents have exercised State authority not authorised by the Constitution contrary to the provisions of Article 2(2) of the Constitution.

ii.the 2nd-12th Respondents have violated their oath of office prescribed by Article 74 of the Constitution.

iii.violates the binding national values and principles of governance prescribed in Article 10 of the Constitution to wit: rule of law, integrity, transparency, accountability and participation of the people.

iv.the Respondents have made an unlawful and unreasonable decision that contravenes Article 47(1) of the Constitution.

v.violates the provisions of Article 73(1) of the Constitution which provides that any State authority assigned to a State officer is a public trust that ought to be exercised in a manner that is consistent with the purposes and objects of the Constitution, demonstrates respect to the people, brings honour to the nation and dignity of the office and promotes public confidence in the integrity of the office.

vi.the Respondents have acted outside the prescribed Constitutional powers of PSC contained in Article 127(6) of the Constitution.

vii.without undertaking public participation, violates the provisions of Article 10 and Article 201(a) of the Constitution which provide for the participation of the people in important decision-making processes including public financial matters.

viii.the Respondents have unconstitutionally performed the functions that are exclusively vested to the SRC by Article 230 (4) and (5) of the Constitution.

ix.violates the provisions of Article 259(11) of the Constitution that provides that the power of PSC to pay MPs allowances in the circumstances of this case must be exercised only after the setting by or with the approval of SRC.

x.the Respondents have exercised State power contrary to the provisions of Article 259 (11) of the Constitution as read with Article 230 (4) of the Constitution.

b)An order of certiorari be issued to quash the decision of the Respondents to set, approve, and pay MP’s a House Allowance outside the Constitutional structure of Remuneration and Benefits of all State Officers in Parliament that is set and communicated by the SRC and in disregard to the constitutional mandate of SRC as required by Article 230(4) (a) of the Constitution.

c)Orders of permanent injunction be issued to restrain the Respondents, their agents and persons acting under the authority of the respondents-from setting, approving and paying any benefit or house allowance to MP’s outside the Constitutional structure of Remuneration and Benefits of all State Officers in Parliament that is set and communicated by the SRC and in disregard to the constitutional mandate of SRC as required by Article 230(4) (a) of the Constitution.

d)An order be issued directing the Clerk of the Senate and the Clerk of the National Assembly to recover from salaries and allowances paid to MPs any allowance paid pursuant to the illegal and unconstitutional decision of the Respondents to pay MPs house allowance - outside the Constitutional structure of Remuneration and Benefits of all State Officers in Parliament that is set and communicated by the SRC and in disregard to the constitutional mandate of SRC as required by Article 230(4) (a) of the Constitution.

Alternatively

An order be issued directing the 3rd to 12th Respondents to personally pay to the Consolidated Fund all House Allowances paid to MPs pursuant to the illegal and unconstitutional decision of the Respondents to pay MPs house allowance-outside the Constitutional structure of Remuneration and Benefits of all State Officers in Parliament that is set and communicated by the SRC and in disregard of the constitutional mandate of SRC as required by Article 230(4) (a) of the Constitution.

e)The Respondents bear the cost of the Petition.

Petition No. 339 of 2019

34. Petition No. 339 of 2019 was filed on 26th August 2019 by the PSC against the SRC and the Attorney General. At the time the said Petition was filed, Petitions Nos. 208 of 2019 and 185 of 2019 had already been consolidated, and the PSC sued as a respondent in those Petitions, had already been designated as the 1st Respondent. Therefore, notwithstanding the PSC being named as a respondent in the consolidated Petitions, its case will be detailed herein below and we will deem it to be a cross-Petition and determine it on merits.

35. The PSC’s case is that on 1st and 8th March 2013, the SRC published the remuneration and benefits for State Officers serving in Parliament, the Executive, Constitutional Commissions and Independent Offices, and County Governments. Further, that the MPs’ remuneration was reduced from Kshs. 851,000/= to Kshs. 532,500/=, a reduction of 37. 4%. It states that the allowances payable to MPs was made subject to taxation unlike in the previous regime under the National Assembly Remuneration Act,[4] under which they were tax-free.

36. The PSC states that it and the MPs were dissatisfied with the said remuneration and benefits structure. Further, that despite a series of consultations between itself and the SRC, a number of issues remained unresolved, such as the review and setting by SRC, of what the PSC considered as “services and facilities” falling within its mandate under Article 127 (6).

37. The PSC also states that on 7th July 2017 the SRC gazetted a remuneration and benefits structure for State Officers in the Executive, Parliament, County Governments and full-time constitutional commissions, in which it abolished the car grant of Kshs. 5,000,000/- which the MPs were previously entitled to in a Parliamentary term and various allowances. Further, PSC states that SRC also abolished sitting allowance for plenary sessions, and reduced the sitting allowance for committee meetings and limited the meetings to a maximum of 16 meetings per month. Lastly, SRC also reduced the number of children that could be covered by the medical cover from 5 to 4 children, without providing any reasons, and abolished medical ex-gratia assistance to MPs and their families who exceeded their medical cover entitlement.

38. In addition, the PSC states that SRC reduced the maximum mortgage entitlement for MPs from Kshs. 35 million to Kshs. 20 million without effecting a similar reduction for other State Officers such as Judges and Cabinet Secretaries. Aggrieved by the SRC’s decision, and after failed consultations with the SRC, the PSC filed Parliamentary Service Commission v Salaries Remuneration Commission; Attorney General & 3 others (Interested Parties)[5](thePSC v SRC Case) in which the court quashed the Gazette Notice No. 6517 which was on the remuneration and benefits of State Officers in Parliament for the reason that its publication was tainted with procedural impropriety. However, that the court declined to interpret the mandate of the PSC and the SRC regarding the expression “services and facilities” in Article 127 on the ground that it was not an issue before it.

39. The PSC avers that the interpretation of the expression “services and facilities” regarding its mandate under Article 127 (6), vis-à-vis the SRC’s mandate under Article 230 is still alive, and, that, this court is the proper forum to determine the issue. It also states that despite the decision in the PSC v SRC Case,SRC has remained adamant that the provision of medical care and/or cover, medical ex gratia payment, the various allowances and a housing facility to MPs are benefits falling within its mandate, and are not services and facilities which fall within the PSC’s mandate.

40. PSC confirmed that the SRC, by a letter dated 14th May 2019, directed the Clerk of the Senate and Secretary to the PSC and the Clerk of the National Assembly, as Accounting Officers, not to pay the “house allowance” to MPs. This according to the PSC impedes the legislative mandate of Parliament under Articles 94, 95 and 96, and the PSC’s mandate under Article 127(6) (a) and (e). Further, that the said letter was written pursuant to Gazette Notice Nos. 6516 and 6519, both dated 7th July 2017, which only applied to remuneration and benefits of State Officers in the Executive and Constitutional Commissions, because Gazette Notice No. 6517 of 7th July 2017, which applied to State Officers in Parliament, was quashed by the Court. According to the PSC, the said letter was therefore made without jurisdiction and is unlawful.

41. Consequently, the PSC prays for­: -

a)A declaration be issued that the mandate and role of the SRC under Article 230 (4) (a) of the Constitution requires it to provide all State Officers, including State Officers serving in the PSC and Parliament with housing allowance.

b)A declaration be issued that the SRC has violated the MP’s right to equality under Article 27 of the Constitutionby failing to provide MPs with housing allowance for their housing in their respective constituencies.

c)An order of Mandamus be issued compelling the SRC to provide MP’s with housing allowance for their housing in their respective constituencies.

d)A declaration be issued that the mandate and role of the PSC under Article 127 of the Constitutionextends to provision of services and facilities to ensure the efficient and effective functioning of Parliament.

e)A declaration be issued that the services and facilities that the PSC is mandated to provide to MP’s under Article 127 of the Constitution as read together with the Section 2 of the Parliamentary Service Act, No. 10 of 2000, are services to ensure the efficient and effective functioning of Parliament as well as to ensure the wellbeing of Members and staff of Parliament and are not remuneration.

f)A declaration be issued that the mandate and role of the SRC under Article 230 (4) (a) of the Constitution is only limited to setting and reviewing the remuneration and benefits of State Officers serving in the PSC and Parliament, and not to determining the number of remunerable meetings that the PSC and/or any Committees of Parliament may hold in the exercise of their respective mandates.

g)A declaration be issued that the decision of the SRC to cap the remunerable meetings for MP’s to not more than 16 meetings in a month interferes with the constitutional mandate and administrative independence of the PSC and therefore is in contravention of Article 249(2)(b) of the Constitution.

h)A declaration be issued that the decision of the SRC to cap the remunerable meetings for Committees of Parliament to not more than 16 meetings in a month interferes with the constitutional mandate of Parliament and therefore is in contravention of Articles 93 (2)and94 (1) of the Constitution.

i)A declaration be issued that the SRC has no mandate to direct the Petitioner’s Clerks of Parliament, whilst exercising their respective roles as Accounting Officers of the PSC and/or the Senate and the National Assembly, from paying “facilitative allowances” to Members of Parliament.

j)An order of Certiorari be issued, to remove to this Honourable Court and to quash, the SRC’s letter dated 14th May, 2019, directing the Clerks of Parliament to refrain from paying “facilitative allowances” to MP’s.

k)An order of Certiorari be issued to remove to this Honourable Court and to quash, Gazette Notice Number 2886 of 1stMarch, 2013.

l)A declaration that pending a new job evaluation that takes into account the provisions of Chapter Seven and Eight of the Constitution, MP’s shall be entitled to receive the remuneration and benefits that they were receiving prior to publication of Gazette Notice Number 2886 of 1st March 2013.

m)An order of Prohibition(or alternatively by injunction or otherwise)be issued to prohibit the SRC from in any way interfering with the work and constitutional independence of the PSC and Parliament.

n)This Honourable Court be pleased to issue any other appropriate order or relief as it may deem fit and just.

o)Costs of the Petition be awarded to the Petitioners in any event.

The Responses

42. Two types of responses to the consolidated Petitions were filed by the parties. The first type are those in support of Petition Nos. 208 of 2019 and 185 of 2019, and in opposition to Petition No. 339 of 2019. The second type are the responses in opposition to Petitions Nos. 208 of 2019 and 185 of 2019.

43. Mr. Thande Kuria, counsel for the 14th, 15th and 16th Respondents, Mr. Lempaa, counsel for the 4th Interested Party and Mr. Nzamba Kitonga SC, counsel for the 5th Interested Party stated that they did not file any responses to the Petitions. However, they all filed submissions in support of Petitions 208 of 2019 and 185 of 2019 and in opposition to Petition 339 of 2019.

44. The responses by the other parties are summarized in the following sections.

The1st to 13th Respondents’ Responses

45. The 1st to 13th Respondents filed two Replying affidavits in opposition to Petitions 185 of 2019 and 208 of 2019. The first one dated 1st October 2019, was sworn by Jeremiah Nyegenye in his capacity as the Secretary to the PSC and Clerk of the Senate. Michael Sialai swore the second affidavit on 30th September 2019, in his capacity as the Clerk to the National Assembly. The 1st to 13th Respondents also filed identical grounds of opposition, both dated 30th September 2019, to the two Petitions.

46. The 1st to 13th Respondents aver that the PSC is a constitutional commission established under Article 127(1) and specified as such under Article 248 (2) (d). They also aver that its membership is provided under Article 127(2) and (3) and that its current members are the 3rd to the 12th Respondents who have been sued in their personal capacities. They depose that the Clerk of the National Assembly has been enjoined in these Petitions yet he is not a member of the PSC. They further aver that members of commissions and holders of independent offices have immunity from personal liability for acts done in good faith in the discharge of their official functions pursuant to Article 250(9).

47. It is the 1st to 13th Respondents’ case that the PSC is a body corporate whose mandate is provided under Article 127(6) and that the impugned decision was made by 3rd to 12th Respondents in their official capacity as members of the 1st Respondent and they cannot be sued in their personal capacities. They cited Judicial Service Commission v. National Assembly & 2 others[6] in support of their averment and urged the court to remove the 3rd to 12th Respondents from the proceedings.

48. The 1st to 13th Respondents also aver that the secretary of a constitutional commission does not participate in the commission’s decisions hence Mr. Nyegenye has been wrongfully sued in Petition No. 208 of 2019.

49. In defence of the 1st Respondent’s impugned decision, the 1st to 13th Respondents aver that under Article 260, MPs are State Officers and are entitled to a housing benefit or a house allowance at the County or Constituency level. Further, that the SRC has not set a housing benefit or house allowance for them contrary to its constitutional mandate. It is their case that in Council of Governors v. Salaries & Remuneration Commission[7](theCoG v SRC case),the court faulted the SRC for failing to set a housing benefit or a house allowance for Deputy Governors. Likewise, the SRC has denied MPs a housing benefit or a house allowance in violation of their constitutional rights as State Officers and SRC has fallen short in the discharge of its constitutional mandate under Article 230(4)(a).

50. The 1st to 13th Respondents explained that by the very nature of their constitutional mandate, MPs have two work stations, which necessitate that they have a house at the County or Constituency level, and facilitative house allowance for their accommodation in Nairobi when they are attending to legislative and other parliamentary business. According to the 1st to the 13th Respondents, what was paid to MPs was a facilitative allowance and not house allowance as alleged by the SRC.

51. The said Respondents further deposed that the SRC has failed to consider that the provision of a housing benefit or house allowance is vital for the productivity and performance of MPs in the discharge of their constitutional and legislative mandate. Further, SRC has not been transparent and fair, and it has discriminated against MPs contrary to Article 27.

52. In support of their claim of discrimination and unfair treatment, the 1st to 13th Respondents cited various circulars released by the SRC, which listed the grades and equivalent job groups for all State Officers and other designated public officers. They gave the example that MPs who despite being graded at E5 are paid lower salary and allowances than Chief Magistrates who are at the lower grade of E4. Likewise, that High Court judges who are in the same grade like MPs are paid a higher gross monthly remuneration package.

53. The 1st to 13th Respondents maintain that the provision of a facilitative house allowance is in line with the PSC’s mandate under Article 127 (6) (a) & (e) which enjoins it to provide services and facilities to ensure the effective and efficient functioning of Parliament. Additionally, they aver that it does not make sense to incur mileage costs transporting MPs from their constituencies or counties to Nairobi to attend parliamentary business, but fail to provide for their accommodation expenses. The 1st to 13th Respondents supported their case by citing the practice of payment of facilitative house allowance in other jurisdictions among them the United Kingdom and India.

54. It is the said Respondents’ averment that services and facilities necessary for Parliament to function are not remuneration or benefits within the meaning of Article 230 (4)(a), which must be read together with Article 127 (6) which mandates the PSC to provide services and facilities to MPs. They supported their averment by stating that pursuant to Article 249(2), the PSC is not subject to control by any other State organ or person. Further, that the PSC is under no obligation to consult with the SRC in the fulfilment of its constitutional mandate.

55. Lastly, the 1st to 13th Respondents denied the allegation made by the SRC and Mr. Okiya Omtatah that the impugned decision led to loss of public funds. They aver that there has been no such loss because in performing legislative and other parliamentary business in Nairobi, MPs are not engaged in private rendezvous but are fulfilling a public function required of them by the Constitution. Additionally, that SRC cannot use the rationale of minimizing wastage of public resources to interfere with the performance of their constitutional mandate.

The 1st Interested Party’s Response

56. Jeremiah Nyegenye the Clerk of the Senate and the Secretary to the PSC and Mr. Michael Sialai the Clerk of the National Assembly swore the affidavits dated 1st October 2019 and 30th September 2019 respectively in opposition to Petition Nos. 185 of 2019 and 208 of 2019. The said deponents are the Accounting Officers of their respective houses of Parliament and responsible for administration and proper management of Parliament.

57. Mr. Nyegenye and Mr. Sialai explained that the Senate comprises of members elected from each County in the country whereas the National Assembly is composed of members elected from each Constituency in the country. Further, that these members are required to come to Nairobi to attend plenary sittings, committee meetings and other businesses of the houses and also attend to their constituents in their respective counties and constituencies.

58. The said deponents aver that as Accounting Officers they are responsible for ensuring that the members have the facilities that they require to transact parliamentary business and attend all committee as well as plenary sittings and, in that capacity, they receive requests from members to facilitate them to attend Parliament in Nairobi. Further, that they receive requests from members requesting that the PSC facilitates them to undertake their constitutional duties in the counties and the constituencies, and other official business.

59. The deponents substantially reiterated the averments made by the 1st to 13th Respondents on the entitlement of MPs to accommodation facilitation to enable them to effectively perform their constitutional roles, and that Article 127(6) (a) (e)mandates the PSC to provide MPs with such facilitation. Furthermore, that the accommodation facilitation is not a benefit.

The 2nd Interested Party’s Response

60. The 2nd Interested Party adopted a similar position to that of the 1st to 13th Respondents. Their response is contained in the replying affidavits sworn by Michael Sialai on 30th September 2019 and Jeremiah Nyegenye sworn on 1st October 2019, and the grounds of opposition dated the same date. The 2nd Interested Party, just like the 3rd to the 12th Respondents averred that they have been wrongly sued in their personal capacity for receiving facilitative allowance from the PSC to enable them effectively and efficiently perform their constitutional mandate.

The 3th Interested Party’s Response

61. Samuel M. Kimeu, the Executive Director of Transparency International-Kenya swore the Replying Affidavit dated 14th June 2019 in support of Petition No. 185 of 2019. He avers that TI-Kenya has been working with others to ensure that political leaders in Kenya and State Officers uphold the national values and principles of governance embodied in Article 10(2).

62. The 3rd Interested Party detailed the processes leading to the payment of the impugned house allowance to the MPs as described by the Petitioners. Mr. Kimeu averred that pursuant to the express constitutional edict in Article 230 (4) (a), the SRC is tasked with the mandate of setting and reviewing the remuneration and benefits of all State Officers including the MPs.

63. He further averred that SRC’s mandate has been the subject of various decisions of the High Court, including the CoG v SRC case relied upon by the PSC to justify the payment of the impugned house allowance. According to the 3rd Interested Party, the court in the said case declined to grant the housing benefit but directed the SRC to discharge its exclusive constitutional mandate to set and review the remuneration and benefits of all State Officers including the Deputy Governors.

64. The 3rd Interested Party also cited the PSC v SRC Case and averred that the said decision clarified the constitutional mandates of the SRC and the PSC. Additionally, the 3rd Interested Party averred that the mandate of the PSC is provided for under Article 127 (6)and that under the said Article, the PSC does not have mandate to set, review and award any remuneration and benefits to State Officers.

65. Mr. Kimeu averred that the options available to the PSC was to request for a review of the MPs’ benefits from the SRC as provided in the Constitution, the SRC Act and Regulations, or alternatively, to seek a court declaration that MPs are entitled to a housing benefit.

66. In conclusion, the 3rd Interested Party averred that the PSC acted with impunity and disregarded the Constitution, the law, High Court decisions and advice of the National Treasury in awarding and paying MPs the Kshs. 250,000/= monthly housing benefit, and backdating it to 5th October 2018. Furthermore, that the PSC and Parliament breached the national values in Article 10(2), and acted outside their constitutional mandates.

SRC’s Response to Petition No. 339 of 2019

67. The SRC filed grounds of opposition dated 22nd October 2019 in opposition to Petition No. 339 of 2019. It reiterated that its mandate under Article 230 (4) (a) and section 11 of the SRC Act is to set and regularly review the remuneration and benefits of all State Officers. Further, that this position has received judicial backing in various court decisions including Teachers Service Commission (TSC) v Kenya Union of Teachers (KNUT) & 3 others.[8]

68. The SRC also states that Petition No. 339 of 2019 is unnecessary and intended to frustrate the functioning of the SRC in its role of setting and regularly reviewing salaries. Further, it states that the Petition is an abuse of the court process since the PSC knew that SRC had already filed Petition Nos. 208 of 2019 and 185 of 2019. According to SRC, the PSC is misdirecting itself in the application of the law and the rules of res judicata in the factual circumstances of this matter, and in particular relying on Gazette Notice No. 6517 published on 7th July 2017 which was quashed by the PSC v SRC case.

69. The SRC explained the processes, tools and consideration that inform its job evaluation and grading of State Officers and reiterated it is highly technical and polycentric in nature. It also denied that there was discrimination in the reduction of the remuneration and benefits of MPs, and stated that it acted independently and within the confines of its constitutional mandate by setting the salaries for MPs. Further, that the PSC is on a fishing expedition for non-existent powers to pay its members additional house allowance, which is illegal and contrary to public policy.

70. The SRC also stated that the limiting of the number of remunerable meetings of parliamentary committees to a maximum of 16 per month does not interfere with the PSC’s independence and mandate. Further, that it only provided for the maximum amount of allowances to pay or meetings on a monthly basis and it did not expressly prescribe the number of meetings that should be held.

71. Further, the SRC states that it is wrong, absurd and unreasonable for the PSC to state that SRC’s mandate to set housing allowance is only limited to offering a house at the constituency or county level since MPs have 2 work stations, and that it is PSC’s mandate to provide services and facilities at Nairobi. Additionally, SRC’s mandate is to set and regularly review the remuneration and benefits notwithstanding the officer’s number of working stations and its mandate is not limited by any locality. In SRC’s view, the claim by PSC that it provides services and facilities to cater for accommodation in Nairobi is a scheme to confer exorbitant benefits to MPs at the expense of the citizenry and is geared at wasting public resources, which is against public interest.

72. The SRC opines that the judgment in the CoG v SRC case is in personam and only declared that denying a housing benefit to Deputy Governors is discriminatory. Further, that there was no finding that failing to set a housing benefit for some State Officers amounts to discrimination. The SRC reiterated that a housing benefit simply means constructing a residence for the particular State Officer as a result of the unique nature of their functions, such as the President and Deputy President. In addition, where a housing benefit is not provided, a housing allowance must be provided as a supplement and in the case of MPs, they are paid a house allowance, which forms 40% of their consolidated pay.

73. The SRC also states that the alleged services and facilities to be provided by the PSC should not in any circumstances be in monetary terms. It states that the Black’s Law Dictionary defines service as a product that is not tangible while a facility is a physical building or product. Further, the SRC is performing its constitutional mandate, which includes regulating the use of public finances to maintain a sustainable wage bill.

74. Lastly, SRC states that it took into consideration all factors the PSC is raising while setting the remuneration and benefits package and if Petition No. 339 of 2019 is allowed SRC’s constitutional role under Article 230(4) (a) will be rendered nugatory.

The Submissions

The Submissions in support of Petition Nos. 185 of 2019 and 208 of 2019

1st Petitioner’s Submissions

75. Mr. Wanyama, the counsel for the SRC filed submissions dated 1st October 2019 in support of Petition No. 208 of 2019. The counsel submitted that the Petition raises a fundamental question regarding the powers of the SRC vis a vis the powers of the PSC as outlined in Articles 127 and 230 and section 11 of the SRC Act. Referring to annexures 1, 2, 6 & 7 to the affidavit in support of the Petition, counsel argued that contrary to PSC’s contention that they paid “a facilitative allowance,” the said documents are clear that what was paid was referred to as a house allowance. Furthermore, that the payment offends Article 230, which confers exclusive mandate to the SRC to set the salaries, and allowances payable to all State Officers, and the PSC cannot exercise a mandate expressly vested upon the SRC by the Constitution. The counsel argued that Article 127 cannot be construed to vest the said mandate to the PSC to pay MPs housing allowance without SRC’s approval.

76. Mr. Wanyama reiterated the reasons why the SRC declined to approve PSC’s request for the house allowance. These were firstly, that the housing benefit that SRC has set for a selected group of State Officers is distinct from a house allowance. Secondly that the housing benefit is the physical building/house provided by the Government and not a cash benefit which is available mostly to public officers whose pay is not consolidated. Thirdly, that MPs earn a consolidated pay which combines the basic salary and house allowance. Fourthly, under section 31(2) of the Employment Act,[9] a house allowance cannot be paid where an employee receives a consolidated pay. Lastly, that the SRC has set additional benefits for MPs in form of mortgages at affordable interest rates to buy houses to address their housing needs.

77. The counsel further submitted that MPs are State Officers as defined in Article 260 and by a letter dated 15th November 2013 addressed to the Speaker of the National Assembly/Chairman of PSC, the SRC was categorical that the set remuneration package for all State Officers is consolidated pay. Further, that for purposes of pension management and computation, 60% of the set remuneration is to be considered as the basic salary while all other allowances unless specified are consolidated into the 40% of the total set remuneration. He averred that MPs are paid a house allowance in their consolidated pay and as such they are not entitled to any other additional housing allowance.

78. Mr. Wanyama contended that there is no law which provides for a benefit/allowance/facility known as a “housing or accommodation facilitation” and that in the correspondence between the Cabinet Secretary, the National Treasury, and the PSC there was no reference to a “housing or accommodation facilitation.” He added that in all the communications between the parties, the PSC indicated that it sought to pay MPs a housing allowance and that the duplication of allowances is a huge loss of public funds.

79. The counsel submitted that PSC’s act of formulating and setting an allowance which is not provided in any written law is a blatant breach of Article 230(4), and the paying and backdating of the additional house allowance to MPs is in breach of Article 2(2). Additionally, he argued that the Respondents have acted in contravention of the common law principle of the rule of law established in Entick v Carrington [10] to the effect that the state or state agencies can only do that which is permitted by law.

80. Mr. Wanyama also argued that setting, approving and paying the housing allowance to MPs by the PSC does not fall within the intendment of Article127(6) (e). He submitted that performing a function necessary for the wellbeing of the MPs does not include setting their benefits as and when they deem fit, hence the PSC acted beyond its constitutional mandate. To buttress his argument, he cited Article 230(4) (5) and section 11 of the SRC Act and Okiya Omtatah Okoiti & 3 others v Attorney General & 5 others[11] which held that all organs created by the Constitution are of equal importance and that where one organ is of the view that another organ has overstepped its mandate, the aggrieved body should seek a solution as provided in the Constitution.

81. Mr. Wanyama also cited the PSC v SRC casewhich held that Article 230(4) mandates the SRC to set and regularly review the remuneration and benefits of all State officers and to advise the national and county governments on the remuneration and benefits of all other public officers who include the MPs.

82. The counsel addressed PSC’s reliance on the decision in the CoG v SRC case and submitted that the case has not been correctly applied. He cited Ekuru Aukot v Independent Electoral & Boundaries Commission & 3 others[12] for the proposition that the language of a decision is to be construed not as a statement of abstract propositions without limitations but in connection with the particular facts of the case, and the specific matters in view when the language was used. Further, that when applied to an essentially different state of facts, it is to be understood as subject by implication to many limitations and restrictions not expressly stated.

83. The counsel further argued that there is a distinction between judgment in rem and in personam and cited the decisions in Japheth Nzila Muangi v Kenya Safari Lodges & Hotels Ltd[13], Pattni v Ali & Anor (Isle of Mann (Staff of Government Division)[14],Edward R. Ouko v Speaker of the National Assembly & 4 others[15]and George William Kateregga v Commissioner for Land Registration & Other[16]for the position that a judgment in personam ordinarily binds only the parties to it, and that a judgement which is conclusive not only against the parties but is also against all the world is a judgement in rem.

84. According to Mr. Wanyama, the Respondents have misinterpreted the Judgement in the CoG v SRC casewhich was a judgment in rem in that it is effective against the whole world but does not confer benefits upon the whole world. He argued that the Deputy Governors were granted the house allowance because of the nature of their work which involves hosting state delegations; hence, the judgment was with respect to the position of deputy governors and not all state officers as interpreted by the Respondents.

85. Regarding the application of the Employment Act[17] to MPs, the counsel submitted that section 2 of the Act defines an “an employee” to mean a person employed for wages or a salary and includes an apprentice and indentured learner and argued that the Act does not apply to a State Officer who is defined in Article 260. Further, that the Act was enacted to govern the relationship between an employer and employee under a contract of employment. He cited the Court of Appeal in County Government of Nyeri & another v Cecilia Wangechi Ndungu[18] which held that the Employment Act[19] does not apply to State Officers.

86. Mr. Wanyama argued that paying MPs an additional house allowance without public participation offends the national values and principles in Article 10, which bind all State organs, State officers and public officers. He also argued that the courts have in many decisions pronounced themselves on the issue of public participation. He cited the decisions in Nairobi Metropolitan PSV Saccos Union Limited &25; others v County of Nairobi Government & 3 Others[20] and Robert N. Gakuru & Others v Governor Kiambu County & 3 others[21] as examples.

87. Further reliance was placed on Article 259(11) of the Constitution, which provides that where the approval of a body is required, it ought to be sought before any step of decision making is done. Mr. Wanyama added that the PSC sought SRC’s approval to pay MPs a housing allowance, which approval was declined, but that despite the provisions of Article 259(11), the PSC went ahead and authorized payment of the allowances. To buttress his argument, he cited the Court of Appeal decision in Teachers Service Commission (TSC) v Kenya Union of Teachers (KNUT) & 3 Others[22] which held that the advice given by SRC is binding on all State Organs and independent commissions.

88. Mr. Wanyama argued that the powers and functions of the PSC are set out in the Constitution and that the law frowns at the act of usurping powers and functions not specifically granted by the Constitution.

The 2nd Petitioner’s Submissions

89. Mr. Omtatah adopted Mr. Wanyama’s submissions. Additionally, he argued that there is no contradiction between Article 127 (6) (e) (i) which provides for the role of the PSC and Article 250 (4) & (8) which provides the mandate of the SRC. He submitted that Article 127 gives PSC power to facilitate an institution and not individuals. He contended that the well-being of members of staff is not the same as benefits of State Officers and added that the determination to pay must be made by the SRC before the payment is done.

90. Mr. Omtatah submitted that the composition of the PSC automatically excludes them from determining the pay because they would be paying themselves. He argued that the Constitution created independent commissions and urged the court to interpret the Constitution in a holistic manner and treat it as a living document as opposed to the view taken by the PSC. He relied on the Supreme Court decision in In theInterim Independent Electoral Commission[23] and urged the court to allow Petition Nos. 185 of 2019 and 208 of 2019 and dismiss Petition No. 339 of 2019.

The 14th, 15th and 16th Respondents’ Submissions

91. Mr. Thande Kuria, counsel for the 14th, 15th and 16th Respondents supported Petition Nos. 208 of 2019 and 185 of 2019, and opposed Petition No. 339 of 2019 in submissions dated 2ndDecember 2019. He submitted that the PSC has no powers to review and alter MPs’ salaries and benefits. His position was that PSC’s mandate under Article 127(6) is to ensure efficient and effective functioning of Parliament, to establish offices in parliamentary service and appoint office holders, prepare annual estimates of parliamentary expenditure and exercise budget control over such estimates and perform such necessary functions for the well-being of members and staff of Parliament. He argued that the proper procedure is for the PSC to request the SRC to review their terms as provided in the SRC Act.

92. Mr. Kuria cited Articles 230 (4) (a) & (b) and section 11 of the SRC Act and submitted that the impugned decision made by PSC is unconstitutional. He argued that the functions set out under the said provisions can only be exercised by the SRC, and that no organ of the state or commission can operate outside the parameters set by the Constitution. He submitted that Rules4 & 5 of the Salaries and Remuneration Commission (Remuneration and Benefits of State and Public Officers) Regulations, 2013 mandates the SRC to undertake a review of salaries and remuneration of state and public officers every four years. To fortify his position, he cited Teachers Service Commission v Kenya Union of Teachers (KNUT) & 3 others[24] and Kenya Union of Domestic, Hotels, Education And Allied Workers (Kudhehia Workers) v Salaries and Renumeration Commission[25]which acknowledged the mischief the creation of SRC was intended to cure, and held that the advice of the SRC under the Constitution is binding on national and county governments and any power or function exercised without that advice is invalid.

93. He also relied on Okiya Omtatah & 3 others v Attorney General & others[26] in which the court held that Parliament had exceeded its mandate by purporting to annul a gazette notice issued by the SRC setting salaries for MPs. Mr. Kuria also cited and placed reliance on Kenya National Commission on Human Rights v Attorney General & another[27] in which the court considered the legal consequences of failure to seek advice from the SRC in matters touching on remuneration and benefits payable to state and public officers, and held that the law mandates the input of the SRC to be sought in such matters.

94. Mr. Kuria further relied on Article 259 (11) which provides that if a function or power conferred on a person under the Constitution is exercisable by the person only on the advice or recommendation, with the approval or consent of, or on consultation with another person, the function may be performed or the power exercised only on that advise, recommendation, with that approval or consent or after that consultation, except to the extent that the Constitution provides otherwise.

95. Additionally, Mr. Kuria cited Article 116 (4) which provides that an act of Parliament that confers a direct pecuniary interest on MPs shall not come into force until after the next general elections. He submitted that the said provision bars lawmakers from taking any action legislative or otherwise that would confer a pecuniary benefit on themselves.

96. Mr. Kuria also submitted that Article2 binds all persons; Article 93(2)directs the National Assembly and the Senate to perform their respective functions in accordance with the Constitution, while Article 94 (4) obligates Parliament to protect the Constitution. Furthermore, that the impugned decision is a violation of Article 73 (1) (a)which provides that the authority assigned to a State Officer is a public trust to be exercised in a manner that is consistent with the purpose and objects of the Constitution. He also relied on Director of Public Prosecutions v Tom Ojienda T/A Prof Tom Ojienda & Associates Advocates & 3 others[28] which held that state organs created by the Constitution are bound by the dictates of the Constitution and therefore they are not at liberty to pick and choose which of its actions are bound by the Constitution.

97. On the question of discrimination, Mr. Kuria faulted Prof. Ojienda’s reliance on the CoG v SRC case which was specific to house allowance payable to Deputy Governors. He argued that MPs though State Officers perform different constitutional roles from the Deputy Governors and comparing their roles and functions cannot be a basis to lay a case for discrimination in terms of remuneration benefits. He additionally argued that the basis upon which the SRC awards remuneration and benefits is based on an objective criterion, job description and overall economy of the country and the public wage bill.

The 3rd Interested Party’s Submissions

98. Mr. Ouma, the counsel for the 3rd Interested Party, relied on written submissions filed on 20th June 2019 in support of Petition No. 185 of 2019. He argued that the SRC has the exclusive mandate to set and review salaries and allowances for State Officers including MPs. He relied on Article 230 (4) and section 11 of the SRC Act. Counsel relied on the decisions in Kenya National Commission on Human Rights v Attorney General & another[29]; PSC v SRC case; and Judicial Service Commission v Salaries and Remuneration Commission & another[30]for the holding that commissions and independent offices ought to function without intrusion on their mandate by any other state organ, authority or person.

99. Mr. Ouma pointed out that the High Court in the CoG v SRC case emphasized SRC’s exclusive mandate to set and regularly review all remuneration and benefits (including the housing benefit) for all State Officers. Further, that SRC’s mandate in that regard was upheld by the Court of Appeal in Teachers Service Commission (TSC) v Kenya Union of Teachers (KNUT) & 3 others (supra­). Therefore, that PSC acted ultra-vires its powers by resolving to pay housing allowance to MPs, as the mandate of the PSC under Article 127(1)does not include payment of MPs’ remuneration. Mr. Ouma also argued that by accepting payments not approved by the SRC, the MPs violated Articles 73 and 94(4).

100. Mr. Ouma further argued that a housing allowance is a benefit to be set and regularly reviewed by the SRC, hence, it cannot be a service,a facility or a programme to ensure efficient and effective functioning of Parliament, nor can it fall within the parameters of an additional function for the well-being of MPs. He submitted that the PSC is enjoined under Article 249(1) to protect the sovereignty of the people of Kenya, to secure the observance of the democratic values and principles of the Constitution and promote constitutionalism. He submitted that all State Organs must act in deference to the Constitution and cited Teachers Service Commission (TSC) v Kenya Union of Teachers (KNUT) & 3 othersfor the holding that an action done by a state organ in usurpation of another State Organ’s mandate is a fundamental jurisdictional error and such an action, is a nullity and liable to be set aside on this ground alone. He also relied on Communications Commission of Kenya & 5 others v Royal Media Services Limited & 5 others[31] which emphasized the need for a public body to be seen to be carrying out its functions free of orders, instructions, or any other intrusions.

101. Additionally, counsel argued that the impugned decision was made in March 2019 and backdated to 5th October 2018 without regard to an Appropriations Bill as required by Article 206(2) & (3). Further, he submitted that the permission of the Controller of Budget under Article 206(4) was not obtained. Mr. Ouma relied on Institute of Social Accountability & another v National Assembly & 4 others[32] for the holding that the Constitution should be interpreted in a manner that promotes its purposes, values, and principles, and advances the rule of law, human rights and fundamental freedoms in the Bill of Rights and contributes to good governance. Lastly, he argued that when a court intervenes under Article 165(3) (d) (ii), it does so to protect the Constitution and ensure the legality of any act in exercise of public power.

The 4th Interested Party’s Submissions

102. Mr. Lempaa who appeared for the 4th Interested Party supported Petition Nos. 208 of 2019 and 185 of 2019, and opposed Petition No. 339 of 2019. He adopted the submissions made by Mr. Wanyama, Mr. Omtatah and Mr. Kuria, and highlighted his written submissions filed on 5th December, 2019. He adverted to SRC’s constitutional mandate under Article 230(1) and section 11 of the SRC Act and cited the Supreme Court decisions in Re the Matter of Interim Independent Electoral Commissions,[33] Communication Commissions of Kenya & 5 Others v Royal Media Services Limited & 5 others[34]andRe the Matter of the National Land Commission[35] which underscored the importance of independent constitutional commissions.

103. Counsel further submitted that the mandate of the PSC is to provide services and to facilitate Parliament to function effectively, and does not include setting salaries and allowances for MPs. He relied on Okiya Omtatah Okoiti & 3 Others v Attorney General & 5 others[36] for the proposition that Parliament cannot and must not be allowed to transgress into the mandate of other constitutional organs. He also cited Teachers Service Commission (TSC) v Kenya Union of Teachers (KNUT) & 3 others[37] in which the Court of Appeal held that recommendations of the SRC are binding on State organs.

104. Responding to Prof. Ojienda SC’s reference to the practice obtaining in comparable jurisdictions including England and India on the provision of accommodation allowance to MPs, Mr. Lempaa submitted that the Independent Parliamentary Standards Authority in England and the Salary, Allowances and Pension of Members of Parliament Act of 1954 of India provide for house allowance. Further, that there are no bodies similar to the SRC in those jurisdictions. He submitted that best practices from other jurisdictions must be applied in a holistic manner. He also distinguished the decision in the CoG v SRC case on the ground that it targeted Deputy Governors, and is therefore a decision in personam and not inrem.

105. Lastly, Mr. Lempaa submitted that Article 116(3) prohibits Parliament from enacting a law that confers direct benefit to MPs during their term. He argued that the PSC’s actions fly in the face of the national values and principles as was observed by the Supreme Court in Communication Commission of Kenya & 5 Others v Royal media Services Limited & 5 Others.[38] He submitted that the PSC’s actions undermine the coexistence of constitutional commissions and urged the court to demarcate the functions of each organ.

The 5thInterested Party’s submissions

106. Mr. Nzamba Kitonga SC, counsel for the Law Society of Kenya, filed written submissions dated 28th October 2019 in support of Petition Nos. 208 of 2019 and 185 of 2019. He gave a brief historical background of the issues raised in the consolidated Petitions. He recalled that Parliament increased their own salaries and benefits by amending laws relating to their pay which was achieved by amending the thenNational Assembly Remuneration Act,[39]triggering public outcry which informed the provisions of Article 230.

107. Mr. Kitonga SC observed that Parliament has severally crafted resolutions aimed at undermining Article230,and thus usurping the powers of the SRC. He gave examples of how the 11th Parliament nullified the Gazette Notices issued by the SRC on their salaries and benefits, and went ahead to use the obsolete National Assembly Remuneration Act to determine their salaries and benefits. He stated that this led to the filing of Law Society of Kenya v the National Assembly and others[40] in which the court declared the resolution unconstitutional, invalid ab intio, and reiterated the sacrosanct constitutional position that all powers to determine the salaries and other benefits of state officers are vested in the SRC.

108. Mr. Kitonga SC observed that the 12th Parliament was also engaged in a scheme to challenge the abolition of mileage allowance for MPs in thePSC v SRC case seeking to quash the decision of the SRC to impose a uniform mileage allowance for all MPs. He stated that the court again reiterated the exclusive constitutional mandate of the SRC to set salaries and benefits of State Officers. That the 12th Parliament then came up with the impugned decision.

109. Mr. Kitonga SC maintained that there is no statute, regulation or law, which supports the decision, and that the mandate to decide on the salaries and remuneration of a State Officer is solely vested on the SRC. Hence, the PSC’s action is illegal, null and void ab intio and ultra vires because its functions are limited under Article 127 (6) (a)to providing services and facilities, by ensuring that MPs have offices, staff, meeting rooms, stationery, functioning audio and video equipment and travel arrangements.

110. The Senior Counsel further argued that the judgement in the CoG v SRCcase relied upon by the PSC was made in personam, and has no application to MPs or any other category of a State officers. Additionally, that the PSC deliberately and illegally misinterpreted its mandate in order to procure an illegal benefit from public funds and the withdrawal of public money without lawful authority, which constitutes abuse of office. Lastly, that the MPs must refund the monies already paid or be surcharged for the recovery thereof.

The Submissions in support of Petition No. 339 of 2019

111. Prof. Ojienda SC, counsel for the PSC filed submissions dated 30th September 2020 in support of Petition No. 339 of 2019. The counsel submitted that the PSC is an independent constitutional commission and its mandate entails performing functions necessary for the well-being of members and staff of Parliament under Article 127 (6) (a) & (e). He also cited section 2 of the Parliamentary Service Act[41] which provides for the definition of services and facilities to include all means by which members of the National Assembly are officially assisted in performing their parliamentary duties. He submitted that Parliament is an independent arm of government and its role is stipulated in Article94.

112. He submitted that on 1st and 8th March, 2013, the SRC published its first review of the remuneration and benefits for State Officers serving in Parliament, the Executive, Constitutional Commissions and Independent Offices, and in the County Governments vide Gazette Notices No. 2885-2888 of 1st March, 2013 and Gazette Notice No. 3143 of 8th March, 2013. He argued that in the 2013 remuneration structure, the remuneration of MPs was reduced from Kshs. 851,000/- to Kshs. 532,500/, a reduction of 37. 4%, and allowances payable to MPs were made subject to taxation, unlike in the previous regime under the National Assembly Remuneration Act[42]where allowances were tax free. He argued that the SRC thereby purported to review and set what the PSC considers as “services and facilities” falling within its mandate under Article 127 (6).

113. Prof. Ojienda SC stated that on 7th July, 2017, the SRC published its second review of the remuneration and benefits structure for State Officers in the Executive of the National Government, Parliament, County Government, and Full Time Constitutional Commissions and Independent Offices (Gazette Notices Number 6516-6519 of 7th July, 2017). He submitted that the SRC by the said Gazette Notice unilaterally abolished various allowances payable to State Officers serving in Parliament: despite the fact that its actions would negatively impact on the remuneration and benefits of State Officers serving in Parliament, and without affording the MPs or the PSC an opportunity to be heard. Further, that SRC did not give reasons for its decision, contrary to Article 47(2) and (3) as read together with Sections 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 10 and 12 of the Fair Administrative Action Act.[43]

114. In addition, that the SRC abolished sitting allowance for plenary sessions, reduced the sitting allowance for committee meetings, and limited the committee meetings that may be paid to a maximum of 16 meetings per month thereby trespassing into Parliament’s mandate under Articles 1, 93, 94, 95, 96 and 127 (6).

115. Prof. Ojienda SC submitted that being aggrieved by the SRC’s decision to abolish the allowances payable to State Officers serving in Parliament, the PSC embarked on consultations with the SRC in vain, which prompted it to sue the SRC in the PSC v SRC case and the court consequently quashed Gazette Notice No. 6517 on the ground that its promulgation was tainted with procedural impropriety.

116. The Senior Counsel further submitted that by a letter dated 14th May, 2019, the SRC purported to direct the Clerk of the Senate who is also the Secretary to the PSC and Clerk of the National Assembly, in their respective roles as Accounting Officers of the Senate and the PSC, and the National Assembly, not to pay a house allowance to facilitate MPs to carry out their constitutional mandate. He argued that the said directive was contrary to the PSC's mandate under Article 127(6) (a) & (e). He further argued that the said letter was purportedly written pursuant to Gazette Notice Nos. 6516 and 6519 both dated 7th July 2017 relating to the remuneration and benefits of State Officers in the Executive and Constitutional Commissions, and which do not apply to State Officers in Parliament.

117. According to Prof. Ojienda SC, when Gazette Notice No. 6517 relating to remuneration and benefits of State Officers in Parliament was quashed in the PSC v SRC case the court declined to interpret the mandate of the PSC and the SRC pertaining to the expression “services and facilities” under Article 127(6), because it was exercising judicial review jurisdiction as opposed to interpreting the Constitution. He thus invited this Court to interpret the expression “services and facilities” pertaining to PSC’s mandate under Article 127 (6) vis a vis SRC’s mandate under Article 230(4), and to harmonise the two Articles.

118. In addition, Prof. Ojienda SC submitted that SRC is mandated to “set and regularly review the remuneration and benefits of all State officers” including MPs who are State Officers under Article 260. He argued that the SRC has not set a housing benefit or house allowance for MPs contrary to its constitutional mandate. He opined that setting of “allowances” does not fall within the mandate of the SRC, whose mandate is limited to remuneration and benefits and advising the national and county governments on the remuneration and benefits of all other public officers.

119. He relied on the decision in the CoG v SRC casesubmitting that it interpreted the mandate of the SRC in the context of SRC’s failure to set a housing benefit or a house allowance for Deputy Governors which the court held amounted to unfair discrimination against Deputy Governors. He submitted that in the same manner the SRC denied Deputy Governors housing benefit or a house allowance, it has denied MPs housing benefit or house allowance. Placing reliance on the said case, he submitted that MPs are State Officers and like other State officers they are entitled to a housing benefit or a house allowance at the County or Constituency level.

120. Senior Counsel further argued that the SRC has not adhered to the principles in Article 230(5) (c) & (d) that requires it to take into account “the need to recognise productivity and performance” and “transparency and fairness in the treatment of the issue of the housing benefits for MPs. Further, that the SRC has not considered that the provision of a housing benefit or house allowance is vital for the productivity and performance of MPs in the discharge of their constitutional mandate. Therefore, that SRC’s failure to set a housing benefit or house allowance for MPs is a violation of their constitutional right, a failure by the SRC to discharge its constitutional mandate and it is discrimination against MPs contrary to Article27.

121. Prof. Ojienda SC submitted that under Article 230(4) the SRC has no mandate to provide MPs with facilitative allowances since Article 127 (6) (a) & (e) confers the said mandate upon the PSC. He referred to Section 2 of the Parliamentary Service Act[44] which provides that: “services and facilities” “includes all means by which members of the National Assembly are officially assisted in performing their parliamentary duties” and reiterated that by the very nature of their work, MPs require facilitative house allowance for their accommodation in Nairobi when they are attending to legislative and other parliamentary business.

122. Therefore, as submitted by the Senior Counsel, the housing benefitor house allowance for MPs that falls within the jurisdiction of the SRC under Article 230(4) (a) is for a house at the County or Constituency level, while the facilitative house allowance provided to MPs by the PSC under Article 127(6) (a) & (e) is to facilitate MPs with accommodation in Nairobi as they attend to legislative and other parliamentary business.

123. Prof. Ojienda SC further argued that payment of facilitative house allowances does not amount to loss of public funds because parliamentary business is public business. He referred to Articles 1, 89, 93, 94, 95 and96 which provides the mandate of MPs which entails undertaking legislative and other parliamentary business and submitted that in performing legislative and other parliamentary business in Nairobi, MPs are fulfilling a public function required of them by the Constitution. He relied on Judicial Service Commission v Salaries and Remuneration Commission & another[45] for the proposition that the SRC cannot hide behind the rationale of minimizing wastage of public resources as a reason to interfere with the constitutional mandates of the PSC and MPs to the detriment of the performance of their public functions.

124. The need to harmonize Articles 127(6) (a) (e) and 230(4) (a) was urged by Prof. Ojienda SC, who submitted that the said Articles must be read together to achieve the aspirations of the people of Kenya as set out in the Preamble to the Constitution in conformity with the dictates of Article 259 (1). For this proposition he relied on Marilyn Muthoni Kamuru & 2 Others v. Attorney General & Another[46]andInthe Matter of the Principle of Gender Representation in the National Assembly and the Senate.[47]

125. He further relied on the Supreme Court decision in Speaker of the Senate & Another v. Attorney-General & 4 others[48] in which the then Chief Justice and President of the Supreme Court, Dr. Willy Mutunga, in his concurring opinion acknowledged the role of the Court in the elimination of the legal penumbras that may emerge because of the compromises made during the constitution-making process. Further, that the Supreme Court cited the decision in Tinyefuza v. Attorney-General[49] for the proposition that the entire Constitution has to be read as an integrated whole without one particular provision destroying the other but each sustaining the other, and that the court should adopt a holistic approach of interpretation, with a view to protecting and promoting the purpose, effect, intent and principles of the Constitution.

126. Prof. Ojienda SC also cited the case of In the Matter of Kenya National Commission on Human Rights,[50] in which the Supreme Court stated that a holistic interpretation of the Constitution means interpreting the Constitution in context. He invited the court to consider the purpose, effect, intent and principles of the Constitution that emerge from the interpretation of the specific mandate of the PSC under Article 127(6) (a) & (e) viewed in relation to the mandate of the SRC under Article 230(4)(a).

127. The Senior Counsel urged the court to take judicial notice of the fact that both the PSC and the SRC are constitutional commissions specified as such under Article 248(2)(d) & (h), and are independent of each other with none being superior nor subservient to the other but both existing in a state of co-equality. He further submitted that the PSC and Parliament are independent of the control of the SRC in the fulfilment of their respective constitutional mandates. It was his argument that pursuant to Article 249(2), the PSC is a constitutional commission whereas Parliament is an independent arm of government, hence, they are independent of the control of the SRC. He submitted that the SRC has no mandate to determine the number of remunerable meetings that the PSC, and/or any committees of Parliament may hold in the exercise of their respective mandates. In the same vein, he argued that the SRC has no mandate to direct the PSC not to pay “facilitative allowances”to MPs.

128. To fortify his argument, Prof. Ojienda SC relied on In the Matter of Interim Independent Electoral Commission[51] in which the Supreme Court expressed itself on the issue of independence of commissions under Article 249(2). He also cited Communication Commission of Kenya & 5 Others v. Royal Media Services limited & 5 others[52] in which the Supreme Court explained the independence of commissions to mean a shield against influence or interference from external forces and that the body in question must be seen to be carrying out its functions free of orders, instructions, or intrusions from those forces.

129. Prof. Ojienda SC placed further reliance on In the Matter of the National Land Commission[53] in which the Supreme Court stated that the Constitution ordains that the commissions, and the holders of independent offices, are subject only to the Constitution and the law, and are independent, and not subject to the direction or control by any person or authority. Further, that the Supreme Court emphasised the need for constitutional commissions to abide by and remain true to the specific constitutional mandate assigned them without digressing from the same, a position he argued was reiterated in Republic v. Commission on Administrative Justice Ex-Parte National Social Security Fund Board of Trustees[54] which asserted that the starting point of resolving any conflict of mandates between constitutional commissions is to consider the reasons behind the establishment of the constitutional commissions.

130. Reliance was also placed on Judicial Service Commission v Salaries and Remuneration Commission & Another[55] in which the court while setting aside SRC’s decision to cap the number of meetings the Judicial Service Commission could hold in a month at eight held that the commissions and the holders of independent offices—

(a) are subject only to the Constitution and the law;

(b) are independent and not subject to direction or control by any person or authority; and

(c) have operational, administrative, decisional and financial independence when discharging their constitutional mandate and that they do not therefore seek direction or permission from any other person or authority on how they should perform their constitutional mandate;

131. In conclusion, Prof. Ojienda SC submitted that the SRC intends to and has attempted to control the PSC in the discharge of its mandate under Article 127(6)(a) & (e). Therefore, that SRC has attempted to control and limit Parliament in the discharge of its constitutional mandate, and is ascribing to itself a mandate that does not belong to it in violation of the Constitution.

The Submissions in Opposition to Petition Nos. 185 of 2019 and 208 of 2019

The 1st-13th Respondents’ and 2nd Interested Party’s Submissions

132. Prof. Ojienda SC made submissions in opposition to Petition Nos. 185 of 2019 and 208 of 2019 on behalf of the 1st to 13th Respondents and 2nd Interested Party dated 30th September 2020 and supplementary submissions dated 2nd December 2020, which were substantially similar to the submissions he made in support of Petition No. 339 of 2019.

133. In addition, Prof. Ojienda SC submitted that the Members of the PSC are immune from personal liability for acts done in good faith in the performance of their constitutional mandate, and that the membership of the PSC is provided for under Article 127(2) & (3)of the Constitution. Counsel contended that the members of the PSC had wrongly been sued in their personal capacities, even though members of commissions and holders of independent offices have immunity from personal liability for acts done in good faith in the discharge of their official functions as provided for under Article 250(9).

134. Prof. Ojienda SC further submitted that the 3rd to the 12th Respondents made the impugned decision in their official capacities as members of the PSC and not in their personal capacities. Counsel cited Judicial Service Commission v National Assembly & 2 others(supra) where the court considered the independence of the Judicial Service Commission and other independent offices and commissions and the immunity of members of independent offices and commissions from personal liability under Article 250(9). He argued that the issue in these Petitions was the collective decision of the 3rd to 12th Respondents acting in good faith in the fulfilment of their constitutional mandate under Article 127(6) in order to facilitate MPs in the discharge of their legislative and constitutional mandate under Articles 1, 89, 93, 94, 95 and 96.

135. Likewise, the Senior Counsel submitted that that the MPs had wrongly been sued in the Petitions in their personal capacities for merely receiving facilitative house allowance from the PSC in order to efficiently and effectively perform their constitutional mandate under Articles 1, 89, 93, 94, 95 and 96 and had not acted contrary to the Constitution. Counsel therefore prayed for the removal of MPs from the Petitions.

The 1st Interested Party’s Submissions

136. Mr. Njoroge who appeared for Parliament, the 1st Interested Party herein, filed submissions on 2nd December 2019 in support of Petition No. 339 of 2019 and in opposition to Petition Nos. 208 of 2019 and 185 of 2019. He submitted that Article 127(6) must be read together with Article 230(4) with each provision sustaining the other. He submitted that the constitutional obligation on the PSC to provide services and facilities is of equal standing to the role of the SRC to set remuneration and benefits for State Officers. He relied on Rethe Matter of Interim Independent Electoral Commission (supra) andCommunication Commission of Kenya & 5 Others v Royal Media Services limited & 5 others (supra)which espoused the importance independence of constitutional commissions.

137. Emphasis as put on the importance of constitutional commissions as held in Judicial Service Commission v Salaries and Remuneration Commission & Another (supra) by Mr. Njoroge, who argued that the PSC’s decision to provide services and facilities did not infringe on the constitutional mandate of the SRC.

138. Mr. Njoroge further submitted that MPs have two work stations: at the Member’s Constituency/County, and in Parliament, Nairobi. This, he argued is in line with Article 1 which requires that elected representatives exercise the sovereign power on behalf of the people, as well as the functions and responsibilities of MPs as set out at Articles 94, 95 & 96. He maintained that the PSC is responsible for providing services and facilities to MPs at their work station, in Nairobi, or such other place as Parliament or any of its Houses or committees may elect to sit in accordance with Article 126. He echoed Prof. Ojienda’s submission that the housing allowance that falls within the jurisdiction of the SRC is for a house at the constituency or county as MPs have two work stations.

139. According to Mr. Njoroge, the allegation by the SRC that the gross remuneration package for MPs includes 40% allowances contradicts the decision in the CoG v SRC case which held that failing to set a housing benefit for some State Officers amounts to discrimination contrary to Article 27. He argued that the SRC has refused to set the allowances despite numerous requests by the PSC and this is contrary to the constitutional principles of good governance, integrity, transparency and accountability as set out at Article 10(c). He faulted the SRC for refusing to work with the PSC in contravention of the principle of consultation and cooperation as set out at Article6. He argued that such cooperation would not take away SRC’s independence nor would be an unlawful direction.

140. Lastly, Mr. Njoroge argued that even if 40% of the total remuneration of the MPs pay was to be taken to be house allowance, it can only be for a Member’s house at their constituency or county, and therefore Article 127 (6) (a) & (e) requires the PSC to provide services and facilities that are necessary for Parliament to function. He also argued that the Court in the CoG v SRC caseheld that the SRC must demonstrate the specific housing allowance set, and therefore the claim that 40% is allowances is unconstitutional and arbitrary.

The Submissions in Opposition to Petition No. 339 of 2019

SRC’s Submissions

141. In its supplementary submissions dated 25th November, 2019, which were essentially in opposition to Petition No. 339 of 2019, the SRC submitted that PSC’s mandate under Article 127(6) does not include setting and reviewing MPs’ remuneration and benefits. It was stressed that section 2 of the Parliamentary Service Act[56] specifically defines services and facilities which does not extend to setting remuneration and benefits for MPs.

142. On the difference between services, facilities, house allowance and housing benefit, it was submitted that the PSC is mandated under Article 127(6) to provide services and facilities to ensure efficient and effective functioning of Parliament. Mr. Wanyama however submitted that the function does not in any way guarantee PSC a right to usurp SRC’s right to set and regularly review remuneration and benefits for MPs.

143. In counsel’s view, a house allowance is a cash benefit paid through the payroll and it is mostly available to public officers whose pay is not consolidated while a housing benefit is the physical building/house provided for by the Government using taxpayers’ funds to house a State Officer due to the unique nature of their work that require hosting of State functions.

144. Mr. Wanyama submitted that the PSC is creating a new term known as accommodation facilitation which term is neither provided under any law or the Interpretation and General Provisions Act.[57] To buttress his argument, counsel referred to the refusal by the President to assent to the Parliamentary Service Commission Bill of 2018which contained clauses that gave the PSC powers to review travel allowances for MPs and Parliamentary staff and to determine MPs and Parliamentary staff salaries and allowances without seeking the SRC’s advisory.

145. Counsel therefore invited the Court to determine the meaning of services, facilities, house allowance and house benefit within the intendment of Articles 127 and230 so that there is clarity on how the two commissions conduct their functions without unnecessary conflict. He further urged the court to be guided by the principles of constitutional interpretation as enunciated in Apollo Mboya v Attorney General & 2 others,[58] namely, that the Constitution is not to be interpreted as an ordinary statute and secondly, the language of the Constitution should be scrutinized to ascertain the purpose of the provision in question.

146. As to why MPs are paid a consolidated salary, it was submitted that the SRC set a consolidated remuneration structure for all State Officers as a best practice in the management of remuneration and benefits. In addition, it was argued that for purposes of calculating gratuity/ pension, where applicable, 60% of the consolidated pay should be used as basic salary. Counsel also submitted that MPs are not employees who are governed by the Employment Act,[59] but State Officers who are, pursuant to Article 260 strictly regulated by the Constitution as held by the Court of Appeal in County Government of Nyeri & Another v Cecilia Wangechi Ndungu.[60]

147. Nevertheless, counsel urged that should the court determine that MPs are employees and are subject to the Employment Act,[61]section 31 does not allow an employee who earns a consolidated pay to get an additional housing allowance. Counsel further submitted that MPs receive a consolidated pay as opposed to other public officers who receive a segregated pay. He defined a consolidated salary as a type of gross salary structure where the basic salary and all other monthly remunerative entitlements and allowances are for work done and combined together without specifically stating any breakups. It was explained that the policy serves to curb abuse and proliferation of allowances in an effort to manage public service wage bill. Further, that the implementation of the consolidated pay structure has facilitated wage bill management.

148. On the issue whether the MPs’ right to equality and freedom from discrimination has been violated, counsel made reference to Article 27 and submitted that it is not every distinction or differentiation in treatment that amounts to discrimination, as was emphasized in Federation of Women Lawyers FIDA Kenya & 5 Others v Attorney General & another,[62] andMohammed Abdula Dida v The Debate Media Ltd and the Media Council of Kenya.[63] Counsel in this respect submitted that no State Officer is paid house allowance in addition to the consolidated pay and that it is the duty of the PSC to demonstrate that MPs have been unequally treated and discriminated and that there is unreasonable differential treatment accorded to them.

149. On the comparison made between the MPs’ and Judges’ salaries, SRC submitted that the said argument is misplaced because of differentials in the job descriptions and tenure of service between the two cadre of State Officers. As such, the PSC cannot use it to back its claims of discrimination. Reliance was placed on Jacqueline Okeyo Manani & 5 others v Attorney General & another[64] where it was held that discrimination arises where equal classes of people are subjected to different treatment, without objective or reasonable justification or proportionality between the aim sought and the means employed to achieve that aim.

150. The CoG v SRC case,relied on by PSC to argue that they were discriminated against, was distinguished on the ground that the job description for Deputy Governors is totally different from that of MPs because of the state functions they are expected to host and that it was a judgment in personam.

151. Counsel contended that the SRC recognized productivity and performance, as well as transparency and accountability, in the methodology used to set allowances and remuneration of MPs. It was also submitted that the job evaluation conducted by the SRC is highly technical and polycentric in nature, which requires consideration of multiple factors including the educational qualifications which the PSC was disputing.

152. Mr Wanyama additionally submitted that the SRC in setting a housing allowance for the MPs did not in any way interfere with the PSC’s mandate. Counsel contended that this was the holding in the PSC v SRC casewhich cited Okiya Omtatah Okoiti & 3 Others v Attorney General & 5 Others.[65]

153. Counsel further submitted that SRC in Gazette Notice No. 2886 of 2013 determined that MPs earn a consolidated pay and, in this package, the basic salary and house allowance is combined with other allowances. It was further submitted that PSC ought to have consulted SRC in case of any clarification, as it is SRC’s duty to continuously review compensation of public servants in a transparent, objective and consistent manner.

154. On the argument by the PSC that SRC had interfered with its independence and mandate by purporting to set the number of meetings to 16, the counsel submitted that the Gazette Notice No. 2886 dated 1st March, 2013 had not in any way limited the number of meetings MPs ought to have. Instead, that the SRC had only allocated each member a maximum of Kshs. 80,000 per month and limited the amount per meeting to Kshs. 5,000, in keeping with the principle of affordability and fiscal sustainability envisaged in Article 230 (5).

155. Lastly, on the issue whether Gazette Notice No. 2886 dated 1st March, 2013 should be quashed, it was submitted that prior to the 11th Parliament, MPs were remunerated through sitting allowances and were not subject to taxation, unlike the current situation where they are paid fixed allowances, and their remuneration and benefits are taxable. Further, the issue of taxation of MPs salaries was conclusively dealt with in Timothy Njoya & 17 Others v Attorney General & 4 Others[66]where it was held that there should be no class of citizens who are exempted from payment of taxes, which decision has not been appealed.

156. Counsel further submitted that in the year 2013, the SRC set a remuneration and benefit structure for MPs for the period of 2013-2017 which was applied with no opposition and upon review of the set structure in 2017, the PSC sought to quash the Gazette Notice 6517 of 7th July 2017 in thePSC v SRC case while relying on Gazette Notice of 2013. According to counsel, it is ironical that the PSC wants to quash the 2013 Gazette Notice which they previously relied on and strongly supported.

157. Moreover, counsel argued that the quashing of the 2013 Gazette Notice was an issue already determined by the court in Okiya Omtatah Okoiti & 3 Others v Attorney General & 5 Others[67]where the court held that the National Assembly exceeded its mandate by purporting to annul the Gazette Notices issued by the SRC on 1st March, 2013.

158. On the reliance by the PSC on Gazette Notice 6517 of 7th July 2017, counsel submitted that the doctrine of res judicata precludes reliance on the said Gazette Notice which was quashed in the CoG v SRC case which decision is the subject of a pending appeal. It was thus submitted that the 2017 Gazette Notice having been quashed, SRC reverted to Gazette Notice No. 2886 of 2013.

The Determination

159. Upon considering the facts and the legal arguments presented by the parties, we find that the following issues fall for determination: -

a. Whether the decision by the PSC to make a payment to MPs for their accommodation is ultra vires and unconstitutional. There are five sub-issues which need to be determined under this issue.

i.What was the nature of the payment made by the PSC?

ii.Who as between the PSC and the SRC has the legal mandate to make the payment?

iii.Whether the SRC interfered with the constitutional mandate and independence of the PSC and Parliament.

iv. What legal instruments regulate the remuneration and benefits payable to MPs.

v. Whether the payments made by the PSC to the MPs ought to be recovered.

b. Whether the SRC has failed to set a house allowance for MPs and if so, whether it amounts to discrimination against MPs.

c. Whether the SRC acted ultra vires its constitutional and statutory mandate in capping the number of remunerable meetings the MPs and PSC could hold in one month.

d. Whether the suit against the 3rd to 12th Respondents & the 2nd Interested Party is incompetent.

e. Whether the reliefs sought in the consolidated Petitions are merited.

f. Who should bear the costs of the consolidated Petitions?

Guiding Principles

160. Before determining the above issues, it is useful to restate the guiding principles of constitutional and statutory interpretation. A convenient starting point is Article 259 which obligates courts in interpreting the Constitution to promote its purposes, values and principles, advance the rule of law, human rights and fundamental freedoms in the Bill of Rights, permits the development of the law and contribute to good governance.

161. This approach has been described as 'a mandatory constitutional canon of statutory and Constitutional interpretation.' [68]As was held in Anthony Ritho Mwangi and another v The Attorney General,[69] “our Constitution is the citadel where good governance under the rule of law by all three organs of the state machinery is secured...”

162. In Institute of Social Accountability & Another v National Assembly & 4 Others High Court,[70] the principles in Article 259 were summed as follows: -

[57] “[T]his Court is enjoined under Article 259 of the Constitution to interpret the Constitution in a manner that promotes its purposes, values and principles, advances the rule of law, human rights and fundamental freedoms in the Bill of Rights and that contributes to good governance. In exercising its judicial authority, this Court is obliged under Article 159(2)(e) of the Constitution to protect and promote the purpose and principles of the Constitution. In determining whether a statute is constitutional, the court must determine the object and purpose of the impugned statute for it is important to discern the intention expressed in the Act itself (see Murang’a Bar Operators and Another v Minister of State for Provincial Administration and Internal Security and Others Nairobi Petition No. 3 of 2011 [2011]eKLR, Samuel G. Momanyi v Attorney General and Another (supra)). Further, in examining whether a particular statutory provision is unconstitutional, the court must have regard not only to its purpose but also its effect…

[59] Fourth, the Constitution should be given a purposive, liberal interpretation...Lastly and fundamentally, it is the principle that the provisions of the Constitution must be read as an integrated whole, without any one particular provision destroying the other but each sustaining the other (see Tinyefuza v Attorney General of Uganda Constitutional Petition No. 1 of 1997 (1997 UGCC 3)). We are duly guided by the principles we have outlined and we accept that while interpreting the impugned legislation alongside the Constitution, we must bear in mind our peculiar circumstances. Ours must be a liberal approach that promotes the rule of law and has jurisprudential value that must take into account the spirit of the Constitution.”

163. Constitutional provisions should therefore be construed purposively and in a contextual manner. Courts are simultaneously constrained by the language used. Courts may not impose a meaning that the text is not reasonably capable of bearing. The interpretation should not be “unduly strained”[71] but should avoid “excessive peering at the language to be interpreted without sufficient attention to the historical contextual scene,” which includes the political and constitutional history leading up to the enactment of a particular provision.[72]

164. It is the duty of the court to promote the spirit, purport and objects of the Constitution, and to adopt a generous construction instead of a merely textual or legalistic one in order to give effect to the intended constitutional principles. It may also be necessary for the court to identify the mischief sought to be remedied by the specific constitutional provisions, and to contextualize the provisions within the Constitutional architecture as a whole, including its underlying values in Article 10. We are also required by the provisions of Article 159 (2) (e) to promote and protect the purposes and principles of the Constitution.

165. Additionally, it is an elementary rule of constitutional construction that no one provision of the Constitution is to be segregated from the others and to be considered alone, but that all the provisions bearing upon a particular subject are to be brought into view and be interpreted so as to effectuate the greater purpose of the instrument.[73]

166. When interpreting the Constitution in a holistic manner, the court should also consider the historical perspective and intent of the provisions in question. This principle was highlighted by the Supreme Court in Re the Matter of Kenya National Commission on Human Rights[74] as follows: -

“[26] But what is meant by a ‘holistic interpretation of the Constitution’? It must mean interpreting the Constitution in context. It is the contextual analysis of a constitutional provision, reading it alongside and against other provisions, so as to maintain a rational explication of what the Constitution must be taken to mean in light of its history, of the issues in dispute, and of the prevailing circumstances. Such scheme of interpretation does not mean an unbridled extrapolation of discrete constitutional provisions into each other, so as to arrive at a desired result.”

(Also see Communications Commission of Kenya & 5 Others v. Royal Media Services Limited & 5 Others[75],and The Speaker of The Senate & Another vs. Honourable Attorney General & Others.[76])

167. Lastly, it is trite that public bodies, no matter how well intentioned, may, only do what the Constitution and the law empowers them to do. That is the essence of the principle of legality, the bedrock of our constitutional dispensation, which is enshrined in our Constitution.[77] Legality therefore exists to ensure that the repository of public power stays within the vital limits of the power conferred and being exercised. We are also guided by the holding in the South Africa case of AAA Investments (Pty) Ltd v Micro Finance Regulatory Council and another where it was held that: -

“…the doctrine of legality which requires that power should have a source in law, is applicable whenever public power is exercised . . . Public power . . . can be validly exercised only if it is clearly sourced in law"[78]

168. Similarly, the principle of the rule of law, which is a foundational principle of the Constitution, requires the exercise of public power to conform to the Constitution and the enabling statutes. The rule of law requires that a decision, viewed objectively, must be rationally related to the purpose for which the power was given.[79] The rule of law, is one of the constitutional controls through which the exercise of public power is regulated by the Constitution.

169. The task for the courts in evaluating whether a decision is illegal is essentially one of construing the content and scope of the instrument conferring the duty or power upon the decision-maker. The instrument will normally be the Constitution or statute. The courts when exercising this power of construction are enforcing the rule of law, by requiring public bodies to act within the four corners of their powers or duties. They are also acting as guardians of sovereignty of the people by ensuring that the exercise of power is in accordance with the scope and purpose of the instruments conferring the power.

170. As Currie points out “the Constitution, premised as it is on the doctrine of constitutional supremacy, attempts to reconcile two conflicting goals: to establish a state system with enough power to govern, and to find ways of constraining and regulating that power so that it is not abused.”[80] The rule of law, and the related principles of legality[81] and accountability[82] are the central constitutional doctrines governing the exercise of public power.

171. We now commence with a sequential analysis of the identified issues.

(a)Whether the decision by the PSC to make a payment to MPs for their accommodation is ultra vires and unconstitutional.

172. At the centre of this issue are multifaceted arguments touching on the constitutional validity of the PSC’s decision to set and pay MPs a monthly housing allowance of Kshs. 250,000/=. The crux of the Petitioners’ attack on the impugned decision is premised on the doctrine of ultra vires. The Petitioners’ argument is that the function of setting remuneration and benefits for all State Officers falls within SRC’s constitutional and statutory mandate. On the other hand, the PSC maintains that it acted within its powers. It argues that provision of a housing allowance or a housing benefit to MPs falls under the ambit of “services and facilities” a function it claims is allocated to it under Article 127 (6) (a).According to the PSC the cited provision mandates it to provide services and facilities, including a housing benefit, to ensure the efficient and effective functioning of Parliament.

173. In presenting their respective arguments, the parties raised various auxiliary justifications which informed the basis of the following sub-issues.

i.What was the nature of the payment made by the PSC?

174. The PSC’s argument is that the words “services and facilities” in Article 127 (6) (a) should be construed to mean that it is mandated to provide MPs with a housing benefit so as to facilitate them to effectively perform their constitutional mandate.

175. On the other hand, the Petitioners’ argument is essentially founded on Article 230(4) (a) which provides that the powers and functions of the SRC shall be to- (a) set and regularly review remuneration and benefits for all State Officers; and, (b) advise the national and county government on the remuneration and benefits of all public officers. This position is replicated in section 11of the SRC Act which provides that in addition to the powers and functions of the Commission under Article 230 (4), the Commission shall—

a.inquire into and advise on the salaries and remuneration to be paid out of public funds;

b.keep under review all matters relating to the salaries and remuneration of public officers;

c.advise the national and county governments on the harmonization, equity and fairness of remuneration for the attraction and retention of requisite skills in the public sector;

d.conduct comparative surveys on the labour markets and trends in remuneration to determine the monetary worth of the jobs of public offices;

e.determine the cycle of salaries and remuneration review upon which Parliament may allocate adequate funds for implementation;

f.make recommendations on matters relating to the salary and remuneration of a particular State or public officer;

g.make recommendations on the review of pensions payable to holders of public offices; and

h.perform such other functions as may be provided for by the Constitution or any other written law.

176. SRC’s position is that a house allowance is a cash benefit paid through the payroll while a housing benefit is the physical building/house provided for by the Government using taxpayers’ funds to house a State Officer. The SRC argued that the PSC is creating a new term known as accommodation facilitation which term is not provided under any law and the act by the PSC of formulating and setting the said allowance is in blatant breach of Article 230 (4).

177. Determining the instant sub-issue requires this court to interpret the words and phrases relied upon by the parties in advancing their positions. The SRC Act defines “salary and remuneration” to include the ordinary, basic or minimum wage or pay and any additional emoluments and benefits whatsoever payable, directly or indirectly, whether in cash or in kind, by an employer to an employee and arising out of the employment of that employee. The Act does not define the word benefit.

178. The Parliamentary Service Act[83]on the other hand defines “services and facilities” to include all means by which members of the National Assembly are officially assisted in performing their parliamentary duties. The SRC Act does not have any definition for the phrase “services and facilities.” Similarly, the Parliamentary Service Act[84] does not define the words “remuneration and benefits.”

179. The PSC argued that payment of housing allowance or benefit falls within its mandate. Advancing this position, Prof. Ojienda SC urged the court to construe the words “services and facilities” in Article 127 (6) (a) to mean that the PSC is mandated to provide MPs with housing so as to facilitate them to effectively perform their constitutional mandate. Prof. Ojienda SC described the amount paid to MP’s as a “facilitative” allowance to enable them to effectively and effectually perform their constitutional duty.

180. Although PSC’s argument is appealing, it collapses not on one but on several fronts. First, a reading of the letter dated 22nd February 2019 signed by Mr. Nyegenye annexed to the affidavit in support of Petition 208 of 2019 and indeed all the correspondence on the subject between the PSC and the SRC, including the Memorandum of the PSC to the SRC on the Remuneration Structure of State Officers serving in Parliament dated 31st January 2019, show that the PSC only referred to a house allowance. There was no mention of a “facilitative allowance.”In fact, the phrases “service and facilities” and “facilitative allowance” were only introduced in Petition No. 339 of 2019 after the impugned payment was challenged in the other two Petitions.

181. The excerpts from the letter herein below from the PSC secretary to the SRC’s secretary dated 22nd February 2019 is instructive in this regard.

“22nd February 2019

Mrs. Anne R. Gitau

Commission Secretary,

Salaries and Remuneration Commission,

George Williamson House,

P.O. Box 43126-00100

NAIROBI

Dear Madam,

RE: ADDENDUM ON OUTSTANDING MATTERS CONCERNING THE REMUNERATION FOR STATE OFFICERS IN PARLIAMENT- HOUSE ALLOWANCE FOR MEMBERS OF PARLIAMENT

Please refer to the consultative meeting held between our respective commissions on 31st January 2019 at the Safari Park Hotel during which the Parliamentary Service Commission presented to your Commission its memorandum on outstanding matters concerning the remuneration of State Officers serving in Parliament dated 25th January 2019.

You will recall that one of the issues addressed in the memorandum was the proposed payment of a house allowance to Members of Parliament. This is a matter that is causing Members of Parliament particular hardship and the Parliamentary Service Commission requests for your Commission’s urgent resolution. In this regard, it has become necessary to forward this Addendum to you on the subject of members’ residential accommodation.

It is noteworthy that Members of Parliament are in a unique situation among officers serving in government in that they have two work stations. The first work station is the constituency or county that the Members of Parliament represent. It is recognized that the home of the Member of Parliament is at their constituency or county. The second work station is at the Parliament in Nairobi. A Member of Parliament is obliged by the Constitution to attend to sittings of their respective House of Parliament and its committees. This therefore necessitates travel to Nairobi for purposes of attending Parliament. Members of Parliament also travel to Nairobi for purposes of meeting national government officials in furtherance of constituency/county.

It is therefore not right that Members of Parliament are expected to pay their own accommodation while attending to official business while in Nairobi. No other category of either State or Public Officers is expected to pay for their own accommodation while away from home on official business…

The Parliamentary Service Commission therefore proposes that the Salaries and Remuneration Commission considers the following three options:

1. House Allowance

As stated in our memorandum dated 25th January 2019, the Parliamentary Service Commission has in its budget for the year 2018/19 an allocation for payment of house allowance to Members of Parliament at the rate of Kshs 250,000/= per month. This is a sum sufficient to enable them rent a house in a location befitting a Member of Parliament. Members of Parliament may therefore be paid a house allowance of Kshs. 250,000/= with effect from 1st July 2018.

2. Payment of domestic (Nairobi) Per diem

The second option would be for the Parliamentary Service Commission to Pay Members of Parliament a daily per diem at the rates applicable for accommodation in Nairobi (or other place of sitting of Parliament) for each night that they spend in Nairobi while on official duty.

3. provision of actual housing

The last option is for the Parliamentary Service Commission to provide actual accommodation of Members of Parliament for the nights that they spend in Nairobi (or other place of sitting of Parliament) while in official duty.

Given the great hardship being endured by Members of Parliament while on official state duties in Nairobi, the Parliamentary Service Commission would appreciate your urgent response on the matter of the facilitation of the accommodation of members of Parliament when they attend to parliamentary and other legislative business.”

182. Regarding the request to the National Treasury to approve the impugned payments to MPs, the following response dated 18th April 2019 is also indicative as to the nature of the intended payment.

“Mr. Jeremiah M. Nyegenye, CBS

Clerk to the Senate

Parliament Building

NAIROBI.

Dear Mr. Nyegenye,

RE: EXCHEQUER REQUEST TO FACILITATE PAYMENT OF

ARREARS OF HOUSE ALLOWANCE TO SENATORS

Reference is made to your letter Ref. No. COS/CORR/2019/51 dated 16th April, 2019.

We take note of the contents of the letter, particularly the resolution of the Parliamentary Service Commission of 22nd March 2019.

It is noted that the decision of the High Court issued on 5th October, 2018 in Petition No.328 of 2016 involved the Council of Governors vs Salaries and Remuneration Commission. Accordingly, you are advised to seek advisory opinion from the Attorney General on interpretation of the same, and whether this applies in the case of house allowance of the Senators.

As indicated in our earlier letter AG3/037/VOL.V/17 dated 10th April, 2019, it is your responsibility as the Accounting Officer to ensure that the proposed payment of arrears of house allowance to Senators is in accordance with the law, including approval by relevant authorities.

Yours sincerely,

Signed

DR. KAMAU THUGGE, CBS

PRINCIPAL SECRETARY/NATIONAL TREASURY.”

183. A similar response was sent to the clerk of the National Assembly.

184. Second, the operative words in Articles 127 (6) (a) and 230 (4) (a) are “services and facilities” and “remuneration and benefits”respectively.In searching for the meaning of the said words, it is inevitable that we will consult dictionaries, judicial pronouncements and consider their statutory context.

185. The practice of appealing to dictionaries simply as memory aids was deemed a function of judicial notice.[85] Words should be given their ordinary meaning. Of that meaning the court is bound to take judicial notice, as it does in regard to all words in our own tongue; and upon such a question dictionaries are admitted, not as evidence, but only as aids to the memory and understanding of the court.[86]

186. Dictionaries may also serve an instantiating function, that is, they may be used by the court to confirm that a contested meaning has been employed in either speech or literature, and has thus been recognized as a valid meaning by lexicographers. Of this instantiating function, Professors Hart and Sacks said, “Unabridged dictionaries are historical records (as reliable as the judgment and industry of the editors) of the meanings with which words have in fact been used by writers of good repute. They are often useful in answering hard questions of whether, in an appropriate context, a particular meaning is linguistically permissible.”[87]In using a dictionary to instantiate a contested meaning, a judge searches the dictionary to determine what meanings have attained currency in the language at large and are thus linguistically permissible in a given context.[88]

187. The Oxford Advanced Learner’s Dictionary[89] defines remuneration as “an amount of money that is paid for work done.” The same dictionary defines benefits as “advantages that you get from a company in addition to the money that you earn.” The Biswas Encyclopaedic Law Dictionary (Legal & Commercial)[90] defines remuneration to mean the basic wage or salary and any additional emoluments whatsoever payable either in cash or in kind to a person employed in respect of employment if the terms of employment are fulfilled.

188. The Black’s Law Dictionary[91]defines remuneration to mean payment, compensation, the act of paying or compensating. It defines a benefit as an advantage or privilege. It also defines fringe benefit to mean a benefit (other than direct salary or compensation) received by an employee from an employer, such as insurance, a company car, or a tuition allowance. Remuneration is the pay or other financial compensation provided in exchange for an employee's services performed.[92]

189. Employee benefits include various types of non-wage compensation provided to employees in addition to their normal wages or salaries.[93] Examples of these benefits include housing (employer-provided or employer-paid), furnished or not, with or without free utilities; group insurance, disability income protection; retirement benefit; day-care; tuition reimbursement; sick leave; vacation; social security; employer student loan contributions; and other specialized benefits.[94]

190. Regarding the phrase “services and facilities,” the Black’s Law Dictionary[95] defines “service” as “to provide service for.” The Merriam Webstar Dictionarydefines “service” as the occupation or function of serving, contribution to the welfare of others, active service.[96] The Collins Dictionary defines service as:- “Something that the public needs, such as transport, communication facilities, hospitals, or energy supplies, which is provided in a planned and organized way by the government or an official body.”[97]

191. According to the Black Law’s Dictionary[98] “allowance” is defined as “a deduction, an average payment, a portion assigned or allowed: the act of allowing.” The Oxford Dictionary defines “allowance” as the amount of something that is permitted, especially within a set of regulations or for a specified purpose; an amount of money that is given to somebody regularly or for a particular purpose; an amount of money that can be earned or received free of tax; a sum of money paid regularly to a person to meet needs or expenses; and, tolerance. The Oxford Advanced Learner’s Dictionary[99] defines allowance as an amount of money that is given regularly or for a particular purpose; the amount that is allowed in a particular situation, an amount of money that can be earned or received before you stary to pay taxes. The Merriam Webstar Dictionaryonline dictionary provides the legal definition of an allowance as a sum granted as a reimbursement or payment for expenses.

192. The word “facilitate” is defined by the Black’s Law Dictionary,[100] as to “make easy or easier.” It defines “facility” as “a building service or piece of equipment provided for a particular purpose; an additional feature of a service or machine; natural aptitude; absence of difficulty or effort.” The Oxford Dictionary defines “facility” as a place, amenity, or piece of equipment provided for a particular purpose; a special feature of a service or machine, which offers the opportunity to do or benefit from something; a natural ability to do or learn something well and easily; absence of difficulty or effort. Lastly, the same dictionary defines the word “facilitate” to mean to make an action or a process possible or easier. The Oxford Advanced Learner’s Dictionary[101] defines “facilitate” to mean to make an action or a process possible or easier.

193. Turning to judicial definitions, the terms “salary” and “remuneration” were also defined in Jimnah Muchiri v Agricultural Society of Kenya[102] which held: -

“...14. It is also submitted that the Claimant was receiving a wage from the Respondent and rely on the definition of salary contained in Mitra's Legal & Commercial Dictionary, 4th Edition, by A.N. Saha, at page 691, “salary" means “ a recompense or consideration made to a person for his pains, industry or work for another person, wages, allowances or other remuneration for work or service”; and at page 672, therein, “remuneration" ordinarily means “reward, recompense, pay, wages or salary for service rendered". The learned Judges took the view that “salary" or “wages" is the remuneration for a contract of service, and the definition of “salary" or “wages" includes allowances payable to an employee for services rendered because these allowances are part of the remuneration to which an employee is entitled under his contract of employment. “Salary" or “wages” or “pay” means remuneration for service paid or payable in cash or capable of being expressed in terms of money, including allowances. The word “remuneration" means “a reward or pay for service rendered";

15. That the word “remuneration " is a word of wide import and it includes allowances to which an employee is entitled under his contract of employment; and those allowances are a part of the contract of employment to which an employee is entitled as a reward for his services.”

194. In the CoG v SRC case,the court defined the words remuneration and benefits as follows: -

“… Remunerate” is defined to means “pay for services rendered or work done” and “benefit” means “a payment made by the state to someone entitled to receive it.”

26. Taken in that context, therefore, remuneration means payment for services rendered or work done (salary) while benefit means the allowance paid by the state to state officers and public officers...”

195. From the above definitions, it is clear that an allowance is a payment of money to an employee or officer to meet work related expenses. A house allowance is a specific allowance payable as part of an employee’s remuneration to cater for the housing costs. Therefore, whether it is named as accommodation allowance, a house allowance or a facilitative allowance, the cross-cutting and relevant feature for our purposes is that the payment made in the instant case was meant to cater the MPs accommodation during the performance of their official duties.

196. On the other hand, the words services and facilities refer to the amenities, offices and equipment which are necessary for the MPs to perform their duties. This construction finds support in the statutory provisions which implement Article 127 of the Constitution. Section 18 of the Parliamentary Service Act,[103] details the manner of provision of services and facilities to Parliament by PSC as follows: -

18. (1) The Commission shall, to the extent of its constitutional mandate, be responsible for fulfilment of the provisions under Article 127(6)(a) and (d) of the Constitution and in particular shall formulate policies, regulations, strategies and put in place mechanisms for the provision of such services and facilities as necessary for the effective functioning of Parliament and the well-being of Members and the staff of the Commission.

(2) The Commission shall adopt comprehensive strategic plans that ensure the realization of Article 127(6)(b) and (d) of the Constitution.

197. The distinction between allowances on one hand and services and facilities on the other, is made even clearer by the provisions of sections 19and20 of the Act which demonstrates the services and facilities envisaged under Article 127(6) (a) to assist the MPs in the performance of their duties are physical and logistical in nature, and not in the nature of payment of funds. Sections 19 and 20of the Act provides as follows: -

19. (1) The Commission shall ensure availability, accessibility, adaptability and acceptability of services and facilities for use by Members and Staff of Parliament.

(2) The Commission shall put in place adequate infrastructure that would be necessary for provision of service for the well-being of Members and staff of Parliament.

(3) The Commission may provide or designate exclusive use of certain facilities for Members.

(4) The Commission may outsource certain services and facilities for the welfare of Members.

(5) Despite subsection (1), the Commission may take measures to facilitate the use of facilities not available within the precincts of Parliament by Members and Staff of Parliament.

20. The Commission shall take measures to facilitate Members to discharge their mandate as provided for in Articles 94,95 and 96 of the Constitution including —

(a) equipping and allocating offices to Members;

(b) facilitating Members to conduct public participation in the performance of the duties;

(c) take any other measure as may be necessary.

198. Therefore, a “facilitative allowance”cannot be a service and facility as suggested by the PSC. The meaning the PSC is trying to ascribe to Article 127 (6) (a) cannot be sustained by a faithful reading of the said provision nor can it be supported by natural and literal interpretation of the said Article. By trying to construe the words “services and facilities” in Article 127 (6) (a) to mean payment of a “facilitative house allowance,” the PSC is trying to impose a meaning which the said provision cannot bear.

199. Third, if the PSC’s argument that “services and facilities” should be construed to mean “facilitative house allowance” is accepted, it would amount to suggesting the existence of a contradiction between Articles 127(6) (a) and 230 (4) (a). Where there are provisions in the Constitution that appear to be in conflict with each other, the proper approach is to examine them to ascertain whether they can reasonably be reconciled.[104] And they must be construed in a manner that gives full effect to each. Provisions in the Constitution should not be construed in a manner that results in them being in conflict with each other. In S v Rens,[105] the Constitutional Court of South Africa held that “it was not to be assumed that provisions in the same constitution are contradictory” and that “the two provisions ought, if possible, to be construed in such a way as to harmonise with one another.”[106] We have in our interpretation herein above, succeeded in harmonizing the different functions of the SRC and PSC in facilitation of MPs by clarifying that allowances are part of remuneration and benefits.

200. Fourth, where there are two provisions in the Constitution dealing with the same subject, with one provision being general and the other being specific, the general provision must ordinarily yield to the specific provision. In this regard, it is useful to recall that the heading to Part 6 of Chapter 8of the Constitution where Article 127 falls is “Miscellaneous” and is therefore a general and cross-cutting provision. The title to Chapter 12 is “Public Finance.” The heading of Part 1 of this Chapter is “Principles and Framework of Public Finance” while Part 6has two sections, namely; “Control of Public Money” and “Financial Officers and Institutions.” The SRC is one of the institutions established in this Part to enforce the financial control. Article 230 (4) lists its functions. A reading of the said provisions shows that SRC's functions are specific and relate to among others, financial control of public funds by setting and regulating remuneration and benefits of State Officers.

201. In Ex parte Speaker of the KwaZulu-Natal Provincial Legislature: In re Certification of the Constitution of the Province of KwaZulu-Natal, 1996[107] the Constitutional Court of South Africa discussing tensions in constitutional provision held that a “general provision . . . would not normally prevail over the specific and unambiguous provisions.”[108] The specific provision must be construed as limiting the scope of the application of the more general provision. Therefore, if a general provision is capable of more than one interpretation and one of the interpretations results in that provision applying to a special field which is dealt with by a specific provision, in the absence of clear language to the contrary, the specific provision must prevail should there be a conflict.

202. From the above analysis, it is our conclusion that the payment made to MPs was a remunerative allowance and not a provision of a service and facility within the meaning of Article 127 (6) (a).

ii. Who, as between the PSC and the SRC has the legal mandate to make the payment?

203. Article 230and section 11 of the SRC Act on the mandate of the SRC have been the subject of judicial construction in numerous court decisions. In Judicial Service Commission v Salaries and Remuneration Commission & another[109] the High Court held that under Article 230(4) (a) of the Constitution, the SRC’s mandate is to set and regularly review the remuneration and benefits of all State officers and to advise the National and County Governments on the remuneration and benefits of all other public officers.

204. In Kenya Union of Domestic, Hotels, Education and Allied Workers (KUDHEHIA Workers) v Salaries and Remuneration Commission & Attorney General[110] the High Court held that: -

“Looking at the provisions of Article 230 of the Constitution as well as the provisions of Section 11 of the SRC Act, it is clear that SRC has the mandate of setting and regularly review the remuneration and benefits of state officers and advising the national and county on the remuneration of other public officers.”

205. In addition, in the CoG v SRC case the High Court held that the mandate of the SRC under Article 230(4) of the Constitution is to set and regularly review remuneration and benefits of all State Officers and to advise the national and county governments on the remuneration and benefits of all public officers. The Court further observed that the mandate of the SRC is reinforced by sections 11 and12of the SRC Act which emphasizes SRC’s constitutional mandate.

206. Additionally, addressing the same issue, the High Court in PSC v SRC held:

“122. In my view Article 230(4) of the Constitution is clear that it is the Respondent’s mandate to set and regularly review the remuneration and benefits of all State officers and to advise the national and county governments on the remuneration and benefits of all other public officers. State Officer, it is therefore clear encompasses the Members of Parliament on whose behalf this petition is filed by the Applicant herein. Unless that provision is amended, the applicants must abide by the Respondent’s decision as long as the same is made in accordance with the Constitution and the relevant statutory provisions. It does not matter whether such a decision is unpalatable to those whose remunerations and benefits are subject to the mandate of the Respondent. Whereas the applicants and the State Officers whose remuneration are subject to the mandate of the SRC are, in the exercise of their freedom of expression, entitled to grit their teeth, express their sentiments atop the hills and down the valleys, at the end of the day they have only one option: to lick their wounds and adhere to the said decision. As long as the law stays as it is now any attempt to strip the Respondent of its Constitutional mandate is bound to suffer the same fate as was in Petition No. 227 of 2013 as consolidated with Petition No. 281 of 2013 and 282 of 2013 - Okiya Omtatah Okoiti & 3 Others vs. AttorneyGeneral & 5 Others [2014] eKLR.”

207. The Court of Appeal in Teachers Service Commission (TSC) v Kenya Union of Teachers (KNUT) & 3 others[111] reiterated the constitutional mandate of the SRC and went further to hold that advice by SRC under Article 230(4) (b) of the Constitution is binding.

208. The mandate of the PSC is set out in Article 127 (6) as follows: -

(6) The Commission is responsible for—

(a) providing services and facilities to ensure the efficient and effective functioning of Parliament;

(b) constituting offices in the parliamentary service, and appointing and supervising office holders;

(c) preparing annual estimates of expenditure of the parliamentary service and submitting them to the National Assembly for approval, and exercising budgetary control over the service;

(d) undertaking, singly or jointly with other relevant organisations, programmes to promote the ideals of parliamentary democracy; and

(e) performing other functions—

(i) necessary for the well-being of the members and staff of Parliament; or

(ii) prescribed by national legislation.

209. Section 11 of the Parliamentary Service Commission Act[112] elaborates the PSC’s mandate as follows: -

11. (1) In addition to the functions set out in Article Functions of the 127(6) of the Constitution, the Commission shall —

(a)direct and supervise the administration of the services and facilities provided by, and exercise budgetary control over, the Service;

(b)determine and review the terms and conditions of service of persons holding or acting in the offices of the Service;

(c)initiate, co-ordinate and harmonize policies and strategies relating to the development of the Service;

(d)initiate programmes —

(i) for training and capacity building of members and staff of Parliament and other persons;

(ii) that promote ideals of parliamentary democracy as set out in Article 127(6)(d) of the Constitution; and

(iii) that promote public awareness and participation in the activities of Parliament; and

(e) do such other things as may be necessary for the well-being of the members and staff of Parliament.

(2) In the performance of its functions under the Constitution and this Act, the Commission shall apply —

(a) the national values and principles of governance set out in Article 10 of the Constitution; and

(b) the values and principles of public service set out in Article 232(1) of the Constitution.

210. In our constitutional architecture, the PSC is established as an independent commission so as to secure the independence of Parliament as an organ of government within the framework of separation of powers. The more practical role of the PSC however is to ensure that Parliament as an institution is well resourced and able to function effectively, so as to achieve the needed parliamentary autonomy. The PSC therefore is the main vehicle through which Parliament achieves its independency and autonomy.

211. The Constitution and the law give the PSC the means to achieve its mandate by giving it functions in three key areas, namely; (a) parliamentary staffing and facilities; (b) budgetary control; and (c) organizational independence. We must at this stage point out that neither does the Constitution nor the statues give the PSC any specific function to set the salaries and allowances of MPs and parliamentary staff. On the contrary, Article 230 (4) specifically vests this function on the SRC. The only financial functions allocated to the PSC by the Constitution are budgetary.

212. Any other function undertaken by the PSC for the well-being of MPs and parliamentary staff must be read in light of its purpose as explained herein above, and holistically taking into account the constitutional mandate of other bodies established under the Constitution. The PSC in this regard justified the payment of the accommodation allowance to MPs on the ground that MPs have two work stations. While this may be a valid concern, the proper constitutional channel which ought to have been followed was to present it to the SRC for consideration and advise.

213. It is not disputed that the PSC set a monthly housing benefit/allowance for MPs of Kshs. 250,000/=, and backdated the payment without the approval of the SRC. It is also not disputed that the MPs were paid the backdated house allowance. In addition, the evidence before us shows that the PSC was advised by the National Treasury to obtain the approval of the relevant authorities before making any payments. Under the Constitution, the relevant authority is the SRC. The PSC therefore acted contrary to the specific provisions of Article 230 (4).

214. In addition, Article 206 (2) provides that money may be withdrawn from the Consolidated Fund in accordance with an appropriation by an Act of Parliament; in accordance with Article 222 or 223 of the Constitution; or as a charge against the Fund as authorized by the Constitution or an Act of Parliament. “Appropriation” here means the authority granted by Parliament to pay money out of the Consolidated Fund or out of any other public fund. Article222 contains provisions on expenditure before the annual budget is passed while Article 223 deals with supplementary budgets. Article 206 (4) provides that money shall not be withdrawn from the Consolidated Fund unless the Controller of Budget has approved the withdrawal. From the material presented before us, it is evident that the PSC set and facilitated the said payment without the approval of the Controller of Budget in violation of Article 206 (4).

215. Additionally, the PSC violated Article 259 (11)which provides that “if a function or power conferred on a person under the Constitution is exercisable by the person only on the advice or recommendation, with the approval or consent of, or on consultation with, another person, the function may be performed or the power exercised only on that advice, recommendation, with that approval or consent, or after that consultation, except to the extent that this Constitution provides otherwise.” We have already found in this respect that PSC did not consult the SRC in setting the impugned allowance and making the payment.

216. In addition, Article116 (3)provides that “an Act of Parliament that confers a direct pecuniary interest on members of Parliament shall not come into force until after the next general election of members of Parliament.” Therefore, even if the PSC had the authority to set a housing benefit for the MPs, that decision could not legally benefit the current Parliament. The membership of the PSC comprises of sitting MPs. The effect of the decision is to award benefits to themselves during their term thereby evading the effect, spirit and purpose of the Article 116 (3).

217. A number of other Articles that are relevant in the exercise of PSC’s mandate were also alleged to have been contravened. Article 94 (4) obligates Parliament to protect the Constitution while Article 73 (1) (a) (i) provides that authority assigned to a State Officer is public trust to be exercised in a manner that is consistent with the purposes and objects of the Constitution. Article 2 (1) provides for the supremacy of the Constitution which binds all persons and all State organs at both levels of Government. Article 2(2) provides that no person may claim or exercise State authority except as authorized under the Constitution, while Article 2(4) provides that any act or omission in contravention of the Constitution is invalid. Article 3 places an obligation on every person to respect, uphold and defend the Constitution. Lastly, Article 10 stipulates national values and principles of governance which bind all State officers, State Organs and Public Officers.

218. It is our finding that by exercising a function not vested upon them by the Constitution, the PSC consequently violated the various constitutional provisions identified above. As long as the impugned decision, viewed objectively, is not founded on the law and not rationally related to the legitimate purpose of PSC’s constitutional power, this court is justified to interfere.

219. It is further our finding that PSC’s argument that Article 127 (6) (a) vests them with the mandate to set and provide a housing benefit to MPs is erroneous. The mandate to determine and set a housing or accommodation allowance, is a function constitutionally vested in the SRC by Article 230 (4) (a) and the SRC Act. Hence, PSC’s decision is found to be ultra vires its constitutional mandate and to offend the principle of legality which requires that decisions by public bodies must have their source at the law.

iii. Whether the SRC interfered with the constitutional mandate and independence of the PSC and Parliament.

220. Prof. Ojienda SC submitted that by directing the Clerks of the Senate and the National Assembly not to pay the house allowance, the SRC interfered with the constitutional mandate and independence of the PSC and Parliament. On the other hand, SRC’s position is that its action accords with its constitutional mandate.

221. In the constitutional scheme of things, the court remains the ultimate guardian of the Constitution and has the obligation to ensure through the principle of legality that the exercise of power by all branches of government occurred within the bounds of their constitutional authorities.

222. We have already held that the PSC’s decision to set and facilitate the payment to the MPs is ultravires its constitutional and statutory mandate. We only need to add that the SRC is an independent constitutional commission established under Article 230(1) and its mandate as provided for in Article 230(4) is to set and regularly review remuneration and benefits of all State Officers and to advise the national and county governments on the remuneration and benefits of all other public officers. This mandate is emphasized by sections11 and 12 of the SRC Act. Therefore, the SRC acted within its mandate by directing the Clerks of Parliament not to pay the impugned allowance. We consequently find and hold that the SRC did not in any manner interfere with the constitutional independence and functions of Parliament and the PSC.

iv. What legal instruments regulate the remuneration and benefits payable to MPs.

223. The PSC in its Petition argued and sought a declaration that pending a new job evaluation that takes into account the provisions of Chapters 7and 8 of the Constitution, the MPs are entitled to receive the remuneration and benefits that they were receiving prior to publication of Gazette Notice No. 2886 of 1st March 2013.

224. This question was determined in the PSC v SRC case where it was held that: -

“139. It is now contended by the Respondent that theSalaries and Remuneration Commission (Remuneration and Benefits of State and Public Officers) Regulations, 2013 are void by virtue ofStatutory Instruments Act.With due respect that argument rings hollow. If the Respondent’s position is that the said Regulations were void, then that argument begs the question on what basis were the Members of Parliament being remunerated at that time" It is noteworthy that an attempt to render the said Regulations inoperative was declared by this Court to have been unconstitutional. It is therefore my view that this Court cannot, without a proper suit being brought before it for the said purposes make a declaration that the said Regulations are void.”

225. The court additionally stated: -

“141. That being the position, since the impugned Gazette Notice were meant to replace the 2013 Notices, it cannot be successfully argued that the quashing of the Gazette Notice No.6517 would leave a lacuna in the remuneration of the Applicants. The effect of a decision quashing the said Gazette Notice is that the status quo prevailing before the publication of the said Gazette Notice would be revived. This position in my view would be curable by the spirit of section 24 of the Interpretation and General Provisions Act which provides that:

Where an Act or part of an Act is repealed, subsidiary legislation issued under or made in virtue thereof shall, unless a contrary intention appears, remain in force, so far as it is not inconsistent with the repealing Act, until it has been revoked or repealed by subsidiary legislation issued or made under the provisions of the repealing Act, and shall be deemed for all purposes to have been made thereunder.”

226. Whereas Gazette Notice number 2886 of 1st March 2013 was to cease applying from 8th August 2017, being the effective date of Gazette Notice No. 6517 of 7th July 2017, the quashing the said Gazette Notice meant that the Gazette Notice Number 2886 of 1st March 2013 would continue to apply until a new Gazette Notice is promulgated by the SRC pursuant to Article 230 (4).

227. Additionally, agreeing with the PSC would amount to overturning the decision in Okiya Omtatah Okoiti & 3 Others v Attorney General & 5 Others[113]which declared unconstitutional the National Assembly Remuneration Act, Cap 5, Laws of Kenya which regulated the setting of salaries and remuneration of MPs prior to the issuance of the 2013 Gazette Notice. In any event as was held in the above case, the remuneration of the MPs of the 11th Parliament and any other Parliament coming into existence thereafter (the current Parliament included) can only be determined by the SRC.

v. Whether the payments made by the PSC to the MPs ought to be recovered.

228. The Petitioners urged the court to order that the amount paid to the MPs as house allowance be recovered. PSC’s position was that MPs perform a public duty and the money paid to them in form of facilitative allowance to enable them perform a public business cannot constitute waste of public funds.

229. Article 201 stipulates the principles on the management of public funds. These include: - (a) openness and accountability, including public participation in financial matters; (b) public money shall be used in a prudent and responsible way; and (c) financial management shall be responsible, and, (d) fiscal reporting shall be clear.

230. Recovery of loss of public funds is specifically addressed by Article 226 (5) as follows: -

If the holder of a public office, including a political office, directs or approves the use of public funds contrary to law or instructions, the person is liable for any loss arising from that use and shall make good the loss, whether the person remains the holder of the office or not.

231. To give effect to the constitutional provisions on the principles guiding public finance, Parliament enacted the Public Finance Management Act.[114] Section 66 of the Act imposes a duty upon the accounting officers of constitutional commissions among them the PSC to monitor, evaluate and oversee the management of public finances in the commission.

232. Section 68 of the Act provides for specific responsibilities of accounting officers. The relevant responsibilities for our purposes are the following: -

(1) An accounting officer for a national government entity, Parliamentary Service Commission and the Judiciary shall be accountable to the National Assembly for ensuring that the resources of the respective entity for which he or she is the accounting officer are used in a way that is—

(a) lawful and authorised; and

(b) effective, efficient, economical and transparent.

(2) In the performance of a function under subsection (1), an accounting officer shall—

(a) ensure that all expenditure made by the entity complies with subsection (1);

(b) ensure that the entity keeps financial and accounting records that comply with this Act;

(c) ensure that all financial and accounting records the entity keeps in any form, including in electronic form are adequately protected and backed up;

(d) ensure that all contracts entered into by the entity are lawful and are complied with;

(e) ensure that all applicable accounting and financial controls, systems, standards, laws and procedures are followed when procuring or disposing of goods and services and that, in the case of goods, adequate arrangements are made for their custody, safeguarding and maintenance;

(f) bring any matter to the attention of the Cabinet Secretary responsible for the entity, or the Chief Justice or the Speaker of the National Assembly if, in the accounting officer’s opinion, a decision or policy or proposed decision or policy of the entity may result in resources being used in a way that is contrary to subsection (1);

233. Section 79 of the Act imposes similar obligations upon public officers. The section reads as follows: -

(1) Every public officer employed in a national government state organ or public entity shall comply with the Constitution and all laws relating to the conduct of public officers when carrying out a responsibility or exercising a power under this Act.

(2) Without prejudice to provisions under subsection (1), a public officer employed in a national government state organ or public entity shall—

(a) comply with the provisions of this Act so far as they are applicable to the officer; and

(b) ensure that the resources within the officer’s area of responsibility are used in a way which—

(i) is lawful and authorised; and

(ii) is effective, efficient, economical and transparent;

(c) within the officer’s area of responsibility—

(i) ensure that adequate arrangements are made for the proper use, custody, safeguarding and maintenance of public property; and

(ii) use the officer’s best efforts to prevent any damage from being done to the financial interests of the national government.

234. Also relevant is section 196 of the Act which provides that:-

(1) a public officer shall not spend public money otherwise than authorized by the Constitution, an Act of Parliament or County legislation.

(2) A public officer shall not raise revenues other than in accordance with the Constitution, an Act of Parliament or an Act of a County Assembly.

(3) A public officer shall not enter into any obligation that has financial implications for the national government budget or a county government budget unless the obligation is authorised by the Constitution, an Act of Parliament or an Act of a County Assembly.

(4) A public officer shall not borrow money, issue a guarantee, indemnity or security or enter into any other transaction that binds or may bind the national government entity or a county government entity to any future financial obligation, unless the borrowing, guarantee, indemnity, security or other transaction is authorised by this Act or by any other written law and, in the case of loans or guarantees, is within the limits provided under this Act.

(5) A public officer shall not direct another public officer to do an act that constitutes a contravention of, or a failure to comply with, this Act, the Constitution or any other written law.

235. Additional offences are provided under sections 197 and 198 of the Act. To underscore the scrupulous manner in which the provisions of the Act are to be complied with, subsections (6) & (7) of section 196 creates a punishable offence in addition to the provisions of Article 226(5)as follows: -

(6) A public officer who contravenes this section commits an offence and on conviction is liable to a term of imprisonment not exceeding two years or to a fine not exceeding one million shillings, or to both.

(7) Where a national government entity or a county government entity—

(a) engages in an action that it is prohibited from doing by this Act; or

(b) fails to comply with an obligation imposed on it by this Act, a public officer who assisted or facilitated the act, or who was a party to, or contributed to, the failure, commits an offence and on conviction is liable to a term of imprisonment not exceeding two years or to a fine not exceeding one million shillings, or to both in addition to provisions under Article 226(5) of the Constitution.

236. Further, section 202 of the Act imposes personal liability on public officers for certain losses sustained by national government. The section states as follows: -

(1) A public officer is personally liable for any loss sustained by the national government that is attributable to—

(a) the fraudulent or corrupt conduct, or negligence, of the officer; or

(b) the officer’s having done any act prohibited by section 196, 197 and 198.

237. A reading of the above provisions shows that an accounting officer is responsible for ensuring that public finance is used lawfully and in a prudent manner. Fundamental to the use of public finance is regularity and propriety. Regularity means compliance with the Constitution and the governing statute including obtaining required consents/approvals from the relevant bodies. Propriety means meeting high standards of public conduct, including robust governance, honesty, transparency, value for money, prudent use of resources and the relevant parliamentary expectations, especially transparency.

238. The accounting officers are obligated by the law to comply with regularity and propriety and the need for efficiency, economy, effectiveness and prudence in the administration and use of public resources and to secure value for public money.

239. We have already held that the PSC failed to seek and obtain the approval of the SRC which is the only body constitutionally mandated to set and pay salaries and remuneration of State Officers. We also held that PSC contravened several constitutional provisions among them Articles 230(4), 206 (4) and 259(11)by setting and facilitating the payment to the MPs of house allowance. The accounting officers for the PSC and Parliament are therefore also culpable for failing to undertake their obligations under the Public Finance Management Act in this regard. For this reason, we therefore find that the said accounting officers are under an obligation to recover the money paid to MPs.

240. A specific prayer was made that in the alternative we find the 3rd to 12th Respondents who were the members of the PSC, personally liable to pay to the consolidated fund the house allowances paid to the MPs. The circumstances upon which a court can arrive at a finding of personal liability for loss of public funds are set out in section 202 (1) (a) and (b) of the Public Finance Management Act. First, there must be a finding of bad faith, fraud, corruption or negligence on the part of a public officer. Bad faith has been defined rarely, but an Australian case defined it as ‘‘a lack of honest or genuine attempt to undertake the task and involves a personal attack on the honesty of the decision-maker.’’[115] Bad faith is a serious allegation which attracts a heavy burden of proof.[116] No evidence was placed, or argument was made before us to demonstrate bad faith, negligence, corruption or fraud on the part of the 3rd to 12th Respondents to support such a finding.

241. Second, there must be a finding that the officers have done done any act prohibited by sections 196, 197 and 198. We have herein above concluded that the PSC violated several provisions of the Constitution and the Public Finance Management Act. We have however, in our disposition considered and issued what we consider to be appropriate remedies in the circumstances of this case.

(b) Whether the SRC has failed to set a house allowance for MPs and if so, whether it amounts to discrimination against MPs.

242. The PSC’s case is that it is an act of discrimination against MPs for the SRC to set housing allowance for the President, the Deputy President, the Chief Justice and the Deputy Chief Justice, Governors, Deputy Governors, Speakers of Parliament and their Deputies and Speakers of County Assemblies and their Deputies and fail to set a housing allowance for MPs who are also State Officers. To fortify their argument, the PSC placed heavy reliance on the CoG v SRC casewhere the High Court held that it was an act of discrimination for the SRC to set house allowance for Governors and fail to set house allowance for Deputy Governors.

243. The PSC also argued that unlike other civil servants who have segregated pay package that includes a house allowance, the MPs are paid a consolidated pay comprising their basic pay and all allowances. Lastly, a comparison was made with the salaries paid to Judges, which PSC claims are higher than those paid to MPs despite being in the same job group.

244. The crux of SRC’s argument is that it has set a house allowance for the certain categories of State Officers such as the President, Deputy President, the Chief Justice, Speakers of both houses of Parliament, the Deputy Chief Justice, Governors and Deputy Governors because of the nature of their work which includes hosting state functions. They also argued that the house allowance entails provision of a physical house constructed by the State and it is not necessarily a monetary payment. Reacting to PSC’s reliance on the CoG v SRC case, Mr. Wanyama, Mr. Omtata, Mr. Ouma, Mr. Kuria and Mr. Lempaa argued that it is a decision inpersonam and not in rem.

245. On the issue of consolidated pay, the SRC responded that all State Officers are paid a consolidated pay as a way of managing the public wage bill. SRC also contended that the nature of the work done by judges and their tenure of service is different from that of MPs. SRC further explained that the pay structure was based on a rigorous and technical job evaluation exercise which took into account multiple factors.

246. We will commence our analysis with an examination of the decision in the CoG v SRC case. Four pertinent factors are discernible regarding its applicability. First, is the question whether the said decision is binding on this court. The said decision was rendered by a court of coordinate jurisdiction and is therefore not binding,[117] though persuasive. This is because of the concept of judicial comity which is the respect one court holds for the decisions of another. As a concept it is closely related to stare decisis. In R.v.Nor. Elec. Co.,[118] McRuer C.J.H.C. stated: -

“....The doctrine of stare decisis is one long recognized as a principle of our law. Sir Frederick Pollock, in his First Book of Jurisprudence, 6th ed., p. 321: “The decisions of an ordinary superior court are binding on all courts of inferior rank within the same jurisdiction, and though not absolutely binding on courts of co-ordinate authority nor on the court itself, will be followed in the absence of strong reason to the contrary…” (Emphasis added).

247. Second, a case is only an authority for what it decides. This is correctly captured in the following passage: -[119]

"A decision is only an authority for what it actually decides. What is of the essence in a decision is its ratio and not every observation found therein nor what logically follows from the various observations made in it. ...every judgment must be read as applicable to the particular facts proved, or assumed to be proved, since the generality of the expressions which may be found there are not intended to be expositions of the whole law, but governed and qualified by the particular facts of the case in which such expressions are to be found. ...a case is only an authority for what it actually decides...." (Emphasis added).

248. The ratio of any decision must be understood in the background of the facts of the particular case.[120] It is well settled that a difference in facts or additional facts may water down the precedential value of a decision.[121] Each case depends on its own facts and a close similarity between one case and another is not enough, because a single significant detail may alter its entire characteristic.[122] To decide therefore, on which side of the line a case falls, the broad resemblance to another case is not at all decisive.

249. Third, is the applicability of the judgment to the instant case. This calls for a close examination of the facts of the said case. As we do so it is apposite to restate the guiding principles of interpreting court judgments. We cannot think of a better illumination than the exposition of the law expressed in Firestone South Africa (Pty) Ltd v Genticuro AG[123] which elucidated the subject as follows: -

“…the basic principles applicable to the construction of documents also apply to the construction of a Court's judgment or order: the Court's intention is to be ascertained primarily from the language of the judgment or order as construed according to the usual well-known rules. As in the case of any document, the judgment or order and the Court's reasons for giving it must be read as a whole in order to ascertain its intention. If on such a reading, the meaning of the judgment or order is clear and unambiguous, no extrinsic fact or evidence is admissible to contradict, vary, qualify, or supplement it. Indeed, in such a case not even the Court that gave the judgment or order can be asked to state what its subjective intention was in giving it. But if any uncertainty in meaning does emerge, the extrinsic circumstances surrounding or leading up to the Court's granting the judgment or order may be investigated and regarded in order to clarify it….

It may be said that the order must undoubtedly be read as part of the entire judgment and not as a separate document, but the Court's directions must be found in the order and not elsewhere. If the meaning of an order is clear and unambiguous, it is decisive, and cannot be restricted or extended by anything else stated in the judgment.”(Emphasis supplied)

250. Briefly, the facts in the CoG v SRC case were that the Council of Governors requested the SRC to make provision for housing for deputy county governors as required by the County Governments Act.[124] The Council of Governors’ case was that deputy county governors had been denied house allowance for 3 years after the 2013 elections, on grounds that the policy did not provide housing for deputy county governors. They pleaded inter alia that the SRC’s action was unlawful since it was discriminatory and contrary to Article 27(5).

251. After analyzing the material before it the court held that no reasonable objective and acceptable justification for that differential treatment had been given as to why the SRC had not set house allowance for Deputy Governors. The court also noted that deputy governors were principal assistants to governors and assisted governors in the running of county affairs and from the constitutional perspective, they were entitled to remuneration and benefits which should include housing allowance to be regularly reviewed by the SRC. It is this consideration on the role of Deputy Governors which informed the court’s decision in the COG v SRC case.

252. The facts in the CoG v SRC case as described above are clearly different from those in the instant case. In any event, we were informed during the hearing of this case that the said decision is subject to a pending appeal, hence, great caution must be employed as we consider its persuasive value.

253. The last question is whether the CoG v SRC case is a decision in rem orpersonam. In Abukar G Mohamed v Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission[125] the High Court observed that orders or judgements which bind the whole world determine the state of affairs rather than the rights of the parties before the Court. The court cited Conflict of Laws[126] also cited by Mr. Wanyama which states thus: -

“An action is said to be in personam when its object is to determine the rights and interests of the parties themselves in the subject-matter of the action, however the action may arise, and the effect of a judgement in such an action is merely to bind the parties to it. A normal action brought by one person against another for breach of contract is a common example of an action in personam.”

254. In Airports Company South Africa v Big Five Duty Free (Pty) Limited and Others[127] it was held that: -

“A judgment in rem determines the objective status of a person or thing…That kind of judgment has a public character that transcends the interests of only the litigating parties. It is a specific kind or example of a judgment in rem.”

255. In Lazar Barlow v Regent Estates Co Ltd,[128] a judgment in rem was defined as follows: -

“A judgment in rem is a judgment which is conclusive as against all the world in whatever it settles as to the status of a person or property, or as to the right or title to the property and as to whatever disposition it make of the property itself, or of the proceeds of its sale.

All persons regardless whether or not they are parties to any legal proceedings are bound by a judgment in rem and as such are estopped from averring that the status or things, or the right or title to property is other than what the court has by its judgment declared or made it to be.

…A judgment in personam determines the right of the parties to an action and those who are privy to them in regard to the subject matter in dispute…A judgment in personam does not affect the rights of third parties.”

256. Our reading of the decision in the CoG v SRC case is that it was informed by the specific rights of the parties before it, and in particular on the specific role of the Deputy Governors who are principal assistants of the Governors. It cannot be said to be a decision in rem because any other person citing discrimination as in this case must demonstrate that he is in a similar job description with the governors or deputy governors.

257. This leads us to the question whether the SRC’s pay structure for the MPs is discriminatory. Article 27guarantees the right to equality and freedom from discrimination in the following terms: -

27. (1) Every person is equal before the law and has the right to equal protection and equal benefit of the law.

(2) Equality includes the full and equal enjoyment of all rights and fundamental freedoms.

(3) Women and men have the right to equal treatment, including the right to equal opportunities in political, economic, cultural and social spheres.

(4) The State shall not discriminate directly or indirectly against any person on any ground, including race, sex, pregnancy, marital status, health status, ethnic or social origin, colour, age, disability, religion, conscience, belief, culture, dress, language or birth.

(5) A person shall not discriminate directly or indirectly against another person on any of the grounds specified or contemplated in clause (4).

258. The precise meaning and implication of the right to equality and non-discrimination has been the subject of numerous judicial decisions in this country and other jurisdictions. In Jacqueline Okeyo Manani & 5 Others v. Attorney General & Another (supra) the High Court stated as follows with respect to what amounts to discrimination: -

“26. Black’s Law Dictionary, 9th Edition defines “discrimination” as (1)”the effect of a law or established practice that confers privileges on a certain class because of race, age sex, nationality, religion or hardship” (2) “Differential treatment especially a failure to treat all persons equally when no reasonable distinction can be found between those favoured and those not favoured”…

28. From the above definition, discrimination, simply put, is any distinction, exclusion or preference made on the basis of differences to persons or group of persons based such considerations as race, colour, sex, religious beliefs political persuasion or any such attributes that has real or potential effect of nullifying or impairing equality of opportunity or treatment between two persons or groups….

29. The Constitution advocates for non-discrimination as a fundamental right which guarantees that people in equal circumstances be treated or dealt with equally both in law and practice without unreasonable distinction or differentiation. It must however be borne in mind that it is not every distinction or differentiation in treatment that amounts to discrimination. Discrimination as seen from the definitions, will be deemed to arise where equal classes of people are subjected to different treatment, without objective or reasonable justification or proportionality between the aim sought and the means employed to achieve that aim.”

259. It is thus recognised that it is lawful to accord different treatment to different categories of persons if the circumstances so dictate. Such differentiation, however, does not amount to the discrimination that is prohibited by the Constitution. In John Harun Mwau v. Independent Electoral and Boundaries Commission & Another[129], the court observed that: -

“[i]t must be clear that a person alleging a violation of Article 27 of the Constitution must establish that because of the distinction made between the claimant and others, the claimant has been denied equal protection or benefit of the law. It does not necessarily mean that different treatment or inequality will per se amount to discrimination and a violation of the constitution.”

260. The European Court of Human Rights has also observed that discrimination means treating differently, without any objective and reasonable justification, persons in similar situations. [130] From this observation, it is safe to state that the law prohibits unfair discrimination. In EG & 7 others v Attorney General; DKM & 9 others (Interested Parties); Katiba Institute & Another:Petition 150 & 234 of 2016 (Consolidated)the court held that: -

“[288] From the above definition, it is safe to state that the Constitution only prohibits unfair discrimination. In our view, unfair discrimination is differential treatment that is demeaning. This happens when a law or conduct, for no good reason, treats some people as inferior or less deserving of respect than others. It also occurs when a law or conduct perpetuates or does nothing to remedy existing disadvantages and marginalization.”

261. With respect to the burden of proof on a claim that an action or law is discriminatory, it has been held that the burden lies on a person alleging unfair discrimination to establish his claim. In Mohammed Abduba Didav Debate Media Limited & another,[131] the court stated as follows: -

“I must add that if the discrimination is based on any of the listed grounds in Article 27 (4) of the Constitution, it is presumed to be unfair. It must be noted, however, that once an allegation of unfair discrimination based on any of the listed grounds in article 27 (4) of the constitution is made and established, the burden lies on the Respondent to prove that such discrimination did not take place or that it is justified.

On the other hand, where discrimination is alleged on an arbitrary ground, the burden is on the complainant to prove that the conduct complained of is not rational, that it amounts to discrimination and that the discrimination is unfair.”

262. The court additionally observed that: -

“It is not every differentiation that amounts to discrimination. Consequently, it is always necessary to identify the criteria that separate legitimate differentiation from constitutionally impermissible differentiation. Put differently, differentiation is permissible if it does not constitute unfair discrimination.”

263. Turning to the facts of the instant case, our understanding of PSC’s argument is that it is challenging the rationale for the SRC’s failure to set housing allowance for MPs and the same pay structure as other civil servants and comparable State Officers. Differently stated, is there a rational objective for SRC’s decision. As we address this question, we are clear that it is not every differentiation that amounts to discrimination. Consequently, it is always necessary to identify the criteria that separates legitimate differentiation from constitutionally impermissible differentiation. Put differently, differentiation is permissible if it does not constitute unfair discrimination.

264. Decided cases suggests that law or conduct which promotes differentiation must have a legitimate purpose and should bear a rational connection between the differentiation and the purpose. The rationality requirement is intended to prevent arbitrary differentiation. The authorities on equality suggest that the right to equality does not prohibit discrimination but it prohibits unfair discrimination. The question that often arises is what makes the discrimination unfair. To prove unfair discrimination, it is incumbent upon the person making the allegations to plead the facts allegedly constituting discrimination and also must prove the discrimination to the required standard.

265. The test for determining whether a claim based on unfair discrimination should succeed was laid down by the South Africa Constitutional Court in Harksen v Lane NO and Others[132] cited above as follows: -

(a)Does the provision differentiate between people or categories of people? If so, does the differentiation bear a rational connection to a legitimate purpose? If it does not then there is a violation of the constitution. Even if it does bear a rational connection, it might nevertheless amount to discrimination.

(b) Does the differentiation amount to unfair discrimination? This requires a two-stage analysis:-

(i)Firstly, does the differentiation amount to ‘discrimination’? If it is on a specified ground, then discrimination will have been established. If it is not on a specified ground, then whether or not there is discrimination will depend upon whether, objectively, the ground is based on attributes and characteristics which have the potential to impair the fundamental human dignity of persons as human beings or to affect them adversely in a comparably serious manner.

(ii) If the differentiation amounts to ‘discrimination’, does it amount to ‘unfair discrimination’? If it has been found to have been on a specified ground, then the unfairness will be presumed. If on an unspecified ground, unfairness will have to be established by the complainant. The test of unfairness focuses primarily on the impact of the discrimination on the complainant and others in his or her situation. If, at the end of this stage of the enquiry, the differentiation is found not to be unfair, then there will be no violation……..

(c)If the discrimination is found to be unfair then a determination will have to be made as to whether the provision can be justified under the limitations clause...”

266. Briefly, the guiding principles in a case of this nature are clear. The first step is to establish whether the impugned decision differentiates between different persons. The second step entails establishing whether that differentiation amounts to discrimination. The third step involves determining whether the discrimination is unfair.

267. In this regard, if the discrimination is based on any of the listed grounds in Article 27, it is presumed to be unfair. It must also be noted, that once an allegation of unfair discrimination based on any of the listed grounds in Article 27is made and established, the burden lies on the Respondent to prove that such discrimination did not take place or that it is justified.

268. Applying the above principles to the facts and the circumstances of this case, we note that the explanation offered by the SRC to the claims that the MPs were differentiated by not being paid a house allowance are as follows: –

(a)The President, Deputy President, The Chief Justice, the Deputy Chief Justice, the Speakers of the two houses of Parliament and their Deputies, the Governors and their Deputies, Speakers of County Assemblies and their Deputies all perform functions which entail holding state functions, and which warrant a housing benefit as opposed to MPs who do not have similar functions.

(b) The housing benefit accorded to the said category of State Officers does not necessarily entail a cash payment but it can entail a house constructed with state funds.

(c) The MPs earn a consolidated pay, 40% of which constitutes allowances, inclusive of house allowance.

(d) The Employment Act, 2007, prohibits payment of a house allowance when an employee is paid a consolidated pay.

269. It is our view that the PSC has not demonstrated unfair discrimination. This is because, firstly, the SRC has demonstrated that MPs are actually paid a house allowance in their consolidated pay. Secondly, SRC has provided an objective and a rational justification as to why a certain category of State Officers are entitled to and are given a housing benefit. The PSC did not demonstrate that MPs undertake functions similar to this category of State Officers. Thirdly, other than the decision in the CoG v SRC caserelied upon which we have distinguished, the PSC did not provide sufficient evidence to support its allegations on differentiated pay between the MPs and Judges, Magistrates and other civil servants nor did it demonstrate that the criteria applied by the SRC in setting the different pay structures was unfair. It follows that the PSC’s claim of alleged discrimination of MPs by the SRC fails.

(c) Whether the SRC acted ultra vires its constitutional and statutory mandate in capping the number of remunerable meetings the MPs and PSC could hold in one month.

270. Counsel for the PSC submitted at length on how the SRC had intruded into PSC’s functions and interfered with the independence of Parliament by purporting to limit the number of sittings which the MPs and the PSC can be paid to sixteen per month in Gazette Notices Nos. 2886 of 2013 and 6517 of 2017.

271. The response by the SRC was that the 2013 and 2017 Gazette Notices did not limit the number of sittings. The SRC submitted that it only allocated each member a maximum of Kshs. 80,000 per month and limited the amount per meeting to Kshs. 5,000, in keeping with the principle of affordability and fiscal sustainability envisaged in Article 230 (5). Further, that the 2017 Gazette Notice had been quashed by the court and the constitutionality of the quashed Gazette Notice cannot be litigated again in these proceedings. Additionally, SRC pointed out that the decision that quashed the 2017 Gazette Notice is the subject of an appeal before the Court of Appeal and that issue cannot therefore be reopened by this court.

272. The PSC relied on the decision in Judicial Service Commission v Salaries and Remuneration Commission & another (supra), where the court found that the SRC’s act of capping the monthly remunerable meetings of the Judicial Service Commission to eight was unconstitutional and ultra vires its mandate. The ratio decidendi of the said decision was that the SRC capped the number of monthly remunerable meetings for members of an independent constitutional commission contrary to Article 249 (2).

273. The court in the said case held as follows: -

“54. That being the position in law, there was no way the 1st respondent could assume mandate it does not have and limit the petitioner’s monthly remunerable sittings through some resolution in violation of clear constitutional and statutory provisions. Any attempt by the 1st respondent to restrict the petitioner from holding more than eight remunerable meetings a month is not only ultra vires her constitutional and statutory mandate but also clearly unconstitutional and illegal. Any such move had to have a rational connection between the 1st respondent’s desire to limit the meetings, the decision thereof and the reasons therefor which the Court is unable to fathom. To my mind, the 1st respondent’s action was clearly aimed at stifling rather than enhancing the petitioner’s independence. It is against not only the spirit of the constitution but violates the petitioner’s operational independence too.

55. The 1st respondent cannot hide behind minimizing wastage of public resources as a reason for capping the petitioner’s sittings. In the case of Judicial Service Commission v Speaker of the National Assembly & 8 Others [2014]eKLR the Court held that ”JSC is a creature of the Constitution, an independent commission subject only to the Constitution and the law and, as provided under Article 249 (2), is not subject to direction or control by any person or authority. Like other constitutional commissions and independent offices, the JSC must however operate within the confines of the Constitution and the law. The court did observe, and I agree with the observation, that while enjoying financial and administrative independence, JSC is accountable to Parliament. To my mind, that is the organ mandated to oversee how the petitioner expends it budgetary allocation and not the 1st respondent in the form of restricting the petitioner’s number of remunerable monthly sittings as a way of reducing the petitioner’s expenditure.”

274. In the present case, Gazette Number No. 2886 of 2013 in the section on allowances, provided for committee sitting allowances in paragraph (b) thereof as follows: -

“Members of Parliament and Senate who serve in committees shall be paid committee sitting allowances as follows: -

(i)Chairperson, Ksh. 10,000/= per day of meeting(s) subject to a maximum of 4 days per week and a maximum of Kshs. 160,000/= per month.

(ii)Vice-chairperson, Ksh. 8,000/= per day of meeting(s) subject to a maximum of 4 days per week and a maximum of Kshs.128,000/= per month.

(iii)Member, Ksh. 5,000/= per day of meeting(s) subject to a maximum of 4 days per week and a maximum of Kshs. 80,000/= per month.”

275. Gazette Notice No. 6517 of 2017 had similar provisions for chairperson and members of parliamentary committees.

276. Our analysis of the Gazette Notices in light of the arguments made by the parties on the limiting of remunerable meetings, lead us to a number of findings. Firstly, it is evident from the said Gazette Notices that the said capping only applied to MPs in parliamentary committees and not in the PSC. The remuneration and benefits of the PSC as a constitutional commission was set by Gazette Notices Nos. 2887 of 2013 and 6519 of 2017 on State Officers in Constitutional Commissions and Independent Offices which did not set any limits as to remunerable meetings of the commission.

277. Secondly, in the present case, the number of remunerable meetings were being capped with respect to parliamentary committee meetings and not with respect to meetings of a constitutional commission. Therefore, the decision in Judicial Service Commission v Salaries and Remuneration Commission & anotheris inapplicable in the circumstances of this case.

278. We also take cognisance of the fact that the PSC has not placed any evidence before this court to demonstrate that the SRC in setting the limits of number of remunerable meeting for MPs in both the 2013 and 2017 Gazette Notices, acted in a manner that would attract the exercise of this court’s judicial review powers. This is the standard of review that is ordinarily applicable with respect to parliamentary committee meetings. Put differently, the PSC did not demonstrate that the SRC thereby acted illegally, unreasonably, in excess of its jurisdiction or committed a procedural impropriety.

279. We have already found that the mandate to set and determine remuneration including allowances, is a function constitutionally vested in the SRC by Article 230 (4) (a) and the SRC Act. No ground has therefore been established by the PSC to merit this court’s interference in the manner in which the SRC set and determined the number of MPs remunerable meetings.

280. Thirdly, in Okiya Omtatah Okoiti & 3 others v Attorney General & 5 others[133] the petitioner was challenging the decision of the National Assembly to overturn SRC’s Gazette Notice No. 2886 of 1st March 2013. Parliament and PSC had an opportunity in that case to raise all matters connected with the Gazette Notice regarding its independence but never did so. PSC is therefore estopped from raising any issue touching on Gazette Notice No. 2886 of 2013 at this point in time. The classic modern statement of the nature of issue estoppel is to be found in a passage from the judgment of Diplock LJ (as he then was) in Mills v Cooper,[134] approved subsequently by the House of Lords in DPP v Humphreys.[135] Diplock LJ said:-

"This doctrine [namely of issue estoppel], so far as it affects civil proceedings, may be stated thus: a party to civil proceedings is not entitled to make, as against the other party, an assertion, whether of fact or of the legal consequences of facts, the correctness of which is an essential element in his cause of action or defence, if the same assertion was an essential element in his previous cause of action or defence in previous civil proceedings between the same parties or their predecessors in title and was found by a court of competent jurisdiction in such previous civil proceedings to be incorrect, unless further material which is relevant to the correctness or incorrectness of the assertion and could not by reasonable diligence have been adduced by that party in the previous proceedings has since become available to him."

281. Furthermore, Gazette Notice No. 6517 of 2017 was quashed in PSC v SRC case. It is also noteworthy that Gazette Notice No. 2886 of 2013 is only operational by default as result of the quashing of the 2017 Gazette Notice.

282. Lastly, there was the unchallenged submission by the SRC that the PSC fully relied upon and supported the 2013 Gazette Notice when it filed the case seeking the quashing of the 2017 Gazette Notice. The PSC cannot therefore be allowed to approbate and reprobate in respect of the 2013 Gazette Notice.

283. We are therefore unable to find in the circumstances of this case that SRC acted ultra vires its constitutional and statutory mandate in limiting MPs remunerable parliamentary committee meetings.

(d) Whether the suit against the 3rd to 12th Respondents & 2nd Interested Party is incompetent.

284. The PSC argued that the 3rd to 12th Respondents are members of a constitutional commission and have immunity from personal liability for acts done in good faith in the discharge of their official functions pursuant to Article 250(9). It was therefore argued that the said members should not have been sued in their personal capacities.

285. Mr. Wanyama, Mr. Omtatah, Mr. Ouma, Mr. Kuria, Mr. Lempaa & Mr. Kitonga did not address this issue.

286. Article 250 (9) provides that a member of a commission, or the holder of an independent office, is not liable for anything done in good faith in the performance of a function of office. A reading of this Article leaves us with no doubt that the 3rd to 12th Respondents enjoy immunity for action performed in good faith in the performance of their duties. The Petitioners in this regard did not endeavour to establish bad faith on the part of the 3rd to 12th Respondents.

287. This being the position, we find and hold that the suit against the 3rd to the 12th Respondents in their personal capacities offends Article 250(9), and hence is unsustainable.

288. There was also an almost similar submission by the MPs, who were joined as the 2nd Interested Party that they had wrongly been sued in their personal capacities, and that the MPs therefore ought to be removed from this suit. Again, there was no outright response by any of the Petitioners to this pleading.

289. It is our view that in the circumstances of this case, Mr Okiya Okoiti Omtatah, the second Petitioner made a correct decision in enjoining each MP as a party in his Petition. This is because the MPs are the beneficiaries of the impugned payments set and facilitated by the PSC, and will be directly affected by the decision of this court on the said payment, particularly if it has adverse effects. Rule 2 of the Constitution of Kenya (Protection of Rights and Fundamental Freedoms) Practice and Procedure Rules, 2013, in this regard defines interested parties as persons who have an identifiable stake or legal interest or duty in the proceedings in a constitutional Petition.

290. We accordingly decline the 2nd Interested Party’s prayer to be excused from these proceedings.

(e). Whether the reliefs sought in the consolidated Petitions are merited

291. This Court is empowered by Article 23(3) to grant appropriate reliefs in constitutional petitions including—

(a) a declaration of rights;

(b) an injunction;

(c) a conservatory order;

(d) a declaration of invalidity of any law that denies, violates, infringes, or threatens a right or fundamental freedom in the Bill of Rights and is not justified under Article 24;

(e) an order for compensation; and

(f) an order of judicial review.

292. In addressing this final issue, we will provide a summary of the findings of this Court, and highlight the applicable principles with regard to the remedies so as to determine the appropriate reliefs to grant in the consolidated Petitions in our disposition.

(i) The Summary of Findings

293. The first substantive issue we considered was whether the decision by the PSC to make a payment to MPs for their accommodation is ultra vires and unconstitutional. The first question the Court considered under this issue was the nature of the payment made by the PSC, and found an allowance to mean a payment of money to an employee or officer to meet work related expenses, while a house allowance is a specific allowance payable as part of an employee’s remuneration to cater for the housing costs. Therefore, whether it is named as accommodation allowance, a house allowance or a facilitative allowance, the Court found that the cross-cutting and relevant feature of the payment made in the instant case was that it was meant to cater the MPs accommodation during the performance of their official duties.

294. On the other hand, the Court found the words services and facilities to refer to the amenities, offices and equipment which are necessary for the MPs to perform their duties. Further, that the distinction between allowances on one hand and services and facilities on the other, was made even clearer by the provisions of sections 18, 19 and 20of the Parliamentary Service Act[136] which demonstrates the services and facilities envisaged under Article 127(6) (a) to assist the MPs in the performance of their duties are physical and logistical in nature, and not in the nature of payment of funds. Therefore, that by trying to construe the words “services and facilities” in Article 127 (6) (a) to mean payment of a “facilitative house allowance,” the PSC imposed a meaning which the said provision could not bear, and our conclusion thus was that the payment made to MPs was a remunerative allowance and not a provision of a service and facility within the meaning of Article 127 (6) (a).

295. As regards the second question in this issue as to who between the PSC and the SRC has the legal mandate to make the said payment, we noted that in our constitutional architecture, the PSC is established as an independent commission so as to secure the independence of Parliament as an organ of government within the framework of separation of powers. We also noted that the more practical role of the PSC is to ensure that Parliament as an institution is well resourced and able to function effectively, so as to achieve the needed parliamentary autonomy. The PSC therefore is the main vehicle through which Parliament achieves its independency and autonomy.

296. We considered the provisions of the Constitution and the law which give the PSC the means to achieve its mandate by giving it functions in three key areas, namely; (a) parliamentary staffing and facilities; (b) budgetary control; and (c) organizational independence. We found that the Constitution and statutes do not give the PSC any specific function to set the salaries and allowances of MPs and parliamentary staff, and that on the contrary, Article 230 (4) specifically vests this function on the SRC. We note that the only financial functions allocated to the PSC by the Constitution are budgetary.

297. It was therefore our finding that any function undertaken by the PSC for the well-being of MPs and parliamentary staff must be read in light of its purpose and mandate, and holistically, taking into account the constitutional mandate of other bodies established under the Constitution. As it was not disputed that the PSC set a monthly housing benefit/allowance for MPs of Kshs. 250,000/=, and backdated the payment without the approval of the SRC, we found that it therefore acted contrary to the specific provisions of Article 230 (4).

298. Other Articles found to have been thereby violated by PSC were Article 259 (11)to the extent that that PSC did not consult the SRC in setting the impugned allowance and making the payment; Article116 (3),to the extent thatPSCawarded benefits to MPs during their term; Article 206 (4) which provides that money shall not be withdrawn from the Consolidated Fund unless the Controller of Budget has approved the withdrawal; Article94 (4) which obligates Parliament to protect the Constitution; Article 73 (1) (a) (i) which provides that authority assigned to a State Officer is public trust to be exercised in a manner that is consistent with the purposes and objects of the Constitution. Article 2(2) which provides that no person may claim or exercise State authority except as authorized under the Constitution; Article 3 places an obligation on every person to respect, uphold and defend the Constitution; and Article 10 which stipulates national values and principles of governance which bind all State officers, State Organs and Public Officers.

299. Our conclusion therefore was that PSC’s argument that Article 127 (6) (a) vests them with the mandate to set and provide a housing benefit to MPs is erroneous. Further, that the mandate to determine and set a housing or accommodation allowance, is a function constitutionally vested in the SRC by Article 230 (4) (a) and the SRC Act. Hence, PSC’s decision is found to be ultra vires its constitutional mandate and to offend the principle of legality which requires that decisions by public bodies must have their source at the law.

300. The third question we answered in this issue was whether the SRC interfered with the constitutional mandate and independence of the PSC and Parliament by directing the Clerks of the Senate and the National Assembly not to pay the house allowance. Flowing from our finding that the PSC’s decision to set and facilitate the payment to the MPs is ultravires its constitutional and statutory mandate, we reiterated that SRC’s mandate as provided for in Article 230(4) is to set and regularly review remuneration and benefits of all State Officers and to advise the national and county governments on the remuneration and benefits of all other public officers. Further, that this mandate is emphasized by sections11 and 12 of the SRC Act.

301. Therefore, our conclusion was that the SRC acted within its mandate by directing the Clerks of Parliament not to pay the impugned allowance, and did not in any manner interfere with the constitutional independence and functions of Parliament and the PSC.

302. The Court also considered a fourth question that arose, as regards the legal instruments that regulate the remuneration and benefits payable to MPs in light of the pleading by PSC that MPs are entitled to receive the remuneration and benefits that they were receiving prior to publication of Gazette Notice No. 2886 of 1st March 2013.

303. Our finding on this question was that whereas Gazette Notice number 2886 of 1st March 2013 was to cease applying from 8th August 2017, being the effective date of Gazette Notice No. 6517 of 7th July 2017, the Court in the PSC v SRC case quashed Gazette Notice of 7th July 2017, which meant that the Gazette Notice Number 2886 of 1st March 2013 would continue to apply until a new Gazette Notice is promulgated by the SRC pursuant to Article 230 (4).

304. The last and fifth question considered under this issue was whether the payments made by the PSC to the MPs ought to be recovered. The Court noted that recovery of loss of public funds is specifically provided for by Article 226 (5),and that various provisions of the Public Finance Management Act[137] including sections 79, 66 and 68, 79, 196 which imposes a duties and responsibilities upon the accounting officers and public officers to ensure that public finance is used lawfully and in a prudent manner.

305. Having found that PSC contravened several constitutional provisions among them Articles 230(4), 206 (4) and 259(11)by setting and facilitating the payment to the MPs of house allowance, we also found that the accounting officers for the PSC and Parliament are therefore also culpable for failing to undertake their obligations under the Public Finance Management Act in this regard. For this reason, we therefore find that the said accounting officers are under an obligation to recover the money paid to MPs.

306. A specific prayer was made that in the alternative we find the 3rd to 12th Respondents who were the members of the PSC, personally liable to pay to the Consolidated Fund the house allowances paid to the MPs. We noted that personal liability for loss of public funds is contingent on a finding of the circumstances listed in section 202 (1) (a) & (b) of the Public Finance Management Act, and that no evidence was placed, or arguments made before us to demonstrate bad faith, negligence, corruption or fraud on the part of the 3rd to 12th Respondents to support such a finding. We however concluded that there was evidence that the impugned payment was undertaken in total disregard of the provisions of the Constitution and the Public Finance Management Act discussed herein above.

307. The second substantive issue we considered was whether the SRC has failed to set a house allowance for MPs and if so, whether it amounts to discrimination against MPs. We examined the decision in the CoG v SRC case which was substantially relied upon by PSC for this contention, and noted that facts in the CoG v SRC case are different from those in the instant case, and was informed by the specific rights of the parties before it, and in particular on the specific role of the Deputy Governors who are principal assistants of the Governors, and cannot be said to be a decision in rem.Furthermore, the said decision is subject to a pending appeal, hence, its persuasive value is limited.

308. We also found that the PSC has not demonstrated unfair discrimination for the reasons that, firstly, the SRC had demonstrated that MPs are actually paid a house allowance in their consolidated pay. Secondly, SRC had provided an objective and a rational justification as to why a certain category of State Officers are entitled to and are given a housing benefit, and the PSC did not demonstrate that they undertake functions similar to this category of State Officers. Thirdly, other than the decision in the CoG v SRC caserelied upon which we have distinguished, the PSC did not provide sufficient evidence to support its allegations on differentiated pay between the MPs and Judges, Magistrates and other civil servants, nor did it demonstrate that the criteria applied by the SRC in setting the different pay structures was unfair. The Court therefore found that the PSC’s claim of alleged discrimination of MPs by the SRC fails.

309. The third substantive issue we considered was whether the SRC acted ultra vires its constitutional and statutory mandate in capping the number of remunerable meetings the MPs and PSC could hold in one month. Our findings after analysing the relevant Gazette Notices were firstly, that the said capping only applied to MPs in parliamentary committees and not in the PSC, as Gazette Notices Nos. 2887 of 2013 and 6519 of 2017 on State Officers in Constitutional Commission and Independent Offices did not set any limits as to remunerable meetings of the PSC.

310. Secondly, in the present case, the number of remunerable meetings were being capped with respect to parliamentary committee meetings and not with respect to meetings of a constitutional commission. Therefore, the decision in Judicial Service Commission v Salaries and Remuneration Commission & anotheris inapplicable in the circumstances of this case. In addition, PSC did not place any evidence before this court to demonstrate that the SRC in setting the limits of number of remunerable meetings for MPs in both the 2013 and 2017 Gazette Notices, acted in a manner that would attract the exercise of this court’s judicial review powers, which is the standard of review that would be ordinarily applicable, and having already found that the mandate to set and determine remuneration including allowances, is a function constitutionally vested in the SRC by Article 230 (4) (a) and the SRC Act.

311. Thirdly, PSC is estopped from raising any issue touching on Gazette Notice No. 2886 of 2013 at this point in time arising from the decision in Okiya Omtatah Okoiti & 3 others v Attorney General & 5 others[138] wherein Parliament and PSC had an opportunity in that case to raise all matters connected with the said Gazette Notice. Furthermore, Gazette Notice No. 6517 of 2017 was quashed in the PSC v SRC case, wherein the PSC fully relied upon and supported the 2013 Gazette Notice. We were therefore unable to find in the circumstances of this case that SRC acted ultra vires its constitutional and statutory mandate in limiting MPs remunerable parliamentary committee meetings.

312. The last substantive issue we addressed was whether the suit against the 3rd to 12th Respondents & the 2nd Interested Party is incompetent. We considered the provisions of Article 250 (9) under which the 3rd to 12th Respondents enjoy immunity for action performed in good faith in the performance of their duties. We also note that the Petitioners in this regard did not endeavour to establish bad faith on the part of the 3rd to 12th Respondents, and therefore found that the suit against the 3rd to the 12th Respondents in their personal capacities offends Article 250(9) and is unsustainable.

313. We also considered similar submission by the MPs, who were joined as the 2nd Interested Party, that they had been wrongly been sued in their personal capacities, and that the MPs therefore ought to be removed from this suit. It was however our view that in the circumstances of this case, each MP was correctly enjoined as a party in the consolidated Petitions, for the reason that the MPs are the beneficiaries of the impugned payments set and facilitated by the PSC, and will be directly affected by the decision of this court on the said payment, particularly if it has adverse effects. We accordingly declined the 2nd Interested Party’s prayer to be excused from these proceedings.

(ii) The Remedies

314. The Petitioners and 1st Respondent have sought remedies of certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, a permanent injunction and various declarations as reproduced hereinabove. Various principles apply with regard to the issue of these orders, that need to be considered in light of our findings as reproduced hereinabove.

315. Certiorari, prohibition and mandamus are judicial review orders. An order of prohibition restrains a public body from acting in the manner specified in the order to restrain a threatened or impending unlawful conduct. An order of certiorari on the other hand nullifies an unlawful decision or enactment. The Court of Appeal in the case of Republic v Kenya National Examinations Council ex parte Gathenji & Others[139] explained the circumstances under which the orders of prohibition and certiorari can issue as follows: -

“Prohibition looks to the future so that if a tribunal were to announce in advance that it would consider itself not bound by the rules of natural justice the High Court would be obliged to prohibit it from acting contrary to the rules of natural justice. However, where a decision has been made, whether in excess or lack of jurisdiction or whether in violation of the rules of natural justice, an order of prohibition would not be efficacious against the decision so made. Prohibition cannot quash a decision which has already been made; it can only prevent the making of a contemplated decision...Prohibition is an order from the High Court directed to an inferior tribunal or body which forbids that tribunal or body to continue proceedings therein in excess of its jurisdiction or in contravention of the laws of the land. It lies, not only for excess of jurisdiction or absence of it but also for a departure from the rules of natural justice. It does not, however, lie to correct the course, practice or procedure of an inferior tribunal, or a wrong decision on the merits of the proceedings...Only an order of certiorari can quash a decision already made and an order of certiorari will issue if the decision is without jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction, or where the rules of natural justice are not complied with or for such like reasons.”

316. An order of mandamus on the other hand requires a public body to do some particular act as specified in the order, to enforce public law duties. The Court of appeal in the above cited decision held as follows on the applicable principles for an order of mandamus to issue:-

“The next issue we must deal with is this: What is the scope and efficacy of an ORDER OF MANDAMUS? Once again we turn to HALSBURY’S LAW OF ENGLAND, 4th Edition Volume 1 at page 111 FROM PARAGRAPH 89. That learned treatise says:-

“The order of mandamus is of a most extensive remedial nature, and is, in form, a command issuing from the High Court of Justice, directed to any person, corporation or inferior tribunal, requiring him or them to do some particular thing therein specified which appertains to his or their office and is in the nature of a public duty. Its purpose is to remedy the defects of justice and accordingly it will issue, to the end that justice may be done, in all cases where there is a specific legal right and no specific legal remedy for enforcing that right; and it may issue in cases where, although there is an alternative legal remedy, yet that mode of redress is less convenient, beneficial and effectual.”

At paragraph 90 headed “the mandate” it is stated:

“The order must command no more than the party against whom the application is made is legally bound to perform. Where a general duty is imposed, a mandamus cannot require it to be done at once. Where a statute, which imposes a duty leaves discretion as to the mode of performing the duty in the hands of the party on whom the obligation is laid, a mandamus cannot command the duty in question to be carried out in a specific way.”

What do these principles mean? They mean that an order of mandamus will compel the performance of a public duty which is imposed on a person or body of persons by a statute and where that person or body of persons has failed to perform the duty to the detriment of a party who has a legal right to expect the duty to be performed….”

317. The remedy of a declaration is normally granted to state authoritatively the lawfulness of a decision, action or failure to act, the consequences that follow from a quashing order, the existence or extent of a public body’s powers and duties, the rights of individuals or the law on a particular issue.

318. The only limitations as to grant of declarations is in purely moral, social, or political matters in which no issue of law or rights arises; where it will serve no practical purpose; or where a court has not heard contested argument on the issue to which the declaration relates and it is likely to affect other parties who are not party to the case. (See Jonathan Moffart et al, Judicial Review: Principles and Procedures (2013) at chapter 30. 16 to 30. 24).

319. The said remedies of certiorari, prohibition, mandamus and declaration are accordingly merited, to the extent that we have found that PSC contravened several constitutional provisions by setting and facilitating the payment to the MPs of house allowance, and that the accounting officers for the PSC and Parliament have a duty and responsibility under the Public Finance Management Act to recover the said payments.

320. The Petitioners also sought a permanent injunction. An injunction is an order prohibiting a person from doing something or requiring a person to do something. Injunctions are however normally in principle granted where there has been a breach of private law rights, and not with respect to public rights or duties, and are therefore not an appropriate remedy in the present Petitions. The Court of Appeal in Cortec Mining Kenya Limited vs Cabinet Secretary, Attorney General & 8 others[140]. held as follows as regards the grant of injunction in judicial review proceedings: -

“34. Can this court grant an order of injunction in a judicial review matter such as this one? For starters, to grant an injunction would amount to giving a relief or remedy that was not even sought in the High Court in the first place.

The High Court could only grant these three prerogative orders. It could not in the judicial review under Section 8 of the Law Reform Act grant an order of injunction such as is sought in the motion before us for the simple reason that injunction is not authorized by and falls outside the amplitude of the reliefs available under Section 8 of the Law Reform Act. An injunction is also not exclusively within the amplitude of public law remedies.”

321. Likewise, the Supreme Court of Kenya, when explaining the distinction between injunctions, and order of stay and conservatory orders in Gatirau Peter Munya v Dickson Mwenda Kithinji & 2 others[141] held as follows:-

“(85)These are issues to be resolved on the basis of recognizable concept. The domain of interlocutory orders is somewhat ruffled, being characterized by injunctions, orders of stay, conservatory orders and yet others. Injunctions, in a proper sense, belong to the sphere of civil claims, and are issued essentially on the basis of convenience as between the parties, and of balances of probabilities. The concept of “stay orders” is more general, and merely denotes that no party nor interested individual or entity is to take action until the Court has given the green light.

(86)“Conservatory orders” bear a more decided public-law connotation: for these are orders to facilitate ordered functioning within public agencies, as well as to uphold the adjudicatory authority of the Court, in the public interest...”

322. The 1st and 2nd Petitioners have also sought orders seeking recovery of funds paid to the MPs as house allowances through various means. This Court is in this regard empowered to grant appropriate relief necessary in the circumstance of a constitutional petition. The definition of "appropriate relief" was given by the South African Constitutional Court in Minister of Health & Others vs Treatment Action Campaign & Others[142]thus:-

"...appropriate relief will in essence be relief that is required to protect and enforce the Constitution. Depending on the circumstances of each particular case, the relief may be a declaration of rights, an interdict, a mandamus, or such other relief as may be required to ensure that the rights enshrined in the Constitution are protected and enforced. If it is necessary to do so, the court may even have to fashion new remedies to secure the protection and enforcement of these all-important rights...the courts have a particular responsibility in this regard and are obliged to "forge new tools" and shape innovative remedies, if need be to achieve this goal.”

323. The Supreme Court of Canada also established the considerations to be applied in the provision of a remedy in a Constitutional violation case that is “just and appropriate” in Doucet-Boudreau v Nova Scotia (Minister of Education).[143] These include provision of remedy that will: -

(1) meaningfully vindicate the rights and freedoms of the claimants;

(2) employ means that are legitimate within the framework of our constitutional democracy;

(3) be a judicial remedy which vindicates the right while invoking the function and powers of a court; and

4) be fair to the party against whom the order is made.

324. We have already considered the applicable provisions of the Constitution and Public Finance Management Acton recovery of public funds that are unlawfully expended, and noted in this respect that the accounting officers of PSC and Parliament have a constitutional and statutory obligation to recover any payments illegally made to the MPS.

325. Lastly, both the Petitioners and the 1st Respondent also sought various orders as regards the question of who should bear the costs of the consolidated Petitions. Section 27 of the Civil Procedure Act stipulates as follows on the award of cost: -

(1) Subject to such conditions and limitations as may be prescribed, and to the provisions of any law for the time being in force, the costs of and incidental to all suits shall be in the discretion of the court or judge, and the court or judge shall have full power to determine by whom and out of what property and to what extent such costs are to be paid, and to give all necessary directions for the purposes aforesaid; and the fact that the court or judge has no jurisdiction to try the suit shall be no bar to the exercise of those powers:

Provided that the costs of any action, cause or other matter or issue shall follow the event unless the court or judge shall for good reason otherwise order.

(2) The court or judge may give interest on costs at any rate not exceeding fourteen per cent per annum, and such interest shall be added to the costs and shall be recoverable as such.

326. In the case of Supermarine Handling Services Ltd v Kenya Revenue Authority[144], this Court explained the circumstances that would lead an appellate court to interfere with the trial court’s exercise of discretion thus:

“Costs of any action or other matter or issue shall follow the event unless the court or Judge shall for good reason otherwise order. It is well established that when the decision of such a matter as the right of a successful litigant to recover his costs is left to the discretion of the Judge who tried his case, that discretion is a judicial discretion, and if it be so its exercise must be based on facts. If, however, there be, in fact, some grounds to support the exercise by the trial Judge of the discretion he purports to exercise, the question of sufficiency of those grounds for this purpose is entirely a matter for the Judge himself to decide, and the Court of Appeal will not interfere with his discretion in that instance...Thus, where a trial court has exercised its discretion on costs, an appellate court should not interfere unless the discretion has been exercised unjudicially or on wrong principles. Where it gives no reason for its decision the Appellate Court will interfere if it is satisfied that the order is wrong. It will also interfere where the reasons are given if it considers that those reasons do not constitute “good reason” within the meaning of the rule....”

327. The applicable principles therefore are that costs follow the event; however, the award of the costs is also at the discretion of the Court. As this is a matter which clearly raises public interest concerns, it is our view that each party should bear its own costs. The rationale for the approach that a litigant pursuing a public interest litigation will ordinarily not be punished in costs was explained in Harun Mwau & Others v Attorney General & Others[145]as follows: -

“180. In matters concerning public interest litigation, a litigant who has brought proceedings to advance a legitimate public interest and contributed to a proper understanding of the law in question without private gain should not be deterred from adopting a course that is beneficial to the public for fear of costs being imposed. Costs should therefore not be imposed on a party who has brought a case against the state but lost. Equally, there is no reason why the state should not be ordered to pay costs to a successful litigant. The court also retains its jurisdiction to impose costs as a sanction where the matter is frivolous, vexatious or an abuse of the court process.

181. Our Constitution places a premium on the values of social justice and rule of law, patriotism and participation of the public. Without unhindered access by the public to the courts, these values would be undermined. An award of costs is also one of the remedies the court may consider in granting appropriate relief under Article 23(3) and Article 258.

182. Our approach to the issue of costs in cases concerning the enforcement of fundamental rights and freedoms and for the enforcement of the Constitution is that the court has discretion in awarding costs. Like all forms of discretion, it must be exercised judicially, in light of the particular facts of the case and giving due regard to the values set out in the preamble of the Constitution and Article 10 in order to achieve the objects of Article 259(1)”.

328. We shall at this stage proceed to give our disposition in light of the foregoing principles.

The Disposition

329. Arising from the findings herein, our disposition is as follows: -

1. The prayers sought in Petition No. 339 of 2019 by the 1st Respondent are hereby declined, and the said Petition is hereby dismissed with no order as to costs.

2. Petitions No. 208 of 2019 and Petition No. 185 of 2019 filed by the 1st and 2nd Petitioners respectively are found to be merited to the extent of the following orders: -

I.A DECLARATION be and is hereby granted thatthe setting and approval of the payment of an accommodation or house allowance to Members of Parliament is a function that is exclusively vested in the Salaries and Remuneration Commission by Article 230 (4) and (5) of the Constitution.

II. A DECLARATION be and is hereby granted thatthe decision of the Parliamentary Service Commission to set, and approve the payment of an accommodation or house allowance to Members of Parliament contrary to the structure of Remuneration and Benefits of all State Officers in Parliament that is set and communicated by the Salaries and Remuneration Commission, and without the approval of the Salaries and Remuneration Commission is in violation of by Article 230 (4) and (5) of the Constitution.

III.A DECLARATION be and is hereby granted thatthe decision of the Parliamentary Service Commission to set, and approve the payment of an accommodation or house allowance to Members of Parliament contrary to the structure of Remuneration and Benefits of all State Officers in Parliament that is set and communicated by the Salaries and Remuneration Commission, and without the approval of the Salaries and Remuneration Commission the functions that are exclusively vested to the SRC is ultra vires the prescribed Constitutional powers of PSC contained in Article 127(6) of the Constitution.

IV.A DECLARATION be and is hereby granted thatthe decision of the Parliamentary Service Commission to set, and approve the payment of an accommodation or house allowance to Members of Parliament contrary to the structure of Remuneration and Benefits of all State Officers in Parliament that is set and communicated by the Salaries and Remuneration Commission, and without the approval of the Salaries and Remuneration is in violation of the provisions of Article 259(11) of the Constitution that required the prior approval of Salaries and Remuneration Commission.

V.A DECLARATION be and is hereby granted thatthe decision of the Parliamentary Service Commission to set, and approve the payment of an accommodation or house allowance to Members of Parliament contrary to the structure of Remuneration and Benefits of all State Officers in Parliament that is set and communicated by the Salaries and Remuneration Commission, and without the approval of the Salaries and Remuneration Commission was an exercise of state authority not authorised by the Constitution and in violation of the provisions of Article 2(2) of the Constitution

VI.A DECLARATION be and is hereby granted thatthe decision of the Parliamentary Service Commission to set, and approve the payment of an accommodation or house allowance to Members of Parliament contrary to the structure of Remuneration and Benefits of all State Officers in Parliament that is set and communicated by the Salaries and Remuneration Commission, and without the approval of the Salaries and Remuneration Commission the functions that are exclusively vested to the SRC was in violation of the provisions of Article 73(1) of the Constitution which provides that any State authority assigned to a State officer is a public trust that ought to be exercised in a manner that is consistent with the purposes and objects of the Constitution.

VII.A DECLARATION be and is hereby granted thatthe decision of the Parliamentary Service Commission to set, and approve the payment of an accommodation or house allowance to Members of Parliament contrary to the structure of Remuneration and Benefits of all State Officers in Parliament that is set and communicated by the Salaries and Remuneration Commission, and without the approval of the Salaries and Remuneration Commission the functions that are exclusively vested to the SRC was in violation of the binding national values and principles of governance prescribed in Article 10 of the Constitution on the rule of law, transparency and accountability.

VIII.An order of CERTIORARI be and is hereby issued to quash the decision the Parliamentary Service Commission to set, and approve the payment of an accommodation or house allowance to Members of Parliament contrary to the structure of Remuneration and Benefits of all State Officers in Parliament that is set and communicated by the Salaries and Remuneration Commission, and without the approval of the Salaries and Remuneration Commission in disregard of Article 230(4) (a) of the Constitution.

IX.An order of MANDAMUS be and is hereby issued directing the Clerk of the Senate and the Clerk of the National Assembly to, within a period of twelve calendar months from the date of this order, recover in full from the salaries and allowances of each Member of Parliament the entire amount of monies paid as accommodation and/or house allowance to the Members of Parliament, pursuant to the illegal and unconstitutional decision of the Parliamentary Service Commission to set, and approve the payment of an accommodation or house allowance to Members of Parliament contrary to the structure of Remuneration and Benefits of all State Officers in Parliament that is set and communicated by the Salaries and Remuneration Commission, and without the approval of the Salaries and Remuneration Commission.

X.Each party shall bear their respective costs of the two Petitions.

330. Orders accordingly.

DATED, SIGNED AND DELIVERED AT NAIROBI THIS

10TH DAY OF DECEMBER 2020

P. NYAMWEYA W. KORIR J. MATIVO

JUDGE JUDGE JUDGE

FURTHER ORDERS ON THE MODE OF DELIVERY OF THIS JUDGMENT

In light of the declaration of measures restricting Court operations due to the COVID -19 Pandemic, and following the Practice Directions issued by the Honourable Chief Justice dated 17th March 2020 and published in the Kenya Gazette on 17th April 2020 as Kenya Gazette Notice No. 3137, this judgment will be delivered electronically by transmission to the e-mail addresses of the Petitioners’, Respondents’, and Interested Parties’ Advocates on record.

P. NYAMWEYA W. KORIR J. MATIVO

JUDGE JUDGE JUDGE

[1] Act No. 18 of 2012.

[2] Act No. 21 of 2014.

[3] Act No. 11 2007.

[4] Chapter 5 of the Laws of Kenya.

[5] High Court JR No. 686 of 2017; {2018} e KLR

[6] {2019} e KLR

[7] {2018} e KLR.

[8] {2015} e KLR.

[9]Act No. 11 of 2007.

[10] {1765} EWHC KB J98.

[11] {2014} e KLR.

[12] {2017} e KLR

[13] {2008} e KLR.

[14] {2006} UKPC 51.

[15] {2017} e KLR.

[16] Kampala High Court Misc. Appl. No. 347 of 2013.

[17] Act No. 11 of 2007.

[18] {2015} e KLR.

[19] Act No.11 of 2007.

[20] {2013} e KLR.

[21] {2014} e KLR.

[22] {2015} e KLR.

[23] {2011} e KLR.

[24] {2015} e KLR.

[25] {2014} e KLR.

[26] {2014} e KLR.

[27] {2015} e KLR.

[28] {2019} e KLR.

[29] {2015} e KLR.

[30] {2018} e KLR.

[31] {2014} e KLR.

[32] {2015} e KLR.

[33] {2011} e KLR

[34] {2014} e KLR.

[35] {2015} e KLR.

[36] {2014} e KLR.

[37] {2015} e KLR.

[38] {2014} eKLR.

[39] Chapter 5 of the Laws of Kenya.

[40] Constitutional Petition No. 281 of 2014.

[41] No. 10 of 2000.

[42] Chapter 5 of the Laws of Kenya.

[43] No. 4 of 2015.

[44] No. 10 of 2000.

[45] {2018} e KLR.

[46] [2016] e KLR.

[47] {2012} e KLR

[48] {2013} e KLR.

[49] Constitutional Petition No. 1 of 1996 (1997 UGCC 3).

[50] Supreme Court Reference No. 1 of 2012, [2014] e KLR.

[51]{2011}e KLR

[52]{2014} e KLR

[53] {2015} e KLR.

[54] {2015} e KLR.

[55] {2018} e KLR.

[56] Act No. 22 of 2019.

[57] Cap 2, Laws of Kenya.

[58] [2018] e KLR

[59] Act No. 11 of 2007.

[60] {2015} e KLR.

[61] Act No. 11 of 2007.

[62] {2011} e KLR.

[63] {2018} e KLR.

[64] [2018] eKLR

[65] {2014} e KLR.

[66] {2013} e KLR.

[67] {2014} e KLR.

[68] See Thirdway Alliance Kenya & another v Head of the Public Service-Joseph Kinyua & 2 others; Martin Kimani & 15 others (Interested Parties) {2020} e KLR.

[69] Nairobi Criminal Application no. 701 0f 2001

[70] {2015} e KLR.

[71]Investigating Directorate: Serious Economic Offences and Others v Hyundai Motor Distributors (Pty) Ltd and Others: In re Hyundai Motor Distributors (Pty) Ltd and Others v Smit NO and Others [2000] ZACC 12; 2001 (1) SA 545 (CC); 2000 (10) BCLR 1079 (CC) at para 24

[72] Johannesburg Municipality v Gauteng Development Tribunal and Others [2009] ZASCA 106; 2010 (2) SA 554 (SCA) at para 39, which quoted Jaga v Dönges, N.O. and Another; Bhana v Dönges, N.O. and Another 1950 (4) SA 653 (A) at 664G-H.

[73]Smith Dakota vs. North Carolina, 192 US 268(1940)

[74] {2014} e KLR.

[75] {2015} e KLR.

[76] {2013} e KLR.

[77] Please see Articles 2(1), (2), 3 (1), 10, 73 & 93(2) of the Constitution among others.

[78] AAA Investments (Pty) Ltd v Micro Finance Regulatory Council {2006} ZACC 9; 2007 (1) SA 343 (CC).

[79] See Democratic Alliance v President of the Republic of South Africa and Others [2012] ZACC 24; 2013 (1) SA 248 (CC); 2012 (12) BCLR 1297 (CC) at para 27 and Albutt v Centre for the Study of Violence and Reconciliation and Others [2010] ZACC 4; 2010 (3) SA 293 (CC); 2010 (5) BCLR 391 (CC) at para 49.

[80] 6 Currie I, The promotion of administrative justice Act in context (Cape Town: Siber Ink, 2007) 10.

[81] See President of the Republic of South Africa and Others v South African Rugby Football Union and others 2000 1 SA 1 (CC) para 148 (SARFU).

[82] See Rail Commuters Action Group and Others v Transnet Ltd/t/a Metro Rail and Others 2005 2 SA 359 (CC) para 73-78; AAA Investments (Pty) Ltd v Micro Finance Regulatory Council and another2007 (1) SA 343 (CC) para 89.

[83] Act No. 10 of 2000.

[84] Ibid.

[85] See Samuel A. Thumma & Jeffrey L. Kirchmeier, The Lexicon Has Become a Fortress: The United States Supreme Court’s Use of Dictionaries, 47 BUFF. L. REV. 227, 270–71 (1999).

[86] Ibid.

[87] Henry M. Hart, JR. & Albert M. Sacks, The Legal Process: Basic Problems in the Making and Application of Law 1375–76 (William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Phillip P. Frickey eds., 1994).

[88] Antonin Scalia, A Matter of Interpretation: Federal Courts and the Law 13 (1998).

[89] 6TH Edition, Oxford University Press.

[90] 3rd Edition, 2008.

[91] 10th Edition.

[92] WordReference.com Dictionary of English.

[93] Glossary. U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics Division of Information Services. February 28, 2008. Accessed on 21st May 2020.

[94] Bureau of Labor Statistics (2008). Online Glossary. Available at: http://www.bls.gov/bls/glossary.htm#

[95] 10th Edition.

[96] https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/service

[97] https://www.collinsdictionary.com/dictionary/english/service

[98] 2nd Edition.

[99] 6TH Edition, Oxford University Press.

[100] 10th Edition.

[101] 6TH Edition, Oxford University Press.

[102] {2019} e KLR.

[103] Act No. 22 of 2019.

[104] See Matatiele Municipality and Others v President of the Republic of South Africa and Others 2006 (5) BCLR 622 (CC) at para 51.

[105] 1996 (2) BCLR 155 (CC).

[106] Ibid Id at 156F-G.

[107] 1996 (4) SA 1098 (CC); 1996 (11) BCLR 1419 (CC).

[108] Ibid at para 28.

[109] {2018} e KLR.

[110] High Court Petition No. 294 of 2013.

[111] {2015} e KLR.

[112] Act No. 22 of 2019.

[113] {2014} e KLR.

[114] Act No. NO. 18 OF 2012.

[115] See SCA v Minister of Immigration [2002] F.C.A.F.C. 397 at [19].

[116] Daihatsu Australia Pty Ltd v Federal Commission of Australia (2001) 184 A.L.R. 576 (Finn J. at 587)

[117] R.v. Nor. Elec. Co., {1955} O.R. 431; R. v. Groves (1977), 17 O.R. (2d) 65.

[118] Ibid

[119] State of Orissa v Sudhansu Sekhar Misra MANU/SC/0047/1967

[120] Ambica Quarry Works v. State of Gujarat and Ors. MANU/SC/0049/1986

[121] Bhavnagar University v. Palitana Sugar Mills Pvt Ltd (2003) 2 SC 111 (vide para 59)

[122] In the High Court of Delhi at New Delhi February 26, 2007 W.P.(C).No.6254/2006, Prashant Vats Versus University of Delhi & Anr. (Citing Lord Denning).

[123] 1977 (4) SA 298 (A) Trollip JA.

[124] Act No. 17 of 2012.

[125]{2017} e KLR

[126] 7th Edn. 1974 at page 98 by R H Graveson

[127] {2018} ZACC 33.

[128] {2018} ZACC 33.

[129] {2013} e KLR.

[130]Willis vs The United KingdomNo. 36042/97, ECHR 2002 – IV.

[131] {2017} e KLR.

[132] {1997} ZACC 12; 1998 (1) SA 300(CC); 1997 (11) BCLR 1489(CC) (Harksen) at para 48.

[133] {2014} e KLR.

[134] {1967} 2 All ER l00 at l04.

[135] {1976} 2 All ER 497

[136] Act No. 22 of 2019.

[137] Act No. NO. 18 OF 2012.

[138] {2014} e KLR.

[139] {1997} e KLR.

[140] (2015) eKLR

[141] (2014) eKLR

[142] {2002} 5 LRC 216 at p. 249.

[143] 2003 SCC 62.

[144] Civil Appeal No. 85 of 2006.

[145] Nairobi High Court Petition No. 65 of 2011 {2012} e KLR.