https://new.kenyalaw.org/akn/ke/judgment/kehc/2026/12494

**REPUBLIC OF KENYA** **IN THE HIGH COURT OF KENYA AT NAIROBI** **MILIMANI LAW COURTS** **JUDICIAL REVIEW APPLICATION MISCELLANEOUS NO. E061 OF 2026** **SAMAWATI CAPITAL PARTNERS LIMITED………………..……………..APPLICANT** **VERSUS** **KENYA REVENUE AUTHORITY …………………………………....…….. RESPONDENT** **JUDGEMENT** 1. The applicant herein moved this court by way of a motion, dated 4th May 2026, supported by an affidavit, sworn by Mr. Samuel Ndonga, on 4th May 2026. The motion seeks an order of *certiorari*, to quash a rejection notice issued by the respondent, dated 7th May 2024; and an order of prohibition, to prohibit the respondent from enforcing the said notice. 2. The applicant avers that it had made an application for amendment of Value Added Tax, VAT, self-assessments, for the period February 2019 to January 2024, in accordance with section 31 of the Tax Procedures Act, Cap. 468B, Laws of Kenya, on i-TAX portal on various dates in the month of March. The respondent rejected the application, by the applicant, and issued a rejection notice, dated 7th May 2024, which did not have reasons for the rejection, as contemplated under section 31(3) of the Tax Procedures Act. The applicant challenged the rejection, by way of an objection to the Commissioner, dated 20th May 2024, which has never been determined. The case, by the applicant, is that that failure to issue an objection decision has rendered the applicant without an appealable decision, within the meaning of section 3 of the Tax Procedures Act, capable of being appealed at the Tax Appeals Tribunal. It avers that the actions of the respondent are irrational, illegal and unreasonable, and without the orders sought, the applicant will not be able to recover the overpaid taxes, or tax paid in error, which will be prejudicial to it. 3. The respondent filed a replying affidavit, sworn on 16th June 2026, by Ms. Audrey Masaa Nzia, one of its officers, appointed under section 13 of the Kenya Revenue Authority Act, Cap. 469, Laws of Kenya, and serving in the Legal and Board Services Department of the Respondent. The respondent argues that the applicant lodged an application before the Tax Appeals Tribunal, seeking to have the Tax Appeals Tribunal compel the respondent to approve its application for amendment. It is stated that the Tax Appeals Tribunal dismissed the application by the applicant, as the prayers sought in it were substantive, and not interlocutory, in nature, and which could only be determined in an appeal. It is further argued that the Tax Appeals Tribunal opined that failure by the applicant to lodge an appeal, and its subsequent reliance on administrative law, cannot override the clear statutory framework governing tax disputes. It is averred that the rejection of the application for amendment, by the respondent, was not arbitrary, but a mandatory enforcement of section 17(1) of the Value Added Tax Act, Cap 476, Laws of Kenya, which explicitly restricts the deduction of input tax to a strict window of 6 months, after the end of the tax period in which the supply occurred. The respondent argues that it acted within the law, and that these proceedings are a clear attempt, by the applicant, for forum-shopping, and to escape the consequences of its own procedural delays. 4. The application was canvassed by way of written submissions. The submissions by the applicant are dated 20th May 2026; while those by the respondent are dated 30th June 2026. 5. In its written submissions, the applicant identifies issues around the lawfulness and fairness, or otherwise, of the rejection of its amended VAT returns by the respondent; whether the rejection notice of the respondent, dated 7th May 2024, was a tax decision, qualifying for objection under section 51 of the Tax Procedures Act; whether failure to issue an objection decision within 60 days should be deemed to amount to the objection by the applicant being allowed by operation of the law; and the jurisdiction of the court to grant the orders sought. 6. On the issue around whether the rejection of the amended VAT returns form was unlawful and procedurally unfair, the applicant submits that the guiding provision of law, in respect of administrative action, is Article 47 of the Constitution, which states that, “*Every person has the right to administrative action that is expeditious, efficient, lawful, reasonable and procedurally fair.”* It is contended that the rejection notice by the respondent was issued without furnishing the applicant with adequate reasons, contrary to sections 31(3) and 49 of the Tax Procedures Act and sections 4 and 6 of the Fair Administrative Action Act, Cap. 7L, Laws of Kenya, and that the said act of the respondent violated Article 47 of the Constitution. *Republic vs. Kenya Revenue Authority Ex Parte M-Kopa Kenya Limited* [2018] eKLR [2018] KEHC 9059 (KLR)**,** where the court allegedly emphasized that public bodies, exercising statutory mandates, must strictly comply with procedural fairness and statutory timelines; and *Suchan Investment Limited vs. Ministry of National Heritage & Culture & 3 Others* [2016] eKLR [2016] KECA 729 (KLR), where the court allegedly held that administrative actions must meet the constitutional threshold of lawfulness, procedural fairness and reasonableness under Article 47 of the Constitution, are cited in support. 7. On the issue as to whether the rejection notice amounted to a tax decision, qualifying for objection under section 51 of the Tax Procedures Act, the applicant submits that the respondent’s rejection of the Applicant’s amended VAT returns constituted a “tax decision” capable of objection under section 51 of the Tax Procedures Act. Section 51(1) of the Tax Procedures Act, it is submitted, states that, *“A taxpayer who wishes to dispute a tax decision shall lodge an objection against that tax decision under this section before proceeding under any other written law.”* It is submitted that failure to issue an objection decision, as provided under section 51(11) of the Tax Procedures Act, meant that the objection stands allowed, by operation of the law, and that it has rendered the applicant without an appealable decision, within the meaning of section 3 of the Tax Procedures Act, capable of being appealed against the Tax Appeals Tribunal pursuant to section 52 of the Tax Procedures Act. *Republic vs. Kenya Revenue Authority Ex parte Stanley Mombo Amuti*[2018] eKLR [2018] KEHC 9745 (KLR),where the court allegedly emphasized that statutory timelines imposed on public bodies are not cosmetic and must be complied with strictly, is cited in support. The applicant contends that the respondent lacks legal basis to continue enforcing the impugned rejection notice, which continues to prevent the applicant from recovering the overpaid taxes and or the taxes paid in error. 8. The respondent submits around only 1 issue, jurisdiction. It is submitted that the exhaustion doctrine, as set out in section 9(2) of the Fair Administrative Action Act, has been violated, for a party aggrieved by a decision of the respondent should lodge a tax appeal, before the Tax Appeals Tribunal, under the Tax Appeals Tribunal Act, Cap. 469A, Laws of Kenya, and an appeal to the High Court thereafter, under section 34 of the Tax Appeals Tribunal Act, if dissatisfied. It is averred that the applicant moved the Tribunal vide a wrong procedure, rather than through appeal, and his application was properly dismissed on 27th February 2026. *Speaker of National Assembly vs. Karume* [1992] KLR 425 [1992] KECA 42 (KLR), is cited, where the court allegedly established that, “… *where there is a clear procedure for redress provided by statute, that procedure must be strictly followed. Judicial review cannot be used as a shortcut to bypass mandatory statutory bodies.”* It is submitted that the applicant sought to amend and claim input VAT dating back as far as February 2019, and that the period fell outside the legally permissible statutory window. It is argued that the respondent has no statutory discretion, to enlarge timelines or admit claims that are time-barred by operational law, and that the application is an attempt to compel an administrative body to perform an illegal act. 9. Having considered the pleadings, affidavits and submissions, I am persuaded that there are only 2 issues for determination, that is around jurisdiction and the merits of the application. 10. I will deal with jurisdiction first, for a determination on jurisdiction has the potential of disposing of the matter *in limine*. 11. In the affidavit, of Ms. Nzia, 3 issues are raised, which turn around jurisdictional issues, and the same have also been addressed in the written submissions filed on behalf of the respondent. The first is that the applicant had moved the Tax Appeals Tribunal over the rejection notice of 2024, and that matter was dismissed on technical grounds, for the applicant had filed an application, rather than an appeal. It is argued that, upon that dismissal, the applicant ought to have either filed an appeal at the High Court, or a proper appeal at the Tax Appeals Tribunal. The second issue is around section 9(2) of the Fair Administrative Action Act. The argument is that there exists an internal dispute resolution mechanism, within the tax legal regime, which ought to have been exhausted, before the matter was escalated to the High Court. Thirdly, and lastly, but by no means least, there is the issue of the rejection being a mandatory enforcement under section 17(1) of the Value Added Tax Act, which restricts the deduction of input tax to a strict window of 6 months, after the end of the tax period in which the supply occurred. The self-assessments in question allegedly dated back to 2019, which meant that the self-assessment was being sought way outside that period. 12. Let me advert to the first issue. It is not in dispute, that the applicant had moved the Tax Appeals Tribunal, in Miscellaneous Application No. E058 of 2025, to have the respondent compelled to approve its amendment of VAT returns for the period running from February 2019 to January 2024 period. That application was dismissed on 27th February 2026, on grounds that the Tax Appeals Tribunal could only handle matters initiated as appeals, and not as applications, by virtue of sections 12 and 52(1) of the Tax Procedures Act. The Tax Appeals Tribunal concluded that it could only entertain an appeal properly filed under section 13(2) of the Tax Appeals Tribunal Act. It downed its tools, on account of want of jurisdiction. The issue now before me is whether, having not filed an appeal at the Tax Appeals Tribunal, the applicant can rush to this court by way of a judicial review application. 13. The dismissal, in Miscellaneous Application No. E058 of 2025, was not on merit. It was on the technicality that the Tax Appeals Tribunal Act provides for the filing of appeals, at section 12, against decisions of the Commissioner. The instant judicial review proceedings relate to rejection of an amended return, filed by the applicant for February 2019. The rejection was dated 7th May 2024. The dispute in Miscellaneous Application No. E058 of 2025 related to the amendment of the applicant’s VAT self-assessment returns for the period February 2019 to January 2024, which is the same period the subject of these judicial review proceedings. 14. I have very carefully gone through the judgment, in Miscellaneous Application No. E058 of 2025, and I have noted that it was clearly pointed out what ought to happen where a tax-payer is dissatisfied with a decision of the respondent on self-assessment. The dispute herein is on amendment of a self-assessment. Section 31 of the Tax Procedures Act provides for amendment of self-assessments by the Commissioner. Section 51(1) of the Tax Procedures Act provides for objections to a tax decision, which objection is to be lodged with the Commissioner, within 30 days, according to section 51(2). Under section 51(11), the Commissioner should make a decision in 60 days, from the date of receipt of a valid notice of objection, failure to which the objection shall be deemed to be allowed. Under section 51(12) of the Tax Procedures Act, a person dissatisfied with a decision of the Commissioner has a right of appeal to the Tax Appeals Tribunal, within 30 days of the making of the decision, upon notification. 15. Section 52 of the Tax Procedures Act provides for appeals from appealable decisions of the respondent, or the Commissioner, to the Tax Appeals Tribunal, in accordance with the Tax Appeals Tribunal Act. Under section 52(2) of the Tax Procedures Act, an appeal relating to an assessment would be valid if the taxpayer has paid the tax, which is not disputed, or has entered into arrangements with the Commissioner, to pay the tax not in dispute under the assessment, as at the time of lodging the notice. Section 53 provides for appeals to the High Court, by a party dissatisfied with the decision of the Tax Appeals Tribunal, in relation to an appealable decision, which appeal should be lodged within 30 days, upon notification of the decision. Section 54 provides for a further right of appeal to the Court of Appeal. 16. It would appear that there was no appealable decision made by the Commissioner, which the applicant could appeal against, under section 52 of the Tax Procedures Act. The applicant argues that it challenged the rejection decision of 7th May 2024, by lodging an objection with the Commissioner, but the Commissioner never responded to the objection, by way of rendering a decision on it, hence, there was no basis for lodging an appeal at the Tax Appeals Tribunal, with respect to a non-existent decision. I agree. Indeed, I note that the respondent has been careful not to address the fact that the Commissioner did not make any decision to the objection raised by the applicant, to the rejection notice of 7th May 2024. It would appear that the applicant had that in mind, when it approached the Tax Appeals Tribunal, by way of the miscellaneous application, rather than by way of appeal. An appeal was simply not feasible, for there was no decision to be appealed against. However, as fate would have it, the Tax Appeals Tribunal Act does not make provision for applications of the character of that in Miscellaneous Application No. E058 of 2025, so the Tax Appeals Tribunal had no jurisdiction to entertain that application. 17. The issue, that the applicant has placed before the court, is that the rejection notice of 7th May 2024 was defective for lack of reasons, hence it was contrary to section 31(3) of the Tax Procedures Act. It is asserted that the said notice was invalid, to that extent, and the applicant expresses fear that the invalid rejection notice could be enforced against it. Under section 31(3) of the Tax Procedures Act, the Commissioner is empowered to accept or reject the amended self-assessment return, but is required, where there is a rejection, to furnish the taxpayer with the reasons for the rejection, within 30 days, after receiving the application. 18. What is the position here? Were reasons given for the rejection? I have the rejection notice of 7th May 2024 before me. It has a column for reasons for rejection, and I see that a reason was assigned to that rejection, being that the reason given for the amendment was not satisfactory. A reason was given for the rejection, that the reason given for the amendment moved by the applicant was not satisfactory. In the objection to the Commissioner, dated 20th May 2024, the applicant objected that the reason given lacked specificity. In short, the complaint was that the reasons for the amendment not being satisfactory were not given. However, the application for amendment was not merely rejected, a reason or explanation was given for the rejection, albeit very brief, that the reason advanced for the amendment was not satisfactory. I note that section 31(3) of the Tax Procedures Act does not elaborate on how the reasons are to be worded, framed or structured. A reason was given; hence it cannot be argued that the application for amendment was rejected without reasons. The reason given, in that brief statement, was adequate for the applicant to escalate the dispute to the Commissioner, under section 51 of the Tax Procedures Act, which it, in fact, did. 19. I have taken time to search for judicial decisions, which turned on section 49 of the Tax Procedures Act, for consideration, to assist interpret that provision in section 49 of the Tax Procedures Act, but I have not come across any that dealt directly with the matter. Those that I have come across were appeals out of the decisions of the Tax Appeals Tribunal, on a decision of the Commissioner, after a rejection notice was issued. In the instant case, there are no decisions of the Commissioner and the Tax Appeals Tribunal in existence, for after the rejection notice was issued, the applicant escalated the matter to the Commissioner, under section 51 of the Tax Procedures Act, but the Commissioner is yet to make a decision, despite lapse of the 60 days required of him by section 51. 20. The closest decision, that I have encountered, on section 49 of the Tax Procedures Act, is *Darwine Wholesalers Limited vs. Commissioner of Investigations and Enforcement* [2023] KEHC 23537 (KLR), where a decision of the Commissioner was under challenge, under sections 49 and 51(9) of the Tax Procedures Act, with respect to a legal and factual basis not being laid, for consideration of the grounds raised by the appellant in is notice of objection to the Commissioner. What was under challenge, in that case, was the decision of the Commissioner under section 51, and not that under section 49. It was a decision on the objection proceedings under section 51, and not the refusal of an application under section 49. 21. In the end, the court, in *Darwine Wholesalers Limited vs. Commissioner of Investigations and Enforcement* [2023] KEHC 23537 (KLR), stated, in what would be more attuned to proceedings and decision under section 51 of the Tax Procedures Act, than those would give rise to the decision under section 49 of the same Act, that: “*In my view, the threshold of information required by a tax payer is such as would be sufficient to put the tax payer on notice and facilitate an application for an appeal or review. I have considered the law and in particular sections 49, 51(8), 9 and 10 of the Tax Procedures Act (‘the TPA’). The law requires that an objection decision should contain a statement of findings on the material facts and the reasons for the decision. In my view, there is no obligation for the Commissioner to deal with each and every one of the grounds separately, so long as the decision presents the statements of findings, addresses the material facts and provides the reasons for the decision.*” 1. I have had occasion to consider decisions of the Tax Appeals Tribunal, on section 49 of the Tax Procedures Act. In *Local Productions Kenya Limited vs. Commissioner of Domestic Taxes* [2019] KETAT 18 (KLR), a claim, by a tax payer, was rejected by the respondent, but no reasons were given for the rejection. The Tax Appeals Tribunal asserted that the respondent was obliged, by section 49 of the Tax Procedures Act, as read with Article 47 of the Constitution, to give reasons for all its decisions. Ultimately, the appeal to the Tax Appeals Tribunal was allowed, on that ground, among others. In *Family Fashion Clothing vs. Commissioner of Investigations and Enforcement* [2021] KETAT 27 (KLR), the issue was around rejection of evidence at assessment, where, allegedly, no reasons were given, for the rejection. Based on section 49 of the Tax Procedures Act, the Tax Appeals Tribunal evaluated the material before it, and established that the respondent had given reasons for the rejection, based on its investigations. 2. What I surmise, from the material before me, is that the Commissioner rejected the application for amendment, and gave a reason for the rejection. Although the applicant claims that no reasons were given, I am satisfied that reasons were given. The applicant may have an issue with either the quality or quantity of the reason given, and may be submitting that the same amounts to no reason. However, a reason was given, whether its quantity or quality was insufficient is an issue that ought to have been answered at the objection proceedings that were initiated before the Commissioner, under section 51 of the Tax Procedures Act. I reiterate, as fate would have it, the Commissioner is yet to make a decision on the objection raised by the applicant. 3. The second argument is that section 9(2) of the Fair Administrative Action Act, has been violated. Section 9 generally deals with procedure for judicial review, for proceedings mounted under the Fair Administrative Action Act. Section 9(2) of the Fair Administrative Action Act declares that the court shall not review an administrative action or decision, under the Fair Administrative Action Act, unless the mechanisms, including internal mechanisms for appeal or review, and all remedies available under any other written law, are first exhausted. 4. The objection, by the respondent, is that the applicant ought to have lodged an appeal at the Tax Appeals Tribunal, under the Tax Appeals Tribunal Act, and, should it be aggrieved by the decision emanating from that process, lodge an appeal at the High Court, by virtue of section 34 of the said Act. It is submitted that the applicant had, indeed, moved the Tax Appeals Tribunal, not by appeal, as prescribed in law, but by way of a miscellaneous application, hence the application was properly dismissed. It is asserted that the sole legal recourse available to the applicant was the statutory tax appeal, and not a collateral fresh judicial review application at the High Court. 5. Let me start by stating that these judicial review proceedings are not premised on the Fair Administrative Action Act, but the Law Reform Act, Cap. 26, Laws of Kenya. The originating pleadings, filed under the Fair Administrative Action Act, is the originating motion. None was filed herein. The applicant followed the procedure prescribed for judicial review proceedings under the Law Reform Act and Order 53 of the Civil Procedure Rules, where obtaining leave is mandatory, followed by the filing of a substantive motion. Having opted for the procedure under the Law Reform Act and Order 53 of the Civil Procedure Rules, the applicant wholly brought itself under the law governing that process. It cannot then be the case, that in terms of process, these proceedings are governed by both the Law Reform Act and Order 53 of the Civil Procedure Rules, on one hand, and the Fair Administrative Action Act, on the other. I have noted that the applicant cites the Fair Administrative Action Act, in its 2 applications, but that is neither here nor there, so long as the procedure that it chose to follow is that in the Law Reform Act and Order 53 of the Civil Procedure Rules, and not that prescribed under the Fair Administrative Action Act. Parties ought to be clear, they should choose to move the court either under the Law Reform Act and Order 53 of the Civil Procedure Rules, or the Fair Administrative Action Act, and not both at the same time. 6. However, what I have stated above notwithstanding, the principle stated in section 9(2) of the Fair Administrative Action Act, does apply to proceedings mounted under the Law Reform Act and Order 53 of the Civil Procedure Rules, not on account of the Fair Administrative Action Act, but that of *Speaker of the National Assembly vs. Karume* [1992] KECA 42 (KLR). That decision turned on Order LIII of the Civil Procedure Rules, the precursor of Order 53, and it asserts the position that “*where there is a clear procedure for the redress of any particular grievance prescribed by the Constitution or an Act of Parliament, that procedure should be strictly followed*,” and “*that order 53 of the Civil Procedure Rules cannot oust clear constitutional and statutory provisions*.” 7. The question, then, would be whether alternative mechanisms for resolution of the tax dispute existed, which the applicant should have taken advantage of. I have already mentioned severally about the Tax Procedures Act and the Tax Appeals Tribunal Act. They provide procedures for dispute resolution, with respect to matters relating to collection of tax by the respondent, hence internal dispute mechanisms exist within that tax regime. 8. That framework was summarized by the Tax Appeals Tribunal, in the impugned decision herein, in Miscellaneous Application No. E058 of 2025, delivered on 27th February 2026, where it said, quite correctly in my view, at paragraph 34, with respect to the internal mechanisms for dispute resolution under the tax legal regime, as follows: *“34. The Statutory framework is therefore sequential. It contemplates:* * + 1. *An application under Section 31 (2) of the TPA;* 2. *Refusal with reasons under Section 49 of the TPA;* 3. *An Objection under section 51 of the TPA;* 4. *An Objection Decision under section 51 (11) of the TPA; and* 5. *An appeal to the Tribunal under Sections 12, 13 of the TAT and 52 of the TPA.”* 1. So, what happened here? Did the applicant exhaust the mechanisms set out above? The material before me points to an application for amendment of a self-assessment being made under section 31(2) of the Tax Procedures Act. There was a refusal or rejection of that application, under section 49 of the Tax Procedures Act, with reasons, based on what I have seen, although the applicant argues that no reason was given for the refusal. There was an objection filed with the Commissioner, under section 51 of the Tax Procedures Act. However, the process stalled at that stage, for the Commissioner never made a decision under section 51(11) of the Tax Procedures Act. As the Commissioner did not make a decision under section 51(11) of the Tax Procedures Act, there was no basis for the applicant to exhaust that mechanism, by filing an appeal under sections 12 and 13 of the Tax Appeals Tribunal Act. The applicant could not, therefore, be to blame for the failure to exhaust the internal mechanism, that blame lies with the respondent, who frustrated the process, through the failure by the Commissioner, to render a decision on the claim by the applicant. 2. The third argument is that the claim for input tax amendment is statutorily time-barred, under section 17(1) of the Value Added Tax Act, because that law restricts deduction of input tax to a window of 6-months, after the end of the tax period, in which the supply happened. It is averred that the claim and the amendment related to a period dating back to February 2019, way outside the 6 months limitation. What is raised here, in my view, is a matter which goes to the merit of the claim. I am seized of this as a judicial review matter. I am only required to look into the process, not the merits. Whether the claim by the applicant was merited, or not, is not before me. 3. In view of what I have discussed above, I am not persuaded that the High Court would have no jurisdiction to consider the application that has been placed before me. 4. Let me consider the said application on its merits. It seeks several orders, 1 *certiorari*, 1 prohibition and 5 declarations. 5. I will start with the easier part, the prayers for declarations. As indicated above, these proceedings are premised on the Law Reform Act and Order 53 of the Civil Procedure Rules, to the extent that the procedure adopted is that provided for under that procedural regime. They are not premised on the Fair Administrative Action Act, to the extent that the procedure, prescribed under that regime, was not followed. Under the Law Reform Act and Order 53 of the Civil Procedure Rules regime, only 3 reliefs are available, and a declaration is not 1 of them. The 3 are *certiorari*, *mandamus* and prohibition. Declarations may be made in proceedings founded on the Fair Administrative Action Act, initiated by way of originating motion, but there is no originating motion here, and I would have no basis for considering making any of the declarations sought in this case. 6. The *certiorari* is sought to remove and quash the rejection notice dated, 7th May 2026, ostensibly for not giving reasons. I believe that this prayer, for *certiorari*, has been answered above, in the findings and holdings that I have already made, that the document, that rejected the application by the applicant, contained a reason for the rejection, and that was that the reason for the amendment was not satisfactory. For avoidance of doubt, let me recite the same *verbatim*: “(b) Reasons for Rejection: reason for amendment not satisfactory.” 1. Based on the above, therefore, there can be no foundation for the argument that the rejection was not accompanied by a reason or reasons, or was not explained. A reason was advanced. It might not have been satisfactory to the applicant, but it was a reason, nevertheless. If the applicant was aggrieved by the reason given, it had the option to challenge it by way of an objection to the Commissioner. Such a challenge was mounted, vide the notice of objection dated 7th May 2024. Whether the reason advanced was adequate or not would have been addressed or resolved in the proceedings emanating from that notice. Unfortunately, as discussed above, the Commissioner has not dealt with that objection to date. As it is, given that reasons were advanced for the rejection, there would be no basis for quashing that rejection of the amended return, hence the *certiorari* sought would not be available. 2. The prohibition prayer is related to the *certiorari* prayer. Sometimes I wonder why parties seek *certiorari* and prohibition together, in circumstances where what is sought to be quashed is also what is sought to be prohibited. In this case, prohibition is sought of enforcement of the rejection notice of 7th May 2024, which is the same decision which is sought to be quashed. Once the *certiorari* order is made, quashing that notice of rejection, the said notice of rejection would cease to exist, and, as a consequence, there would be no reason to prohibit that which does not exist. Regardless, I have concluded above, that the *certiorari* is unavailable, to quash the said notice, for the reasons given, hence there would be no basis for grant of the prohibition order. 3. At the end of it all, I am not persuaded that the applicant is entitled to the orders that are sought in this matter. Consequently, I do hereby dismiss the motion, dated 4th May 2026. Each party shall bear its own costs. Orders accordingly. **DELIVERED VIA CTS, DATED AND SIGNED IN CHAMBERS, AT MILIMANI, NAIROBI, ON THIS 4TH DAY OF AUGUST 2026.** **W MUSYOKA** **JUDGE** **Mr. Abdirahman, Court Assistant.** **Ms. L Wafula, Legal Researcher.** **Advocates** **Ms. Koskei, instructed by Maero Law Advocates LLP, for the applicant.** **Ms. Audrey Nzia, Advocates, for the respondent.**