Sammy Traders Ltd v Mohe; Warui (Interested Party) (Civil Appeal E150 of 2024) [2026] KEHC 7925 (KLR) (5 June 2026) (Judgment)

Sammy Traders Ltd v Mohe; Warui (Interested Party) (Civil Appeal E150 of 2024) [2026] KEHC 7925 (KLR) (5 June 2026) (Judgment) Neutral citation: [2026] KEHC 7925 (KLR) Republic of Kenya In the High Court at Kiambu Civil Appeal E150 of 2024 KL Kandet, J June 5, 2026 Between Sammy Traders Limited Appellant and Daniel Mwaura Mohe Respondent and Dennis Kaberia Warui Interested Party (Being an appeal from the judgment of Hon. M. A Opondo (Ms) SPM, delivered on 31st July, 2024 in Kiambu CMCC No.185 of 2015) Judgment 1.This appeal arises from the judgment delivered on 31st July, 2024 in Kiambu CMCC No. 185 of 2015. The suit originated from the Further Amended Plaint dated 3rd March, 2020 and filed by Daniel Mwaura Mohe being the plaintiff in the lower court (hereafter the Respondent) and against Dennis Kaberia Warui (the 1st Defendant) and Sammy Traders Limited (the 2nd Defendant in the lower court and hereafter the Appellant). 2.In the suit, the Respondent sought for reliefs against the Defendants in the nature of general damages for pain, suffering and loss of amenities, special damages in the sum of Kshs.138,800/- arising out of a road traffic accident which occurred on or about 5th March, 2015. It was alleged that the 1st Defendant was at all material times the driver of the motor vehicle registration No. KBS 296M, Toyota Probox (hereafter the subject motor vehicle) while the 2nd Defendant/Appellant was at all material times the registered owner of the subject motor vehicle. It was further pleaded in the plaint that on the material date, the subject motor vehicle was so negligently, carelessly driven or controlled and managed by Dennis Kaberia Warui (1st Defendant) who was the driver of the Appellant and in actual possession of the subject motor vehicle and knocked down the Respondent who was standing at the shop verandah at Ting’ang’a Shopping Centre, causing him to sustain serious bodily injuries. 3.The Appellant filed the statement of defence dated 14th November, 2017 denying the averments made in the plaint in respect to negligence and liability on his part. Conversely, the Appellant filed a Third-Party Notice dated 22nd November, 2022 against Omondi Joshua Kennedy claiming indemnity from him against liability from the accident for the reason that at the date of the accident, the Appellant had already transferred ownership of the subject motor vehicle to Omondi Joshua Kennedy through a sale agreement. Omondi Joshua Kennedy (third-party) did not enter appearance or file a Defence with respect to the case. 4.The suit proceeded to full hearing with the testimonies of both the Appellant and the Respondent. Upon close of submissions, the trial court delivered judgment on 31st July, 2024 against the Defendants in the total sum of Kshs.308,000/- made up as follows:i.Kshs.170,000/= as general damages jointly against the Defendants;ii.Kshs.38,000/= as special damages;iii.Kshs.100,000/= as future medical costs; andiv.Costs of the suit and interest from the date of Judgment at Court’s rates. 5.Aggrieved with the outcome, the Appellant preferred this appeal which is premised on the following grounds:i.That the Learned Trial Magistrate erred in both law and fact by failing to appreciate the reasonable and sufficient evidence tendered in Court by the Appellant hence erroneously holding the Appellant 100% liable.ii.The Learned Magistrate erred in both law and fact in failing to appreciate that the Appellant was not in actual possession of the subject motor vehicle when the cause of action arose and/or the alleged accident occurred and that the Appellant having disposed the vehicle.iii.That the Learned Magistrate erred in both law and fact in ignoring the Third Party entirely and failing to appreciate the liability of the Third Party and the Third-Party proceedings thereto.iv.That the Learned Trial Magistrate erred in law and in fact in failing to consider the Appellant’s Statement of Defence against the weight of the evidence tendered by the Respondent herein.v.That the Learned Trial Magistrate erred in law and in fact in failing to evaluate the evidence in its totality and in failing to take into consideration submissions and authorities submitted by the Appellant.vi.That the Learned Trial Magistrate failed to exercise his discretion judiciously in awarding general damages and failed to apply the settled principles of the law and thus there was no good or proper basis for the said assessment of damages.vii.The Learned Trial Magistrate erred in law and in fact in not finding that the Respondent had failed to attribute and did not prove any of the pleaded particulars of negligence on the part of the Appellant. 6.The Appellant therefore seeks to have the trial Court’s judgment set aside accordingly and the Appeal be allowed with costs. 7.The Appeal was canvassed by way of written submissions. The Appellant’s counsel condensed his grounds of appeal into four salient issues, namely, a) whether the learned magistrate erred in law and fact by finding the Appellant liable as the owner and not the third party who had possession and beneficial ownership; b) whether the trial court failed to properly consider the third-party proceedings and the legal effect of the third party’s failure to enter appearance; c) whether the learned trial magistrate erred in law and fact by failing to consider the Appellant’s submissions and misapplying the law ; and d) whether the award of damages was excessive and unsupported by evidence. 8.On the 1st issue concerning liability, counsel for the Appellant submitted that the trial court erred both in fact and in law by finding the Appellant liable merely on account of being the registered owner of the motor vehicle, while disregarding evidence showing that beneficial ownership and possession had already passed to the third party, Omondi Joshua Kennedy. 9.Counsel relied on Section 8 of the Traffic Act, Cap 403, and argued that the presumption of ownership created thereunder is rebuttable. In support thereof, reliance was placed on the decisions in Samuel Mukunya Kamunge v John Mwangi Kamuru and Joel Muga Opija v East African Sea Food Limited [2013] eKLR, where the courts recognized that actual, beneficial or possessory ownership may override registration particulars. 10.Counsel contended that the Appellant had tendered a written sale agreement dated 13th August, 2012 together with uncontroverted evidence showing that possession, control and use of the subject motor vehicle had been transferred to the third party long before the accident occurred on 5th March 2015. It was therefore argued that the learned magistrate misdirected herself by disregarding the evidence on beneficial ownership and by imposing liability solely on the basis of registration records. 11.On the 2nd issue relating to the third-party proceedings, counsel submitted that the learned magistrate failed to properly consider the legal effect of the third party’s failure to enter appearance after being duly served with the third-party notice. Reliance was placed on Order 1 Rule 17 of the Civil Procedure Rules, which provides that a third party who fails to appear is deemed to admit the validity of the decree and his liability to contribute or indemnify the defendant. 12.Counsel further cited the cases of Imani A. Yuman v Amina Ahmed Abdullah & Another [2012] eKLR and Blue Shield Insurance Co. Ltd v Joseph Mboya Oguttu [2009] eKLR to support the argument that the third party’s default amounted to an admission of liability. It was therefore contended that the trial court erred by failing to evaluate or address the consequences of the third party’s default, thereby unfairly imposing full liability upon the Appellant instead of granting indemnity against the third party. 13.On the 3rd issue, counsel submitted that the learned magistrate failed to properly evaluate the Appellant’s evidence, submissions and cited authorities, thereby misapplying the law. It was argued that the trial court failed to consider the evidence concerning transfer of possession and beneficial ownership, resulting in a selective and one-sided judgment. Counsel maintained that, had the trial court properly analysed the evidence before it, it would have found that liability rested with the third party and not the Appellant. 14.On quantum, Counsel submitted that the award of damages made by the trial court was excessive and unsupported by the evidence tendered. It was argued that whereas the Respondent had only proved minor soft tissue injuries, the learned magistrate awarded general damages of Kshs.170,000/=, special damages of Kshs.38,000/= and future medical expenses of Kshs.100,000/= without proper justification. Counsel relied on Tracom Limited & Another v Hassan Mohamed Adan [2009] eKLR for the principle that future medical expenses must not only be specifically pleaded but also strictly proved. It was contended that no receipts, invoices or credible expert evidence had been produced to support the award on future medical expenses and that the learned magistrate therefore erred in awarding the same. 15.Counsel relied on authorities including Francis Omari Ogaro v JAO (minor suing through next friend and father GOD) [2021] KEHC 2358 (KLR), HB (minor suing through mother & next friend DKM) v Jasper Nchonga Magari & another [2021] eKLR, Ephraim Wagura Muthui & 2 others v Toyota Kenya Limited & 2 others [2019] eKLR and Nyambati Nyaswabu Erick v Toyota Kenya Limited & 2 others [2019] eKLR, where lower awards were made for comparable soft tissue injuries. Counsel therefore urged the court to find that the total award of Kshs.308,000/= was excessive, unjustified and liable to interference on appeal. 16.In conclusion, Counsel for the Appellant submitted that the trial court misapprehended both the law and the evidence placed before it, thereby arriving at erroneous findings on liability and quantum. Consequently, the court was urged to allow the appeal and to set aside or vary the impugned judgment in the manner sought by the Appellant. 17.The Respondent filed its written submissions dated 21st May, 2025 and further submissions dated 25th September, 2025. Counsel for the Respondent condensed its submissions into four salient issues namely: whether the learned trial magistrate properly evaluated the evidence before the court and correctly apportioned 100% liability against the Appellant; whether the Appellant, as the registered owner, was properly held liable for the negligence of the driver at the time of the accident; whether the learned trial magistrate correctly considered the effect of the Third Party proceedings and the Third Party's failure to enter appearance; and whether the assessment of general and special damages was properly made in accordance with established legal principles. 18.On the 1st issue, the Respondent submitted that the learned trial magistrate properly evaluated the evidence before the court and correctly apportioned liability against the Appellant. Counsel relied on the decision in Daniel Toroitich Arap Moi v Mwangi Stephen Muriithi & another [2014] eKLR for the principle that the burden of proof in civil cases remains on a balance of probabilities even where the defendant does not adduce evidence. It was submitted that the Respondent had sufficiently discharged that burden by proving occurrence of the accident involving the Appellant’s motor vehicle where the Respondent sustained injuries as a result thereof. Counsel further relied on the decision in Trust Bank Limited v Paramount Universal Bank Limited & 2 others [2009] eKLR to argue that where a party fails to adduce evidence, its pleadings remain mere statements and the opposing party’s evidence stands uncontroverted. 19.On the question of ownership and liability, counsel submitted that the Appellant, as the registered owner of the subject motor vehicle, was properly held liable pursuant to Section 8 of the Traffic Act, which creates a rebuttable presumption of ownership. While conceding that the presumption may be displaced by evidence of beneficial ownership, counsel argued that the Appellant failed to effectively rebut the same. Reliance was placed on the decisions in Benard Muia Kilovoo v Kenya Fresh Produce Exporters [2020] and Jared Magwaro Bundi & another v Primarosa Flowers Limited [2018] on the principles governing beneficial ownership of motor vehicles. 20.Counsel pointed out that the Appellant’s witness admitted that the alleged purchaser had not completed payment of the purchase price, leaving a balance of Kshs.121,000/= outstanding, and therefore beneficial ownership had not fully passed to the third party. It was thus contended that the Appellant remained liable as both the registered and beneficial owner at the time of the accident. 21.Regarding the issue on the third-party proceedings, the Respondent submitted that although the third party failed to enter appearance and was therefore deemed under Order 1 Rule 17 of the Civil Procedure Rules to admit liability to indemnify the Appellant, such admission did not extinguish the Appellant’s primary liability to the Respondent. In support thereof, counsel cited the decision in Imani A. Yuman v Amina Ahmed Abdullah & another [2012] eKLR concerning the legal consequences of a third party’s default in appearance. 22.On quantum, the Respondent submitted that the awards made by the trial court were reasonable and consistent with established legal principles. It was argued that the award of Kshs.38,000/= on special damages was properly proved through receipts produced before the trial court. Counsel further submitted that the award of Kshs.170,000/= as general damages was justified in view of the injuries sustained by the Respondent. On future medical expenses, the Respondent submitted that the award of Kshs.100,000/= was properly pleaded, specifically proved and supported by Dr. Kinuthia’s medical report which quantified the anticipated future medical costs. Consequently, the court was urged to dismiss the appeal with costs. 23.The court has considered the record of appeal, the pleadings and original record of the proceedings as well as the submissions by the respective parties. This being a first Appeal, the duty of the court is as set out in the the Court of Appeal case in Selle v Associated Motor Boat Co. [1968] EA 123 in the following terms:“An appeal from the High Court is by way of re-trial and the Court of Appeal is not bound to follow the trial judge’s finding of fact if it appears either that he failed to take account of circumstances or probabilities, or if the impression of the demeanor of a witness is inconsistent with the evidence generally.An appeal to this court from a trial by the High Court is by way of retrial and the principles upon which this court acts in such an appeal are well settled. Briefly put they are that this court must reconsider the evidence, evaluate it itself and draw its own conclusions though it should always bear in mind that it has neither seen nor heard the witnesses and should make due allowance in this respect.In particular this court is not bound necessarily to follow the trial judge’s findings of fact if it appears either that he has clearly failed on some point to take account of particular circumstances or probabilities materially to estimate the evidence or if the impression based on the demeanor of a witness is inconsistent with the evidence in the case generally.” 24.It is thus trite law that an Appellate court will not ordinarily interfere with a finding of fact made by a trial court unless such finding was based on no evidence, or it is demonstrated that the court below acted on wrong principles in arriving at the finding it did. (See Ephantus Mwangi & Another v Duncan Mwangi Wambugu [1982 – 1988] IKAR 278.) 25.Upon examination and appreciation of all the pleadings filed in the Appeal and the rival submissions, it is the court’s view the appeal turns on two issues, namely, whether the finding of the trial court on liability was well founded and whether the award on damages was justified. 26.On the first issue on liability, the trial court apportioned 100% liability on the 1st and 2nd Defendant’s jointly. It held that the 1st Defendant was liable for driving the subject motor vehicle carelessly and recklessly at the material date of the accident. As a result, the motor vehicle knocked down the Plaintiff causing him bodily injuries. The trial court further held that since the 1st Defendant had not entered appearance nor filed a Defence in the suit, he failed to rebut or controvert the evidence adduced by the Plaintiff further finding him liable for the accident. 27.In the impugned judgment, the trial court found that the 2nd Defendant was vicariously liable for causing the accident on account that he was the registered owner of the subject Motor vehicle as at the date of the accident, as per the NTSA Copy of records. An earlier Ruling of the Court also held that the 2nd Defendant was the beneficial owner of the subject motor vehicle. In addition, the trial court held that although the 2nd Defendant indicated that it had sold the subject motor vehicle to a Third party, a Mr. Omondi Joshua Kennedy, prior to the accident, the transfer process had not yet been completed at the NTSA and the ownership of the vehicle still remained with the 2nd Defendant. 28.On this issue, the Appellant challenged the trial court’s holding submitting it was erroneous for fully apportioning liability on him despite tendering evidence showing that it had sold the subject motor vehicle to the 3rd Party who had custody and control. Further, the Appellant stated that the trial court failed to attribute liability on the 3rd Party Mr. Omondi Joshua Kennedy despite acquiring the motor vehicle and also failing to enter appearance or file a defence controverting the evidence of the 2nd Defendant. 29.On the other hand, the Respondent affirmed the trial Court’s holding on the said issue submitting that the trial court was correct in apportioning liability on the 2nd Defendant/Appellant as the registered owner of the subject motor vehicle. The Respondent stated that the trial court made a correct finding as the legal ownership of the subject vehicle remained with the Appellant pending full payment of the full purchase price by the third party. He further stated that the third party remained the Appellant’s agent and a licensee/loanee to the Respondent. 30.Section 8 of the Traffic Act (Cap 403) provides that “the person in whose name a vehicle is registered shall, unless the contrary is proved, be deemed to be the owner of the vehicle.” 31.The forgoing provision, indicates that on a prima facie basis the individual registered on the log book is presumed to be the owner of the subject motor vehicle. However, Courts have consistently held that the entry in the log book is not conclusive proof of ownership where evidence can be adduced to show that the de facto, beneficial or possessory owner is a person other than the one named in the register. 32.In Nancy Ayemba Ngaira v Abdiali [2010] KEHC 1866 (KLR), the Court opined thus: “There is no doubt that the registration certificate obtained from the Registrar of motor vehicles will show the name of the registered owner of a motor vehicle. But the indication thus shown on the certificate is not final proof that the sole owner is the person whose name is shown.” 33.Further, In Benard Muia Kilovoo v Kenya Fresh Produce Exporters [2020] eKLR it was stated as follows:“ 41.The Court of Appeal in these binding decisions is clearly stating:(i)That the presumption that the person registered as owner of the motor vehicle in the logbook is the actual owner is rebuttable.(ii)Where there exists other compelling evidence to proof otherwise then the court can make a finding of ownership that is different from that contained in the logbook.(iii)Each case must however be considered in its own peculiar facts.” 34.In this present case, the 2nd Defendant/Appellant had adduced evidence in form of a sale agreement dated 13th August, 2012 which showed that the Third party Mr. Omondi Joshua Kennedy Maruka purchased the subject motor vehicle (on hire purchase) from the Appellant at the purchase price of Kshs.790,000/=. 35.Further, the Third party subsequently paid the purchase price by way of instalments leaving a nominal balance. Proof of payments in form of receipts of the purchase price were also attached in the pleadings. Further, there were mutually agreed conditions of the sale annexed to the Agreement that indicated that the Buyer/3rd Party would take actual possession of the subject motor vehicle upon payment of the purchase price and deposit which clearly showed the intention of the parties as at the time of the contract. In addition, condition 10 provided that the Buyer would be responsible and liable in the event of an accident. 36.The law that governs sale of vehicles is the Sale of Goods Act Cap 31. Section 19(1) and (2) of the Sale of Goods Act provides:“1)Where there is a contract for the sale of specific or ascertained goods, the property in them is transferred to the buyer at such time as the parties to the contract intend it to be transferred.2)For the purposes of ascertaining the intention of the parties, regard shall be had to the terms of the contract, the conduct of the parties and the circumstances of the case.” 37.From the forgoing provision, it is quite clear that the property in goods passed at the time of making the agreement when the subject motor vehicle was delivered to the third party. 38.It is the court’s view that the Appellant adduced substantial evidence on a balance of probabilities to prove that he divested himself of ownership of the motor vehicle to the Third party, Mr. Omondi Joshua Kennedy Maruka the Buyer, and who in turn became a beneficial owner with custody, possession and control of the subject motor vehicle as at the date of the accident. 39.Furthermore, in Joel Muga Opija v East African Sea Food Limited [2013] KECA 181 (KLR), the Court of Appeal held that “where a registered owner has sold a vehicle and divested himself of possession and control, he cannot be held vicariously liable for the negligence of the driver. The failure to effect the transfer of ownership in the registration book does not operate to maintain a state of vicarious liability that has, in fact, ceased to exist.” 40.The Court of Appeal in Osumo Apima Nyaundi v Charles Isaboke Onyancha Kibondori & 3 others [1996] eKLR further stated that:“The Traffic Act is an Act of Parliament to consolidate the law relating to traffic on the roads. It is not an Act which decides the defacto or dejure ownership of vehicles. Ownership of a vehicle passes by sale and delivery. The registration book of the vehicle is only evidence of title. Section 8 of the said Act reads: “8. A person in whose name a vehicle is registered shall, unless the contrary is proved, be deemed to be the owner of the vehicle.” This section signifies that a registered owner will be deemed prima facie, the owner. It is open for the real owner (should he be not the registered owner) to prove to the contrary.” 41.Before making a conclusive finding on the issue of liability, this Court turns on the effect of the third-party proceedings and liability of the third party. The Appellant faults the trial court’s finding that it failed to evaluate and reference the effect of the third-party’s default which warranted indemnification of the Appellant. 42.It is the Appellant’s case that he filed a 3rd party notice upon Omondi Joshua Kennedy who failed to enter appearance or file a Defence. The Appellant submitted that the third-party’s failure to enter appearance or file a Defence in the trial court matter implied admission on the part of the third party who is deemed to admit liability to contribute or indemnify the Appellant. 43.On a cursory perusal of the trial Court’s judgment, it appears that the issue of the third party escaped the trial court’s attention as the trial court did not make any orders or address the default in appearance on the part of the third party. 44.Third party proceedings are governed by the Civil procedure Rules, 2010 under Order 1 Rule 15 of the Civil Procedure Rules which provides as follows;“i.Where a defendant claims as against any other person not already a Party to the suit (hereinafter called the third Party)a.that he is entitled to contribution or indemnity; orb.that he is entitled to any relief or remedy relating to or connected with the original subject-matter of the suit and substantially the same as some relief or remedy claimed by the plaintiff; orc.that any question or issue relating to or connected with the said subject-matter is substantially the same question or issue arising between the plaintiff and the defendant and should properly be determined not only as between the plaintiff and the defendant but as between the plaintiff and defendant and the third Party or between any or either of them, he shall apply to the Court within fourteen days after the close of pleadings for leave of the Court to issue a notice (hereinafter called a third-Party notice) to that effect, and such leave shall be applied for by summons in chambers ex parte supported by affidavit.i.A copy of such notice shall be filed and shall be served on the third Party according to the rules relating to the service of a summons.ii.The notice shall state the nature and grounds of the claim, and shall, unless otherwise ordered by the court, be filed and served within fourteen days of leave, and shall be in or to the effect of Form No. 1 of Appendix A with such variations as circumstances require and a copy of the plaint shall be served therewith.iii.Where a third Party makes as against any person not already a Party to the action such a claim as is mentioned in sub-rule(1), the provisions of this Order regulating the rights and procedure as between the defendant and the third Party shall apply mutatis mutandis as between the third Party and such person, and the court may give leave to such third Party to issue a third Party notice, and the preceding rules of this Order shall apply mutatis mutandis, and the expressions “third Party notice” and “third Party” shall respectively apply to and include every notice so issued and every person served with such notice.iv.Where a person served with a notice by a third Party under Subrule (4) makes such a claim as is mentioned in Subrule (1) against another person not already a Party to the action, such other person and any subsequent person made a Party to the action shall comply mutatis mutandis with the provisions of this rule.” 45.With regards to service of the Third-Party Notice, the Appellant submitted that it duly served the notice upon the third party, Mr. Omondi Joshua Kennedy Maruka on 23rd August, 2023 in accordance to the provisions of 0rder 1 Rule 15 (2) & (3) of the Civil Procedure Rules. Further, the third party despite service, did not enter appearance or file a Defence to counteract the Appellant’s claims. 46.Order 1 Rule 19 of the Civil Procedure Rules provides the consequence of none appearance by the third party thus providing:“Where a third Party makes default in entering an appearance in the suit, or in delivering any pleading, and the defendant giving the notice suffers judgment by default, such defendant shall be entitled, after causing the satisfaction of the decree against himself to be entered upon the record, to judgment against the third Party to the extent claimed in the third-Party notice; the court may upon the application of the defendant pass such judgment against the third Party before such defendant has satisfied the decree passed against him:” 47.It is therefore this Court’s finding that non appearance of the third party and failure to file a defence despite service to controvert the evidence adduced against it, implies admission on his part. This Court places reliance in the case of Imani A. Yuman vs Amina Ahmed Abdullah & Anor (2021) eKLR where the court held that “failure to enter appearance even after due service of a Third-Party Notice indicated that the applicant admitted liability of a decree obtained against him.” 48.The consequence of such default, in the court’s view, is between the Appellant (Defendant) and the third party as it is the Defendant who seeks enjoinment of the third party in the suit and not between the Plaintiff and the third party. In the case of Kenya Commercial Bank -vs Suntra Investment Bank Ltd (2015) Eklr the court made the following similar observations;“In any case, the said third Party is not a Party in the suit and no claim has been laid against it by the Plaintiff or the Defendant. In law, a third Party is enjoined in a suit at the instance of the Defendant and through the set procedure under (Order 1 rule 15 - 22 of the Civil Procedure Rules. And, liability between the Defendant and the third Party is determined between the Defendant and the third Party, but of course, after the court is satisfied that there is a proper question to be tried as to liability of the third Party and the Defendant and has given directions under Order 1 rule 22 of the Civil Procedure Rules.” 49.Accordingly, in view of the forgoing, while this Court upholds the trial court’s finding on liability against the Appellant vis-à-vis the Respondent/Plaintiff, on the other hand, this Court finds merit on the ground that the trial court ought to have given directions on the default in appearance of the third party or ought to have entered judgment on indemnity in favour of the Appellant against the third party. 50.The second limb of the appeal concerns itself with quantum on the damages awarded specifically under the heads of general damages and future medical expenses. 51.On the award of damages, the trial Court awarded the Plaintiff/Respondent a cumulative sum of Kshs.308,000/= consisting of special damages of Kshs.38,000, general damages of Kshs.170,000/= and future medical expenses of Kshs.100,000/=. 52.The Appellant challenges the lower court’s finding claiming that the award for general damages was excessive and unjustified and that Respondent did not produce any receipt, invoice, or credible expert evidence substantiating the alleged future medical expense of Kshs.100,000/=. 53.Further, the Appellant cited court authorities to show lower amounts were awarded for similar soft tissue injuries. They include: Francis Omari Ogaro v JAO (minor suing through next friend and father GOD [2021] KEHC 2358 (KLR): Kshs.140,000/=; HB (minor suing through mother & next friend DKM) V Jasper Nchonga Magari & another [2021] eKLR where Nyakundi J awarded Kshs.60,000/= for blunt injury to the head, neck, thorax, abdomen and limbs. Ephraim Wagura Muthui 2 others V Toyota Kenya Limited & 2 others [2019] eKLR where Majanja J set aside the lower court award of Kshs.55,000/= for cut wound on the parietal area of the head, contusion on the neck, blunt trauma to the chest, cut wound on the left leg and blunt trauma to the back and substituted it with an award of Kshs.100,000/=. 54.On the other hand, the Respondent maintained that the trial court award of general damages in the sum of Kshs.170,000 was reasonable considering the injuries sustained. 55.It is trite law that an appellate Court shall not interfere with an award of damages unless it is so inordinately high or low so as to represent an entirely erroneous estimate. It must be shown that the trial magistrate proceeded on wrong principles, or that they misapprehended the evidence in some material respect, and so arrived at a figure which was either inordinately high or low. (See the case of Butt v Khan, Civil Appeal 40 of 1977). 56.According to the lower court proceedings, it is not in dispute the Respondent suffered the following injuries as a result of the accident:i.Multiple injuries, cuts, lacerations on the head, forehead, nose, hips and the occiput;ii.Multiple bruises and lacerations of the wrists and hands;iii.Multiple bruises and lacerations of the right knee; andiv.Bruises and lacerations of the left ankle joint. 57.Having carefully evaluated and compared the injuries referenced in the authorities, I am satisfied that the trial court properly evaluated the injuries and awarded the Respondent general damages of Kshs.170,000/= that was reasonable taking into account the rate of inflation and comparative case law referred to herein. Based on the authorities cited before the trial court this court finds that the award by the trial court was not excessive. An award of Kshs.170,000/= would be sufficient the circumstances. This court is guided by the case of Joseph Mwangi Kiarie & Another v Isaac Otieno Otieno, HCCA No 30 of 2018, where Kshs.180,000/= was awarded for comparable soft tissue injuries.The Court further relies on the decision in the case of Anyumba & 2 others v Chepkwony (Civil Appeal 7 of 2020) [2023] KEHC 24459 (KLR) which substituted the award of Kshs.300,000/= to Kshs.120,000/= for similar soft tissue injuries. 58.To that extent, I agree with the trial court’s finding on the award and this Court is not persuaded that the trial court’s award was inordinately high or that wrong principles were applied. I affirm the trial court’s award on general damages. 59.On the future medical expenses whose award was also challenged on appeal, the Respondent relied on the medical report prepared by Dr. Moses Kinuthia dated 17th May, 2017 wherein the doctor opined that the Respondent would require further medical sessions of physiotherapy due to post-head injury syndrome approximated to cost Kshs.100,000/=. On its part, the trial court awarded the sum of Kshs.100,000/- sought by the Respondent with reference to the first medical report mentioned hereinabove. 60.Upon the court’s consideration of the award, the Court is satisfied that the future medical cost of Kshs.100,000/= is supported by the medical evidence tendered by the Respondent. In the circumstances, the court sees no reason to disturb the award. Final Orders 1.In the result, the appeal partially succeeds only to the extent that the Court finds that the Appellant is entitled to indemnity from the third party, Omondi Joshua Kennedy. 2.Consequently, the Court makes the following orders:a.The finding on liability against the Appellant in favour of the Respondent is upheld;b.The awards on general damages, special damages and future medical expenses are upheld;c.Judgment is entered in favour of the Appellant against the third party, Omondi Joshua Kennedy, for full indemnity in respect of the trial court Judgment /decretal sum payable to the Respondent;d.Save for the foregoing variation on indemnity, the appeal is dismissed;e.Each party shall bear its own costs of the appeal.It is so ordered. DATED, SIGNED AND DELIVERED VIRTUALLY AT NAIROBI THIS 5TH DAY OF JUNE 2026, THROUGH THE MICROSOFT TEAMS PLATFORM.KENNEDY KANDETJUDGEIn The Presence Of:No Appearance For The AppellantWanyangu Hb For Namada For The RespondentCourt Assistant: Jael Nosim