https://new.kenyalaw.org/akn/ke/judgment/kehc/2026/10203

**THE REPUBLIC OF KENYA** **IN THE HIGH COURT OF KENYA** **AT KIAMBU** **HCCOMM E024 OF 2025** SAMUEL MACHARIA NYAGA……………..…………………….. APPLICANT VERSUS I&M BANK LIMITED………………………..……………….1ST RESPONDENT VALLEY AUCTIONEERS……………………..……………..2ND RESPONDENT **RULING** 1. The applicant filed a Notice of Motion application dated 28th August 2025, pursuant to Sections 1A, 1B and 3A of the Civil Procedure Act, Order 40 Rule 1 of the Civil Procedure Rules, 2010, and Sections 96(2) and (3) of the Land Act, No. 6 of 2012. He seeks an interim injunction against the respondents either by themselves, their agents, employees or other authorized agents from trespassing, selling, wasting, removal or any disposition of L.R No. Kiambu/Municipality Block 5 (Kiamumbi) 1797 Kiambu (hereinafter the subject property) pending the hearing and determination of the suit. 2. The Motion is premised on the grounds on the face of it, and the supporting affidavit sworn on 28th August 2025 by Mr. Samuel Macharia Nyaga. He deposed that he operates various bank accounts with the 1st respondent to which he applied, and was granted a loan facility of Kshs.18,000,000/=, which was secured by the subject property. He stated that he serviced the loan well until September 2024, when he suffered from spinal illness and had to travel to Malaysia and India for treatment as shown in the receipts for travel and medical costs. Mr. Macharia averred that due to illness, he was not able to service the loan and the 1st respondent sent an email threatening to sell the charged land, to which he responded by asking for a four (4) months’ grace period, which was ignored. 3. Mr. Macharia deposed that on 17th January 2025, the 1st respondent served him with a 90 days’ Statutory Notice, to which he replied with a proposal of paying monthly instalments of Kshs.100,000/=. He stated that in late July 2025, he was called by an Auctioneer and was served with Notice of Sale which showed that sale was scheduled for 2nd September 2025, which was irregular. He stated that on 22nd August 2025, he was informed by a supplier that a cheque that he had issued was dishonoured with a message of *‘frozen’,* which was done on the 1st respondent’s own volition without an express Court order. He stated that he had moved this Court to get an intervention to prevent the sale of the charged property. 4. The respondents opposed the application through a replying affidavit sworn on 5th November 2025, by Mr. Andrew Muchina, the 1st respondent’s Senior Manager, Legal Department. Mr. Muchina deposed that the applicant was granted a loan facility upon acceptance of a letter of offer dated 31st May 2023 and an addendum dated 15th September 2023. He stated that the loan was secured through a charge instrument registered in respect to the subject property, and that the applicant defaulted in loan repayments, which led to the 1st respondent issuing a 90 days’ Statutory Notice dated 17th January 2025 and a 40 days’ Notice dated 29th April 2025, through a Certificate of Postage. He averred that the applicant was subsequently issued with a 45 days’ Notice by Auctioneers through registered post. Mr. Muchina averred that the Auctioneers subsequently advertised the subject property for sale through the Standard Newspapers and the Daily Nation Newspapers, both dated 18th August 2025. 5. Mr. Muchina averred that the applicant admitted the debt through various meetings wherein he committed to make monthly instalments of Kshs. 100,000/= and another Kshs.200,000/= or even make a lumpsum payment of Kshs.1,000,000/=. He stated that the applicant also admitted the debt in paragraphs 4, 5 and 6 of his supporting affidavit. Mr. Muchina averred that the applicant applied for, and was granted the loan and he is bound by the terms in the two letters of offer. He deposed that the respondents lawfully proceeded with realization of the sale and the applicant is now estopped from challenging the debt. Mr. Muchina contended that the applicant has not met the grounds set out in the case of **Giella v Cassman Brown** **& Co. Ltd** [1973] EA 358, and asserted that the property having been offered as security becomes a commodity for sale. He stated that the debt stood at Kshs.23,314,134.00 as at 31st October 2025, and urged this Court to dismiss the application with costs to the 1st respondent. 6. The application was canvassed by way of written submissions. The applicant filed his written submissions through the law firm of G. M. Muhoro Advocates dated 25th May 2026, whereas the respondents filed their wriiten submissions dated 9th April 2026, through the law firm of Wamae & Allen LLP. 7. Mr. Ndungu, learned Counsel for the applicant, submitted on three issues; whether the applicant has established a *prima facie* case, whether he stands to suffer irreparable loss and damage and if the balance of convenience tilts in favour of the applicant. Counsel stated that these issues are the conditions that were established in the case of **Giella V Cassman Brown & Co. Ltd** (supra), which were adopted by the Court in **Nguruman Limited v Jan Bonde Nielsen & 2 others** [2014] eKLR. 8. On the first issue, Mr. Ndungu cited the case of **Mrao Ltd -vs- First American Bank of Kenya Ltd & 2 others [2003] KLR 125,** which defined what constitutes a *prima facie* case. He stated that the applicant has satisfied the first condition in that the 1st respondent unilaterally froze his bank accounts and irregularly exercised its statutory power of sale. Counsel stated that the applicant held seven (7) accounts with the 1st respondent who froze them without any Court order or statutory mandate from a competent authority such as Kenya Revenue Authority or without any suspicion of fraudulent activity. Mr. Ndungu argued that having outstanding loan arrears is not a valid reason to freeze accounts and cited the case of **Kenya Commercial Bank Limited v Specialized Engineering Co Ltd**[1982] KLR 485, to buttress his submissions. 9. Still on the condition of establishing a *prima facie* case, Mr. Ndungu submitted that the statutory power of sale was irregular due to failure to serve the 45 days’ Notice, failure to advertise the properties in daily Newspapers with wide circulation and failure to obtain a valuation report of the subject property, prior to the proposed sale. Counsel disputed the service of the 45 days’ Notice by the Auctioneer, and contended that the latter called and said that he had effected service at the subject property, yet the applicant does not reside there and does not have any authorized representative there. Counsel stated that the service was irregular under Rule 15 of the Auctioneers Rules. 10. Mr. Ndungu cited the case of **Andrew Muriuki Wanjohi v Equity Building Society Ltd & 2 others** [2006] eKLR and **Beatrice Atieno Onyango v Housing Finance Company Limited & 3 others** [2020] eKLR, where Courts held that failure to comply with statutory and procedural requirements on the statutory power of sale renders the sale unlawful. He disputed the assertion by the respondents that the applicant had come to Court with unclean hands and stated that the mere fact that a borrower defaults, and is unable to make payments but has engaged in good faith settlement discussions, does not amount to unclean hands. 11. On the second condition, Mr. Ndungu submitted that the applicant suffered irreparable loss for the period when his bank accounts were frozen, since he could not support his family and business. He cited the case of **Samuel Kamau Macharia & another v Kenya Commercial Bank & 3 others** [2010] eKLR, where the Court held that denial of access of ones bank account is a form of harm which money cannot adequately compensate. Counsel also contended that the mandatory statutory requirements were not followed and the Court will be justified to restrain the sale, as was held in the case of **National Bank of Kenya v Shimmers Plaza Ltd** [2009] eKLR. 12. On the third condition, Mr. Ndungu stated that the applicant stands to lose his property through an irregular sale. He urged this Court to weigh all competing interests of the case. He relied on the decision made in **Nguruman Limited v Jan Bonde Nielsen & 2 others** (supra), which stated that if an applicant has demonstrated irreparable injury, the balance of convenience needs not to be considered independently. 13. Counsel submitted that the applicant herein, has made genuine efforts in repaying the loan, but the 1st respondent refused to give him a temporary standstill following the serious illness he suffered, showing unreasonable and disproportionate exercise of its rights. 14. He stated that Courts have held that the maxim that *“he who comes to equity must come with clean hands”,* cannot be used as an absolute bar to being granted relief, where the applicant has come to Court in good faith to enforce his legal and constitutional rights. He placed reliance on the case of **Stella Kavutha Muthoka & Kenya Women Microfinance Ltd** [2022] KEHC 1489 (KLR), to support his assertion. 15. On the contention that there was improper service by the Auctioneer contrary to Rule 15 of the Auctioneers Rules, Mr. Ndungu cited the case of **Thathy v Eastern Kenya Auctioneers v Middle East Bank Kenya Ltd** (Civil Suit No 302 of 2022), where the Court held that strict compliance with Auctioneers Rules is mandatory and in case of non-compliance, the Notification of Sale is rendered invalid and cannot form a basis for a public auction. Counsel urged this Court to allow the instant application with costs. 16. Mr. Wawire, learned Counsel for the respondents, similarly relied on the conditions set out in the case of **Giella v Cassman Brown & Co Ltd (supra) and the case of Mrao Ltd vs First American Bank of Kenya Ltd & 2 others (supra),** which explained the meaning of the term *prima facie*. 17. Counsel stated that the applicant applied for the loan, defaulted and admitted the debt and the 1st respondent issued all statutory requirements in exercise of its power of sale. He argued that an injunction is an equitable remedy and a party seeking it must comply with the principles governing it. He also cited the maxim that “*he who comes to equity must come with clean hands”.* Mr. Wawire argued that the applicant flouted the terms of the loan, and as such, he does not deserve the Court’s audience. 18. He relied on the case of **Stella Kavutha Muthoka & Kenya Women Microfinance Ltd** (supra),where the Court stated that it cannot come to the aid of a person in extricating himself from the circumstances that he or she has created and the Court therein cited the Kiswahili saying that *“dawa ya deni ni kulipa”.* 19. On the second condition, Mr. Wawire submitted that the applicant as a chargor, cannot claim that he will suffer irreparable loss given that the charged property becomes a commodity for sale in case of default. He cited the case of **Kitur & another v Standard Chartered Bank & 2 others** [2002] eKLR and the case of **Andrew M. Wanjohi v Equity Building Society & 7 others** (supra),to support his position. He stated that the 1st respondent is a reputable bank capable of fully compensating the applicant, if the Court finds it culpable after trial. 20. On the third condition, Mr. Wawire submitted that the balance of convenience tilts in favour of the respondents as they will suffer greater hardship, if the orders being sought herein are granted to the applicant because of the interest on the loan, which continues to accrue. He maintained that the 1st respondent is in a position to compensate the applicant which shows that the balance of convenience is in its favour. He relied on the case of **Thathy v Eastern Kenya Auctioneers v Middle East Bank Kenya Ltd** (supra),wherein the Court addressed the issue of balance of convenience and found that it tilted in favour of the bank therein, since the plaintiff was not repaying the loan leading to accrual of interest, and it was held that a sale of the property was in the best interest. 21. Counsel also submitted on the issue of costs of the application, which he urged this Court to grant to the respondents if they emerge the successful parties. He cited the case of **Party of Independence Candidate of Kenya & another vs Mutula Kilonzo & 2 others** [2013] eKLR, in which the Court had cited the case of **Levben Products v Alexander Films (SA) (PTY) Ltd** 1957 (4) SA 225C (SR) at 227, which stated that as a general rule, costs are discretional and they are granted to the successful party. **ANALYSIS AND DETERMINATION**. 1. I have considered the instant application, the grounds on the face of it and the affidavit in support thereof. I have also considered the replying affidavit and the written submissions filed by Counsel for the parties. The main issue for determination is whether the plaintiff is entitled to orders of temporary injunction. 2. Order 40 Rule 1 of the Civil Procedure Rules, 2010, provides for interlocutory injunction, as follows: - 3. ***Where in any suit it is proved by affidavit or otherwise—*** 4. ***that any property in dispute in a suit is in danger of being wasted, damaged, or alienated by any party to the suit, or wrongfully sold in execution of a decree; or*** 5. ***that the defendant threatens or intends to remove or dispose of his property in circumstances affording reasonable probability that the plaintiff will or may be obstructed or delayed in the execution of any decree that may be passed against the defendant in the suit, the Court may by order grant a temporary injunction to restrain such act, or make such other order for the purpose of staying and preventing the wasting, damaging, alienation, sale, removal, or disposition of the property as the Court thinks fit until the disposal of the suit or until further orders.*** 6. In an application for an interlocutory injunction, the applicant bears the burden to satisfy the Court that it should grant such an order. The Court of Appeal in the case of **Nguruman Limited v Jan Bonde Nielsen & 2 others** (supra),which relied on the principles established in thecase of **Giella v Cassman Brown & Co Ltd (supra), held as follows-** ***“In an interlocutory injunction application, the applicant has to satisfy the triple requirements to;*** ***(a) establish his case only at a*prima facie *level,*** ***(b) demonstrate irreparable injury if a temporary injunction is not granted, and*** ***(c) ally any doubts as to (b) by showing that the balance of convenience is in his favour.”*** 1. The Court of Appeal in the case of **Mrao Ltd -vs- First American Bank of Kenya Ltd & 2 others (supra),**considered what constitutes a *prima facie* case and stated as follows- ***“So what is a prima facie case, I would say that in civil cases, it is a case in which on the material presented to the Court, a tribunal properly directing itself will conclude that there exists a right which has apparently been infringed by the opposite party to call for an explanation or rebuttal from the latter.*** ***A prima facie case is an arguable case. It is not sufficient to raise issues but the evidence must show an infringement of a right and the probability of success of the applicant’s case upon trial. That is clearly a standard, which is higher than an arguable case”.*** 1. In this case, the Court has been called upon to determine whether the rights of the applicant have been infringed by the respondents so as to establish whether he has a *prima facie* case or not. It is not in dispute that the applicant obtained a loan facility from the 1st respondent which was secured by the registered charge over the subject property. The applicant admitted being in default of the loan, which he attributed to his serious spinal illness where he sought treatment in Malaysia and India as seen in the medical and travel receipts he exhibited to his affidavit. The applicant stated that he is ready and willing to repay the loan and had held various meetings with the 1st respondent and he offered to be paying monthly instalments of Kshs.100,00/= or Kshs.200,000/=. 2. The 1st respondent on its part argued that the applicant having obtained the loan facility which is secured bythe subject property defaulted in payment, which even the applicant has admitted. 3. It is not disputed that the parties herein entered into a contract, being the letter of offer and the addendum letter of offer which bound them, and as such, they must comply with the terms therein as stated in the case of [**William Kazungu Karisa v Cosmas Angore Chanzera**](https://new.kenyalaw.org/akn/ke/judgment/kehc/2006/1974) [2006] eKLR, where the Court held that- ***“The basic rule of the law of contract is that the parties must perform their respective obligation in accordance with the terms of the contract executed by them”.*** 1. A Court should not grant an injunction where the debt has been admitted, as in this case where the applicant admitted in his supporting affidavit to being indebted to the 1st respondent. In this regard, this Court is guided by the Court of Appeal decision in **Giro Commercial Bank Limited v Halid Hamad Mutesi[2002] eKLR,** which held as follows- ***“I*t has been held time and again that a mortgagee cannot be restrained from exercising his power of sale because the amount due is in dispute or that the mortgagee has commenced a redemption action** ***or because the mortgagor objects to the manner in which the sale is being arranged***. ***In that case, where*** **the debt is admitted as due and the loan is not being serviced, the Court should not grant an injunction.”** 1. The applicant herein asserted that he was not served with the 40 days’ Notice, and that the Auctioneer’s Notification of Sale was irregularly served contrary to Rule 15 of the Auctioneers Rules. He also asserted that valuation of the subject property was not done. 2. This Court has gone through the annextures to the replying affidavit and notes the 90 days’ Statutory Notice dated 17th January 2025 was served by way of registered post, via postal address 14489-00100 Nairobi, and the applicant admitted service. The applicant however disputed service of the 40 days’ Notice which was also served through registered post via the same postal address 14489-00100 Nairobi. Certificates of posting for the said two Notices were exhibited by the 1st respondent in its replying affidavit. The applicant cannot therefore claim that he was not served with the latter Notice. See the decision in **Mombasa HCCC No.31 of 2013 Fredrick Makumbi –vs- Kenya Commercial Bank Ltd**, where the Court relied on the case of **Maithya –vs- Housing Finance Corporation of Kenya HCCC No.1129 of 2002**, and held thus- ***“It is the Plaintiff who alleged that he was not served with the Statutory Notice. Once the Defendant provided evidence of that service the burden of proof shifted to the Plaintiff. This shifting of burden of proof is based on the rule that “he who asserts must prove.” See the book of Principles of Evidence by Alan Taylor 2nd Edition. The onus was on the Plaintiff to prove non-service of the Plaintiff. In view of the fact that the Plaintiff failed to prove the same the Plaintiff has failed to satisfy that burden. It is obvious that the Plaintiff could have obtained information from the Post Master General on whether the said notice was posted and the whereabouts of it. The Plaintiff did not on prima facie basis do so.”*** 1. This Court finds that the 1st respondents discharged the burden of proof on service for the 90 days’ Statutory Notice and the 40 days’ Notification of Sale. 2. The applicant denied having been served with the 45 days’ Redemption Notice allegedly sent by the Auctioneer. Although the 1st respondent attached a copy of a postal receipt to its affidavit, the copy availed was almost illegible and cannot go to the aid of the respondents. Secondly, the applicant asserted that the Auctioneer called and said that he had effected service of the 45 days’ Notice at the subject property, yet he (applicant) does not reside there and does not have any authorized representative in the said property. He as such disputed the mode of service resorted to by the Auctioneer. Having denied service of the said Notice, the burden of proof shifted to the 1st respondent in accordance with the provisions of Sections 107 to 109 of the Evidence Act, to prove that there was proper service of the 45 days’ Redemption Notice. The respondents failed to discharge the said burden of proof. 3. The applicant raised a further issue of non-advertisement of the sale of the property by way of public auction in Newspapers with a wide circulation. This Court has seen Newspaper excerpts annexed to the replying affidavit of Andrew Muchina, in both the Standard Newspapers and Daily Nation Newspapers of 18th August 2025. This Court is therefore satisfied that the advertisement was proper, as the said Newspapers have nationwide circulation. 4. The applicant brought up the issue that valuation of the subject property was not done. The 1st respondent did not respond to the said issue in its replying affidavit. This Court has perused the annextures to the said replying affidavit and has not seen any valuation report. It is trite that a valuation report is very crucial when it comes to sale of property by public auction as it provides guidance as to the price below which a property cannot be sold. 5. The law under Section 97 of the Land Act provides for valuation to be done. It states as follows- ***“(2) A charge shall, before exercising the right of sale, ensure that a forced sale valuation is undertaken by a valuer.*** ***(3) if the price at which the charged land is sold is twenty-five per centum below the market value at which comparable interests in land of the same character and quality are being sold in the open market –*** ***(a) There shall be a rebuttable presumption that the chargee is in breach of the duty imposed by subsection (1) and*** ***(b) the chargor whose charged land is being sold for that price may apply to a Court for an order that the sale be declared void, but the fact that a plot of charged land is sold by the charge at an undervalue being less than twenty-five per centum below the market value shall not be taken to mean that the charge has complied with the duty imposed by subsection (1).*** 1. **The purpose of the valuation report is to provide the forced sale value and market value of a property as was stated in the case of Maithya V. Housing Finance Co. of Kenya & another [2003] 1 EA 133 at 139, as follows: -** ***“Charged properties are intended to acquire or are supposed to have a commercial value otherwise lenders would not accept them as securities. The sentiment of ownership which has been greatly treasured in this country over the years has in many situations given way to commercial considerations. Before lending, many lenders banks and mortgage houses are increasingly insisting on valuations being done so as to establish forced sale values and market values of the properties to constitute the securities for the borrowings or credit facilities… loss of the properties by sale is clearly contemplated by the parties even before the security is formalized”.*** 1. This Court finds that despite the charge instrument being regular and valid, the debt being admitted, and the advertisement having been done, the respondents needed to comply with statutory procedures first, in order for a valid public auction to be conducted. It is this Court’s considered view that in the absence of the valuation report, the process initiated by the 1st respondent was flawed in that regard, which shows that the applicant has a *prima facie* case with a probability of success. 2. Before addressing the second condition on irreparable injury, I will address the issue of balance of convenience, defined in the case of **Pius Kipchirchir Kogo vs Frank Kimeli Tenai** [2018] eKLR, where it was held that- ***“The meaning of balance of convenience will favour of the Plaintiff; is that if an injunction is not granted and the Suit is ultimately decided in favour of the Plaintiffs, the inconvenience caused to the Plaintiff would be greater than that which would be caused to the Defendants if an injunction is granted but the suit is ultimately dismissed.*** ***Although it is called balance of convenience it is really the balance of inconvenience and it is for the Plaintiffs to show that the inconvenience caused to them will be greater than that which may be caused to the Defendants. Inconvenience be equal, it is the Plaintiff who will suffer. In other words, the Plaintiff has to show that the comparative mischief from the inconvenience which is likely to arise from withholding the injunction will be greater than that which is likely to arise from granting”*** 1. In this instance, this Court finds that the balance of convenience tilts in favour of the applicant owing to the fact that there was no valuation report provided to guide the process of the sale by public auction. 2. On the issue of irreparable injury, the case of **Nguruman Limited vs. Jan Bonde Nielsen & 2 others** (supra), discussed thus: ***“On the second factor, that the applicant must establish that he “might otherwise” suffer irreparable injury which cannot be adequately remedied by damages in the absence of an injunction, is a threshold requirement and the burden is on the applicant to demonstrate, prima face, the nature and extent of the injury.*** ***Speculative injury will not do; there must be more than an unfounded fear or apprehension on the part of the applicant. The equitable remedy of temporary injunction is issued solely to prevent grave and irreparable injury; that is injury that is actual, substantial and demonstrable; injury that cannot “adequately” be compensated by an award of damages. An injury is irreparable where there is no standard by which their amount can be measured with reasonable accuracy or the injury or harm is such a nature that monetary compensation, of whatever amount, will never be adequate remedy.”*** 1. Non-valuation of the subject property would give the respondents the leeway to sell the property at an undervaluation, which would cause irreparable injury to the applicant. See the case of **Nelka Regional Ventures Ltd vs Absa Bank Kenya Plc & Regent Auctioneers** (2025) KЕНС 17222 (KLR), where the Court held that- ***“Section 97(1) of the***[***Land Act***](https://new.kenyalaw.org/akn/ke/act/2012/6)***imposes a duty of care on the chargee to obtain the best price reasonably obtainable. The Court in***[***Zumzum Investment Limited v Habib Bank Limited***](https://new.kenyalaw.org/akn/ke/judgment/kehc/2014/6207)***[2014] eKLR held that a chargor may, in appropriate circumstances, be allowed to conduct an independent valuation to verify compliance.*** ***28.Considering the dispute regarding valuation, and in the interest of fairness and transparency, I find it just to allow the Applicant to commission an independent valuation at its own cost, without restraining the Respondent’s statutory power of sale, provided the sale is not concluded before the valuation report is filed and served upon the Respondent within thirty (30) days.”*** 1. The applicant disputed service of the Redemption Notice by the Auctioneer. This Court has read Rule 15 of the Auctioneers Rules, which provides that:- ***“Upon receipt of a court warrant or letter of instruction the auctioneer shall in the case of immovable property—*** ***(a )record the court warrant or letter of instruction in the register;*** ***(b ) prepare a notification of sale in the form prescribed in Sale Form 4 set out in the Second Schedule indicating the value of each property to be sold;*** ***(c) locate the property and serve the notification of sale of the property on the registered owner or an adult member of his family residing or working with him or where a person refuses to sign such notification, the auctioneer shall sign a certificate to that effect;*** ***(d) give in writing to the owner of the property a notice of not less than forty-five days within which the owner may redeem the property by payment of the amount set forth in the court warrant or letter of instruction;*** ***(e) on expiry of the period of notice without payment arrange sale of the property not earlier than fourteen days after the first newspaper advertisement.*** 1. As earlier found in this Ruling, there was no evidence of proper service of the 45 days’ Redemption Notice. That being the case, this Court directs that valuation of the property shall be done first, so that the intended sale can proceed. Given that the 90 days’ Statutory Notice and the 40 days’ Notification of Sale were regularly served upon the applicant, this Court partially allows the application, on condition that a valuation is undertaken of the subject property. Thereafter, a valuation report shall be served upon the applicant. It then follows that a Redemption Notice shall be issued by an Auctioneer, once valuation of the subject property has been done. 2. In the end, this Court partly allows the Notice of Motion application dated 28th August 2025. I hereby make the following orders- 3. **An order of temporary injunction, limited to one hundred and twenty (120) days is hereby granted restraining the respondents either by themselves, their agents, employees or other authorized agents from trespassing, selling, wasting, removing or disposing of the property known as L.R No. Kiambu/Municipality Block 5 (Kiamumbi) 1797 Kiambu, until such a time that valuation of the said property shall be undertaken and consequently, issuance of a 45 days’ Redemption Notice by an Auctioneer in accordance with Rule 15 of the Auctioneers Rules; and** 4. **The costs of the application will abide the outcome of the case.** **It is so ordered.** **DATED, SIGNED and DELIVERED at KIAMBU on this 26TH day of JUNE 2026. Ruling delivered through Microsoft Teams Online Platform.** **NJOKI MWANGI** **JUDGE** **In the presence of:-** No appearance for the plaintiff/applicant Mr. Wawire for the respondent Ms Julia – Court Assistant.