[2009] KEHC 1723 (KLR)
The court found that the plaintiff failed to establish a prima facie case for the grant of an interlocutory injunction. The loan agreement clearly stipulated that upon leaving the bank's service, the concessional interest rate would cease and a commercial rate would apply at the bank's discretion. The plaintiff did...
Source-derived case information.
- Citation
- [2009] KEHC 1723 (KLR)
- Parties
- Plaintiff: Samuel Nyakuri Lusweti; Defendant: National Bank of Kenya Ltd; Defendant: J.N. Njagi
- Court
- High Court
- Court Station
- High Court at Nairobi (Milimani Law Courts)
- Jurisdiction
- Kenya
- Case Number
- Civil Suit 430 of 2008
- Procedural Posture
- Civil Suit / Ruling on Interlocutory Injunction (chamber Summons)
- Outcome
- application dismissed with costs to the defendants
- Judges
- JM Khamoni
- Legal Topics
- Interlocutory Injunctions, Employee Mortgage Loans, Interest Rate Variation, Termination of Employment
- Source Language
- en
Source-derived case record
Summary, issues, holding and outcome
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Parties
Samuel Nyakuri Lusweti
Plaintiff
National Bank of Kenya Ltd
Defendant
J.N. Njagi
Defendant
Procedural Posture
Civil Suit / Ruling on Interlocutory Injunction (chamber Summons)
Legal Issues
- 1 Whether the plaintiff is entitled to an interlocutory injunction restraining the 1st defendant from charging interest above 5% per annum on the mortgage pending determination of the suit.
- 2 Whether the revision of the interest rate upon termination of employment is lawful under the loan agreement and applicable law.
- 3 Whether the plaintiff has established a prima facie case and stands to suffer irreparable loss.
Ratio Decidendi
The court found that the plaintiff failed to establish a prima facie case for the grant of an interlocutory injunction. The loan agreement clearly stipulated that upon leaving the bank's service, the concessional interest rate would cease and a commercial rate would apply at the bank's discretion. The plaintiff did not demonstrate that the revision of the interest rate was unlawful or that he would suffer irreparable loss that could not be compensated by damages. The court also noted that no specific constitutional provisions were cited to support the plaintiff's claim of rights violation. The balance of convenience was found to favour the defendants, as they could adequately compensate...
Court Disposition
application dismissed with costs to the defendants
Orders
- The plaintiff's chamber summons dated 23rd September 2008 is dismissed with costs to the defendants.
Full Case Text
Judgment text and source record
28 paragraphs
REPUBLIC OF KENYA
IN THE HIGH COURT OF KENYA
AT NAIROBI (NAIROBI LAW COURTS)
Civil Suit 430 of 2008
SAMUEL NYAKURI LUSWETI.................................................. PLAINTIFF
VERSUS
NATIONAL BANK OF KENYA LTD ............................ 1ST DEFENDANT
J.N. NJAGI........................................................................ 2ND DEFENDANT
RULING
The Plaintiff’s Chamber Summons dated 23rd September 2008 is brought under order XXXIX Rules 1 and 3 of the Civil Procedure Rules and prays for orders against the 1st Defendant
“THAT pending the hearing and determination of this suit, the first defendant be restrained from charging the Plaintiff any other rate of interest other than 5% per annum on monthly installments due on a mortgage taken on LR NO. ELDORET MUNICIPALITY/BLOCK 9/1366. ”
Briefly from what has been brought to my attention during the hearing of the said chamber summons, at all material times the Plaintiff was an employee of the 1st Defendant as a bank clerk at the 1st Defendant’s Harambee Avenue Branch, Nairobi, where the 2nd Defendant was employed as the 1st Defendant’s Chief Branch Manager. By a letter dated 19th January 2008, the 1st Defendant terminated the Plaintiff’s employment pursuant to clause A5 (d) of
“The collection Agreement Covering Section Heads, Clerks, Technical and Subordinate Staff”.
That letter spelled out to the Plaintiff the effect of termination of his employment upon his liabilities to the 1st Plaintiff clearly stating that such liabilities, if any, would
“attract a commercial rate of interest with effect from the date of”
the letter of termination.
The Plaintiff as the 1st Defendant’s clerk, had been granted a house loan of Kshs.2,150,000/= which he was paying at an interest rate of 5% under terms and conditions which included the following:
“This facility is available to you in accordance with the special conditions for loans to members of staff issued by Head Office which states inter-alia:-
That upon leaving the Bank’s service for any reason the loan will become repayable at the sole discretion of the Bank.
That upon leaving the banks service for any reason a normal commercial interest will be charged.”
The Chamber Summons is based on eight grounds found on the face of the same application supported by the Plaintiff’s affidavit dated 23rd September 2008. The said Chamber Summons is opposed by the Defendants on the basis of their Replying Affidavit dated 20th November 2008.
I do note that during the hearing Mr. Wati, the learned counsel for the Plaintiff, relied on provisions of the current constitution of Kenya to try and establish, for example, ground number 7, that the termination of the Plaintiff’s employment amounted to a contravention of the Constitution and that therefore the revision of the rate of interest on the mortgage is equally a nullity in law.
To my mind that is a very contentious issue which has to be established during the hearing of the main suit in this private employer-employee or mortgagor-mortgagee relationship. I further note that no provisions of the Constitution are cited as the basis of bringing this Chamber Summons.
On the whole therefore, and to be brief, I am not seeing a prima facie case established before me by the Plaintiff. In any case, I think the balance of convenience tilts in favour of the Defendants in terms of commercial interest and ability to adequately compensate the Plaintiff if need be, and may be that is why the Plaintiff has not been able to show that he will suffer irreparable loss.
It follows that I should reject and I do hereby dismiss this Chamber Summons with costs to the Defendants.
Dated this 3rd day of August 2009.
J.M. KHAMONI
JUDGE