https://new.kenyalaw.org/akn/ke/judgment/kehc/2026/8634

St John Chrisootom Kudho Sec. School v Jen Jack General Supplies (Civil Appeal E062 of 2024) [2026] KEHC 8634 (KLR) (19 June 2026) (Judgment) Neutral citation: [2026] KEHC 8634 (KLR) Republic of Kenya In the High Court at Kisumu Civil Appeal E062 of 2024 A Mabeya, J June 19, 2026 Between St John Chrisootom Kudho Sec. School Appellant and Jen Jack General Supplies Respondent Judgment 1.The respondent filed a claim against the appellant vide a statement of claim dated 15/1/2024 seeking judgment in the sum of Kshs. 285,000/- plus costs of the suit with interest. The claim was for monies owed following the supply of cereals to the appellant. 2.The appellant entered appearance vide a response dated 28/2/2024 wherein it denied the claim and sought the same to be dismissed with costs alleging that the claim was time barred pursuant to Section 3 (2) of the Public Authorities Limitation Act. 3.The matter proceeded to trial and in its judgment, the trial adjudicator found in the first instance that the appellant was not covered by Section 3 (2) of the Public Authorities Limitation Act before proceeding to find in favour of the respondent and awarding it the claim as sought. 4.Being dissatisfied with the said judgment/decree, the appellant lodged this appeal vide the Memorandum of Appeal dated 28/03/2024 raising five (5) grounds of appeal as follows: -a.The learned trial magistrate erred in both fact and in law by failing to appreciate that the burden of proof was at all times on the plaintiff.b.The learned trial magistrate erred in law by shifting the burden of proof to the defendant.c.The learned trial magistrate erred in fact and in law by arriving at a finding that the claimant produced invoice to show that they supplied the sum of Kshs. 285,000/- yet the sum was not supported by an invoice, no delivery note and local purchase order and the only invoice attached was that for Kshs. 85,000/- thus arriving at a finding based on no evidence.d.The learned trial magistrate erred in law by ignoring the cardinal principle that special damages claims must be specifically pleaded and proved and the special damage herein was not proved to the required standard.e.The learned trial magistrate erred in fact and in law by completely ignoring the defendant’s written submissions and all authorities cited whose copies were availed. 5.The parties agreed to dispose the appeal by way of written submissions and in this case, I note that the parties relied on submissions filed back in 2024 and dated 27/8/2024 and 30/10/2024, respectively. I have duly considered the said submissions and this being a first appeal, the Court is duty bound to evaluate the evidence before the trial court afresh and come to its own independent findings and conclusions. See Selles & Anor vs. Associated Motor Boat Co Ltd & Others [1968] EA 123. 6.Before the trial court, the parties elected to proceed as provided in Section 30 of the Small Claims Court Act which provides that parties prosecute the trial by way of the documents adduced therein. 7.Consequently, I have considered the evidence tendered before the trial court. This being an appeal from the Small Claims Court, it is important to point out that Section 38 of the Small Claims Court Act provides for the jurisdiction of this Court in determining appeals from the Small Claims Court. It provides thus; -“ 1.A person aggrieved by the decision or an order of the Court may appeal against that decision or order to the High Court on matters of law. 2.An appeal from any decision or order referred to in subsection (1) shall be final.” 8.It is clear from the foregoing that, jurisdiction of this Court from the Small Claims Court is only on matters of law and not factual issues. It is not enough for a party to plead in its grounds of appeal that the trial magistrate “erred in law” then proceed to set out issues of facts that they are aggrieved with. 9.A perusal of the Grounds of Appeal elucidated by the appellant reveals that the only issues of law for consideration are whether the trial court shifted the burden of proof to the appellant/defendant and whether the trial court flouted the principle that special damages ought to be specifically pleaded and proven. 10.On the first issue, it is trite that the under section 107 (1) of the Evidence Act, Cap 80, the legal burden of proof lies upon the party who invokes the aid of the law and substantially asserts the affirmative of the issue. There is however, the evidential burden that is cast upon any party the burden of proving any particular fact which he desires the court to believe in its existence which is captured in sections 109 and 112 of the Evidence Act. 11.It follows that the general rule is that the initial burden of proof lies on the plaintiff in a case but the same may shift to the defendant depending on the circumstances of the case. See Evans Nyakwana v Cleophas Bwana Ongaro [2015] eKLR. 12.Perusing the impugned judgment, there is no incident to indicate that the trial adjudicator shifted the burden of proof to the appellant, on the contrary, the trial adjudicator laid out the requirements on the burden of proof and proceeded to establish whether the claimant (respondent) had satisfied the same and arrived at a conclusion that it had. This limb of the appeal thus falls. 13.As to whether the trial adjudicator flouted the legal doctrine that special damages must be specifically pleaded and proven, it is evident from the impugned judgment that the trial adjudicator complied with the said doctrine finding that the claimant had specifically pleaded the special damages and substantiated the same. Indeed, the record reveals two invoices dated 8/1/2019 and 5/9/2020 substantiating the claim. Consequently, this limb of the appeal similarly fails. 14.Further, this Court has similarly gone through the proceedings by the adjudicator and has not come upon any instance of whimsical exercise of discretion and the same has not been demonstrated by the appellant. 15.The upshot of the above is that the Court finds the appeal to be without merit and dismisses the same with costs. 16.This judgment similarly applies to the other matter in this series, to wit, Civil Appeal No. E063 of 2024.It is so decreed. DATED AND DELIVERED AT KISUMU THIS 19TH DAY OF JUNE, 2026.A. MABEYA, FCI ArbJUDGE