[2012] KEHC 191 (KLR)
The High Court held that a consent order is binding on the parties as a contract and can only be set aside on grounds of fraud or mistake. The trial magistrate had no jurisdiction to extend time limited by a consent order, as neither Order 50 rule 6 nor Section 1A(i) of the Civil Procedure Act provides such power....
Source-derived case information.
- Citation
- [2012] KEHC 191 (KLR)
- Parties
- Appellant: Stephen Marani Shibweche (Suing as Adm & Personal Rep. of Samuel Simiyu); Respondent: Shajannand Industries Ltd
- Court
- High Court
- Court Station
- High Court at Kakamega
- Jurisdiction
- Kenya
- Case Number
- Civil Appeal 62 of 2010
- Procedural Posture
- Civil Appeal / Judgment
- Outcome
- appeal allowed
- Legal Topics
- Consent Orders, Extension of Time, Court Jurisdiction, Setting Aside Orders
- Source Language
- en
Source-derived case record
Summary, issues, holding and outcome
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Parties
Stephen Marani Shibweche (Suing as Adm & Personal Rep. of Samuel Simiyu)
Appellant
Shajannand Industries Ltd
Respondent
Procedural Posture
Civil Appeal / Judgment
Legal Issues
- 1 Whether a court has jurisdiction to extend time limited by a consent order between parties.
- 2 Whether the trial magistrate erred in law and fact in granting the extension of time to deposit the decretal sum.
- 3 Whether the court can interfere with or alter a consent order except on grounds of fraud or mistake.
Ratio Decidendi
The High Court held that a consent order is binding on the parties as a contract and can only be set aside on grounds of fraud or mistake. The trial magistrate had no jurisdiction to extend time limited by a consent order, as neither Order 50 rule 6 nor Section 1A(i) of the Civil Procedure Act provides such power. The lower court's enlargement of time was therefore unlawful, and the application for extension should have been dismissed. The appeal was allowed, the lower court's ruling and orders were set aside, and the respondent's application for enlargement of time was dismissed with costs to the appellant.
Court Disposition
appeal allowed
Orders
- The ruling and orders of the Chief Magistrate’s Court in Kakamega dated 12.10.10 in CMCC No. 39 of 2007 are set aside.
- The respondent’s application before the lower court dated 13.10.10 in CMCC No. 30 of 2007 is dismissed with costs to the appellant.
Full Case Text
Judgment text and source record
29 paragraphs
REPUBLIC OF KENYA
High Court at Kakamega
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(An Appeal from the Judgment and decree of Hon. H. Ong’udi, CM delivered on 10th March, 2010 in Kakamega CMCC No. 366 of 2008)
STEPHEN MARANI SHIBWECHE (Suing as Adm & Personsl Rep. of SAMUEL SIMIYU.....APPELLANT
VERSUS
SHAJANNAND INDUSTRIES LTD..................................................................................................RESPONDENT
JUDGMENT
On 23. 12. 09, the Lower Court entered Judgment for the sum of Kshs.516,000/= plus interest and costs in favour of the plaintiff/appellant against the defendant/respondent.
The respondent subsequently filed an application for stay of execution of the judiciary decree made on 23. 12. 09 pending the hearing and determination of an appeal in Kakamega HCCA No. 17 of 2010 on 10. 3.10. The application dated 23. 12. 09 was by consent “allowed on condition that the decretal amount be deposited in a joint bank account in the names of both advocates of the parties within 30 days from today. Costs to the respondent”.
The respondent did not deposit the decretal sum in time and on 14. 4.10 filed an application for the enlargement of time within which to deposit the decretal sum. The application was opposed. After hearing the parties, the trial magistrate in a ruling dated 12. 5.10 allowed the application and enlarged the time up to 19. 6.10. The appellant was aggrieved by the said enlargement of time and appealed to this court on the following grounds:-
“1. That the learned magistrate erred in law and in fact in finding and holding that the Court had owned a consent order recorded by the parties and hence the Court had the discretion to interfere with it by extending the time limited by the parties.
2. That the learned magistrate erred in law and fact in granting prayer two (2) of the said application dated 13th April 2010 when it was obvious that the said prayer had previously been heard and determined.
3. That the learned magistrate erred in law and infact in holding that the court had jurisdiction under Order XLIX Rule 5 of the Civil Procedure Rules to hear and determine the merits of the Application before the court.
4. That the learned magistrate erred in law and in fact by citing and relying on section 1A (i) of the Civil Procedure Rules as the basis of her determination without bearing in mind that the said section was not meant to cover consent orders or to assist a litigant who is bent to abuse the court process.
5. That in arriving at her decision, the learned magistrate did so in a partisan manner and failed to exercise her discretion within the precedent Law and applicable principles and as a result arrived at a wrong decision which has occasioned a serious miscarriage of justice and ought to be reversed.”
The appellant was represented by the firm of Muma Nyagaka & Co. advocates while the respondents were represented by E. K. Owinyi & Co. Advocates.
The parties took directions on 2. 6.11 for the appeal to proceed by way of written submissions. Submissions were filed on behalf of the appellant but none were filed by the respondent’s side. The main issue herein is whether a court had any powers to extend the time limited by the consent of the parties.
As stated in the case of FLORA WASIKE VS DESTINO WAMBOKO [1982-88] I KAR 625, a Consent is binding on the parties like a contract and like a contract it can only be set aside on grounds of fraud or mistake.
Order 50 rule 6 or Section 1A (i) CPA do not give the court any such jurisdiction to alter the Consent entered into by the parties.
Although the appellants counsel asked the court to dismiss appeal No. 17 of 2010 with costs, the said appeal is not part of these proceedings. On 2. 6.11, the directions given were that HCCA No. 39 of 2007 be consolidated with this Appeal No. 62/2010, it appears there is an error on the record as No. 39/02 is the lower court record. HCCA. No. 17 therefore remains pending.
The appeal herein (HCCA. No. 62/10) is allowed and the ruling and orders of the Chief Magistrate’s Court in Kakamega dated 12. 10. 10 in CMCC No. 39 of 2007 set aside. The respondent’s application before the lower court dated 13. 10. 10 in CMCC No. 30 of 2007 is dismissed with costs to the appellant.
Delivered, dated and signed at Kakamega this 18th day of December, 2012
B. THURANIRA JADEN
J U D G E