https://new.kenyalaw.org/akn/ke/judgment/keelrc/2026/2044

Tausi Assurance Company Limited v Makabara & another (Employment and Labour Relations Cause E982 of 2025) [2026] KEELRC 2044 (KLR) (15 July 2026) (Ruling) Neutral citation: [2026] KEELRC 2044 (KLR) Republic of Kenya In the Employment and Labour Relations Court at Nairobi Employment and Labour Relations Cause E982 of 2025 BOM Manani, J July 15, 2026 Between Tausi Assurance Company Limited Claimant and Moses Muniko Makabara 1st Respondent Momentum Credit Limited 2nd Respondent Ruling Background 1.The 1st Respondent was an employee of the Claimant until he resigned from employment on 24th September 2025. During the subsistence of the aforesaid employment relationship, the 1st Respondent procured a financial facility from the Claimant which he used to purchase motor vehicle registration number KDM 296 U. To secure repayment of the financial facility by the 1st Respondent, the motor vehicle was registered in his name and that of the Claimant. 2.The parties (the Claimant and the 1st Respondent) agreed that the car loan was to be repaid over a period of five years. Further, they agreed that the motor vehicle was to be comprehensively insured with the Claimant’s interest noted in the insurance cover. In line with the aforesaid agreement, the Claimant issued the 1st Respondent the appropriate insurance cover for the motor vehicle and as well took custody of the logbook which bears the joint names of the parties (Claimant and 1st Respondent). 3.The Claimant contends that during routine evaluation of its records in September 2025, it discovered that the 1st Respondent had not renewed the insurance cover for the motor vehicle. It contends that when it raised the matter with him, he indicated that he had secured insurance cover for the vehicle from ICEA Lion Insurance Company at a cheaper rate. 4.The Claimant avers that when it scrutinized the insurance cover from ICEA Lion Insurance Company Limited, it realized that its (the Claimant’s) interest in the motor vehicle had not been noted. It further contends that when it conducted a search at the National Transport and Safety Authority (NTSA), it learned that the motor vehicle had been transferred into the joint names of the Respondents. 5.The Claimant avers that it was surprised by this development since it still holds the original logbook for the vehicle which shows that it (the vehicle) is registered in the joint names of the Claimant and 1st Respondent. It further avers that the development was strange because the liability for which the vehicle was registered in the joint names of the 1st Respondent and itself is yet to be discharged and was outstanding at Ksh. 1,222,162.00 as at 1st September 2025. 6.The Claimant contends that the motor vehicle could only have been transferred to the joint names of the Respondents through fraudulent means. It contends that the development has gravely exposed it to the risk of financial loss. 7.The Claimant further avers that during the subsistence of the employment relationship between it and the 1st Respondent, it financed the 1st Respondent’s training on the understanding that he was to remain in its employment for a period of at least two years. It contends that the parties had further agreed that should the 1st Respondent exit employment earlier than agreed, he would refund it the sum of Ksh. 656,190.00 which was spent on his training. 8.The Claimant avers that the 1st Respondent breached the employment contract by: resigning without notice; failing to pay one month’s salary in lieu of notice to resign; failing to repay the balance of the car loan; and failing to refund the amount which was expended on his training. As such, it seeks an order to recover the aforesaid amounts. Further, it seeks an order reversing the transfer of the vehicle into the joint names of the Respondents. 9.Contemporaneous with the Memorandum of Claim, the Claimant filed the application dated 7th October 2025. The application is premised on the grounds on the face thereof and the supporting affidavit dated 7th October 2025. 10.The Claimant seeks the following interim reliefs:-a.Spent.b.Spent.c.Spent.d.That the court issues an order of temporary injunction to restrain the Respondents by themselves, their servants, employees, agents, legal representatives and or persons claiming under them or howsoever from attaching, offering for sale, advertising for sale, selling, disposing off, alienating, transferring and or in any way interfering and or dealing in any manner and or directly or indirectly interfering with, obstructing or otherwise compromising the Claimant’s lawful safe custody, control, and safe preservation of motor vehicle registration number KDM 296 U pending the hearing and determination of the suit.e.That the court grants the Claimant leave to retain custody, control and safe preservation of motor vehicle registration number KDM 296 U pending the hearing and final determination of the suit so as to safeguard its proprietary and financial interest and prevent any interference, disposal or alienation of the said vehicle to the detriment of the Claimant.f.That the court gives directions on costs of the application. 11.The grounds and affidavit in support of the application largely reiterate what the Claimant has pleaded in the Memorandum of Claim. The Claimant avers that the 1st Respondent manipulated the registration of the motor vehicle and secured a new financial facility from the 2nd Respondent despite the fact that he still owes it (the Claimant) the sum of Ksh. 1,222,162.00. It contends that when it discovered the fraud and confronted the 1st Respondent about it, he resigned from employment allegedly because his mental well-being had been impacted by the development. 12.The Claimant avers that the 1st Respondent surrendered the suit motor vehicle to it on 23rd September 2025 and that the vehicle is currently under its custody. However, it contends that the 1st Respondent did not offer a proposal regarding how he was to repay the loan balance. Further, it contends that he did not indicate whether and how he was going to reverse the impugned transfer of the vehicle from the names of the two Respondents. 13.The Claimant avers that on 30th September 2025, a firm of auctioneers, ostensibly acting on behalf of the 2nd Respondent, unsuccessfully attempted to repossess the suit motor vehicle. It contends that it is thus reasonably apprehensive that the said auctioneers may attempt to repossess the vehicle again. Hence, the prayers in the application. 14.The application is opposed by the Respondents. They have both filed replying affidavits to anchor their opposition to the motion. 15.The 1st Respondent admits that he was an employee of the Claimant until he resigned on 24th September 2025. He contends that he resigned because of medical reasons. 16.The 1st Respondent denies that he fraudulently manipulated the ownership records for the suit motor vehicle. He says that everything that he did in relation to the motor vehicle was not motivated by a deceitful intent. 17.The 1st Respondent admits that he owes the Claimant Ksh. 1,200,000.00 on account of a car loan. He avers that he is willing to service the facility as agreed in the loan agreement between them. 18.The 1st Respondent contends that the Claimant should apply his terminal benefits to settle part of the outstanding loan. He further avers that he should be allowed to repay the balance of the loan in reasonable monthly instalments given his precarious financial position arising from his unemployment. 19.On its part, the 2nd Respondent filed a Notice of Preliminary Objection dated 15th December 2025 and a replying affidavit dated 6th November 2025. 20.In the preliminary objection, the 2nd Respondent contends that the Claimant has no reasonable cause of action against it (the 2nd Respondent). It contends that the suit motor vehicle is charged to it under the Movable Property Security Rights Act, 2017 for a loan advanced to the 1st Respondent. As such, it contends that it is a secured creditor. 21.The 2nd Respondent contends that because it is a secured creditor, the court is not seized of jurisdiction to interfere with its (the 2nd Respondent’s) right over the suit motor vehicle. 22.The 2nd Respondent asserts that the Claimant’s claim, if any, lies against the 1st Respondent. As such, it prays that the claim against it be struck out. 23.The 2nd Respondent reiterates the contents of the preliminary objection in the replying affidavit. It asserts that it is a stranger to the dispute between the Claimant and the 1st Respondent. It further contends that it advanced the 1st Respondent financial accommodation of Ksh. 500,000.00 against the logbook of the suit motor vehicle. It avers that the loan was to be repaid in twenty four monthly instalments. 24.The 2nd Respondent contends that prior to advancing the 1st Respondent the loan, it valued the suit motor vehicle and procured a joint registration thereof with the 1st Respondent. It contends that it also registered a chattels mortgage over the vehicle effectively becoming a secured creditor. 25.The 2nd Respondent avers that the 1st Respondent requested for an additional facility of Ksh. 713,000.00 which it granted. It contends that the 1st Respondent subsequently defaulted in servicing the loan facilities. 26.The 2nd Respondent asserts that following the default by the 1st Respondent, it (the 2nd Respondent) issued several demands seeking settlement of the loan facilities. However, it asserts that the 1st Respondent ignored the demands. It (the 2nd Respondent) further avers that the 1st Respondent proceeded to disconnect the tracking devise which had been fitted on the vehicle in a bid to prevent its repossession. 27.The 2nd Respondent contends that in the face of the 1st Respondent’s default to service the loan facilities, the law entitles it to repossess and sell the suit motor vehicle. It contends that whilst exercising its rights of repossession and sell of the suit vehicle, it realized that the Claimant had taken custody of the vehicle. 28.The 2nd Respondent contends that at the time it entered into the loan agreement with the 1st Respondent, the 1st Respondent was the sole registered owner of the suit vehicle. As such, it contends that the Claimant was not a co-owner of the vehicle at the time. The 2nd Respondent thus contends that the Claimant has no legitimate basis to interfere with its (the 2nd Respondent’s) right to repossess the suit vehicle. 29.The 2nd Respondent also filed a separate application dated 6th November 2025. The application seeks the following orders:-a.That the Claimant’s suit against it (the 2nd Respondent) be struck out for want of locus standi and for failing to disclose a reasonable cause of action.b.That the suit be struck out as the court has no jurisdiction to interfere with the Applicant’s (2nd Respondent’s) right of recovery of the suit motor vehicle as a secured creditor.c.That the Claimant’s application dated 7th October 2025 be struck out and the interim orders which issued on 9th October 2025 be set aside.d.That the Claimant be ordered to surrender the suit motor vehicle to the Applicant (2nd Respondent).e.That the court gives directions on the costs of the application. 30.The application is anchored on the grounds on the face thereof and the supporting affidavit dated 6th November 2025. The grounds and affidavit basically reiterate the 2nd Respondent’s averments in the Notice of Preliminary Objection dated 15th December 2025 and the replying affidavit dated 6th November 2025. 31.In response to the application, the Claimant reiterates that it financed the 1st Respondent to purchase the suit motor vehicle and to secure the loan, the two registered the vehicle in their joint names. It avers that the 1st Respondent was to repay the loan in five years. 32.The Claimant reiterates that the 1st Respondent was to take out a comprehensive insurance cover for the vehicle and was to note its (the Claimant’s) interest in the vehicle in the said cover. However, it avers that whilst it was conducting routine inspection of documents in respect of the vehicle in September 2025, it realized that the 1st Respondent had flouted this requirement. 33.The Claimant further avers that when it conducted a search at the NTSA, it realized that the 1st Respondent had removed its (the Claimant’s) name from the ownership records of the motor vehicle. Instead, it contends that the 1st Respondent had proceeded to register the vehicle in the joint names of the two Respondents. 34.The Claimant avers that this development was baffling since it (the Claimant) still has custody of the logbook for the vehicle which shows that it (the vehicle) is registered in the names of the 1st Respondent and the Claimant. It further contends that the loan for which the joint registration was procured remains outstanding. 35.The Claimant maintains that it has legitimate interest in the suit vehicle since it (the vehicle) is held as security for the car loan which it (the Claimant) advanced to the 1st Respondent. It contends that the transfer of the vehicle into the joint names of the two Respondents without its (the Claimant’s) involvement smirks of fraud and illegality and is detrimental to its (the Claimant’s) interests. 36.The Claimant maintains that the 2nd Respondent was duty-bound in law to conduct due diligence on the ownership status of the vehicle before it could accept it as security for the subsequent loans it advanced the 1st Respondent. It contends that the 2nd Respondent’s failure to exercise due diligence over the matter renders the purported security it (the 2nd Respondent) created over the suit vehicle invalid. 37.Having regard to the foresaid, the Claimant contends that the 2nd Respondent’s attempts to strike out the claim against it is misconceived and premature. The Claimant avers that it has a reasonable cause of action against the 2nd Respondent. The Claimant further avers that the matters it has raised in the suit warrant full trial and cannot be resolved through an interlocutory application. 38.The Claimant contends that it will be improper for the court to authorize release of the vehicle to the 2nd Respondent at this stage in the face of the issues which it (the Claimant) has raised. It contends that doing so will render the suit nugatory. 39.The Claimant asserts that the court has jurisdiction to entertain the suit as it is premised on the employer-employee relationship which it (the Claimant) had with the 1st Respondent. It (the Claimant) contends that the loan facility it advanced to the 1st Respondent was anchored on this relationship. 40.The Claimant contends that one of the critical issues which the court is called upon to determine is how the security it (the Claimant) created over the suit motor vehicle was cancelled and the vehicle unlawfully transferred to the joint names of the Respondents. It contends that the court cannot disregard this issue allegedly because the 2nd Respondent has created a charge over the vehicle. 41.On his part, the 1st Respondent admits that he approached the 2nd Respondent for a financial facility of Ksh. 500,000.00. He further concedes that the 2nd Respondent granted him the facility. 42.The 1st Respondent avers that he serviced the facility until July 2025 when he encountered difficulties in remitting the monthly instalments. He contends that as a result of the aforesaid challenges, he requested the 2nd Respondent for a loan top up which was granted. 43.The 1st Respondent avers that around 28th August 2025, he received an insurance cover for the suit motor vehicle from the 2nd Respondent. He contends that he noticed that the cover had been procured from ICEA Lion Insurance Company Limited. He denies that he ever authorized the 2nd Respondent to take out the aforesaid insurance cover for the suit motor vehicle. 44.The 1st Respondent avers that on 13th August 2025, he disclosed his NTSA credentials to the 2nd Respondent. He avers that he suspects that the 2nd Respondent took advantage of this disclosure to transfer the suit motor vehicle into the joint names of the Respondents. 45.The 1st Respondent avers that the moment he realized that the vehicle’s ownership had been transferred from the joint names of the Claimant and himself to the joint names of the 2nd Respondent and himself, he called officials of the 2nd Respondent over the matter. He contends that the 2nd Respondent’s staff told him that the transfer was on account of the loan facilities he had taken from the 2nd Respondent. 46.The 1st Respondent admits that the 2nd Respondent installed a car tracker on the vehicle. However, he denies that he tampered with the tracker. 47.The 1st Respondent avers that when the Claimant raised concerns about the changes in the ownership details of the vehicle, he informed the 2nd Respondent about it. He further avers that he notified it (the 2nd Respondent) about the fact that the Claimant had instructed him to surrender the car to it (the Claimant). Analysis 48.It is evident from the preliminary material before the court that the Claimant and 1st Respondent had an employment relationship. As a matter of fact, the 1st Respondent admits this fact. 49.It is also apparent that by his letter dated 15th August 2023, the 1st Respondent applied for a car loan from the Claimant. The record shows that the Claimant wrote to the 1st Respondent on 30th August 2023 approving the loan application. 50.The Claimant required the 1st Respondent to register the vehicle in the joint names of the 1st Respondent and itself as a condition for disbursement of the loan. Further, the 1st Respondent was asked to deposit the original logbook with the Claimant. 51.The preliminary material before the court shows that after the 1st Respondent was issued with the facility, he purchased the suit motor vehicle and caused it to be registered in the joint names of himself and the Claimant. However, this joint registration between the Claimant and the 1st Respondent was subsequently cancelled under unclear circumstances and the vehicle registered in the joint names of the two Respondents. 52.The Claimant has presented evidence to show that it immediately wrote to various agencies including ICEA Lion Insurance Company Ltd (which had issued the 1st Respondent with an insurance cover for the vehicle after the impugned transfer), the NTSA and the police raising alarm regarding the transfer of the vehicle to the joint names of the Respondents. In the letters, the Claimant notified the various agencies aforesaid that it had an interest in the vehicle and did not understand how it (the vehicle) had been transferred to the two Respondents without regard for the fact that it (the Claimant) was a joint owner of the vehicle. 53.The evidence on record further shows that when the Claimant confronted the 1st Respondent about the impugned transfer of the vehicle to the joint names of himself and the 2nd Respondent, he tendered his resignation from employment and handed over the vehicle to the Claimant. In his affidavit in response to the Claimant’s application, the 1st Respondent does not deny the Claimant’s contention that it financed him to purchase the suit vehicle and that as security for repayment of the loan, he caused the said vehicle to be registered in the joint names of the Claimant and himself. He further concedes that the loan from the Claimant is still outstanding. However, he does not cogently account for how the same vehicle was transferred from the joint names of the Claimant and himself to the 2nd Respondent and himself before he cleared repayment of the loan. 54.In his reply to the 2nd Respondent’s application, the 1st Respondent admits having taken a loan from the 2nd Respondent but denies having offered the suit motor vehicle to this Respondent as security for the facility. He contends that on 13th August 2025, he shared his NTSA credentials with the 2nd Respondent and suspects that the 2nd Respondent took advantage of this to transfer the suit motor vehicle from the joint names of himself and the Claimant into the names of the Respondents. 55.The above sequence of events puts to question the circumstances under which the suit motor vehicle was transferred from the joint names of the Claimant and the 1st Respondent into the joint names of the two Respondents even as it is evident that the loan facility which the Claimant had advanced the 1st Respondent and for which the vehicle had been pledged as security to the Claimant was still outstanding. The authenticity of the transfer requires to be interrogated through a full trial. 56.The issue of suspected fraud which the Claimant has raised cannot be wished away under the guise of the 2nd Respondent having created a chattels mortgage over the suit vehicle. The position in law is that only legitimate transfers of property are capable of creating a legal interest in the property. Illegitimate transfers cannot confer good title to property. This reality applies to transfer of title for both movable and immovable property. 57.The Latin maxim nemo dat quod non habet is of critical significance in this respect. It simply means that one cannot give what he does not have. In respect of movable property, one cannot pass good title to property if he does not have such title in the first place (Rowland v Divall [1923] 2 KB 500). 58.As stated earlier, before the suit vehicle was transferred to the joint names of the Respondents, it was registered in the joint names of the Claimant and the 1st Respondent. As such, a valid transfer of the property required the joint action and concurrence of the Claimant and 1st Respondent. The 1st Respondent could not singularly pass title to the property to a third party without the involvement of the Claimant. Such transfer would result in no legitimate title to the third party who purports to acquire it. As such, it is not open to the 2nd Respondent to wave the chattels mortgage in its possession and expect the court to close its eyes to the serious complaints which the Claimant has raised in the suit. 59.The fact that an individual is not entitled to wave a title document to property without more in the face of a challenge to the validity of the title has been affirmed by the court in a myriad decisions. In the Court of Appeal case of Munyu Maina v. Hiram Gathiha Maina (2013) eKLR, the learned Judges of the court stated as follows:-‘’We state that when a registered proprietor’s root of title is under challenge, it is not sufficient to dangle the instrument of title as proof of ownership. It is this instrument of title that is in challenge and the registered proprietor must go beyond the instrument and prove the legality of how he acquired the title and show that the acquisition was legal, formal and free from any encumbrances including any and all interests which need not be noted on the register.’’ 60.Although the above observation was made in the context of landed property, it applies with equal force to movable property. As such, it has relevance to the case before court. 61.The 2nd Respondent cannot rely on the impugned transfer to plead indefeasibility of its rights over the suit motor vehicle. If the process that led to the transfer of the vehicle into the joint names of the Respondents is shown to have been irregular, the joint title to the two Respondents will be susceptible to cancellation. 62.The Claimant and the 1st Respondent had an employment relationship pursuant to which the Claimant financed the 1st Respondent to purchase the suit motor vehicle. The parties (the Claimant and 1st Respondent) agreed that the vehicle will be registered in their joint names to secure the Claimant’s financial interest. However, it is alleged that the 1st Respondent colluded with the 2nd Respondent to unlawfully transfer the vehicle into their joint names thereby exposing the Claimant to the risk of financial loss. 63.Having regard to the foresaid, this court has jurisdiction to inquire into the propriety of the impugned transfer as the transaction arose in the context of an employer-employee relationship. As such, the 2nd Respondent’s assertion that the court has no jurisdiction over the matter is without merit. 64.The 2nd Respondent cannot as well wave the impugned title to the suit vehicle to assert that the court is not entitled to inquire into whether it (the title) was properly acquired. As such, its (the 2nd Respondent’s) objection to the court’s jurisdiction on this front is unmerited. 65.In the premises, the court is convinced on the basis of the preliminary material that have been placed before it that the Claimant has raised serious allegations of fraud which require further interrogation. The court is further convinced that prior to the transfer of the suit vehicle into the joint names of the Respondents, the said vehicle had been registered in the joint names of the Claimant and the 1st Respondent to secure the loan facility which the Claimant advanced to the 1st Respondent. The court is also convinced that this facility remains unpaid to date. 66.Despite this, title to the motor vehicle was somehow moved from the Claimant and the 1st Respondent to the two Respondents. The 1st Respondent contends that the 2nd Respondent may have irregularly caused the transfer after it accessed his NTSA credentials. This requires to be verified through full trial. However, until this is done, there is legitimate concern regarding the legality of the transfer. 67.The foregoing set of facts evince that the Claimant has established a prima facie case which entitles it to the orders sought. The Claimant has been able to demonstrate that its right to property is under threat of infringement and requires further interrogation by the court. 68.This is in consonance with the settled definition of what constitutes a prima facie case as was set out in the case of Mrao Ltd v First American Bank of Kenya Ltd & 2 others [2003] KECA 175 (KLR) in which the learned Judges of the Court of Appeal described the term as follows:-‘’So what is a prima facie case? I would say that in civil cases it is a case in which on the material presented to the Court a tribunal properly directing itself will conclude that there exists a right which has apparently been infringed by the opposite party as to call for an explanation or rebuttal from the latter.’’ 69.The court is also satisfied that there is sufficient material on record to demonstrate that if the orders sought by the Claimant are not granted, it (the Claimant) is likely to suffer irreparable injury. Irreparable injury does not mean an injury that is impossible to repair. Rather, it refers to material injury which must be actual and substantial (see Dalpat Kumar v. Prahlad Singh (1992) (1) UJ501 (SC)). 70.In the instant case, the 1st Respondent has sworn an affidavit of means in which he lays bare his financial situation. He contends that he has no reliable means to repay the facilities in question since he is not in employment. He avers that he has no assets or savings to enable him take up additional financial obligations and pleads for indulgence by the court. 71.The dispositions by the 1st Respondent leave no doubt in the court’s mind that should it (the court) not issue the orders which the Claimant seeks, it (the Claimant) will be exposed to the risk of irreparable injury in the sense that it may never be able to recover the loan balance from the 1st Respondent. In the premises, it (the court) finds that the Claimant has surmounted the second requirement for the grant of the orders sought. 72.Having regard to the fact that the manner in which the joint title to the motor vehicle was moved from the Claimant and the 1st Respondent to the two Respondents has been questioned and remains unclear, the balance of convenience tilts in favour of issuing the orders which the Claimant seeks. This is necessary in order to preserve the subject matter of the dispute until the legitimacy of the impugned transfer to the joint names of the Respondents is conclusively interrogated. 73.The 2nd Respondent has applied to strike out of the Claimant’s suit on the ground that it does not disclose a reasonable cause of action against it. The court has scrutinized the preliminary material before it and is convinced that the Claimant has a reasonable cause of action. The issue regarding how the title to the suit motor vehicle was transmitted from the joint names of the Claimant and the 1st Respondent into the joint names of the Respondent’s without the Claimant’s participation and or concurrence is certainly a matter which presents a grievance which constitutes a proper cause of action. 74.As was pointed out in Hamptons Hospital Limited v Chief Justice & President of the Supreme Court of Kenya & 2 others; Sika Kenya Limited & another (Interested Parties) [2025] KEHC 1173 (KLR), the term reasonable cause of action does not denote a claim which must ultimately succeed. Rather, it simply denotes a claim which has some chance of success. The court spoke to the issue as follows:-‘’As to the meaning of cause of action, this phrase simply describes the existence of facts that would give rise to a claim that is properly founded in law. In Isaiah Ondiba Bitange & 3 others v Institute of Engineers of Kenya another [2017] eKLR the Court explained thus:‘’….By a cause of action is meant any facts or series of facts which are complete in themselves to found a claim or relief…..I think “reasonable cause of action” means a cause of action with some chance of success….’’ 75.Having regard to the foregoing, the court is satisfied that the Claimant has a reasonable cause of action against the Respondents. As such, the request to strike out the claim against the 2nd Respondent is unmerited. Determination 76.The upshot is that the court finds that the Claimant’s application dated 7th October 2025 is merited. As such, the application is allowed with the consequence that:-a.Pending the hearing and determination of the suit, the court issues an order of temporary injunction to restrain the Respondents by themselves, their servants, employees, agents, legal representatives and or persons claiming under them or howsoever from attaching, offering for sale, advertising for sale, selling, disposing off, alienating, transferring and or in any way interfering and or dealing in any manner and or directly or indirectly interfering with, obstructing or otherwise compromising the Claimant’s lawful safe custody, control, and safe preservation of motor vehicle registration number KDM 296 U.b.Pending the hearing and determination of the suit, the court grants the Claimant leave to retain custody, control and safe preservation of motor vehicle registration number KDM 296 U so as to safeguard its (the Claimant’s) proprietary and financial interest and prevent any interference, disposal or alienation of the said vehicle to the detriment of the Claimant. 77.Conversely, the court arrives at the conclusion that the 2nd Respondent’s preliminary objection and application dated 6th November 2025 are unmerited and accordingly dismisses them. 78.Costs of the two applications and the preliminary objection shall abide the outcome of the suit. DATED, SIGNED AND DELIVERED ON THE 15TH DAY OF JULY, 2026B. O. M. MANANIJUDGEIn the presence of:…………….for the Claimant…………….for the RespondentsOrderIn light of the directions issued on 12th July 2022 by her Ladyship, the Chief Justice with respect to online court proceedings, this decision has been delivered to the parties online with their consent, the parties having waived compliance with Rule 28 (3) of the ELRC Procedure Rules which requires that all judgments and rulings shall be dated, signed and delivered in the open court.