https://new.kenyalaw.org/akn/ke/judgment/keca/2026/1383

Technical University of Kenya v Kuria & 20 others (Civil Appeal 596 of 2019) [2026] KECA 1383 (KLR) (10 July 2026) (Judgment) Neutral citation: [2026] KECA 1383 (KLR) Republic of Kenya In the Court of Appeal at Nairobi Civil Appeal 596 of 2019 DK Musinga, M Ngugi & F Tuiyott, JJA July 10, 2026 Between Technical University of Kenya Appellant and Charles Kaindo Kuria 1st Respondent Kennedy Wanjala Namutilu 2nd Respondent Charles Langat 3rd Respondent Edmond Kihara Vanbriggs 4th Respondent Emmanuel Kibet Korir 5th Respondent Starford Kipkoech 6th Respondent Anne Wangari Mwangi 7th Respondent Goefrey Kipchirchhir Too 8th Respondent Hiram Gachinah Ngige 9th Respondent Peter Mwangi Wanjiru 10th Respondent Pius Afula Ogango 11th Respondent Cornelius Silya Matheka 12th Respondent Kevin Kyalo Wambua 13th Respondent Erick Odhiambo Ogeya 14th Respondent Elijah Mwenda Mwaura 15th Respondent Samuel Maina Wambui 16th Respondent Henry Matara Kiriama 17th Respondent George Ombogo Nyangeri 18th Respondent Mose Mbithi Mutinda 19th Respondent David Mutunga Mwania 20th Respondent Boniface Okong’o Otieno 21st Respondent (Being an appeal from the judgment of the Constitutional and Human Rights Division of the High Court of Kenya at Nairobi (Makau, J.) delivered on 2nd May 2019 in Petition No. 607 of 2014 Petition 607 of 2014 ) Judgment 1.The phenomenon of missing examination scripts is not unheard of in our public universities. Students sit exams, the scripts are collected by a lecturer for marking but are never returned to the university nor marks submitted. What, if any, is the cause of action that accrues to the students in such circumstances? This, partly, is the question this appeal seeks to answer. 2.The respondents, twenty-one (21) in number, were part of a class of seventy-two students who enrolled and pursued a diploma course in the school of Mechanical and Mechatronics Engineering at the Technical University of Kenya (the appellant or the University). In 2012 the school administered the core and mandatory mathematics exam and all the students’ scripts were collected by the lecturer in charge of the subject, one Mr. Ndedah (Ndedah or the lecturer). In a sad twist, the lecturer neither returned the scripts nor submitted the marks of the students. 3.The University commenced administrative and disciplinary action against the lecturer culminating in a criminal charge against him preferred in Criminal Case No. 5509 of 2014. 4.The criminal proceedings could not and did not resolve the inconvenience and difficulties caused to the students. Under section 35(d) (b) of The Universities Act, the Senate of a university is the administrative body of the university tasked with dealing with all academic issues that may arise. The Senate deliberated upon the issue of the missing scripts and a decision was made to have the 72 affected students re-sit the core mathematics paper in January 2015. The consequence was a delay in the students completing their courses. 5.Unhappy with the state of affairs, 21 out of the 72 students, now the respondents, commenced a constitutional petition, being Milimani Constitutional Petition No. 607 of 2014, in which they asserted that they successfully completed their programme/course in December 2013 and qualified to graduate on 18th December 2014, but their names had been excluded from the list of graduands for that day. 6.The respondents asserted violation and contravention of their constitutional rights. Citing Articles 27, 47 and 50, they contended that they were not given written reasons why they were not graduating on the set date, and that the University had exercised its power capriciously, arbitrarily and oppressively. Alleging violation of the doctrine of natural justice, the students argued that: their legitimate expectation to graduate had been breached; they had then been punished for commissions and/or omissions in which they bore no fault; and that the University’s decision was made in bad faith, extreme malice and without any fairness. Lastly, they asserted that their inherent dignity under Article 28 of the Constitution had been violated. 7.The respondents sought the following reliefs:a.An order of mandamus be issued to compel the Respondents to include the names of the Petitioners in the list of grandaunts for the graduation ceremony slated for 18th December 2014 and graduate them.b.In the alternative and (sic) order do issue stopping the Respondent from proceeding with the graduation on 18th December 2018.c.An order of mandamus be issued to compel the Respondents to issue the relevant diploma certificates to the Petitioners within a specific period of time.d.Declaratory orders do issue that the rights and freedoms of the petitioners under articles 27, 28, 47 and 50 of the Constitution have been violated.e.An order for compensation do issue and that an inquiry as to the quantum thereof be gone into.f.The Honourable Court grants such further or other orders it deems just, expedient and fair.g.Costs be provided to the Petitioners. 8.The answer by the University was that its Senate, which made the decision for a resit, comprised all stakeholders of the University which included two members elected by the student’s association. The decision was reached in consultation and discussion with all members present, including the students’ representatives. The allegation of non -communication was denied and only 21 of the 72 students instituted the suit with the remaining 51 students ready to resit. 9.In line with one of its functions, the University Senate decides which persons have attained the prescribed standard of proficiency and are otherwise fit to be granted a degree, diploma, certificate or other award of the University and to report its decision thereon to the Council. There was no basis upon which the Senate could determine whether any of the 72 students had attained the required standard of proficiency, absent the mathematics scripts. While regretting the action of the lecturer, the University contended that it was the first time it had happened in the long history of the institution and remedial measure had already been put in place to avoid a recurrence of such an incident. 10.Prior to the hearing of the petition, the parties recorded a consent on 15th December 2014 before Lenaola, J. (as he then was) in the following terms:i.The examinations in respect of the Petitioners including for the mathematics unit to be conducted by the Respondent between 5th January 2015 and 16th January 2015.ii.The results for the said examinations, generally and the mathematics unit specifically to be released on or before 20th February 2015.iii.Subject to the petitioner passing the said examinations transcripts to be availed to the Petitioners on application, from 10th March 2015.iv.Subject to the Petitioners passing the examinations and pending the communication ceremony, qualified students to be issued with appropriate letters of recommendation.v.The parties shall discuss the issue of awards of diploma certificate for directions on 29th January 2015.” 11.Subsequent to the consent, another consent was reached before the same judge marking the matter as settled on 22nd January 2016. The consent was, however, set aside on application by the students on 8th October 2018, paving the way for hearing of the petition on merit, which proceeded on the basis of pleadings and submissions. 12.In the judgment now impugned in this appeal, Makau, J. drew three issues for determination. We paraphrase them:a.whether the university violated the respondents’ right to dignity.b.whether the university violated the aggrieved students’ right to fair administrative action.c.whether the aggrieved students were entitled to damages and costs. 13.The learned judge found for the students regarding the first two issues, setting out reasons, which we discuss later in this decision. In the end, each of the students was awarded Kshs.148,764 as “compensation for violation of their bill of rights under Articles 28 and 47 of the Constitution.” They were also awarded costs of the petition. 14.The University, aggrieved by the decision, challenges it on five grounds that the learned Judge erred in fact and law;1.in declaring that the Respondents’ right to dignity was violated by the Appellant.2.in failing to consider the circumstances upon which the delay to graduate the Respondents occurred hence declaring that their right to fair administrative action was violated.3.when he awarded damages to the Respondents without cogent evidence.4.when he allowed the Respondents’ prayer for costs even after the Petition was marked as settled.5.when he used Legal Notice No. 197 of Regulation of wages (General Amendment Order 2013) which was not applicable to the Respondents. 15.This first appeal raises issues of law as the facts are substantially common ground. Given the grounds of appeal and submissions made around them, the issues curved out for determination by the High Court remain relevant at this stage. We begin with the fair administrative action question. 16.The University submitted that it was absurd for the learned trial judge to hold that the one-year and six-months delay in ensuring a re-sit was inefficient, unreasonable, and procedurally unfair under Article 47 of the Constitution and Section 63 (3) of the Universities Act. The University argued that the process of following up on missing scripts inevitably took time and that it had to try every other channel, including allowing Mr Ndedah time to submit the scripts before asking the students to re-sit the paper. Further, a large institution cannot effect re-sits immediately. The University Senate deliberated on the issue and decided on a re-sit once it became clear the lecturer could not account for the scripts. 17.It was contended that section 63 (3) of the Universities Act, which requires a university council to dispose of matters within six months, was not meant to operate in isolation and must be guided by the limitation principles in Article 24 (1) (a) of the Constitution. It was argued that the delay was justified given the process of investigating the whereabouts of the scripts, and that it would have been absurd to rush graduation without satisfying academic standards. The University asserted that it had accorded the Respondents fair administrative action and the judge erred in finding otherwise. 18.The respondents’ answer is that under Article 47 of the Constitution, every person has the right to fair administrative action that is expeditious, efficient, lawful, reasonable, and procedurally fair. It was submitted that the University, as a public university, was governed by the Universities Act No. 42 of 2012 and its own Charter, it being contended that notwithstanding that the University became aware that the lecturer had failed to submit marks in 2012, it was nonchalant and wilfully refused to take action, allowing the respondents to proceed to their third year without knowledge of the jeopardy they faced. Cited is the decision in Kenya Revenue Authority v Export Trading Company Ltd (Petition 20 of 2020) [2022] KESC 31 (KLR) to argue that the legality or lawfulness of an act lies at the core of Article 47(1). The apex Court therein relied on De Smith Woolf & Jowell’s Principles of Judicial Review to find that legitimate expectation arises where a person responsible for taking a decision has induced a reasonable expectation of a benefit. The respondents asserted that while the University had the authority to administer exams and grant awards under sections 6(w) and 9(a) of its Charter, it failed to exercise this authority in a fair and efficient manner. The respondents submitted that the University failed to resolve the issue within six months as provided by section 63 (3) of the Universities Act and only administered a re-sit in 2015 after being ordered by the court. 19.Regarding the issue whether the University violated Article 47 right of fair administrative action, the trial Court observed and held that:“The respondent had sat for mathematic paper in May 2012 in their 2nd year of study. The respondent herein had 1 year before petitioners sat for their 3rd and final year examination, in 2013 and also had 1 year and 6 months before the graduation date on 18th December 2014. I find that the plaintiff(sic) had all the time needed to rectify the situation or take decisive action to dispose and resolve the matter by informing and asking the petitioners to re-sit the paper in view of the situation but the respondent failed to take expeditious, efficient, lawful, reasonable and procedurally fair action, notwithstanding, that the petitioners right or fundamental freedom had been or was likely to be adversely affected by its administrative action. No reason for petitioners’ failure to graduate with other candidates was given to them notwithstanding the petitioners’ right to be given written reason for the respondent’s action. The respondent’s failure to take any action for a period of 1 year and 6 months, I find, that is inefficient, unreasonable and procedurally unfair in light of Article 47 of the Constitution and section 63(3) of the Universities Act.” 20.It is a settled principle of good administrative action, codified in Article 47, that it must be expeditious and efficient. What amounts to an expeditious and efficient action may differ from circumstance to circumstance, but at the heart of it is that the speed and manner in which the administrative action is processed and completed must not involve unreasonable or unnecessary delay so that by the reason only of delay the outcome is not oppressive or prejudicial to the person affected by the action. 21.Section 63(3) of the Universities Act No. 42 of 2012 provides:“A University council shall expeditiously dispose of all matters before it and in any event, within six months.” 22.Neither party argues that the period of six months set out by the statute is unreasonable or exacting or overly ambitious. We take it to be the period within which the University is expected to process and dispose of all administrative actions before it. It is statutory aspiration of expedition in administrative action by universities. Yet the contention by the University that there may be bona fide reasons why this timeframe may sometimes be breached is not without merit. Similarly, there are administrative actions that cannot wait six months and must be resolved much quicker. The context of the administrative action will inform the speed with which it is to be acted on and finalized. 23.The missing scripts were collected by the lecturer in May 2012. Although it is unclear when the lecturer was to return them, marked, the affected students proceeded to sit for third year examinations in May 2013 and ought to have successfully completed their programmes by December 2013. At trial, the University did not refute the respondents’ contention that they, either individually or though the student union, followed up on the missing scripts. 24.It was not until sometime in 2014 that it became clear to the students that they would not be graduating as expected as their names were missing from the list of students due to graduate on 18th December 2014. Anxious about that state of affairs, their lawyers wrote to the University on 13th November 2014 demanding that they be included in the coming ceremony. While the University argues that it needed to exhaust the possibility of retrieving the scripts from the wayward lecturer, it should have always kept its eye on the clock so that whatever action it took would not jeopardise the students’ expectation to graduate on time. That the University only had the lecturer charged after the demand letter, one and a half years after the exam was administered, is evidence of its laxity and inefficiency in dealing with the matter. Further, it has not been demonstrated why the University did not organize for a re-sit even as it pursued the lecturer. 25.We have no doubt that the University did not act with the urgency that the matter at hand bespoke, leading to students graduating one year later. The trial judge correctly apprehended the context of the grievance, and we endorse the conclusion that the University violated the respondents’ right to fair administrative action. 26.The University argued that the respondents' assertion of violation to the right to dignity without cogent evidence demonstrating an actual violation was misleading and did not hold water. It was contended that constitutional petitions must be pleaded with precision and specificity regarding which right was violated and in what manner. Cited is the decision in Anarita Karimi Njeru v Republic (Miscellaneous Criminal Application 4 of 1979) [1979] KEHC 30 (KLR). The University further relied on section 107(1) of the Evidence Act for the argument that whoever desires a court to give judgment on a legal right dependent on facts must prove the existence of those facts. The University maintained that it did not in any way violate or threaten to violate the respondents' right to dignity and was committed to ensuring students were well-equipped for the job market to protect their dignity in terms of quality and reliability. It was submitted that no evidence was produced to support the allegation that the respondents were considered failures by their parents, community, or peers for not graduating at the required time. In concluding on this aspect, the judge was faulted for failing to find that the respondents had not supplied evidence of a lifetime stigma caused by graduating in December 2015 instead of December 2014. 27.In response, the respondents argued that human dignity in recognition and protection of fundamental freedoms and rights is underscored under Article 19 (2) of the Constitution, which provides that the purpose of protecting human rights is to preserve the dignity of individuals and promote social justice. The respondents submitted that the University failed to file a response to the petition at the High Court, and therefore the respondents' evidence was uncontroverted. The respondents contended that they only discovered they were ineligible for graduation from the appellant's portal in 2014 when it was too late. The respondents had a legitimate expectation to graduate in December 2014 after being permitted to proceed to the third and final year without any written communication regarding missing marks from their second year. The respondents argued that the delayed graduation had a significant impact on their lives, robbing them of their dignity and control over their personal circumstances, citing COI & another v Chief Magistrate Ukunda Law Courts & 4 others [2018] KECA 15 (KLR). The respondents submitted that in their society, educational success signifies hope for the family, and being left behind by peers for two years without job prospects stripped them of their dignity and rendered them hopeless. 28.Article 28 on the right to dignity reads:“Every person has inherent dignity and the right to have that dignity respected and protected.” 29.The respondents pleaded that the university had violated their right to dignity as “they are considered failures by their parents, college mates, communities, friends and the society for not graduating at the required time”. This was the specific averment that needed to be proved so as to establish the violation. 30.The provision on the right to dignity does not delineate its scope but characterizes it as inherent, a signal that dignity is inalienable and inherent on all persons. It is an intrinsic worth simply by virtue of being human. There is jurisprudence that suggests what the right to human dignity entails. Regarding a similar provision, the Constitutional Court of South Africa in Dawood and Another v Minister of Home Affairs and Others; Shalabi and Another v Minister of Home Affairs and Others; Thomas and Another v Minister of Home Affairs and Others (CCT35/99) [2000] ZACC 8; 2000 (3) SA 936 (CC); 2000 (8) BCLR 837 (CC) (7 June 2000) discussed the right to dignity as follows:“The value of dignity in our Constitutional framework cannot therefore be doubted. The Constitution asserts dignity to contradict our past in which human dignity for black South Africans was routinely and cruelly denied. It asserts it too to inform the future, to invest in our democracy respect for the intrinsic worth of all human beings. Human dignity therefore informs constitutional adjudication and interpretation at a range of levels. It is a value that informs the interpretation of many, possibly all, other rights. This Court has already acknowledged the importance of the constitutional value of dignity in interpreting rights such as the right to equality, the right not to be punished in a cruel, inhuman or degrading way, and the right to life. Human dignity is also a constitutional value that is of central significance in the limitations analysis. Section 10, however, makes it plain that dignity is not only a value fundamental to our Constitution, it is a justiciable and enforceable right that must be respected and protected. In many cases, however, where the value of human dignity is offended, the primary constitutional breach occasioned may be of a more specific right such as the right to bodily integrity, the right to equality or the right not to be subjected to slavery, servitude or forced labour.” 31.Similarly, in South Africa v Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development and Others (CCT320/17) [2019] ZACC 34; 2019 (11) BCLR 1321 (CC); 2020 (1) SA 1 (CC); 2020 (1) SACR 113 (CC) (18 September 2019) the South African Constitutional Court held:“There is a history and context to the right to human dignity in our country. As a result, this right occupies a special place in the architectural design of our Constitution, and for good reason. As Cameron J, correctly points out, the role and stressed importance of dignity in our Constitution aims “to repair indignity, to renounce humiliation and degradation, and to vest full moral citizenship to those who were denied it in the past.” Unsurprisingly because not only is dignity one of the foundational values of our democratic State, but it is also one of the entrenched fundamental rights. And section 10 of the Constitution provides: “Everyone has inherent dignity and the right to have their dignity respected and protected.” 32.Additionally, in S v Makwanyane and Another (CCT3/94) [1995] ZACC 3; 1995 (6) BCLR 665; 1995 (3) SA 391; [1996] 2 CHRLD 164; 1995 (2) SACR 1 (6 June 1995) the Constitutional Court stated that:“The importance of dignity as a founding value of the new Constitution cannot be overemphasised. Recognising a right to dignity is an acknowledgement of the intrinsic worth of human beings: human beings are entitled to be treated as worthy of respect and concern. This right therefore is the foundation of many of the other rights that are specifically entrenched in chapter 3.” 33.In holding in favour of the respondents on this question, the learned judge held;“The petitioners in their petition under paragraph 14.3 content (sic) that their inherent dignity and right to have their dignity respected and protected have been violated since they are considered failures by their parents, college mates, community, friends and the society for not graduating at the required time. In the instant petition the respondent did not file any response to the petition and it would be wrong for the respondent to purport to rely on a Replying affidavit to an application in response to the petition. The petitioners’ classmates after seeing the petitioners’ names missing in the list of grandaunts for December 2014 and their parents having noted the petitioners were not graduating, on due date, they considered them as failures in the society as general for graduating after 5 years for a course that would have taken 3 years. The petitioners’ classmates, friends and parents would see them as slow and not bright and equate them with failure. I find the petitioners allegations having not been controverted, that they have demonstrated, their inherent dignity and right to have their dignity respected and protected was abrasively violated. I find that this is a lifelong stigma which the petitioners have to live with since the damage already done cannot be undone. This kind of pain and suffering can only be compensated by an award of damages. 34.While the primary grievance of the students was that their right to fair administrative action had been breached, the same set of facts could also give rise to another constitutional violation, so that the unintended consequence of the University’s slow response to the matter could lead to a violation of the student’s right to dignity. The failure of the affected students to graduate on time was not attributable to any shortcoming on their part, academic or otherwise. Further the reason they failed to graduate would not be apparent to third parties. On the evidence before the trial court there was no material upon which the learned Judge could draw the conclusion that the affected students were considered as failures by either their parents or members of the society. There was a dearth of evidence that the University’s inaction led to a degradation or dishonour of the intrinsic worth of the students. Given the facts and circumstances of this case, the holding by the trial court that the student’s right to dignity had been violated was, in our view, based solely on speculation and conjecture. 35.We turn now to the appeal against the award of damages. The University submitted that the trial court erroneously relied on Legal Notice No. 197 of 2013, which applied only to already employed artisans, to calculate damages for the respondents. It was argued that the respondents did not prove that they were guaranteed jobs within seven months of graduation, or that it was rational to assume they would have secured employment in that timeframe. Drawing from the decision in Joyce Chepkoech Too v Egerton University & another [2021] KEHC 7817 (KLR) and Dendy v University of the Witwatersrand (597/05) [2007] ZASCA 30, it was contended that damages as a remedy for a violation to a constitutional right was a secondary remedy intended for vindication of the victim rather than punishment to the violator. It was asserted that it was improper to award damages without cogent evidence. 36.Weighing further on this line of argument, it was submitted that relying on repealed legislation to award damages was a clear demonstration that the trial Judge misdirected himself in law. It was argued that the respondents squandered their chance to amend their pleadings to reflect the existing law, and that the court could not rely on legislation that was not part of the pleadings. Citing Peter Opande v Ngaga Enterprises Limited [2019] KECA 58 (KLR) and United India Insurance Co Ltd v East African Underwriters (Kenya) Ltd [1985] KECA 39 (KLR), we were asked to interfere with the discretionary decision as the judge misdirected himself in law, misapprehended facts, or reached a decision that was plainly wrong. 37.On their part, the respondents argued that the judge exercised his discretion in accordance with his remit when he awarded damages of Kshs. 148,764 to each respondent. The learned judge presumed, reasonably, that it would have taken the respondents seven months to secure employment and used the minimum wage provided in the legal notice as a conservative guide. The respondents cited Migori County Government & another v Migori County Transport Sacco (Civil Appeal 110 of 2017) [2021] KECA 7 (KLR) for the assertion that the assessment of damages is discretionary and appellate courts should be slow to interfere. The respondents sought solace in Douglas Moturi Nyairo v University of Nairobi [2018] KEHC 5232 (KLR), where a petitioner was awarded Kshs. 400,000 for a similar violation, arguing that they were entitled to higher damages than what was awarded. 38.In their further submissions, the respondents noted that the University had addressed the court regarding grounds 3 and 5 of the memorandum of appeal. The respondents observed that the University’s initial argument was that the trial court erroneously relied on Legal Notice 197 of 2013 because it applied only to already employed artisans. They maintained that the University had previously acceded to the applicability of that notice, albeit only for artisans, and further pointed out that the respondents’ petition in the High Court was uncontroverted as the University failed to file a response. The respondents asserted that the University had changed tune by arguing that the 2013 notice was inapplicable because it had ceased to be in operation. 39.The respondents submitted that they filed their petition on 10th December 2014, at which time Legal Notice 197 of 2013 was in full operation. While a consent was recorded on 16th December 2014 regarding certain obligations, the prayer for compensation and an inquiry as to its quantum remained pending for determination. They argued that the trial judge always had discretion under Article 23 of the Constitution to award damages for the violation of their rights and did not strictly need to rely on any other law to do so. The respondents contended that the cause of action arose in 2014 when they were prevented from graduating, and because the petition was filed that same year, their rights were violated when the 2013 notice was in effect. Relying on Section 27 of the Interpretation and General Provisions Act, it was argued that subsidiary legislation comes into operation on the day of publication unless otherwise provided. Cited was section 23(3) of the Act for the postulation that a repeal does not affect the previous operation of a law or any right, privilege, obligation, or liability acquired or accrued under that law. They relied on JOO v MBO; Federation of Women Lawyers (FIDA Kenya) & another (Amicus Curiae) (Petition 11 of 2020) [2023] KESC 4 (KLR) to argue that legislation must not be given retrospective effect unless the intention is clear and unambiguous. 40.It was further argued that the University's position was farcical because applying Legal Notice 117 of 2015 would have significantly increased its liability, as it provided for a higher daily rate than the 2013 notice. They cited George Gikubu Mbuthia v Consolidated Bank of Kenya Ltd & another [2016] KECA 159 (KLR) and Abayomi Babatunde vs Pan Atlantic Shipping and Transport Agencies Ltd. (2008) 11 E-WRN / 01 (SC); SC.154/2002 to emphasize that an appellate court should not substitute its own discretion for that of the trial court. 41.Finally, the respondents prayed that this Court reviews the award upward to Kshs. 400,000/- for each respondent, based on comparative case law. This is a request which we immediately decline to consider as no cross -appeal was preferred by the respondents. 42.As an appellate court, we should be slow to interfere with an award of damages unless the trial court acted on wrong principles or misapprehended the evidence and thereby made a patently erroneous award or made an award that was inordinately high or low (see Butt v Khan [1978] KECA 24 (KLR)). We approach the issue of damages with this caution. 43.The trial court made an award in respect to the violation of the two constitutional rights; the right to fair administrative action and the right to dignity. The trial court correctly observed that the primary purpose of a constitutional remedy was to vindicate guaranteed rights and prevent or deter further infringement, and an award of damages was a secondary remedy to be made only in appropriate cases. See Dendy v University of the Witwatersrand and Others (2015/03) [2005] ZAGPHC 39; 2005 (5) SA 357 (W); [2005] 2 All SA 490 (W); 2005 (9) BCLR 901 (W) (5 April 2005). 44.Specifically on damages for this type of violations, the Supreme Court in CMM (Suing as the Next Friend of and on Behalf of CWM) & 6 others v Standard Group & 4 others (Petition 13 (E015) of 2022) [2023] KESC 68 (KLR)observed:“(94)To answer directly the question posed by this issue, under common law principles, it is settled that an injured party is entitled to damages for the loss and injury suffered under private law causes of action, like in tortious claims. In situations like those, compensation for personal loss depends on proof of such loss or damage. However, arising out of the violation of constitutional rights and fundamental freedoms of an individual under public law, the nature of the damages awardable are broadly compensatory or vindicatory, as should be apparent from the list of examples of reliefs in Article 23. While it is not necessary to prove loss or damage in cases of constitutional rights violations, the court may consider the extent, nature, gravity and immensity of harm suffered by the aggrieved party when determining the appropriate remedy. In deserving cases, the redress may be in the form of an award of damages to compensate the victim. In some cases, a suitable declaration, an injunctive or conservatory order, or an order of judicial review will suffice to vindicate the right.(95)In assessing the appropriate sum to be awarded as compensation, the court must feel satisfied that the sum will afford the victim adequate redress to vindicate the victim’s constitutional right. Assessment of the right quantum for compensation will take into account all the relevant facts and circumstances of the violation and the victim in the particular case, bearing in mind any aggravating features. We stress that the purpose of constitutional relief of an award of compensation is not necessarily intended to punish the violator, but only to vindicate the right of the victim.” 45.In arriving at what it considered to be appropriate damages, the trial court held that it would take 7 months for each of the respondents to get employment and applied a day rate of 1062.00 per day for 20 working days. 46.While the threshold for proving damages as a constitutional remedy may not be as exacting as when it is a tortious remedy, still we think that when the damages awarded is more than nominal, then there has to be some basis upon which the award is reached. In the words of the Supreme Court in the decision we have just cited, “the court may consider the extent, nature, gravity and immensity of harm suffered by the aggrieved party when determining the appropriate remedy”. Here, we are unable to find anything, on the record, that would inform the possible period within which the students would get employment. From this perspective, the award was far too speculative. We would interfere with it. 47.On our part we would make a nominal award of Kshs. 50,000.00 for each respondent, noting that there was no material at all that was placed before the court upon which it could work a vindicatory or compensatory relief. 48.On the last ground, the University submitted that the learned trial Judge erred by awarding costs despite the petition having been marked as settled with no orders as to costs on 7th September 2016, and considering that the respondents did not incur costs incidental to the petition after that date. It was contended that judicial discretion under section 27 (1) of the Civil Procedure Act must be exercised in accordance with reason and justice. The University cited the decision in Party of Independent Candidate of Kenya & another v Mutula Kilonzo & 2 others [2013] KEHC 5939 (KLR) to emphasize that while costs follow the event, the discretion must be exercised upon grounds that a reasonable man would apply. It was submitted that the learned Judge erred by awarding costs without regard to the fact that the matter had already been marked as settled. 49.On this question, the respondents argued that the petition was fully heard by the High Court and would not have taken its procedural course until judgment was delivered in May 2019. While the consent recorded on 16th December 2014 settled certain obligations, other prayers remained pending for determination. The respondents, further, make reference to the court ruling of 8th October 2018. 50.We have familiarised ourselves with the court ruling of 8th October 2018 in which Okwany, J., in her ultimate orders, directed that the parties file and exchange written submissions to the remaining prayers in the main petition and specifically set them out as prayers d, e, f and g. Prayer g was on costs. This ruling has not been challenged and it is the one that paved way for the determination of the petition in the judgment which is the subject of this appeal. The trial Judge was perfectly in order to make an order on costs. We find no fault in the order made, which was in favour of the respondents who had succeeded in their action. 51.In the end, this appeal partially succeeds, to the extent that we set aside the holding that the respondents’ right to dignity had been violated and further set aside the award of damages of Kshs 148,764 and substitute it with an award of damages of Kshs 50,000.00 (Kenya shillings Fifty thousand) to each respondent. Each party shall bear their own costs. DATED AND DELIVERED AT NAIROBI ON THIS 10TH DAY OF JULY 2026.D. K. MUSINGA.......................................JUDGE OF APPEALMUMBI NGUGI.......................................JUDGE OF APPEALF. TUIYOTT....................................JUDGE OF APPEALI certify that this is a true copy of the original.Signed DEPUTY REGISTRAR.