Tegekson v Lipton Teas and Infusions Kenya PLC (Employment and Labour Relations Cause E008 of 2025) [2026] KEELRC 1465 (KLR) (28 May 2026) (Judgment)

Tegekson v Lipton Teas and Infusions Kenya PLC (Employment and Labour Relations Cause E008 of 2025) [2026] KEELRC 1465 (KLR) (28 May 2026) (Judgment) Neutral citation: [2026] KEELRC 1465 (KLR) Republic of Kenya In the Employment and Labour Relations Court at Kericho Employment and Labour Relations Cause E008 of 2025 AN Mwaure, J May 28, 2026 Between Bernard Tegekson Claimant and Lipton Teas And Infusions Kenya Plc Respondent Judgment Introduction 1.The Claimant commenced this suit via a Memorandum of Claim dated 17th February 2025, seeking judgment to be entered against the Respondent as follows:a.A declaration that the Respondent’s summary dismissal of the Claimant’s employment amounted to unfair and unlawful dismissal and violated the Constitution of Kenya, the Employment Act, and the recognized common law principle of employment law.b.A compensation of Kshs.11,902,108.40 being:i.Three (3) months’ salary in lieu of notice in the sum of Kshs.1,020,180.72;ii.General damages for wrongful dismissal and unfair termination equivalent to twelve (12) months’ salary amounting to Kshs.4,080,722.88; andiii.Gratuitous/severance pay for 20 years in the sum of Kshs.6,801,204.80/=c.An order for compensation by way of exemplary damages to the Claimant for maliced.Costs of the claime.Interests at court rates on (b), (c), and (d) above, from the date of filing of this claim until payment in full. Claimant’s case 2.The Claimant avers that he was employed by the Respondent in 2005 as a Shift Supervisor and rose through the ranks to become Manufacturing Manager at Jamji Factory in June 2023, having served diligently and without blemish throughout his career. 3.On 23rd August 2024, the Claimant avers that he was served with a suspension and show cause letter alleging breaches of sections 44(3) and 44(4)(e) of the Employment Act, including economic sabotage, failure to pay overtime, improper staff assignments, and negligence in factory operations. He responded to the Notice to show cause on 27th August 2024, denying all allegations, but was thereafter invited to a disciplinary hearing on 4th September 2024 via a letter dated 2nd September 2024. 4.At the hearing, the Claimant avers that he was denied access to witness statements and cross-examination rights, rendering the process procedurally unfair. Subsequently, by a letter dated 6th September 2024, he was summarily dismissed for alleged gross misconduct under sections 44(3), 44(4)(c), and 44(4)(e) of the Employment Act, and ordered to vacate the company house by 13th September 2024. 5.The Claimant avers that his appeal of 13th September 2024 was dismissed on 19th September 2024, despite his complaint that he had been denied access to his laptop and supporting documents. 6.The Claimant now contends that the dismissal was unfair, unlawful, malicious, and predetermined, in violation of the Constitution, the Employment Act, and principles of natural justice. Respondent’s statement of response 7.The Respondent opposed the memorandum of claim via statement of response dated 26th June 2025. 8.The Respondent denies the Claimant’s assertions of unfair and unlawful dismissal and avers that the Claimant committed acts of gross misconduct contrary to the Employment Act, 2007 and the Respondent’s Code of Conduct. It relies on the Notice to Show Cause dated 23rd August 2024, the Claimant’s response of 27th August 2024, and the summary dismissal letter of 6th September 2024, maintaining that the disciplinary process was fair, lawful, and compliant with sections 41, 44(3), and 44(4)(c) and (e) of the Employment Act. 9.The Respondent contends that the Claimant was duly notified of the allegations, afforded a hearing on 4th September 2024 with representation, and given an opportunity to respond. It denies that the hearing was procedurally unfair or predetermined, asserting that the panel relied on operational records and audit findings explained to the Claimant, and that the appeal was properly considered and dismissed by Ms. Sylvia Ten Den on 19th September 2024. 10.The Respondent further denies that the Claimant was denied access to documents or suffered mental anguish, and avers that the dismissal was justified in law and fact. It argues that the Claimant is not entitled to notice pay, damages, or severance pay, and prays that the entire claim be dismissed with costs. Claimant’s evidence in court 11.CW1, the Claimant, adopt his written statement dated 17th February 2025 together with the list of document dated even date marked as exhibits 1 to 20 as his evidence in chief. 12.In cross-examination, CW1 testified that he was in charge of the factory, responsible for supervising employees, enforcing company policies, and safeguarding tea quality by ensuring proper sorting of incoming leaves. He admitted in his written response to the Notice to Show Cause that there had been inconsistencies in the number of personnel sorting tea, though he maintained that the leaves met company standards. He explained that some staff had been redeployed to other factories by the Head of Manufacturing, necessitating reliance on casual labourers. He stated that overtime was duly paid in accordance with procedure, though he heard during the disciplinary hearing that some employees were not paid and were compelled to work late without equipment. He contended that he was not given an opportunity to respond to such complaints and was unaware of them prior to the hearing. 13.CW1 stated that he confirmed appointing an acting team leader for a few hours but denied appointing a manager, noting that he was aware of the company’s policy on acting postings. He further stated that although a thermometer battery had expired, alternative methods of checking tea quality were used pending replacement. He asserted that the disciplinary hearing was a sham: witness statements presented were anonymous, his responses were disregarded, and he was denied access to his laptop containing documents necessary for appeal. 14.In re-examination, CW1 reiterated that his explanation regarding staff rotation was contained in his response but was not considered. He emphasized that he was not furnished with witness statements prior to the hearing and thus had no opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses. He maintained that the Notice to Show Cause lacked specific particulars, that overtime payments were governed by clear company policy, and that he had no role in determining such payments. Respondent’s evidence in court 15.RW1, Gerald Wabwire, the Respondent’s head of manufacturing, adopted his written statement dated 30th September 2025 together with the list of documents dated even date marked as exhibits 1 to 6 as his evidence in chief. 16.In cross-examination, RW1 testified that CW1 had risen from a junior position to managerial rank by the time of termination. He acknowledged that CW1 had not previously been subjected to disciplinary proceedings. He had no recollection of CW1 being awarded a certificate of exemplary service. He did not identify the complainants against CW1 but confirmed that he issued a Notice to Show Cause premised on accusations made. 17.RW1 stated that he personally issued documents to CW1, including the Notice to Show Cause dated 23rd August 2024, a suspension letter dated 26th August 2024, and received CW1’s response dated 27th August 2024. He averred that the allegations emanated from employees and that investigations had been undertaken by another department. At the disciplinary hearing, statements of complaints were read to CW1, though witnesses were not called; instead, phone calls were made. He described the hearing as essentially his word against CW1’s. He did not recall CW1 requesting documents at the hearing, though CW1 sought access to his laptop but later waived that request, which RW1 believed occurred at the appeal stage. He confirmed CW1 was accused of economic sabotage, production of variant products without correction, and unfair labour practices such as assigning duties without compensation. RW1 stated that overtime and acting allowance were governed by procedure, requiring approval by line managers, including himself. 18.RW1 asserted that CW1 had delegated managerial duties to another employee without compensation and that employees worked extra hours without documentation. He confirmed that a thermometer was not working, requisition had been made, and he was one of the approvers. CW1 sought equipment from another factory, which RW1 did not approve. He characterized CW1’s conduct as reckless, noting that even a single incident could amount to recklessness. He acknowledged CW1 had previously been seconded to Tanzania and awarded a national honour by the Respondent, and that CW1 had been transferred between factories before RW1 joined the company. He maintained that CW1’s alleged reckless performance was captured in the Notice to Show Cause. 19.In re-examination, RW1 reiterated that CW1 did not complain of insufficient time nor request additional time to respond to the Notice to show cause. He emphasized that investigations had preceded the Notice to Show Cause and that CW1 did not request the investigation report. He stated that spare equipment was available in another factory and that CW1 was instructed to use it, but failed to do so, thereby breaching procedure by not using the thermometer to measure tea. Claimant’s submissions 20.The Claimant submitted that his summary dismissal was both substantively unjustified and procedurally unfair, contrary to Sections 41, 43 and 45(2) of the Employment Act, 2007, which place the burden on the employer to prove valid reasons and fair procedure. The Respondent failed to discharge this burden, as no cogent evidence was tendered to support the allegations under sections 44(3), 44(4)(c) and 44(4)(e) of the Employment Act. In Otieno v General Industries Ltd [2024] KEELRC 2040, the Court held that employers must prove valid reasons with sufficient evidence, while in Mwangi v Family Bank Ltd [2023] KEELRC 2156, it was emphasised that the employer’s belief must be genuine, not whimsical. Similarly, in Walter Ogal Anuro v Teachers Service Commission [2013] KEELRC 386 (KLR), the Court underscored the twin requirements of substantive justification and procedural fairness. The Respondent’s reliance on mere suspicion, without evidence, offends the principle in Osire v Mega Pack (K) Ltd [2023] KEELRC 1504, where Nderitu J held as follows:“Section 43(2) of the Act deserves a second look before the court decides on the substance of the dismissal. What the employer is required to have is a genuine belief that the employee has misconducted himself or herself in the alleged manner, even if such believe later on turns out to be untrue. However, the belief must be genuine and not based on malicious, discriminative, speculative, weird, whimsical, and capricious allegations.What this court understands to be the totality of the genuine belief imperative is that the employer should have some prima facie evidence that the employee has engaged in misconduct that deserves disciplinary action. For such a belief to exist, the employer ought to have carried out some reasonable investigation and gathered the evidence against the employee. In my opinion, mere suspicion cannot be a ground for taking disciplinary action that may lead to dire consequences, including dismissal, as it happened in this cause.In as much as the test is partly subjective on the part of the employer, this court holds the view that the belief should be genuine and reasonable founded on prima facie evidence. While it is not the duty of this court to substitute its view for that of the employer, the court has a duty and indeed an obligation to intervene where the position taken by the employer is unreasonable and not founded on reasons that go beyond mere suspicion. If employers were to act against employees on mere suspicion of misconduct, the environment at the workplace would become chaotic, uncertain, and untenable, hence not conducive for optimum productivity.” (Emphasis ours) 21.Procedurally, the Claimant submitted that the Respondent violated section 41 of the Employment Act, as he was ambushed with witness statements at the hearing, denied cross-examination rights, and given less than 24 hours to prepare, contrary to the standards set in Anthony Mkala Chitavi v Malindi Water & Sewerage Co. Ltd [2013] eKLR, David Wanjau Muhoro v Ol Pejeta Ranching Limited [2014] KEELRC 296 (KLR), Kenfreight (E.A) Limited v Benson K. Nguti [2016] KECA 409 (KLR), Mary Chemweno Kiptui v Kenya Pipeline Company Limited [2014] KEELRC 905 (KLR), and Postal Corporation of Kenya v Tanui [2019] KECA 489 (KLR). The appellate process was perfunctory, confirming bias and predetermination. 22.Consequently, the dismissal was unlawful, and under Sections 49 and 50 of the Employment Act, the Claimant seeks remedies, including three months’ salary in lieu of notice amounting to Kshs.1,020,180.72/=, twelve months’ salary as damages amounting to Kshs.4,080,722.88/=, severance pay for 20 years, amounting to Kshs.6,801,204.80/=, and exemplary damages of Kshs.1,000,000/=, fortified by the principle in Bank of Baroda (Kenya) Limited v Timwood Products Ltd [2008] KECA 350 (KLR) on oppressive and arbitrary employer conduct. 23.The Claimant thus prays that this Honourable Court finds the dismissal unfair, wrongful, and unlawful, and grants the reliefs sought. Respondent’s submissions 24.The Respondent submitted that it has discharged its statutory burden under Sections 43, 44(3), 44(4)(c) and (e), and 45 of the Employment Act, 2007, by proving that the Claimant’s conduct amounted to gross misconduct and a fundamental breach of the contract of service. The cumulative incidents processing valiant leaf without sortation, presiding over uncompensated overtime and Sunday work, unauthorized acting appointments, and failure to maintain accurate records constituted wilful neglect, insubordination, and governance breakdown, thereby justifying summary dismissal. The proportionality of the sanction is supported by the principle that senior managers bear heightened accountability, and the disciplinary committee’s deliberations fell within the “range of reasonable responses” contemplated by law. 25.On procedural fairness, the Respondent submitted that it complied with section 41 of the Employment Act, as clarified in Postal Corporation of Kenya v Andrew K. Tanui(Supra) and Patrick Abuya v Institute of Certified Public Accountants of Kenya (ICPAK) & another [2015] KEELRC 154 (KLR), which held that employers are not required to conduct mini-trials but must notify, explain, and allow response. The Claimant was served with a Notice to Show Cause dated 23rd August 2024, and responded in writing via a letter dated 27th August 2024, and attended a hearing held on 4th September 2024, thus satisfying statutory requirements. 26.The Claimant submitted that the reliefs sought are legally inadmissible: notice pay is extinguished under section 44 of the Employment Act, severance is only payable in redundancy under section 40 of the Employment Act, and exemplary damages are excluded by D.K. Njagi Marete v Teachers Service Commission [2020] KECA 840 (KLR). The Supreme Court in Kenfreight (EA) Ltd v Benson Nguti [2019] KESC 79 (KLR) reaffirmed that remedies under section 49 of the Employment Act are structured and discretionary, not open-ended. 27.Accordingly, the Respondent prays that the Claimant’s Memorandum of Claim be dismissed with costs, or in the alternative, any award be minimal and strictly guided by the statutory factors under section 49(4) of the Employment Act. Analysis and determination 28.The court has considered the pleadings together with submissions; the issues for determination are as follows:a.Whether the Respondent accorded the Claimant a fair hearing in accordance with section 41 of the Employment Act;b.If (a) above is affirmative, whether the Claimant is entitled to the relief sought; andc.Who should bear the costs of the suit 29.For fair termination to take place, there must be substantive justification and procedural fairness as set out in sections 41, 43 and 45(2) of the Employment Act. In Walter Ogal Anuro V Teachers Service Commission [2013] KEELRC 386 (KLR), the court held as follows:“However, for a termination to pass the fairness test, it must be shown that there was not only substantive justification for the termination but also procedural fairness”. 30.In Benson K Nguti v Kenfreight [E.A] Limited [2014] eKLR the Court of Appeal held that;“Section 41 of the Employment Act provides that before an employer terminates the employment of an employee on ground of misconduct, poor performance or incapacity, the employer must explain to the employee the reason for the intended termination. The said explanation must be in a language of the claimant's understanding, and the claimant must be given the option of being accompanied by a fellow worker or shop floor union representative of his choice. The said provision further requires, in mandatory terms, that the employee and his companion must be accorded an opportunity to air their case in defence before a final decision is made to terminate the employment......In addition, Section 45(2) (a) and (b) of the Employment Act provides that an employer shall not terminate the employment of an employee except on ground of a fair and valid reason. A fair reason is defined by the said Section 45(2) (a) and (b) as one that relates to the employee's conduct, capacity and compatibility, or based on the operational requirements of the employer. Section 43 (a) and 47(5) of the Employment Act puts on the employer the burden of proving the reason for termination in a claim arising out of the termination of employment as it is herein” 31.The Claimant all his employment life at the Respondent’s organisation was a top performer who used to get several occolads from 2010 to 2024. He got his first letter of appointment on 11th March 2005 effective to 1st April, 2005. From that date he received a number of promotions. In August 2021 he was transferred to Jamji village and he continued working as plant manager with no incidents. 32.It was on 13th August 2024 he received a Notice to show cause with various accusations among others, processing valiant leaf without sortation which impacted the quality of the tea. He was also accused of allocating more work to the employees and would not pay their overtime allowance. He was accused of calling employees to work on Sundays and without compensation. 33.He responded and explained the issues raised in the Notice to show cause. He was then invited for a Disciplinary hearing on 2nd September 2024. The hearing took place on 4th September 2024. At the hearing the Claimant was accused of the same issues raised in his show cause letter and was said to have contravened Sections 44(3) and 44(4) of the Employment Act. 34.The court observed that it was not clear what acts of negligence the Claimant was found to have committed as per the minutes of the Disciplinary meeting. 35.There are minutes between a person referred as an investigator and witnesses. There is no clarity on any complaints by the witnesses or how the investigator got to know the accusations against the Claimant. The Claimant in the meeting affirmed the sortation of leaves was happening. The Claimant and his representative in their concluding remarks during the hearing affirmed improvement in the Jamji factory. The Claimant affirmed he was ready to continue improving the work relationship.The representative of the Claimant Daniel Koske said they had not given extra work to the staff and as well to add to their normal duties. 36.On 6th September 2024, the Claimant was issued with a summary dismissal letter. He appealed the dismissal on 13th September 2024 and even pleaded for pardon if he had wronged the Respondent unintentionally. The appeal was dismissed and his dismissal was upheld. 37.His terminal dues were:-1.Salary upto 6th September 2024.2.Prorata leave earned and not utilised upto 6th September 2024.3.Staff Pension Benefits and Certificate of Service. 38.The court is of the view that the Claimant was not accorded a fair hearing as required under Section 41 of the Employment Act, thereby contravening the Employment Act as well as the Fair Administrative Action Act. The court emphasizes that the twin requirements of Sections 41 and 43 must operate together, and one cannot stand without the other. While the allegations against the Claimant may have been genuine, the Respondent failed to provide him with the necessary documents, including witness statements, during the disciplinary hearing. Instead, the statements were merely read out, denying the Claimant the right to engage the witnesses as the allegations raised were personal to the witnesses. Proper procedure requires charges to be read, witnesses to be availed for any clarification, and the accused to be given liberty to cross‑examine before presenting a defence, which the Respondent failed to observe. The company’s own policy clearly sets out this procedure, yet it was disregarded. 39.In the case of Osire -vs- Mega Pack K Ltd Cause 66 of 2018 the court held:-“Section 43(2) of the Act deserves a second look before the court decides on the substance of dismissal. What the employer is required to have is genuine belief that the employee has misconducted himself or herself in the alleged manner, even if such believe later on turns out to be untrue. However, the belief must be genuine and not based on malicious, discriminative, speculative, weird, whimsical, and capricious allegations.What this court understands to be the totality of the genuine belief imperative is that the employer should have some prima facie evidence that the employee has engaged in misconduct that deserves disciplinary action. For such a belief to exist, the employer ought to have carried out some reasonable investigation and gathered the evidence against the employee. In my opinion, mere suspicion cannot be a ground for taking disciplinary action that may lead to dire consequences, including dismissal as it happened in this cause.Inasmuch as the test is partly subjective on the part of the employer, this court holds the view that the belief should be genuine and reasonable founded on prima facie evidence. While it is not the duty of this court to substitute its view for that of the employer, the court has a duty and indeed an obligation to intervene where the position taken by the employer is unreasonable and not founded on reasons that go beyond mere suspicion. If employers were to act against employees on mere suspicion of misconduct, the environment at the workplace would become chaotic, uncertain, and untenable, hence not conducive for optimum productivity.” 40.The Claimant was charged with disobeying lawful orders and neglecting to perform his duties. These are generalised allegations and are not supported by documentary or viva voce evidence except the written statements of people who were interviewed by the investigator in the absence of the Claimant. 41.The court finds the Respondent failed to prove valid reasons for dismissal contrary to Section 45(1) of the Employment Act 2007. 42.Having considered the pleadings, submissions and case laws the court is satisfied the Claimant was unfairly and wrongfully dismissed. 43.For the remedies, the court awards the Claimant: -(1)Two months’ salary in lieu of notice in accordance with his two contracts of Employment Act, amounting to Kshs.680,120/48.(2)For compensation for unfair termination in accordance with Section 49(1)(c) of the Employment Act, the court awards 5 months' compensation, which will be calculated as follows:Kshs.340,060.24 X 5= 1,700,301/20(3)The court will decline to award severance pay as it is not provided in the contract letter and this is not a redundancy termination.(4)Respondent to issue the Claimant with a certificate of service in accordance with section 51 of the Employment Act.(5)Total awarded is Kshs.2,380,421/68 plus interest at 14% per annum from date of this judgment till full payment.(6)In exercise of its inherent discretion, the Court orders each party to bear their costs of the suit.It is so ordered. DATED, SIGNED AND DELIVERED VIRTUALLY AT NAKURU THIS 28TH DAY OF MAY, 2026.ANNA NGIBUINI MWAUREJUDGEOrderIn view of the declaration of measures restricting Court operations due to the COVID-19 pandemic and in light of the directions issued by His Lordship, the Chief Justice on 15th March 2020 and subsequent directions of 21st April 2020 that judgments and rulings shall be delivered through video conferencing or via email. They have waived compliance with Order 21 Rule 1 of the Civil Procedure Rules, which requires that all judgments and rulings be pronounced in open Court. In permitting this course, this Court has been guided by Article 159(2)(d) of the Constitution which requires the Court to eschew undue technicalities in delivering justice, the right of access to justice guaranteed to every person under Article 48 of the Constitution and the provisions of Section 1B of the Civil Procedure Act (Chapter 21 of the Laws of Kenya) which impose on this Court the duty of the Court, inter alia, to use suitable technology to enhance the overriding objective which is to facilitate just, expeditious, proportionate and affordable resolution of civil disputes.A signed copy will be availed to each party upon payment of Court fees.ANNA NGIBUINI MWAUREJUDGE