https://new.kenyalaw.org/akn/ke/judgment/kehc/2026/6579

Texas Alarms (K) Limited v Ngundu & another (Civil Appeal E044 of 2025) [2026] KEHC 6579 (KLR) (15 May 2026) (Judgment) Neutral citation: [2026] KEHC 6579 (KLR) Republic of Kenya In the High Court at Mombasa Civil Appeal E044 of 2025 J Ngaah, J May 15, 2026 Between Texas Alarms (K) Limited Appellant and Maingi Ngundu 1st Respondent Afro Kanini Maingi 2nd Respondent Judgment 1.On or about 30 August 2022, the 1st and respondent and his late wife, Lina Mulatya, were on a walkway, off Abdalla Farsey Road near Buxton area in Mombasa town when they were struck by the appellant’s motor vehicle, registration no. KCR 999C (hereinafter “the motor vehicle”). They sustained bodily injuries from which the 1st respondent’s wife came off worse; she succumbed to the injuries and died soon after the accident. 2.By a plaint dated 24 October 2022, the respondents sued the appellant for damages for the benefit of the deceased’s estate under the Law Reform Act cap. 26 and for the benefits of the deceased’s dependants under the Fatal Accidents Act, cap. 32. Of course, they sued in their respective capacities of administrator and administratrix of the deceased’s estate. 3.It was their case that the road traffic accident occurred as a result of recklessness or negligence of the appellant’s driver. Although the appellant contested the respondents’ claim, the trial court found for respondents. In his judgment delivered on 6 February 2025, the learned magistrate (Honourable Lewis Gatheru, Principal Magistrate) held that the appellant’s driver was solely responsible for the accident and, therefore, the appellant was vicariously liable. He awarded Kshs. 200,000/= under the head of special damages; Kshs. 50,000/= for pain and suffering; Kshs. 200,000/= for loss of expectation of life and Kshs. 2,754,857.66 under the head of loss of dependency. 4.The appellant was aggrieved by the learned magistrate’s decision and filed the instant appeal against it. In the memorandum of appeal dated 24 February 2025, the appellant has faulted the learned magistrate’s decision on the following grounds:“1.That the Learned Principal Magistrate erred in awarding to the Plaintiff the sum Shs.2,754.858.00 for loss of dependency in that the said sum is so excessive as amount to an erroneous estimate of the damages payable to the Plaintiff.2.That the Learned Principal Magistrate erred in adopting the multiplier/multiplicand method whilst calculating damages for the loss of dependency under the Fatal Accidents Act when, in all the circumstances of this case he ought to have applied global award method.3.That the learned Principal Magistrate erred in not holding that in the absence of any documentary and credible evidence in respect of the actual earnings of the deceased there was no evidence before the Honourable Court to assess damages for loss of dependency under the Fatal Accidents Act.4.That the Learned Principal Magistrate erred in adopting a ratio of 2/3 whilst assessing damages under the Fatal Accidents Act when he had found that deceased was married and had a husband.5.That the Learned Principal Magistrate erred in not holding that the deceased husband being the principal bread winner and natural guardian and provider for himself and their 3 minor children named in paragraph 7 of Plaint dated 24th October 2022 would adequately cater for the needs of himself the said children.6.That the Learned Principal Magistrate erred in not adopting a ratio of 1/3 while assessing damages under the Fatal Accident Act considering all the circumstances and the totality of the evidence led before him.7.That the Learned Principal Magistrate erred in law and in fact in failing to consider and take account of the fact that the deceased was survived by a 32 year old daughter who is sufficiently capable of providing for together with the support of her 53 year old father for the interest of her minor siblings in the absence of the deceased and thereby excessively reducing the dependency upon the deceased.8.That the learned principal magistrate erred in not deducting the amount awarded by him for loss of expectation of life from the amount awarded for loss of dependency under the Fatal Accidents Act.9.That the Learned Principal Magistrate erred in Law and in fact in awarding to plaintiffs a sum of Shs.50,000.00 for pain and suffering when there was clear evidence before him that the deceased died a few hours after the accident.10.That the learned Principal Magistrate erred in law and in fact in awarding to the plaintiffs an excessive sum of Shs.200,000.00 for loss of expectation of life without giving any or any adequate reasons for doing the same.11.That the Learned Principal Magistrate erred in law and in fact in making award under the various heads by failing to take into account that the general damages awarded to the plaintiffs would be invested to earn interest. If the Learned Principal Magistrate had bone (sic) that factor in mind it is reasonably possible that he would have awarded lesser amount to the plaintiffs under each head.12.That the learned Principal Magistrate erred in law in failing; -a.To appreciate the significance of the various facts that emerged from the evidence of the plaintiffs' witnesses.b.To consider or properly consider all the evidence before him and/orc.To make any or any proper findings on the aspect of quantum of damages on the evidence before him.13.That the learned principal magistrate erred in failing to consider or properly consider the written submissions filed by counsel for the defendant/appellant.” 5.Based on these grounds, the appellant has sought to have the appeal allowed and the decision of the subordinate court set aside or varied in terms that this Honourable Court will deem proper. The appellant has also asked for an order on costs. 6.It is apparent from the grounds of appeal that the appeal is against quantum of damages awarded to the respondents under the heads of loss of dependency; loss of expectation of life and pain and suffering. Thus, in evaluating the evidence afresh and coming to its own conclusions, this Honourable Court will focus its attention on the evidence pertinent to these awards. In navigating that course, this Honourable Court will always be wary of the advantage the lower court had of having heard and seen the witnesses, first hand.But first things first. 7.Whenever a question arises at the appellate stage on the quantum of damages either awarded or awardable by the trial court, the general guide is that while such an assessment is a function of the discretion of the trial court, the appellate court will be called upon to interfere or disturb the assessment if, in the exercise of its discretion, the lower court either took into account an irrelevant factor or left out a relevant factor or that the award it made was too high or too low as to amount to an erroneous estimate, or, that the assessment is based on no evidence, in any event. The Court of Appeal in Bashir Ahmed Butt v Uwais Ahmed Khan [1982-88] KAR 5 said of the discretion of the trial court in assessing damages in the following terms:“An appellate Court will not disturb an award of damages unless it is so inordinately high or low as to represent an entirely erroneous estimate. It must be shown that the Judge proceeded on wrong principles or that he misapprehended the evidence in some material respect and so arrived at a figure which was either inordinately high or low." 8.Turning to specific heads of damages, I will first deal with the appellant’s contention that “the learned principal magistrate erred in not deducting the amount awarded by him for loss of expectation of life from the amount awarded for loss of dependency under the Fatal Accidents Act.” 9.In other words, the learned magistrate is alleged to have made what would be described as a double award because she made an award under the Law Reform Act and under the Fatal Accidents Act yet the beneficiaries of both awards are alleged to be the same people. 10.This question was addressed in Kemfro Africa Limited t/a Meru Express Service, Gathogo Kanini versus A.M. Lubia & Olive Lubia (1982-88) 1KLR 727 where it was held, inter alia, that where the net benefit will be inherited by the same dependants under the Law Reform Act, that must be taken into account in the damages awarded under the Fatal Accidents Act because the loss suffered under the latter Act must be offset by the gain from the estate under the former Act. 11.This was also the position adopted by the Court of Appeal in Asal versus Muge & Another (2001) KLR 202 where the Court cited its earlier decision in Maina Kaniaru & Another versus Josephat Muriuki Wangondu, Civil Appeal No. 14 of 1989 (unreported) where it said: -“The rights conferred by section 2(5) of the Law Reform Act (Cap 26, Laws of Kenya) for the benefit of the estates of the deceased persons are stated to be “in addition to and not in derogation of any rights conferred on the dependants of the deceased persons by the Fatal Accidents Act.” This does not mean that damages can be recovered twice over but that if damages recovered under the Law Reform devolve on the dependants the same must be taken into account in reduction of the damages under the Fatal Accidents Act…” 12.All that these decisions mean is that damages in fatal accidents are recoverable under the distinct heads of the Law Reform Act and the Fatal Accidents Act. As far as the Law Reform Act is concerned the relevant provision is section 2(1) (5); it provides as follows:2.(1)Subject to the provisions of this section, on the death of any person after the commencement of this Act, all causes of action subsisting against or vested in him shall survive against, or, as the case may be, for the benefit of his estate:Provided that this subsection shall not apply to causes of action for defamation or seduction or for inducing one spouse to leave or remain apart from the other or to claims for damages on the ground of adultery.(2)…(3)…(4)…(5)The rights conferred by this Part for the benefit of the estates of deceased persons shall be in addition to and not in derogation of any rights conferred on the dependants of the deceased persons by the Fatal Accidents Act or the carriage by Air Act, 1932, of the United Kingdom, and so much of this Part as relates to causes of action against the estates of the deceased’s persons shall apply in relation to causes under those Acts as it applies in relation to other causes of action not expressly excepted from the operation of subsection (1).(underlining mine). 13.It is apparent from this provision of the law that any cause of action for the benefit of the deceased’s estate and, thus, any award that may ensue therefrom is not in substitution of or an alternative to the right that accrues to the deceased’s dependants under the Fatal Accidents Act. 14.The Fatal Accidents Act itself makes it clear as to who should benefit from any action taken under it; section 4(1) thereof states: -4.(1)Every action brought by virtue of the provisions of this Act shall be for the benefit of the wife, husband, parent and child of the person whose death was so caused, and shall, subject to the provisions of section 7, be brought by and in the name of the executor or administrator of the person deceased; and in every such action the court may award such damages as it may think proportioned to the injury resulting from the death to the persons respectively for whom and for whose benefit the action is brought; and the amount so recovered, after deducting the costs not recovered from the defendant, shall be divided amongst those persons in such shares as the court, by its judgment, shall find and direct:Provided that not more than one action shall lie for and in respect of the same subject matter of complaint and every such action shall be commenced within three years after the death of the deceased person.(2)In assessing damages, under the provisions of subsection (1), the court shall not take into account-(a)any sum paid or payable on the death of the deceased under any contract of assurance or insurance, whether made before or after passing of this Act;(b)any widow’s or orphans pension or allowance payable or any sum payable under any contributory pension or other scheme declared by the Minister, by notice published in the Gazette, to be a scheme for the purpose of this paragraph. 15.That an action is maintainable under the Fatal Accidents Act for the benefit a deceased person’s wife, husband, parent or child is beyond dispute. Where such an action is viable, the trial court has the discretion, as is it always has, to determine the amount of damages payable. Subsection (2) provides some guide as what ought not to be considered in exercising discretion in the assessment of damages under this head. One thing that is clear is that the provision does not provide any general or specific guidelines of what should be considered. My thinking is that this omission is deliberate so as to leave the trial court with sufficient latitude within which it can exercise its discretion in the assessment of damages taking into account the peculiar circumstances of each individual case that come before it. 16.It is upon this understanding that while an award under the head of loss of dependency may be “reduced” as was suggested by the Court of Appeal in Maina Kaniaru & Another versus Josephat Muriuki Wangondu (supra) because an award has been made under the Law Reform Act it cannot be done away with altogether. The fact that those who are likely to benefit from the deceased’s estate are the same people who will benefit from any claim under the Fatal Accidents Act is only factor to be considered in the extent of damages to be made; it is not a reason to reject a claim for an award for loss of dependency. 17.Another Court of Appeal decision that sheds light on this question is Kemfro Africa Limited t/a “Meru Express Services (1976)” & another v Lubia & another (No 2) [1985] KECA 137 (KLR). The court here was categorical that it was sufficient that a trial court “takes into account” damages paid under the Law Reform Act in assessment of damages under the Fatal Accidents Act. “Taking into account” does not necessarily mean reducing the award made under the Fatal Accidents Act by a margin of the award or awards made under the Law Reform Act. The Court held as follows:“And did the Judge take account of the assessment for the estate under the Law Reform Act when it came to that for Lubia under the Fatal Accidents Act? He added all the assessments together, it is true, but, in my judgment, an arithmetical deduction need not be set out as for an examination answer. The test is whether or not this Court can be satisfied the Judge remembered before he assessed the loss for Lubia at Kshs 150,000 that Lubia would inherit the Kshs 25,000 from Myra’s estate? In my view he did and I base that on the way in which he directed himself and the sum he awarded Lubia under the Fatal Accidents Act which even if the Kshs 25,000 under the Law Reform Act were not taken into account was not manifestly excessive.”(per Kneller, J.A.) 18.Adding his voice to this position was Chesoni, J.A, who held as follows:“To be taken into account and to be deducted are two different things. The words used in s. 4(2) of the Fatal Accidents Act are “taken into account”. The section says what should not be taken into account and not necessarily deducted. For me it is enough if the judgment of the lower Court shows that in reaching the figure awarded under the Fatal Accidents Act the trial judge bore in mind or considered what he had awarded under the Law Reform Act for the non-pecuniary loss. There is no requirement in law or otherwise for him to engage in a mathematical deduction as suggested by Mr Barasa.” 19.In Silverstone Quarry Limited & Another versus Beatrice Mukulu Kang’uta & Another, (2020) KECA 867 (KLR) the Court of Appeal established as a fact in awarding a claimant the sum of Kshs. 946, 496 under the head of loss of dependency, the High Court did not take into account the award made under the Law Reform Act. The court, therefore, took into account the award made under the Law Reform Act and adjusted the award under the Fatal Accidents Act to Kshs. 900,000/=. 20.Against this background, the question that arises is whether in making the award under the head of loss of dependency, the learned magistrate took into account the award made under the Law Reform Act. As noted earlier in this judgment, the learned magistrate awarded the sum of Kshs. 2,754,858 under loss of dependency. He arrived at this figure by adopting a multiplicand of Kshs. 15,652.60 and a multiplier of 22 years. The learned magistrate held that the deceased spent a larger share of her income on the family and, therefore, applied a dependency ration of two-thirds. 21.In making this award the learned magistrate did not make any reference whatsoever to the awards made under the Law Reform Act. There is, therefore, some force and, of course, merit, in the appellant’s submissions that the award under the head of loss of dependency is tainted to the extent that the learned magistrate did not give due consideration to the awards made under the Law Reform Act. In short, the learned magistrate made an error of principle and, for this reason, this Honourable Court would be entitled to interfere with the learned magistrate’s exercise of discretion in his award under the head of loss of dependency. 22.The appellant has also faulted the award under this head for being excessive because the learned magistrate adopted the multiplicand and multiplier method in calculating the award yet there was no documentary and credible evidence that the deceased earned a regular income. This aspect of the appellant’s appeal is captured in grounds 1,2 and 3 of the grounds of appeal. 23.The 1st respondent’s evidence on the deceased’s earnings was as follows:“We used to weave baskets. It’s a casual jua kali job and so no receipts to support the job…As said we had no papers to the business as its jua kali.” 24.Where a deceased’s income is unascertainable, it has been held that the multiplier approach is inappropriate. In Mwanzia v Ngalali Mutua and Kenya Bus Services (Msa) Ltd & Another which was quoted with approval in Albert Odawa v Gichimu Gichenji NKU HCCA No. 15 of 2003[2007] eKLR, Ringera, J. as he then was stated as follows:“The multiplier approach is just a method of assessing damages. It is not a principle of law or a dogma. It can, and must be abandoned, where the facts do not facilitate its application. It is plain that it is a useful and practical method where factors such as the age of the deceased, the amount of annual or monthly dependency, and the expected length of the dependency are known or are knowable without undue speculation where that is not possible, to insist on the multiplier approach would be to sacrifice justice on the altar of methodology, something a Court of Justice should never do.” 25.The same principle was adopted in Mary Khayesi Awalo & Another v Mwilu Malungu & Another ELD HCCC No. 19 of 1997 [1999] eKLR where Nambuye J., stated that: -“As regards the income of the deceased there are no bank statements showing his earnings. Both counsels have made an estimate of the same using no figures. In the court's opinion that will be mere conjecture. It is better to opt for the principle of a lump sum award instead of estimating his income in the absence of proper accounting books.” 26.In Beatrice Wangui Thairu v Hon. Ezekiel Barngetuny & Another Nairobi HCCC No. 1638 of 1988 (UR) where Ringera J. (as he then was) addressed this issue and stated as follows:“The principles applicable to an assessment of damages under the Fatal Accidents Act are all too clear. The court must in the first instance find out the value of the annual dependency. Such value is usually called the multiplicand. In determining the same, the important figure is the net earnings of the deceased. The court should then multiply the multiplicand by a reasonable figure representing so many years. In choosing the said figure, usually called the multiplier, the court must bear in mind the expectation of earning life of the deceased, the expectation of life and dependency of the dependants and the chances of life of the deceased and dependants. The sum thus arrived at must then be discounted to allow the legitimate considerations such as the fact that the award is being received in a lump sum and would if wisely invested yield returns of an income nature.” 27.Even then, if a multiplicand cannot be ascertained, for whatever reason, it does not necessarily follow that the deceased would be deemed to have never earned or could not have made any earnings in future for the rest of his life. In Jacob Ayiga Maruja & Another v Simeon Obayo, Civil Appeal No. 167 of 2002 [2005] eKLR, a decision which the learned magistrate relied upon in assessment of the loss of the award under the head of loss of dependency, the Court of Appeal held that: -“We do not subscribe to the view that the only way to prove the profession of a person must be by production of certificates and that the only way of proving earning is equally the production of documents. That kind of stand would do a lot of injustice to very many Kenyans who are even illiterate, keep no records and yet earn their livelihood in various ways. If documentary evidence is available, that is well and good. But we reject any contention that only documentary evidence can prove these things.” 28.Where a deceased person’s income cannot be determined with any measure of certainty for want of documentation or for any other reason, the award for loss of dependency may be pegged on the government wage guidelines issued from time to time or, in the alternative, the court may award a global sum. Two of the several decisions from the Court of Appeal on this issue affirm the position that wage guidelines may be adopted in computing loss of dependency in circumstances where the deceased’s income is not ascertainable. 29.In Nyauma & another (Suing as the administrators on behalf of Beatrice Moraa Nyamboki) versus Mwakaya (Civil Appeal 27 of 2020) [2026] KECA 348 (KLR) (27 February 2026) (Judgment) the Court of Appeal adopted this position in a second appeal to the Court. It held as follows:“23.In the present appeal, the trial court adopted a multiplicand of Kshs.15,000 based on oral evidence that the deceased was a businesswoman earning approximately Kshs.30,000 per month. The first appellate court, however, substituted this with the general minimum wage guidelines of Kshs.10,000, citing lack of documentary proof directly linking the income to the deceased. It also deducted the award for loss of expectation of life on the basis that it had not been factored into the dependency computation and to avoid double compensation.24.The appellants argue that this was an unwarranted interference with the trial court’s discretion. However, the first appellate Court was entitled to re-evaluate the evidentiary basis of the trial court’s awards, and in doing so, it applied the correct legal standard. In Silverstone Quarry Ltd & Manji Hirji Chhabhandiya v Beatrice Mukulu Kang’uta & Zakayo Mwaka Muthoka(supra), this Court held that in the absence of credible proof of income, the court is entitled to apply the gazetted minimum wage guidelines. The deceased’s occupation was inconsistently described either as a trader and or a farmer, and no reliable evidence was adduced to establish her actual earnings and profession. The first appellate Court’s approach was therefore well grounded in law, and we find no error in principle to warrant our interference.” 30.And in Silverstone Quarry Limited & Another versus Beatrice Mukulu Kang’uta & Another, (supra)The Court of Appeal held that:“24.The evidence that was adduced by the respondents that the deceased was working as a mason was not disputed. What the applicant took issue with, was the alleged daily income of Kshs. 800. No documents were adduced nor was the court informed where the deceased was working. In the circumstances, although the appellants were not obliged to produce documents to confirm the deceased’s employment and income, it was reasonable that the court applies the gazetted minimum wage for masons, as there was nothing to substantiate the allegation that the deceased was earning more than the minimum provided by law. We concur with the appellant that the minimum wage of Kshs. 11,831.20 should have been used as the multiplicand.” 31.Turning back to the appellant’s case, the learned magistrate pegged the multiplicand on the minimum wage applicable at the time he rendered his judgement and held:“The evidence is that the couple was engaged in some form of economic activity i.e. they were artisans but no proof of gradation. Hence I shall adopt the Kshs. 15,652.60 as per 2022 Regulation of Wages (General) (Amendment) Order for ungraded artisan.” 32.In view of the Court of Appeal decisions I have highlighted, there was nothing wrong in the learned magistrate adopting the minimum monthly wage as the multiplicand in the absence of any evidence that the deceased was in any formal employment or that she earned a regular income. I only need to clarify that the minimum wage the learned magistrate adopted was for a general labourer and not for ungraded artisan. According to Regulation of Wages (General) (Amendment) Order, 2022 published by the cabinet Secretary for Labour in Gazette Notice No. 114 of 1 July 2022, the minimum monthly wage for a general labourer, exclusive of house allowance, was Kshs. 15, 201.65. 33.An ungraded artisan’s minimum salary for an ungraded artisan working in Mombasa was indicated in that notice as Kshs. 20,517.85. The respondent did not pursue this issue by way of a cross-appeal and, therefore, I will do well not to interrogate it any further. However, the figure provided in the Gazatte Notice as the minimum monthly wage is Kshs. 15, 201.65 and not Kshs. 15,650.60 as stated by the learned magistrate. 34.The last issue on the questions the appellant has raised over the award under the head of loss of dependency is on the dependency ratio. The appellant argues in its submissions that that no proof was provided that the deceased had any dependants. In the alternative, it was submitted that a dependency ratio of 1/3 could be applied instead of the 2/3 ratio which the learned magistrate adopted. 35.In their plaint, the respondents pleaded that the deceased was survived by five dependants, including the respondents who are respectively the husband and the step-daughter to the deceased. The other three were listed as Margaret Yaa, daughter aged 16, Mumbi Maingi, daughter, aged 14, and Boniface Mulatya, son aged two. 36.The 1st respondent testimony on the deceased’s dependants was as follows:“We didn’t have any marriage certificate but I have blessings from elders as we had a traditional customary law… Proof that my wife used to pay fee is in Kitui not in court. My first born is now 18 years old and finished form IV and I have the last one in standard 7 and is 13 years old.” 37.Of the named dependants, only the deceased’s husband testified. The 2nd respondent who was said to be over 30 years and a step-daughter did not testify; neither did the alleged deceased’s son whom the 1st respondent described as his first born and whom he stated was aged “18 years and finished form IV”. The only other child who was presented as a witness (because his witness statement was filed in court) was Bonface Musyoka Maingi but he too did not testify. 38.It is not mandatory that every person named as a dependant must testify to prove their existence; however, where it is disputed and denied, as it was in the respondents’ case, that the alleged dependants not only existed but also that they relied on the deceased for their upkeep, some form evidence in proof of these facts was necessary. The deceased’s children who are of age and who depended on the deceased ought to have testified, at the very least, to satisfy the court that the deceased was their bread winner. I would excuse the minors for not testifying but I gather from the 1st respondent’s evidence that there was only one minor left, said to be 13 years old at the time he testified. 39.It was also the 1st respondent’s evidence that he worked together with his wife and, therefore, taken at his own word, he cannot be said to have depended on the deceased. Taking all these factors into consideration, I would agree with the appellant that the deceased would have spent a third of her income on the family and, thus, the trial court ought to have adopted a dependency ratio of one third and not two thirds in assessing the loss of dependency. 40.Bearing in mind the law on the award of damages under the head of loss of dependency and, taking all these factors into account the award ought to have been computed as follows:Kshs. (15, 201.65 x 12 x 22 x 1/3) = Kshs. 1,337,745.20 41.The amount of awards made under Law Reform Act for the benefit of the deceased’s estate are rather minimal and except for the minor child and the deceased’s husband, the rest of the beneficiaries of the deceased’s estate will not benefit as her dependants. For this reason, I see no basis for reducing the award under loss of dependency. 42.Besides the appellant’s grievances with the damages awarded under the head of loss of dependency, the appellant has also faulted the award on loss of expectation of life which, in its view, was excessive. 43.Damages under the head of loss of expectation of life are more or else an estimate of the quality of the deceased’s future but for the accident that terminated his or her life. The award has been described as ‘unreal’ or ‘arbitrary’ but all the same, it is usually made in deserving cases. In Kemfro Africa Limited t/a Meru Express Service, Gathogo Kanini versus A.M. Lubia & Olive Lubia (1982-88) 1KLR 727 Kneller, JA said of this award in the following terms:“What has to be valued is the loss of the victims’ prospective happiness which Viscount Simmonds in Benham versus Gambling (1941) AC 157 said ‘might seem more suitable for discussion in an essay on Aristotelian ethics than in a judgment in a court of law’ and because it is an unreal arbitrary award it usually is the current conventional sum…It was £200 in 1941 and £500 in 1968.” (See page 730).” 44.The award made here is always conventional in the sense that it is pegged on similar awards that have been made in the past. It is an award that is ordinarily made on the assumption that the deceased had the prospects of a happy life. For a long time in this country, this award has always been in the region of Kshs 100,000 to Kshs 150,000. For instance, in HCCA No. 52 of 2001, Salim Golamali T/A Kalenjin Auto Hardware versus Lucas Nyongesa where Kshs. 120,000/= was awarded as general damages for loss of expectation of life and in Civil Appeal No. 144 of 1990 Kenya Breweries versus Ali Kahindi Saro where an award of Kshs 100,000/= was made under this head. In High Court Civil Appeal No. 15 of 2003, Albert Odawa versus Gichimu Gichenji an award of Kshs 100,000/= was made in compensation for loss of expectation of life; and in Nakuru High Court Civil Case No. 437 of 1996, Jackson Magata Kuritu versus Cheruiyot Keter the sum of Kshs. 150,000/= was awarded under this head. 45.Taking the inflationary trends that have tended towards lowering the value of the Kenyan Shilling, the award of Kshs. 200,000/= under the head of loss of expectation of life cannot be considered as excessive or inordinately high. I am not prepared to fault the learned magistrate and interfere with the award he made under this head. 46.The final award by which the appellant was aggrieved is the award under the head of pain and suffering. In fatal injury claims, damages under this head are for the pain and suffering the victim endured between the time he sustained the injury and his demise; the damages tend to be more substantial if the victim dies long after the accident. The converse is true, where death is immediate or almost immediate, the award tends to be much less. 47.According to the post-mortem report, the deceased died while undergoing treatment but on the same day that the accident happened. There is no doubt that the deceased must have endured pain before her death. The learned magistrate awarded Kshs. 50, 000/= under this head which, in my humble view, is reasonable. I will not disturb the award. 48.In the final analysis, only the award under the head of loss of dependency will be disturbed and the appeal is hereby allowed to that extent. For the avoidance of doubt judgment is entered for the respondents against the appellant as follows:a.Loss of dependency Kshs. 1,337,745.20b.Loss of expectation of life Kshs. 200,000.00c.Pain and suffering Kshs. 50,000.00d.Special damages Kshs. 200,000.00Total Kshs. 1,787,745.20 49.Considering that the appeal has partly succeeded, parties will bear their respective costs of the appeal but the respondents will have costs of the suit in the lower court. Interest on the net award and costs shall be calculated at court rates from the date of the judgment in lower court till payment in full. Orders accordingly. SIGNED, DATED AND DELIVERED ON 15 MAY 2026NGAAH JAIRUSJUDGE