https://new.kenyalaw.org/akn/ke/judgment/kehc/2026/10716

Edvinsson v Murugi (Civil Appeal E918 of 2025) [2026] KEHC 10716 (KLR) (Civ) (16 July 2026) (Judgment) Neutral citation: [2026] KEHC 10716 (KLR) Republic of Kenya In the High Court at Nairobi (Milimani Law Courts) Civil Civil Appeal E918 of 2025 BW Murunga, J July 16, 2026 Between Tim Edvinsson Appellant and Joseph Mweru Murugi Respondent (Being an Appeal from the Ruling and Order of the Chief Magistrate's Court at Nairobi in Milimani CMCC No. E696 of 2025 – Hon. Selina M. Muchungi (SRM), delivered on 8th August 2025) Judgment 1.‘We have taken the heavy decision to stop Diplomatic Immunity’.That was the message posted on the social media platform Facebook on 26th April 2024 by Jeppe Ulrichsen, Magnus Bersang and Emil Kristensen comprising the grunge band called Diplomatic Immunity whom aficionados of motion pictures will recall took their name from Lethal Weapon 2 and whose repertoire of songs included some of the greatest hits known in the music scene.But this case is about another kind of diplomatic immunity and a different kind of hit. The Appellant, who is claiming diplomatic immunity, is alleged to have hit the Respondent in a road traffic accident. 2.Rather than the cheeky reference to the defunct band in an amusing play on words, diplomatic immunity is one of the oldest and most fiercely guarded doctrines in the law of nations. It is also a useful reminder of how casually the phrase travels in ordinary conversation, and how exactingly it must be handled once it arrives, as it now has, in a court of law. 3.The Appellant, who claims the protection of diplomatic immunity, is alleged to have collided with the Respondent, a motorcyclist, on a Nairobi road. What began as an ordinary traffic dispute has grown, through the discipline of litigation, into a contest over the outer boundaries of one of the most venerable institutions of international law and, more particularly, over the deceptively simple question whether that immunity bends to the character of the act complained of, or stands upon the status of the person who committed it. 4.The Respondent instituted suit before the subordinate court vide a Plaint dated 7th February 2025, seeking compensation for injuries sustained in a road traffic accident that occurred on or about 14th November 2024 at the intersection of Convent Drive and James Gichuru Road, Nairobi, when a motorcycle he was riding collided with the Appellant's motor vehicle as the Appellant executed a right turn. 5.The Respondent's case, as pleaded, was that the collision was occasioned by the Appellant's negligent driving of the motor vehicle, resulting in bodily harm to the Respondent. 6.Upon being served with the suit papers, the Appellant entered a Conditional Memorandum of Appearance under protest dated 16th April 2025, filed a Statement of Defence under protest dated 30th April 2025, and thereafter, by a Notice of Motion dated 29th April 2025, sought to strike out the suit in limine on the sole but solid ground that he enjoys diplomatic immunity. 7.The Appellant's case was, and remains, that he is the spouse of Ms. Linda Pedersen, First Secretary and Deputy Head of Administration and Consular Affairs at the Embassy of Sweden in Nairobi, and that by virtue of Article 37(1) of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, 1961 (“the Vienna Convention”), read together with the Privileges and Immunities Act (Cap. 179 of the Laws of Kenya), he is entitled to immunity from civil jurisdiction coextensive with that of a diplomatic agent, and that this immunity has not been waived by the Kingdom of Sweden. 8.The Respondent opposed the application, contending that diplomatic immunity is not absolute; that it does not extend to private acts unconnected with official diplomatic functions; that the accident arose from the Appellant's negligent driving in a purely private capacity; and that the doctrine of restrictive immunity confines protection to the former. The Respondent further contended that a blanket application of immunity would unjustifiably limit his rights under Articles 48 and 25(c) of the Constitution. 9.In her Ruling delivered on 8th August 2025, the learned trial Magistrate, Hon. Selina M. Muchungi (SRM), dismissed the Application to Strike Out, holding, in substance, that: (i) there was no suggestion that the Appellant was performing a state or official function at the time of the accident; (ii) the Appellant had failed to demonstrate any justification for limiting the Respondent's right of access to justice; and (iii) there was no evidence that continuation of the proceedings would hinder the Appellant from performing official functions or meeting Kenya's obligations under international law. 10.Being aggrieved, the Appellant preferred the present Appeal, setting out seven grounds in his Memorandum of Appeal dated 6th September 2025, which may conveniently be summarised as follows –(a)The learned Magistrate failed to appreciate the mandatory nature of Articles 31 and 37(1) of the Vienna Convention, which grant members of a diplomatic agent's household immunity equivalent to that of the diplomatic agent.(b)The learned Magistrate erroneously held that diplomatic immunity under the Vienna Convention is limited to acts performed in an official capacity, whereas Articles 31 and 37(1) extend full immunity from civil jurisdiction without functional qualification.(c)The learned Magistrate failed to strike out the suit despite the existence of an absolute bar in the form of unwaived diplomatic immunity.(d)The learned Magistrate disregarded binding precedent affirming that diplomatic immunity under Cap. 179 is absolute unless expressly waived by the sending State.(e)The learned Magistrate erred in purporting to balance the Respondent's right of access to justice under Article 48 of the Constitution against the Appellant's immunity, contrary to the Supreme Court's holding that diplomatic immunity is a constitutionally permissible limitation on that right.(f)The learned Magistrate impermissibly shifted the burden of proof onto the Appellant to show that the suit would hinder diplomatic functions, despite immunity being status-based and requiring no such proof.(g)The learned Magistrate failed to appreciate the arguments, points of law and jurisprudence raised by the Appellant, arriving at a decision unsupported by the material before the court. 11.The appeal was canvassed by way of written submissions. The Appellant filed his initial submissions dated 9th March 2026 and, pursuant to this Court's directions of 22nd May 2026, further submissions dated 3rd June 2026; the Respondent filed submissions dated 25th March 2026. 12.The Appellant submitted that the learned Magistrate erred in law by failing to appreciate that diplomatic immunity under Articles 31(1) and 37(1) of the Vienna Convention is mandatory and status-based; that once protected status is demonstrated, the court has no discretion to decline effect to it save within the three narrow exceptions expressly listed in Article 31(1); and that the trial court impermissibly introduced an “official capacity” qualification that finds no textual support in Article 37(1). 13.The Appellant maintained that, as the spouse of a diplomatic agent forming part of her household, he enjoys immunity from civil jurisdiction coextensive with that of Ms. Pedersen herself, and that this immunity is status-based rather than conduct-based, extending even to civil claims arising from ordinary private conduct such as a road traffic accident. 14.The Appellant further submitted that the trial court erred in undertaking a fresh constitutional balancing exercise between diplomatic immunity and the Respondent's right of access to justice, contending that Kandie v Alassane BA & another (Petition 2 of 2015) [2017] KESC 13 (KLR) affirms diplomatic immunity as a constitutionally permissible limitation on Article 48 rights, foreclosing any need for a subordinate court to reopen that balance case by case. 15.In his supplementary submissions of 3rd June 2026, the Appellant disputed, in the alternative and without prejudice to his objection that the point was raised too late, the Respondent's contention that Ms. Pedersen belongs to the administrative and technical staff. He maintained that she holds the diplomatic rank of First Secretary, formally recognised as such by the Government of Kenya through her Diplomatic Identity Card, and that this rank, not her administrative portfolio, governs her classification under the Vienna Convention. 16.The Appellant prayed that the appeal be allowed, the Ruling of the subordinate court set aside, the Respondent's suit struck out for want of jurisdiction, and costs of the appeal and of the proceedings below awarded to him. 17.The Respondent opposed the appeal, framing four issues for determination: whether the Appellant had proved that he was the spouse of a diplomat entitled to immunity; whether he enjoyed immunity from the present civil proceedings; whether the trial court had properly exercised its discretion; and whether the appeal was, in the result, meritorious. 18.The Respondent argued that the Appellant's own documentary evidence undermined his claim: the identity card annexed to his affidavit identified his spouse as “Deputy Head of Administration and Consular Affairs,” placing her, on the Respondent's reading of Article 1(f) of the Vienna Convention, within the administrative and technical staff rather than the diplomatic staff, and consequently subjecting the Appellant to the narrower, functional immunity available under Article 37(2) rather than Article 37(1). 19.The Respondent further submitted that, even on the Appellant's own case, the immunity available under Article 37(2) does not extend to acts performed outside the course of official duties, and that a road traffic accident occasioned while driving in a private capacity falls squarely outside any such protection. Reliance was placed on section 16 of Cap. 179 for the proposition that a Cabinet Secretary's certificate, or its equivalent, was required to establish diplomatic status, and that stamped passports alone did not suffice. 20.On the nature of immunity generally, the Respondent submitted that the Vienna Convention exists to facilitate the efficient functioning of missions, not to shield individuals from the consequences of private wrongdoing, and that both the Convention and Kenyan jurisprudence citing Theuri Kihira v Gerhard Matthiessen [2019] eKLR and Isaji v Avihama & another (Civil Appeal E509 of 2021) [2024] KEHC 2107 (KLR) recognise a doctrine of restrictive or functional immunity under which protection does not extend to private conduct, including road traffic accidents. 21.On the trial court's exercise of discretion, the Respondent contended that the learned Magistrate acted within jurisdiction in weighing the Appellant's claimed immunity against the Respondent's rights under Articles 24 and 259 of the Constitution, and had not thereby purported to invalidate any treaty. The Respondent urged this Court to dismiss the appeal with costs. Analysis 22.Three questions fall for determination in this Appeal:a.First, whether the Appellant's spouse is a “diplomatic agent” within Article 1(e) of the Vienna Convention, such that the Appellant falls within Article 37(1) rather than the narrower protection of Article 37(2);b.Second, and at the very heart of this Appeal, whether the immunity conferred by Article 37(1) extends to private acts – including an ordinary road traffic accident – or is confined, as the learned Magistrate held, to acts performed in an official capacity; andc.Third, what legal consequence follows for the Respondent's claim if this appellate Court were to find that the Appellant is immune from the jurisdiction of the Kenyan courts. 23.The Vienna Convention forms part of the law of Kenya. Kenya ratified it on 1st July 1965 and gave it domestic effect through the Privileges and Immunities Act (Cap. 179), section 3 of which incorporates the Articles set out in the First Schedule to the Act into Kenyan law. 24.The Constitution of Kenya, 2010 has since reinforced that status: Article 2(5) provides that the general rules of international law form part of the law of Kenya, and Article 2(6) provides that any treaty or convention ratified by Kenya forms part of the law of Kenya under the Constitution. The Supreme Court confirmed in Kandie v Alassane BA & another (Petition 2 of 2015) [2017] KESC 13 (KLR) that Article 2(6) operates retrospectively to draw pre-2010 treaty obligations, such as this Convention, into the fold of Kenya's constitutional order. 25.It is worth pausing to recall why any of this matters, before descending into the text of individual Articles. Diplomatic immunity is not a courtesy reserved for the well-connected, nor a technicality for the fortunate defendant. It is one of the oldest rules of international intercourse- older, in its essentials, than the modern State itself resting on the practical recognition that envoys between sovereigns must be able to live, travel and speak in the receiving country without fear of coercion, lest the channels of diplomacy, which are civilisation's chosen alternative to war, be choked at the border by every aggrieved litigant with a grievance, real or imagined. 26.The International Court of Justice, in the Case Concerning United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran (United States of America v Iran) [1980] ICJ Reports 3, described the rules of diplomatic and consular law as a body of principles fundamental to the maintenance of relations between States, built up over centuries precisely because every State, whatever its momentary grievance against a particular envoy, retains a permanent interest in the survival of the system as a whole. Kenya's courts do not sit outside that consensus; they sit within it, bound by treaty, by statute, and now by their own Constitution. 27.The Preamble to the Vienna Convention supplies the guiding philosophy in terms this Court adopts without reservation:…the purpose of such privileges and immunities is not to benefit individuals but to ensure the efficient performance of the functions of diplomatic missions as representing States. 28.That the purpose is functional does not mean that the protection, once granted to a particular category of person, must itself be tested function by function, act by act, on every occasion it is invoked. A rule can serve a functional end while operating, for reasons of certainty and practicality, on a status basis and whether it does so, for any given class of protected person, is a question the Convention answers expressly, category by category, rather than one this Court is free to answer afresh by reference to the Preamble alone. It is to that categorical structure that the Court now turns. Issue One: Is the Appellant's Spouse a “Diplomatic Agent”? 29.The first controversy that seems to have been raised for the first time in the Respondent's submissions of 25th March 2026 is whether Ms. Pedersen, described in her documentation as “Deputy Head of Administration and Consular Affairs,” is properly classified as a diplomatic agent under Article 1(e) of the Vienna Convention, or merely as a member of the “administrative and technical staff” under Article 1(f), with the correspondingly narrower protection under Article 37(2). 30.This Court must first address the Appellant's procedural objection that the point comes too late. It is well established that an appellate court will not ordinarily permit a party to raise, for the first time on appeal, a point neither pleaded nor canvassed before the trial court, save where it presents a pure question of law or of the construction of a document already in evidence, capable of resolution without further factual investigation. 31.In Thomas Openda v Peter Martin Ahn [1982] KECA 59 (KLR), the Court of Appeal, applying the earlier East African authorities of Tanganyika Farmers Association Ltd v Unyamwezi Development Corporation Ltd [1960] EA 620 and Visram & Karsan v Bhatt [1965] EA 789, held that a new point may not be raised on appeal unless the evidence on record establishes, beyond doubt, that the facts, if fully investigated, would have supported the case now sought to be advanced. 32.This Court is satisfied that the classification point falls within that narrow exception, since it turns entirely on documents already exhibited in the Record of Appeal, Ms. Pedersen's passport at page 11 and her Diplomatic Identity Card at page 13, and requires no further evidence to resolve. It is, in substance, a question of construing documents already before the Court. The Court accordingly determines it on the merits, while recording, as will be seen, what the exercise avails the Respondent. 33.Article 1 of the Vienna Convention supplies a precise taxonomy. Paragraph (d) defines the “members of the diplomatic staff” as “the members of the staff of the mission having diplomatic rank.” Paragraph (e) defines a “diplomatic agent” as “the head of the mission or a member of the diplomatic staff of the mission.” Paragraph (f), by contrast, confines the “members of the administrative and technical staff” to “the members of the staff of the mission employed in the administrative and technical service of the mission.” 34.The dividing line Article 1 draws is rank, not portfolio. A First Secretary who happens to head the administration and consular section of a small mission does not thereby cease to be a diplomat; she remains a member of the “diplomatic staff” for so long as she holds diplomatic rank, whatever desk she occupies on a given day. The Record of Appeal places this beyond serious dispute: Ms. Pedersen's Diplomatic Identity Card, issued by the Chief of Protocol at the Kenyan Ministry of Foreign Affairs, styles her “First Secretary, Deputy Head of Administration & Consular Affairs” and the Appellant's own diplomatic passport, at page 15, identifies him as “Husband of L. Pedersen, First Secretary at the Embassy of Sweden in Nairobi.” First Secretary is, and has long been, a substantive rank in the recognised hierarchy of the diplomatic list, below Counsellor and above Second Secretary, and a person who holds it is, without more, “a member of the … staff … having diplomatic rank” within Article 1(d), and therefore “a diplomatic agent” within Article 1(e). 35.The Respondent's argument mistook the label for the ledger. “Administration and Consular Affairs” describes what Ms. Pedersen does; “First Secretary” describes what she is, and it is the latter that the Convention makes determinative. It would, moreover, produce an absurd result if diplomats assigned administrative, consular, political or economic portfolios within a mission were thereby demoted from Article 1(e) to Article 1(f) merely by virtue of their functional assignment on the organogram. Nothing in the Convention supports so mechanical a reading, and this Court declines to adopt it. 36.It follows that Ms. Pedersen is a diplomatic agent, and that the Appellant, as her spouse and a non-national of Kenya forming part of her household, falls within Article 37(1) rather than Article 37(2). The “official functions” qualification that Article 37(2) expressly imposes on the households of administrative and technical staff has no textual foothold in Article 37(1), and the learned Magistrate erred in importing it by analogy. Issue Two: Does Immunity Under Article 37(1) Extend to Private Acts? 37.Having found that the Appellant is protected under Article 37(1), the Court turns to the question that has animated this Appeal from its first filing to its last: does the immunity conferred by that Article, and by Article 31, to which it refers extend to private conduct, or is it, as the Respondent contended and the learned Magistrate held, confined to acts performed in an official capacity? 38.The answer is supplied, with unusual clarity for an international instrument, by the structure of Article 31 itself, which provides:A diplomatic agent shall enjoy immunity from the criminal jurisdiction of the receiving State. He shall also enjoy immunity from its civil and administrative jurisdiction, except in the case of – (a) a real action relating to private immovable property situated in the territory of the receiving State, unless he holds it on behalf of the sending State for the purposes of the mission; (b) an action relating to succession in which the diplomatic agent is involved as executor, administrator, heir or legatee as a private person and not on behalf of the sending State; (c) an action relating to any professional or commercial activity exercised by the diplomatic agent in the receiving State outside his official functions. 39.Three things may be said of this text. First, the three exceptions in sub-paragraphs (a) to (c) are exhaustive, not illustrative; the canon expressio unius est exclusio alterius applies with full force to a treaty drafted, as this one was, through careful and contested negotiation at the 1961 Vienna Conference, where every clause was fought over and every omission was, in a real sense, a decision, a reading reinforced by Article 31 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 1969, which directs that a treaty be interpreted according to the ordinary meaning of its terms in their context and in light of its object and purpose. 40.Second, none of the three exceptions, immovable property, succession, and professional or commercial activity outside official functions, bears any relationship whatever to tortious liability arising from the use of a motor vehicle. 41.Third, and most tellingly, the drafters plainly knew how to write a purely functional limitation when that was their intention: they did so, in terms, for administrative and technical staff under Article 37(2), and again, more narrowly still, for service staff under Article 37(3). That the same limitation is conspicuously absent from Article 31 and from Article 37(1) is not an oversight to be corrected by a receiving State's courts; it is the Convention speaking, deliberately, by its silence. 42.The point sharpens on comparison with the Convention's sister instrument. The Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, 1963, confines the immunity of consular officers under its Article 43 to acts performed in the exercise of consular functions – a plainly functional formula. That the drafters used such language for consular officers in 1963, having declined to use it for diplomatic agents under Article 31 in 1961, confirms rather than contradicts the reading urged here: where the community of nations wished to condition immunity on the official character of the act, it knew precisely how to say so, and its silence in Article 31 was not an accident of drafting. 43.This reading is not the eccentric position of this Court alone. In Al-Malki and another v Reyes and another (Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs and others intervening) [2015] EWCA Civ 32, the England and Wales Court of Appeal, considering the very same Article 31(1)(c) exception, in the context of a domestic servant's employment claim against a diplomat, held that the exception for “commercial activity” did not extend to conduct incidental to ordinary family and domestic life, precisely because the Convention's Preamble makes plain that its immunities exist to secure the efficient functioning of the mission, and not to catalogue every private act a diplomat might commit. 44.The Kenyan Employment and Labour Relations Court reached materially the same conclusion in Eugine Linyulu Isalambo v Barbro Ekvall [2016] KEELRC 909 (KLR), where Nzioki wa Makau J, faced with an argument that a diplomat's private domestic employment relationship fell outside the Convention's protection, held that “commercial activity as expressed in the Vienna Convention does not apply to activities incidental to daily life but rather to commercial activities engaged in for personal profit outside official duties,” and struck out the suit for want of jurisdiction, invoking the now-famous words of this Court's predecessor in Owners of Motor Vessel “Lilian S” v Caltex Oil (Kenya) Ltd [1989] KLR 1 that jurisdiction is everything, and that without it a court has no power to take one further step. 45.If the private employment of a domestic household staff does not strip a diplomat of Article 31 immunity, it is difficult to see, as a matter of principle, why the driving of a private motor car should do so. Both are ordinary incidents of a life lived, however temporarily, in a foreign country; neither is a “professional or commercial activity” within Article 31(1)(c); and the Convention draws no distinction between the sympathetic private act and the unsympathetic one. 46.Immunity, once it attaches to the status, does not require the diplomat or the members of the diplomatic household to justify each act as worthy of the protection. 47.The Respondent placed considerable reliance on Kandie v Alassane BA & another (Petition 2 of 2015) [2017] KESC 13 (KLR), in which the Supreme Court held that the immunity enjoyed by officials of Shelter Afrique “was not absolute because it only applied to official functions.” The reliance is misplaced, and the error, though understandable, deserves to be corrected with some care, for it evidently proved attractive to the court below as well. Kandie did not concern the Vienna Convention at all. It concerned a Host Country Agreement between Kenya and Shelter Afrique, an international financial institution, under which immunity was extended to senior officers in terms expressly limited to acts performed by them in their official capacity, a limitation the contracting parties themselves had written into their own bilateral instrument, and which the Supreme Court properly gave effect to. 48.Nothing in Kandie purports to read a similar limitation into Article 31 or Article 37(1) of the Vienna Convention, where no such limitation exists; the Supreme Court was interpreting the words the parties before it had actually used, not legislating a universal rule of “functional immunity” applicable to every species of privilege known to international law. 49.A holding tethered to one instrument's express text cannot migrate, without more, to a different instrument whose text says something else. To transplant Kandie's language onto Article 37(1) is a category error, the same category error, incidentally, that this Court's sister court in the Employment and Labour Relations Division has taken pains to avoid when distinguishing personal diplomatic immunity from the restrictive immunity of a mission as an institutional employer, in cases such as Lucy Muingo Kusewa & another v Embassy of Sweden, Nairobi [2017] eKLR (concerning the Embassy's own liability in an employment dispute, governed by the different, restrictive doctrine of State immunity) and Talaso Lepalat v Embassy of the Federal Republic of Germany [2015] eKLR. 50.It is at this point that the true taxonomy of immunities in international law must be restated, for the confusion between its branches lies at the root of the Impugned Ruling. International law recognises at least two distinct species of immunity relevant here. The first is sovereign or State immunity, which shields a foreign State and its organs from the jurisdiction of another State's courts and which, under the modern doctrine of restrictive immunity distinguishes between the sovereign acts of a State (acta jure imperii) and its commercial or private acts (acta jure gestionis), immunity attaching only to the former. 51.That is the doctrine at play in Ministry of Defence of the Government of the United Kingdom v Ndegwa [1983] KLR 68 and in Lucy Muingo Kusewa, both cited to the learned Magistrate, and both concerned with the liability of a State organ, not an individual diplomat. 52.The second is diplomatic immunity properly so called, personal, status-based, and conferred not on the State but on the individual, an altogether different creature of international law, defined not by reference to the nature of each act but by reference to the office the individual holds. It is this second species that Articles 31 and 37(1) of the Vienna Convention create, and it is this second species that was in issue before the learned Magistrate. 53.The doctrine of restrictive immunity, however venerable in its own sphere, has no business being imported into the interpretation of Article 31; to do so conflates institutional immunity with personal immunity in a manner the text of the Convention does not permit and international jurisprudence does not sanction. 54.There is a further, and perhaps more human, point to be made, one which the Appellant's submissions gestured towards without fully developing. A diplomatic mission does not function through the accredited agent alone. It functions through a household, a spouse who keeps the diplomat fed, sane and socially embedded in a foreign capital; children who attend school and, in their small way, represent their country's ordinary humanity to the receiving State; a family whose settled, unremarkable presence is itself part of what allows an embassy to operate as something more than a fortified office block. 55.This is precisely why the Convention extends full, unqualified privileges to the diplomatic household under Article 37(1), rather than leaving family members to fend for themselves in the receiving State's courts: their presence in Kenya, however domestic and unofficial each particular errand may look on any given Tuesday afternoon, is inseparable from, because it is part of what makes possible, the mission's continued and efficient operation. 56.Driving to the shops, collecting a child from school, attending a dinner: these are not exceptions carved out of diplomatic life by the receiving State's indulgence; they are diplomatic life, in the only form in which any human being actually lives it. The Convention does not ask the household to prove, act by act, that each errand served the sending State; it made that determination once and for all when it drafted Article 37(1) without a functional qualification, and it is not for a subordinate court, however well-intentioned, to reopen a question the treaty-makers deliberately closed. 57.For all these reasons, this Court is satisfied that the immunity conferred on the Appellant under Article 37(1) of the Vienna Convention is status-based rather than conduct-based, and extends to the ordinary private acts of daily life, including the driving of a motor vehicle, subject only to the three narrow exceptions enumerated in Article 31(1)(a) to (c), none of which arises on the facts of this case. The learned Magistrate's introduction of an “official functions” requirement into Article 37(1) was not a permissible gloss on the Convention; it was, respectfully, a rewriting of it, and this Court cannot allow it to stand. 58.Nothing in this holding is inconsistent with Article 32, which supplies the Convention's own safety valve. Waiver, and waiver alone, is the mechanism by which the immunity here found to exist may be displaced, and Article 32(2) insists that any such waiver “must always be express.” 59.No such waiver by the Kingdom of Sweden appears anywhere on the record, nor was one contended for by the Respondent. The immunity therefore stands, unqualified and unwaived. Issue Three: What Consequence Follows for the Respondent's Claim? 60.The finding that the Appellant is immune from the jurisdiction of the Kenyan courts does not end this Court's inquiry, for immunity of the person is not the same thing as extinction of the wrong. The common law has long insisted, through the maxim ubi jus ibi remedium, that a legal right does not exist in a vacuum, and this Court is alive to the risk that an unqualified striking-out of the suit might be read, wrongly, as declaring that a man knocked off his motorcycle on a Nairobi road has no redress at all, merely because the vehicle that struck him happened to be driven by a member of a diplomat's household. 61.That risk is dispelled by a distinction the parties' submissions did not sufficiently draw out: diplomatic immunity attaches to the person, not to the motor vehicle, and certainly not to the contract of insurance which Kenyan law compulsorily requires every motorist, diplomat and citizen alike, to carry. 62.Sections 4 and 5 of the Insurance (Motor Vehicles Third Party Risks) Act (Cap. 405) make it unlawful to use a motor vehicle on a Kenyan road without a policy covering third-party death or bodily injury; nothing in the Vienna Convention, the Privileges and Immunities Act, or any principle of international law exempts a diplomat's household from this ordinary incident of using the roads of the receiving State without the third party cover policy , and nothing on this record suggests that the vehicle in question was not so insured. 63.If anything, the Record of Appeal shows that notice went out to the insurer. There was a tacit acknowledgement in this sense that even if the person alleged to have occasioned the accident were immune from legal action, it did not absolve the underwriter from its obligations under the Insurance (Motor Vehicles Third Party Risks) Act. 64.A motor vehicle is a thing, not a person; it cannot hold a diplomatic identity card, and it does not travel on the Appellant's passport. The insurer who underwrote the risk under the third party cover contract of insurance owes its obligations not to the Appellant's convenience but to a contract of indemnity entered into for valuable premium, in a market it chose to operate in, subject to the ordinary law of Kenya. 65.The insurer does not enjoy, or could conceivably claim, an immunity that belongs, in international law, only to the person of the diplomat and the members of the diplomatic household, a privilege as personal as a passport photograph, and no more transferable. 66.Section 10 of Cap. 405 obliges an insurer to satisfy a judgment obtained against its insured in respect of a liability the policy covers, and this Court is conscious that the ordinary operation of that section presupposes a judgment against the insured, a judgment this Court cannot itself enter against the Appellant, precisely because he is immune from its jurisdiction. 67.That structural reality is better honestly confronted than papered over. It does not, however, mean that any claim the Respondent may have against the insurer is thereby extinguished; it means only that its enforcement cannot follow the ordinary two-step sequence of judgment-then-satisfaction against the insured, and must instead be worked out, should the Respondent choose to pursue it, in proceedings properly constituted against the insurer itself, in which the insurer's liability under its own policy may be tried as issues without any coercive process ever issuing against the Appellant personally. 68.Article 41 of the Vienna Convention itself imposes on every person enjoying its privileges a duty to respect the laws of the receiving State. Diplomatic immunity was never intended, and this Court declines to permit it, to become a shield behind which the ordinary consequences of a road traffic accident simply vanish. 69.The Embassy of the Kingdom of Sweden may, consistently with the spirit of comity that underlies the entire Convention, also wish to consider whether facilitation of a settlement, or engagement with the Respondent's insurer, would better serve the reciprocal goodwill on which diplomatic relations depend than the alternative of silence. 70.Even as it edges closer to making the disposition, this appellate Court is itching to also make some final words on proportion. Diplomats and their households are not, by virtue of accepting a posting abroad, rendered answerable for nothing; they are rendered answerable elsewhere, and by other means, than the coercive process of the receiving State's own courts. 71.That is the bargain every State strikes when it ratifies the Vienna Convention, and it is not this Court's place to renegotiate it from the bench merely because, on the facts of a particular case, the bargain appears to run against a sympathetic litigant. The remedy for whatever hardship remains lies in diplomacy, in insurance, and in the political and reciprocal channels the community of nations has built for precisely this purpose – not in a Kenyan trial court quietly legislating an exception the treaty-makers chose not to write. 72.On the safety valves of insurance that are contemplated and enforced by law, it is worth floating, without mootness, the If-Then Theorem of formal logic rather than behavioral psychology to this effect: If the diplomatic immunity was absolute as against the underwriter, then the policy would not have been taken. The insured placed cover to protect third parties such as the Respondent as mandatorily required by law. If risk cannot attach to the person in control of the vehicle, then it is anticipated by legislation that the where premiums were paid to underwrite risks to third parties, such third parties should not be disadvantaged at all. if the insurer underwrites risk, then it is an assurance to the Insurance regulatory Authority and to the public at large that if something happens, come to me and such risk may land at their doorstep. No doubt any the insurer of diplomatic vehicles would also appreciate that it can not have a ‘hands off’ attitude in connection with its insured and will have no doubt investigated the accident. By corollary, if there was need for the doctrine of subrogation to apply where an insurer in a material damage claim sought recompense, then it would also be unfair for the insurer of a diplomatic vehicle to lose out on a claim because the negligent party hit the diplomatic vehicle and the claim could only be brought irn the name of the diplomat. 73.There is company to these thoughts as in other countries, such as those United States, federal regulations under 22 CFR Part 151 (moreso under section 6 of the Diplomatic Relations Act) require all diplomatic missions, their members and families, and covered United Nations officials to carry and maintain liability insurance against bodily injury, death, and property damage arising from the use of any motor vehicle. 74.That seems to be the like arrangement under our Privileges and Immunities Act that has the First Schedule and Article 56 thereof that states that members of the consular post shall comply with any requirement imposed by the laws and regulations of the receiving State in respect of insurance against third party risks arising from the use of any vehicle, vessel or aircraft. That, coupled with the sentiments on responsibility seems more progressive than where there is a complete dismissal as happened in Alfred Kioko Muteti v Timothy Miheso & another [2015] KEHC 520 (KLR) where there was no available remedy for the wrong. I hasten to say that responsibility in this case isn’t culpability by the insurance company as the Respondent still has to prove their case like any other. What this Court aims to do as a remedy for the Respondent despite some legs off the suit being cut off is simply keep up with the sentiments of Madan, J.A in D.T. Dobie Co. Ltd v. Muchina & Others, Civil Appeal No.37 of 1997:“A court of justice should aim at sustaining a suit rather than terminating it … (by a summary dismissal). Normally, a law suit is for pursuing it”. Disposition 75.The court doesn’t take the heavy decision to stop diplomatic immunity. In the result, and for the reasons set out in this Judgment, this Court finds and orders as follows:(a)The Appeal is allowed. The learned Magistrate erred in law in holding that the Appellant's immunity under Article 37(1) of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, 1961, was confined to acts performed in an official capacity, and in declining, on that erroneous basis, to strike out the suit against the Appellant.(b)The Ruling and Order of the Chief Magistrate's Court at Nairobi delivered on 8th August 2025 in CMCC No. E696 of 2025 is set aside.(c)The Respondent's suit against the Appellant personally, in CMCC No. E696 of 2025, is struck out for want of jurisdiction, the Appellant being immune from the civil jurisdiction of the courts of Kenya by virtue of Article 37(1) of the Vienna Convention, no waiver of that immunity having been made, expressly or otherwise, by the Kingdom of Sweden.(d)For the avoidance of doubt, nothing in this Judgment determines, or prejudices, any claim the Respondent may bring against the insurer of the motor vehicle involved in the accident of 14th November 2024, whether by fresh suit or such other procedure as may be available in law, it being the finding of this Court that the immunity herein upheld is personal to the Appellant and does not attach to the said motor vehicle or to any policy of insurance covering it.(e)The Respondent shall have liberty to pursue any such claim against the said insurer, this Judgment being no bar to it.(f)Given the questions of law raised and the divided practical outcome, each party shall bear its own costs of this Appeal and of the Application before the trial court. 76.It is so ordered. DATED, SIGNED AND DELIVERED AT NAIROBI THIS 16TH DAY OF JULY 2026............................................................MURUNGA, JIn the presence of:Masiga h/b for Ms Aurora instructed by Coulson Harney LLP Advocates for the AppellantNdichu instructed by Kimani Musyimi & Ndichu Advocates LLP Advocates for the RespondentKevin Babu - Court Assistant