[2022] KEHC 14343 (KLR)

Tinega v Nyange & another (Suing as the Legal Administrators of the Estate of Francis Nyagwach Omayo - Deceased) (Civil Appeal 22 of 2021) [2022] KEHC 14343 (KLR) (3 June 2022) (Judgment)

Neutral citation: [2022] KEHC 14343 (KLR)

Republic of Kenya

In the High Court at Nyamira

Civil Appeal 22 of 2021

JN Njagi, J

June 3, 2022

Between

Yobesh Tinega

Appellant

and

Getrude Wakio Nyange

1st Respondent

Peter Ondari Omayo

2nd Respondent

Suing as the Legal Administrators of the Estate of Francis Nyagwach Omayo - Deceased

Judgment

1. The respondents brought up a claim against the appellant at the lower court in their capacity as administrators of the estate of the deceased herein seeking recovery of general and special damages after the deceased was fatally knocked down by the appellant’s motor vehicle registration number xxxx.

2. The parties in the case entered consent on liability in the ratio of 90: 10 in favour of the respondent against the appellant. Thereafter the trial magistrate assessed damages as follows;(a)Pain and suffering - Kshs 200,000/=(b)Loss of expectation of life - Kshs 100,000/=(c)Loss of dependency - Kshs 7,789,992/=(d)Special damages - Kshs 125,000/=

3. The appellant was aggrieved by the award and filed the instant appeal on the following grounds:1. That the learned magistrate erred in law and in fact by failing to consider and appreciate the applicable principles in assessment of damages and thereby arrived at an excessive and unjustified award.2. That the learned magistrate erred in law and fact by awarding Kshs 200,000/= for pain and suffering contrary to the evidence on record.3. That the learned magistrate erred in law and fact by awarding Kshs 100,000/= for loss of expectation of life, an amount which was excessive and unjustified.4. That the learned magistrate erred in law and fact by awarding Kshs 125,000/= as special damages which were not specifically pleaded and strictly proved as required by the law.5. That the learned magistrate erred in law and fact by awarding Kshs 7,889,299/= as general damages for loss of dependency which amount was inordinately high, unjustified and contrary to the evidence on record.6. That the learned magistrate erred in law and fact by awarding a multiplier of 21 years, a multiplicand of Kshs 49,369/= despite overwhelming evidence to the contrary.7. That the learned magistrate erred in law and fact by failing to consider the appellants evidence and submissions on record.

4. The appeal was canvassed by way of written submissions wherein the firm of Kimondo Gachoka & Co Advocates appeared for the appellant while the firm of Ben K Gichana & Co Advocates represented the respondents.

Submissions - 5. The advocates for the appellant submitted that the deceased died 20 days after the accident. That the award of Kshs 200,000/= for pain and suffering was excessive and that an award of Kshs 20,000/= would be adequate compensation under this head. Counsel relied on the following cases:a.Rose Munyasa & Daphton Kirombo & Anor (2014) eKLR where the court awarded Kshs 30,000/= for pain and suffering.b.Edner Gesare Ogega vs Aiko (2015) eKLR where Kshs 20,000/= was awarded for pain and suffering.

6. On loss of dependency, counsel submitted that the trial court failed to exercise its discretion fairly by taking into account irrelevant factors and awarding Ksh 7,889,299/= contrary to the evidence on record. That the trial court erroneously computed the multiplier as follows: -49,369 * 21 * 12 * 2/3 = 7,789, 992/=That the pay slip for the month of March 2015 showed that the deceased’s net pay was Ksh 15,926/=. That as per the pay slip the deceased was earning a gross pay of Kshs 58,030/= less deductions as follows:a.House allowance. Kshs 3000/=b.Commuter allowance. Kshs 4000/=c.Health risk allowance. Kshs 3850/=d.Health workers extraneous allowance. Kshs 20000/=e.WSPS contribution. Kshs 543. 60/=f.Equity bank. Kshs 29699/=g.PAYE. Kshs 11,341/=h.NHIF. Kshs 320/=

7. Counsel relied on the following authorities:a.Packers Limited vs Ignatius Rotich (2014) eKLR where the court said that in determining the multiplicand the medical allowance ought not to be taken into account since it was deemed this was for her personal health cover. That there is no evidence tendered to show that this allowance was for spouse or children.b.Maina Kaniaru & Jane Wahito v Josephat Muriuki Wangondu, COA Civil Appeal No 14 of 1989 in which the court stated that medical allowance ought not to be taken into consideration since the same was for personal use. That equally the commuter allowance and the leave allowance ought not be taken into consideration.c.Joseph Kahiga Gachii & Paul Mathaiya Kahiga Githii (Suing as the administrators of the estate of the late Lydia Wanjiru Kahiga and Elizabeth Murugi Kahiga Both Deceased v World Vision Kenya & 2 Others (2014) eKLRWhere the court applied the net earnings when computing loss of dependency and not the gross pay. Counsel in this case urged the court to apply the net pay of Ksh 15,926/=.

8. It was submitted that though the plaint stated that the deceased was survived by a widow and minor daughters there were no documents produced to proof that the said dependants were minors. Therefore, that a dependency ratio of 1/3 should be applied.

9. The deceased herein died at the age of 39 years. The trial court used a multiplier of 21 years on the basis that the deceased would have lived to work up to the retirement age of 60 years. Counsel for the appellant submitted that the choice of a multiplier is a matter at the discretion of the court which must be exercised judiciously as was stated by the Court of Appeal in Board of Governors of Kangubiri Girls High School & Another v Jane Wanjiku Muriithi & Another (2014) eKLR. Further that the determination of a multiplier is a question of fact to be determined from the peculiar circumstances of the case. That in doing so the court ought to take into consideration the vicissitudes of life such as shortened life due to death from natural causes. To support this proposition, the appellant relied on the case ofRodger Dainty v Mwinyi Omar Haji & Another (2004) eKLR. Consequently, it was submitted that there was no guarantee that the deceased herein would have lived up to 60 years. Counsel urged the court to use a multiplier of 16 years after factoring in the vicissitudes of life and thus award loss of dependency as follows:15,926 x 16 x 12 x 1/3 = 1,019,264/=.

10. The award of Kshs 100,000/= on loss of expectation of life was conceded though the appellant submitted that it ought to be deducted from the award. The award in special damages to the sum of Kshs 125,000/= was also conceded.

11. The respondent on the other hand submitted that the trial court did not err in any manner in the assessment of quantum. That the assessment took into account the applicable principles in the assessment of damages and should thus not be disturbed.

12. It was submitted that a death certificate was produced that showed that the deceased died a month after the accident. That the deceased must have undergone a lot of pain before he died. The appellant relied on the case of Mercy Muriuki & Another vs. Samuel Mwangi Nduati & Another (Suing as the legal Administrator of the Estate of the late Mwangi) [2019] eKLR where it was observed that:'The generally accepted principle therefore is that very nominal damages will be awarded on these two heads of damages if the death followed immediately after the accident. The conventional award for loss of expectation of life is Kshs 100,000/= while for pain and suffering the award range from Kshs 10,000/= to Kshs 100,000/= with higher damages being awarded if the pain and suffering was prolonged before death.'

13. Counsel submitted that the award made by the magistrate in the instant case was within the range of awards made by courts where the deceased endured great pain and suffering before succumbing after a duration of time. The case of Beatrice Mukulu Kang’uta & Another v Silverstone Quarry Limited and Another (2016) where Kshs 200,000/= was awarded for a deceased who died a few hours after the accident.

14. Counsel also cited the cases of Caleb Juma Nyabuto v Evance Otieno Magaka & Another (2021) eKLRand Retco East Africa Limited v Joseph Kwamboka Nyachaki & Another (2021) eKLRwhere awards of Kshs 100,000/= were upheld for pain and suffering for victims who died a few minutes after the accident. That in the instant case where the deceased died a month after the accident an award of Kshs 200,000/= was commensurate with the pain endured before death.

15. On loss of dependency, it was submitted that evidence was adduced that the deceased died at the age of 39. That he was working as a nurse with Nyamira County Government with a net pay of Kshs 49,369/=. That a letter from the chief that was produced as exhibit in the case indicated that the deceased was survived by a widow and 4 children.

16. It was submitted that the deceased as a civil servant would have worked for another period of 21 years before attaining the retirement age of 60 years. That the computation by the trial court on loss of dependency was not faulty. Counsel relied on the case of Kimunya Abednego alias Abednego Munyao v Zipporah S Musyoka & Another (2019) where Kariuki J adopted a multiplier of 20 years for someone who died at the age of 41 years. Also cited was the case of The Standard Group & Another v Chepngetich Beatrice (2021) eKLR where a multiplier of 20 years was upheld for someone who died at the age of 38 years. That there is no compelling reason to interfere with the award of Kshs 7,789,992/= and the same should remain undisturbed.

Analysis and Determination — 17. This being a first appeal the court is obligated to re-evaluate, re-assess and re-examine the evidence on record and arrive at its own independent conclusion while bearing in mind that the trial court had the advantage of seeing and hearing the witnesses testify. This principle was stated by the Court of Appeal in Gitobu Imanyara & 2 others v Attorney General (2016) eKLR thus:'An appeal to this Court from a trial by the High Court is by way of retrial and the principles upon which this Court acts in such an appeal are well settled. Briefly put, they are that this court must reconsider the evidence, evaluate it itself and draw its own conclusions though it should always bear in mind that it has neither seen nor heard the witnesses and should make due allowances in this respect.'

18. In Peters v Sunday Post Ltd [1958] EA 424, the Court held that;'Whilst an appellate court has jurisdiction to review the evidence to determine whether the conclusions of the trial judge should stand, this jurisdiction is exercised with caution; if there is no evidence to support a particular conclusion, or if it is shown that the trial judge has failed to appreciate the weight or bearing of circumstances admitted or proved, or had plainly gone wrong, the appellate court will not hesitate so to decide.'

19. In addition, I am alive to the fact that an appellate court will not ordinarily interfere with the findings of fact by the trial court unless they were based on no evidence or on a misapprehension of it or the court is shown demonstrably to have acted on wrong principles on reaching the findings - see Eunice Auma Onyango v Salin Akinyi Oluoch, Civil Appeal No 71 of 2015.

20. The issue before the court is whether the trial court erred in its award of damages under the various heads.

21. The appeal is on quantum of damages. The guiding principles upon which an appellate court can disturb an award of damages made by a lower court are as was stated by the Court of Appeal in Hellen Waruguru Waweru (Suing as the legal representative of Peter Waweru Mwenya) v Kiarie Shoe Stores Limited (2015) eKLR thus:As a general principle, assessment of damages lies in the discretion of the trial court and an appellate Court will not disturb an award of damages unless it is so inordinately high or low as to represent an entirely erroneous estimate. It must be shown that the Judge proceeded on wrong principles or that he misapprehended the evidence in some material respect and so arrived at a figure which was either inordinately high or low. The Court must be satisfied that either the judge, in assessing the damages, took into account an irrelevant factor, or left out of account a relevant one or that; short of this, the amount is so inordinately low or so inordinately high that it must be a wholly erroneous estimate of the damages. See Kemfro Africa Ltd t/a Meru Express & Another v AM Lubia and Another [1982-88] 1 KAR 727, Peter M Kariuki v Attorney General CA Civil Appeal No 79 of 2012 [2014] eKLR and Bashir Ahmed Butt v Uwais Ahmed Khan [1982-88] KAR 5.

22. I will now proceed to consider the awards under the various heads as awarded by the trial court.

Pain and suffering — 23. The evidence adduced before the trial court was that the accident occurred on the March 14, 2015 and the deceased succumbed to the injuries on April 10, 2015 while undergoing treatment in hospital. The deceased therefore died close to a month after the accident. The appellant had at the lower court proposed a sum of Kshs 10,000/= and cited one authority where similar amount was awarded. The respondent had proposed a sum of Kshs 200,000/= and relied on one authority where Kshs 100,000/= was awarded The trial court awarded Kshs 200,000/= for pain and suffering for the reason that the deceased died one month after the accident and was thus in severe pain before he died.

24. In this appeal the appellant urged the court to award Kshs 20,000/= under this head and relied on two authorities (supra) where Kshs 30,000/= and Ksh. 20,000/= were made. The respondent on the other hand supported the award of Kshs 200,000/= based on the decision of Beatrice Mukulu Kang'uta v Silverstone Quarry Limited & Another (supra). I have however noted that the award in the said case has since been reduced on appeal to Kshs 50,000/= in Silverstone Quarry Ltd & Another vs Beatrice Mukulu Kang'uta (suing as administrator of the estate of Philip Musyoka Muthoka (supra). I have noted that in that case the deceased had died about 5 hours after the accident.

25. I have considered awards in other cases where the victims died in comparative period to which the deceased herein died after the accident. In Victor Hosea Letting v Anwarali and Brothers Limited & another [2019] eKLR the deceased died one-and a-half months after the accident and Sergon J awarded Kshs 150,000/= for pain and suffering.

26. In Paul Ouma v Sarah Akinyi and Monica Achieng Were (suing as the legal representative in the Estate of Paul Otieno Were (Deceased) (2018) eKLRwhere the deceased died 55 days after the accident Makau J reduced an award of Kshs 200,000/= to Kshs 100,000/= on the basis that there was no evidence on the pain that the deceased underwent. Said the learned Judge:'I have considered the deceased in this case did not die instantly but after some time. There is no evidence as to the seriousness of his injuries and the pain he underwent. It might have taken 55 days as he underwent treatment but the number of days do not mean the deceased underwent a lot of the pain nor has it been stated that the pain was serious as pain cannot be measured in terms of the duration the deceased underwent treatment. I therefore find that an award of Kshs 200,000 for pain and suffering was excessive and reduce the same to Kshs 100,000/=.'

27. In Allan Owiti Awuor & another v Tabitha Micere Mathu (Suing As Personal Representative of The Estate Of Peter Mathu Ng'ang'a) (2021) eKLR where the deceased died after one day, Nyakundi J reduced the award of the lower court from Kshs 200,000/= to Kshs 100,000/=.

28. In Benedeta Wanjiku Kimani v Changwon Cheboi (2013) eKLR the court awarded Kshs 200,000/= where the victim died after four months. In the case of James Mutuma Kirimi v PCEA Kikuyu Hospital & Another (2017) eKLR the court awarded Kshs 200,000/= for a victim who died 3 ½ months after an operation.

29. In the instant case the deceased was in pain for close to a month before he died. Having regard to the cited authorities, I am of the view that the award of Kshs 200,000/= made by the trial court was on the higher side. I consider that an award of Kshs 130,000/= would be appropriate in this case in respect to pain and suffering.

Multiplier 30. The 1st respondent who was PW2 in the case testified that she was the wife to the deceased. That the deceased was a nurse with Nyamira County Government. That he was survived by herself as the widow and 4 minor children. She produced the deceased’s pay slip for the month of March 2015, Pexh 8. She also produced a letter from her area chief, Pexh 4 indicating that she and her children were the survivors of the deceased. She also produced the birth certificates for the 4 children, P exh 5(a) — (d) indicating that their parents were herself and the deceased. They indicated that the children were born between 2001 and 2009.

31. The evidence that the 1st respondent was the widow to the deceased and that the 4 children were children of the deceased was not challenged. The birth certificates indicated that the children were aged between 6 and 15 years at the time when the deceased died. There was then no doubt that the deceased was survived by a widow and 4 minor children.

32. The deceased died at the age of 39. The trial court applied a multiplier of 21 years and a multiplicand of Kshs 49,369/=.

33. The choice of a multiplier and multiplicand are at the discretion of the court. The same must however be exercised judiciously and with reason. In Cornelia Elaine Wamba vs Shreeji Enterprises Ltd & Others (2012) eKLR, the court stated that:'the choice of a multiplier or multiplicand is a matter of the Court's discretion which discretion has to be exercised judiciously and with a reason. Some of the factors to be taken into consideration by a court in the exercise of its mandate on the choice of the two are the age of the deceased, nature of the profession he was aged in, possibility of retirement from employment where the profession engaged in provides for a retirement age and, lastly, possibility of death through natural causes and departure for greener pastures elsewhere.'

34. In applying a multiplier of 21 years, the trial court in this matter held that the deceased as a civil servant would have worked for a period of 21 years until his retirement at 60 years. The appellant proposed a multiplier of 16 years while the respondent defended the court’ s choice of 21 years.

35. I have considered the cases cited by the parties on the multiplier. I have also considered other case where the deceased died in their 30s. InJoseph Gatone Karanja v John Okumu Soita & Esther Chepkorir (Suing as administrator of the estate of Benard Soita Nyongesa (DCD) [2022] eKLR Ogolla J upheld a multiplier of 26 years for a deceased who died at the age of 34 years.

36. In Martin Gitau & another v Shadrack Mulonzi & another [2018] eKLR where the deceased died at the age of 39 years, Lucy Njuguna J applied a multiplier of 16 years.

37. In Abdimana Abdulwahab & another v Janet Njeri Wambui & another (suing as the legal representatives for and on behalf of the Estate Jane Wambui Kiragu Deceased) [2021] eKLR where the deceased died at the age of 39, Gikonyo J applied a multiplier of 21 years.

38. In Caleb Ombima & another v Florence Akoth Awino & another [2019] eKLR where also the deceased died at the age of 39 years, Cherere J upheld a multiplier of 21 years.

39. In Tobias Odoyo Oburu v Ruth Moraa Oigo & another [2018] eKLR where the deceased who was a businessman died at 39 years, Majanja J upheld a multiplier of 16 years.

40. The deceased herein was a civil servant. He would have worked up to the retirement age of 60 years if it were not for the accident. The court in determining the multiplier is required to factor in imponderables of human life. Taking all the above into account I think that a multiplier of 18 would be reasonable.

Multiplicand - 41. The deceased was a nurse by profession with a gross pay of Kshs 58,030/- and a net pay of Kshs 15,926/= after all the various deductions were made. The trial magistrate argued that the only deductions that were liable to be made from the pay slip was PAYE of Kshs 11,341/= and NHIF deduction of Kshs 320/=, thereby leaving a balance of Kshs 49,369/=. The magistrate applied that figure as the multiplicand.

42. The other deductions as per the deceased’s pay slip were:WCPS Contribution - Kshs 543/=Loan Equity Bank - Kshs 29,899/=Thereby leaving a net pay of Kshs 15,926/=.

43. The appellant argued that it is the net pay that is applicable for purposes of determining the multiplicand. The respondent supports the figure as determined by the trial court.

44. In Evaline Chepkirui (suing as the Legal Representatives of the Estate of the Late Kiprotich Cheruiyot) v Stella Asuga & another [2021] eKLR, Gikonyo J dealt with such an issue and held as follows:'The appellant has fastened a quarrel with the trial court's ascertainment of the applicable multiplicand. According to the appellant, the trial court ought to have deducted only tax element from the gross salary.I note from the record that the trial court allowed other deductions over and above the tax payable (PAYE). My understanding of this aspect of law is that, not all deductions in a pay slip are discounted in the ascertainment of the multiplicand for purposes of loss of dependency. I should think that, only the tax element is to be deducted from the gross pay. PAYE is tax payable to government. However, statutory and other deductions whose beneficial owner is the deceased and his estate, are not to be discounted when assessing dependency.

45. I am persuaded that this is the correct position of the law. The deceased used to earn a commuter allowance of Kshs 4,000/=. It is my position that the said sum was for the benefit of the deceased and not for the family. It should therefore be deducted.

46. The trial court deducted a sum of Kshs 320/= for NHIF. In my view this sum ought not to have been deducted as it was for the benefit of the family.

47. The deceased was being deducted some money by Equity Bank for payment of a loan. Being a married man, the loan must have been taken for the benefit of the family and therefore should not be deducted as submitted by the appellant. In my view the only deductions should be the commuter allowance of Kshs 4,000/= and PAYE of Kshs 11,341/= thereby leaving a balance of Kshs 42,689/= which I determine as the applicable multiplicand.

48. The appellant faulted the trial court for using a dependency ratio of 1/3. The court has made a finding that the deceased was survived by a widow and 4 children. It is generally accepted that the applicable ratio where the deceased was married is 2/3. In Joseph Gatone Karanja v John Okumu Soita & Esther Chepkorir (Suing as admin of the estate of Benard Soita Nyongesa (DCD) [2022] eKLR it was held as follows:'Courts have held that the dependency ratio, is the fraction of the income that a person is expected to give to his dependents in his lifetime. As such, if a person is married, it is expected that the person would spend 2/3 of his income to support his dependants but where the person unmarried it is accepted that 1/3 of his income is utilized in support of his dependants. This position finds support in a litany of cases. See Petronila Muli v Richard Muindi Savi & Catherine Mwende Mwindu [supra] and Sidi Kazungu Gohu & Another (Legal Representatives of the Estate of George Yongo Katana (Deceased) vs Fatuma Abdi Mohamed & Another [2021] eKLR.'

49. There is thereby no rationale of using the ratio of 1/3 in this case since the deceased was married. The applicable ratio was 2/3. The loss of dependency therefore comes to:42,689 x 18 x12 x 2/3 = 6,147,216.

50. The matter for discount of the award on loss of expectation of life from the award on loss of dependency has been dealt with by the Court of Appeal in Hellen Waruguru Waweru (suing as the legal representative of Peter Waweru Mwenja (Deceased) v Kiarie Shoe Stores Limited (2015) eKLR stated:'This Court has explained the concept of double compensation in several decisions and it is surprising that some courts continue to get it wrong. The principle is logical enough; duplication occurs when the beneficiaries of the deceased's estate under the Law Reform Act and dependants under the Fatal Accidents Act are the same, and consequently the claim for lost years and dependency will go to the same persons. It does not mean that a claimant under the Fatal Accidents Act should be denied damages for pain and suffering and loss of expectation of life as these are only awarded under the Law Reform Act, hence the issue of duplication does not arise.The confusion appears to have arisen because of different reporting of the Kenfro case (supra) which was heavily relied on by Mr Kiplagat. The version he relied on is from 11982-881 1 KAR 727 which concentrates on the decision of Kneller JA in extracting the ratio decidendi. The same case, however, is more fully reported in 119871 KLR 30 as Kenfro Africa Ltd t/a Meru Express Services 1976 & Another -VS- Lubia & Another (No 2) and the ratio decindendi is extracted from the unanimous decision of all three Judges. It was held, inter alia, that: -'An award under the Law Reform Act is not one of the benefits excluded from being taken into account when assessing damages under the Fatal Accidents Act; it appears the legislation intended that it should be considered.The Law Reform Act (Cap 26) section 2 (5) provides that the rights conferred by or for the benefit for the estates of deceased persons shall be in addition to and not in derogation of any rights conferred on the dependants of the deceased persons by the Fatal Accidents Act. This therefore means that a party entitled to sue under the Fatal Accidents Act still has the right to sue under the Law Reform Act in respect of the same death.The words 'to be taken into account' and 'to be deducted' are two different things. The words in Section 4 (2) of the Fatal Accidents Act are 'taken into account'. The Section says what should be taken into account and not necessarily deducted. It is sufficient if the judgment of the lower court shows that in reaching the figure awarded under the Fatal Accidents Act, the trial judge bore in mind or considered what he had awarded under the Law Reform Act for the non-pecuniary loss. There is no requirement in law or otherwise for him to engage in a mathematical deduction.'The deduction of the entire amounts made under the LRA in this case was erroneous and once again, we have to interfere with the final award of damages. We observe that the High Court reduced even further the figure of Kshs 100,000 awarded for Loss of life expectation to Kshs 70,000 despite confirmation in its judgment that there was no dispute on the award. Mr Kiplagat attempted to justify the reduction by the argument that it would be beneficial to Hellen because less amount would be deducted from the FAA award. With respect, that argument is misguided since there is no compulsion in law to make the deduction.'

51. The same position was reiterated, by the Court of Appeal, in Daniel Inyangala Ambetsa vs Moses Sigoria Shauri t/a Multibrand Marketing [2020] eKLR, where the court said:'In the instant case, the learned Judge interfered with the award of damages made by the trial court. She relied on the alternate proposal by the respondent regarding what the appellant should have received. She further took the view that the correct position in law was that a party claiming should not benefit under both the Fatal Accidents Act and the Law Reform Act. We do not think that that is the correct position in law.In the premises, the learned Judge erred in holding that the award by the trial court amounted to double compensation.'In view of the above there is no requirement to deduct one award from the other.

52. The award on special damages was not contested. I accordingly substitute the award as follows:Pain and suffering - Kshs 130,000/=Loss of expectation of life - Kshs 100,000/=Loss of dependency - Kshs 6,147,216/=Special damages - Kshs 125,000/=Total - Kshs 6,502,216/=Less 10% contribution - Kshs 650,221/=Balance - Kshs 5,851,995/=Judgement is accordingly entered for the respondent to the sum of Kshs 5,851,995/=. Each party to bear its costs to the appeal.

DELIVERED VIRTUALLY, DATED AND SIGNED AT NAIROBI THIS 3RD DAY OF JUNE, 2022. J.N. NJAGIJUDGEIn the presence of:Mr. Ndolo – Virtually for AppellantMr. Wafula – Virtually for RespondentsCourt Assistant30 days Right of Appeal.