https://new.kenyalaw.org/akn/ke/judgment/kehc/2026/10340

Vegpro Kenya Limited v Muringi & another (Civil Appeal E691 of 2024) [2026] KEHC 10340 (KLR) (Civ) (9 July 2026) (Judgment) Neutral citation: [2026] KEHC 10340 (KLR) Republic of Kenya In the High Court at Nairobi (Milimani Law Courts) Civil Civil Appeal E691 of 2024 D Mburu, J July 9, 2026 Between Vegpro Kenya Limited Appellant and Joseph Maina Muringi 1st Respondent Hon Attorney General 2nd Respondent (Being an appeal from the judgment of Hon. L. Mbacho (SRM) delivered on 25th January, 2024 in Nairobi Milimani CMCC No. 1638 of 2020) Judgment 1.This appeal emanates from the judgment delivered on 25.01.2024 in Nairobi Milimani CMCC No. 1638 of 2020. The suit was commenced by way of a plaint filed by Joseph Maina Muringi, the plaintiff in the lower court (hereafter the 1st Respondent) against Vegpro Kenya Ltd (hereafter the Appellant) and the Honorable Attorney General (hereafter the 2nd Respondent) the 1st and 2nd defendants in the lower court, respectively). The claim was grounded on the tort of malicious prosecution for which the 1st Respondent sought general damages for false imprisonment, unlawful confinement, malicious prosecution, abuse of the legal process, pain & suffering; exemplary & punitive damages; costs of the suit & interest thereon at the Court’s rate until payment in full; and any other orders as the honorable Court may deem fit to grant. 2.It was averred that on or about 04.02.2009 the Appellant maliciously and without any reasonable or probable cause laid false information before the Officer Commanding Station (OCS) at Jomo Kenyatta International Airport Police Station against the 1st Respondent being an employee of Techpak Industries Ltd and as a result of which information the 1st Respondent was charged alongside five (5) others in Makadara Criminal Case No. 674 of 2009 with the offence of stealing by servant contrary to Section 281 of the Penal Code and upon hearing of the matter was acquitted by the Court for lack of evidence. The 1st Respondent further averred that he was wrongfully arrested and charged, he was greatly injured in his character and reputation, he has been exposed to scandal, ridicule and contempt, he has been put into considerable trouble, inconvenience, anxiety and expense and has thereby suffered loss and damage. 3.The Appellant filed a statement of defence admitting various facets of the plaint meanwhile went ahead to denying the key averments in the plaint and or liability. It went on to aver that on plausible grounds on reasonable suspicion reported the theft to the police as required by law whereafter it was the police that conducted investigations that led to the decision to charge the 1st Respondent. That after reporting the loss to the police, the Appellant had no control of the subsequent events, it also had no say in the investigations, charging of the suspects and the acquittal of the 1st Respondent. 4.The 2nd Respondent on its part equally filed a defence denying the key averments in the plaint and in the alternative and without prejudice to its earlier averments stated that if at all the 1st Respondent was arrested and charged, the same was done after a legitimate complaint was made to the police, proper investigations done and in execution of the police statutory duty. 5.The suit proceeded to full hearing during which only the Appellant and 1st Respondent adduced evidence. In its judgment, the trial court found in favour of the 1st Respondent and entered judgment against the Appellant and 2nd Respondent jointly and severally in the sum of Kshs. 1,500,000/-, costs of the suit and interest at the court rates. 6.Aggrieved with the outcome, the Appellant filed a memorandum of appeal dated 3rd June 2024 challenging the judgment of the trial court on the following grounds-:“ 1.That the learned trial Magistrate erred in fact and in law in failing to appreciate that the criminal proceedings against the 1st Respondent were not set in motion by the Appellant as the Appellant does no have any investigative and or prosecutorial power and any action taken by the police and prosecutor are independent of the Appellant. 2.That the learned Magistrate erred in fact and in law in failing to consider that the Appellant only made a complaint to the police and nothing more and what followed in regard to the investigations and prosecution of the 1st Respondent had nothing to do with the Appellant. 3.That the learned trial Magistrate erred in fact and law in failing to appreciate that for a claim of malicious prosecution to suffice against the Appellant, the 1st Respondent must prove on a balance of probabilities that the police were acting as agents of the Appellant. 4.That the learned trial Magistrate erred in fact and in law in failing to appreciate that there was reasonable and or justifiable cause to justify the complaint made to the police by the Appellant. 5.That the learned trial Magistrate erred in fact and law in failing to take into account the settled elements of law crucial to sustain a claim for malicious prosecution. 6.That the learned trial Magistrate erred in both fact and law in condemning the Appellant and the 2nd Respondent to pay the 1st Respondent damages for malicious prosecution, yet she did not make specific or express finding that there was bias meted against the 1st Respondent, during investigations and or prosecution. 7.That the learned trial Magistrate erred both in fact and law in finding and holding that the prosecution of the 1st Respondent in the said criminal case was actuate by malice, yet that was no so and she did not state any reason(s) or ground(s) to support such a finding and holding. 8.That the learned trial Magistrate erred in both fact and law, in awarding the 1st Respondent exaggerated and exorbitant general damages for malicious prosecution of Kshs. 1,500,000/- without any factual and or legal basis, yet the 1st Respondent did not deserve such an award or any other at all.” (sic) 8.The appeal was canvassed by way of written submissions, of which this Court has duly considered alongside the entirety of the record of appeal. 9.This is a first appeal. The Court of Appeal for East Africa set out the duty of the first appellate court in Selle –Vs- Associated Motor Boat Co. [1968] EA 123. Further, an appellate Court will not ordinarily interfere with a finding of fact made by a trial court unless such finding was based on no evidence, or it is demonstrated that the court below acted on wrong principles in arriving at the finding it did. See Ephantus Mwangi & Another vs Duncan Mwangi Wambugu [1982 – 1988] 1KAR 278. 10.Upon review of the memorandum of appeal and submissions by the respective parties before this court, it is the Court’s view the appeal turns to the twin question whether the trial court’s finding that the Appellant and 2nd Respondent were liable for malicious prosecution was well founded, and if so, whether the damages awarded were reasonable in the circumstances. In Wareham t/a A.F. Wareham & 2 Others v Kenya Post Office Savings Bank [2004] 2 KLR 91, it was settled that cases are tried and determined on the basis of the pleadings made and the issues of fact or law framed by the parties or Court on the basis of those pleadings. Hence, a review thereof is apposite before dealing with evidentiary matters. That said, the gist of the respective parties’ pleadings had earlier been captured in this judgment as such the same do not warrant a restatement at this juncture. 11.Nevertheless, the trial Court after restating and examining the evidence on record pronounced itself in its judgment by stating in part that-:“At the close of their case, all parties herein filed written submissions that I have duly read and considered.Analysis and determinationHaving taken into account the pleadings, the evidence adduced as well as the submissions made, the following are, in my respectful view, the issues that fall for determination in the suit: 1.Whether the criminal proceedings were instituted by the defendants? 2.Whether the said prosecution was actuated by malice? 3.Whether there was reasonable cause and or justification to make the complaint to the police? 4.Whether the criminal proceedings terminated in the plaintiff’s favour? 5.Whether the defendants are liable to compensate the plaintiff and if so what should be the award of damages? 6.Who should bear the costs of the suit?…….On the first issue,….there is no dispute that the said proceedings were instituted by the 1st defendant. Accordingly, I find that the plaintiff was prosecuted pursuant to the said complaint.On whether the making of the said report was malicious, the law is clear that the mere fact that a person has been acquitted of the criminal charge does not necessarily connote malice on the part of the prosecutor.………In the present case, the circumstance from which the Court can deduce that the arraignment of the Plaintiff was probably justified have not been disclosed to the Court……..As earlier stated, I do not find that the witness statements/testimony proved that the plaintiff committed the offence with which he was charged….In my view the 2nd Defendant’s agents proceeded recklessly and indifferently. I do not think that the prosecution of the Plaintiff jointly with others, in the absence of evidence on how he committed the offence is justified.Therefore, in the absence of any evidence as to the facts and circumstances upon which the defendants relied, the Court can only conclude that there was no probable and reasonable cause for charging the Plaintiff and that constitutes malice for the purpose of the tort of malicious prosecution.On whether there was reasonable cause and or justification to make the complaint to the police……….The evidence against the plaintiff was not only thin, but that it was an improper and wrongful motive for the 2nd defendant’s agents to have charged the plaintiff and prosecuted him in the circumstances of this case…….Charging the plaintiff and failing to call any evidence linking him to the offence amounted to malice on the part of the police and the 1st defendant considering the plaintiff was not even their employee. The investigating officer even stated that he did not understand why the plaintiff was charged with the offence.……….I find no evidence was adduced by the 1st and 2nd defendant to justify their decision to charge and prosecute the plaintiff. This Court is not convinced by the 2nd defendant’s counsel submissions that the police in prosecuting the plaintiff had good intention and that they were only performing their duties by investigating a complaint filed by the 1st defendant yet the same police refused to cooperate with the Attorney General for purposes of giving evidence in this case to shed light on why they arrested, charged and prosecuted the plaintiff.The 2nd defendant did not adduce any evidence of that good intention to rebut the evidence of malice on their part.The next issue is whether the criminal proceedings were terminated in the plaintiff’s favor. There is no doubt that the criminal proceedings were terminated in favour of the plaintiff 10 years later………… It is therefore my considered opinion that the plaintiff is clearly entitled to an award of damages for malicious prosecution.……In conclusion, the plaintiff’s case succeeds, I proceed to enter judgment for the plaintiff against the defendants jointly and severally as follow-; 1.General damages for malicious prosecution Kshs. 1,500,000/= 2.The defendants shall pay the costs of the suit. 3.The amount in 1 above shall attract interest at the Court rates from the date of this judgment.” (Sic). 12.The applicable law as to the burden of proof is found in Section 107, 108 and 109 of the Evidence Act. The duty of proving the averments contained in the plaint lay upon the 1st Respondent likewise were the averments contained in the Appellant’s and 2nd Respondent’s pleadings. See the Court of Appeal decision in Karugi & Another v Kabiya & 3 Others (1987) KLR 347. 13.As earlier stated, the 1st Respondent’s cause of action was founded on malicious prosecution. Further, as rightly noted by the trial Court, the conjunctive elements to be proved in an action founded on malicious prosecution are well settled since Mbowa v. East Mengo District Administration [1972] EA 352, where the East African Court of Appeal summarized the law as follows:“The action for damages for malicious prosecution is part of the common law of England...The tort of malicious prosecution is committed where there is no legal reason for instituting criminal proceedings. The purpose of the prosecution should be personal and spite rather than for the public benefit. It occurs as a result of the abuse of the minds of judicial authorities whose responsibility is to administer criminal justice. It suggests the existence of malice and the distortion of the truth. Its essential ingredients are:1.the criminal proceedings must have been instituted by the defendant, that is, he was instrumental in setting the law in motion against the plaintiff and it suffices if he lays an information before a judicial authority who then issues a warrant for the arrest of the plaintiff or a person arrests the plaintiff and takes him before a judicial authority;2)the defendant must have acted without reasonable or probable cause i.e. there must have been no facts, which on reasonable grounds, the defendant genuinely thought that the criminal proceedings were justified;3)the defendant must have acted maliciously. In other words, the defendant must have acted, in instituting criminal proceedings, with an improper and wrongful motive, that is, he must have had, “an intent to use legal process in question for some other than its legally appointed and appropriate purpose” Pike v. Waldrum [1952] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 431 at p. 452; and4)the criminal proceedings must have been terminated in the plaintiff’s favour, that is, the plaintiff must show that the proceedings were brought to a legal end and that he has been acquitted of the charge...”See also Murunga v Attorney General [1979] KLR 138 14.All the ingredients above must be established for a claimant to succeed in a cause of action founded on malicious prosecution. The undisputed events leading to Nairobi Milimani CMCC No. 1638 of 2020 are that pursuant to a complaint lodged by the Appellant to the police, the 1st Respondent, being an employee of the Techpak Industries Limited alongside others were arrested and jointly charged. Despite the 1st Respondent pleading in his plaint that he was charged with the offence of stealing by servant contrary to Section 281 of the Penal Code, the actual offence addressed in the judgment by the criminal Court in Makadara Criminal Case No. 674 of 2009 was stealing contrary to Section 268 as read with Section 275 of the Penal Code. The latter notwithstanding, the criminal Court proceeded to hear the matter, and in its judgment, delivered on 14.03.2019 found the 1st Respondent not guilty of the charge and acquitted him accordingly under Section 215 of the Criminal Procedure Code. 15.These facts formed the basis of the 1st Respondent’s cause of action before the lower court. Indubitably, the Appellant’s complaint to the police set into motion the criminal proceedings in Makadara Criminal Case No. 674 of 2009 eventually brought against the 1st Respondent. It is further not disputed that the criminal proceedings terminated in the 1st Respondent’s favour thereby resolving ingredients (1) and (4) in Mbowa (supra). 16.That said, a review of the impugned decision of the trial Court, it equally concurred that the aforestated ingredients were not in issue. Therefore, what was saliently for consideration was whether Appellant and 2nd Respondent must have acted without reasonable or probable cause; and acted maliciously thus leading to the prosecution of the 1st Respondent. According to Halsbury’s Laws of England, 4thEdition – Reissue, Vol.45 (2):-“[R]easonable and probable cause for a prosecution has been said to be an honest belief in the guilt of the accused person based on a full conviction, founded upon reasonable grounds, of the existence of a state of circumstances which, assuming them to be true, would reasonably lead any ordinary prudent and cautious man, placed in the position of an accuser, to the conclusion that the person charged was probably guilty of the crime”. 17.In Murunga v Attorney General [1979] KLR 138 the Court applied the test in Kagane & Others v Attorney General & Anor (1969) EA 643, namely that, whether there was a reasonable and probable cause for the prosecution is primarily to be judged on the objective question whether the material known to the prosecutor would satisfy a prudent and cautious man that the accused was probably guilty. 18.Before the trial court, the 1st Respondent testified as PW1. He proceeded to adopt as his evidence in chief his witness statement dated 13.03.2020 and supplementary witness statement dated 16.05.2020 meanwhile adduced into evidence the documents appearing in his list documents as PExh.1 to 8. He maintained that he was maliciously prosecuted and that there was no witness who knew him that testified as against him. That one C.I. Mungera testified before the criminal Court that he did not know why charges were preferred against him whereas at the time he was employed by Techpack Industries Ltd that was supplying punnets to the Appellant. Under cross examination, he iterated that he worked for Techpak Industries Ltd meanwhile confirmed that it was within the Appellant’s right to report the incident to the police once they discovered that their property had been stolen. He equally confirmed being put on his defence in the criminal matter however qualified that the Appellant did not act with malice. He surmised that he did not know whether anything was stolen from the Appellant. In re-examination, he stated that the witnesses who testified in the criminal matter could not identify him, meanwhile it was within the Appellant’s right to report the matter to the police. That neither did the prosecution demonstrate his participation in the stealing nor did the accountants who testified in the criminal matter, implicate him. He maintained that he was a Techpak employee and as such could not know what was going on at Appellant’s company. 19.On the part of the Appellant, Frankline Zenda testified as DW1. He too adopted his witness statement dated 11.04.2023 as his evidence in chief and adduced into evidence the documents appearing in the Appellant’s list of documents as DExh.1-3. It was his evidence that the 1st Respondent who at the time was an employee of Techpak Limited and that he used to supply the Appellant with punnets. That there was no malice on the part of the Appellant given that it reported the matter to the police upon realization that there were punnets which had been stolen. Under cross-examination, he stated that he was not employed with the Appellant as at when the punnets were reported stolen meanwhile never interacted with the 1st Respondent at the time. It was his evidence that he did not testify in the criminal case however, from the records it was discovered that punnets were missing to the tune of Kshs. 18 million whereas there were delivery notes for the said amount but no punnets for the same amount. That the Appellant’s store records showed that the punnets were delivered and paid for. In re-examination, he stated that the accounts office could not allow for payments without confirmation from the 1st accused in the criminal matter whereas goods were paid for, yet they were not in the store. 20.Reviewing the evidence in the lower court, including the charge sheet and the decision of the criminal Court, the gist of the prosecution case was that on diverse dates, the 1st Respondent alongside others stole punnets valued at a Kshs. 18 million being property of the Appellant. At the time it was not disputed that the 1st Respondent was an employee of Techpak Limited that was a supplier of the said punnets to the Appellant. The latter fact was confirmed by a number of witnesses before the criminal Court. Further, it was not disputed that the 1st Respondent performed deliveries in the course of his employment with Techpak Limited however it appears that in his defence, the 1st Respondent testified that when the purported offence occurred between May of 2007 and 2008 he was not performing deliveries but serving as a director with Techpak Limited. That said, regarding the role of the Appellant as a complainant, having lodged the complaint to the police, which complaint there is consensus between the Appellant and 1st Respondent was based on a reasonable and probable cause, to wit, the Appellant left investigations to the police. 21.Invariably, the decision to charge the 1st Respondent was made by the police. The Court of Appeal in Wambua v Mbuthi & 2 others (Civil Appeal 231 of 2016) [2022] KECA 84 (KLR) while addressing itself, in part, on the role played by a complainant stated that; -“19………... In our view, the 1st and 2nd respondents having been found harboring the donkeys was sufficient to establish probable cause. As to what would transpire thereafter is a matter that would be left to the police and the prosecution to determine whether or not to mount a prosecution. Clearly, the course of action to be taken after she lodged a complaint was beyond her control. 20.In the case of Jedel Nyaga vs Silas Mucheke, CA No. 59 of 1987 this Court stated thus; “The appellant had made a complaint to the police and nothing more and what followed had nothing to do with him. The decision to arrest the respondent was made by the police who must have found some merit in the report”. Consequently, the Court found that; “the appellant who had made the report to the police was not responsible for the arrest of the respondent and the mere fact that he was a probable prosecution witness did not render him responsible for the arrest of the subsequent prosecution of the respondent by the police.”21 Similar finding were made in Koech vs African Highlands & Produce Company Limited & Another [2006] eKLR 148 thus;“The police carried out their own investigation and were satisfied that there were sufficient grounds upon which a charge of theft by servant could be preferred against the plaintiff. The first defendant carried out its own investigation regarding the disappearance of its property, just like any prudent person or company would in the circumstances but those investigations had nothing to do with the investigations by the second defendant through the police and the resultant decision to charge the plaintiff with the said offence.” 22.So that, in as much as the appellant lodged a complaint with the police, she clearly had no control over its outcome. In other words, whether or not the police would prosecute the two respondents was a decision that rested entirely with the prosecution. 23.We would add that in the prosecution’s case, there was also nothing in the evidence that disclosed that the police did not believe in the authenticity of the appellant’s case. We therefore find that on the prosecution’s part, reasonable and probable cause in prosecuting the case was properly established” (sic) 23.Here, given the earlier set out undisputed facts, the investigating officer who testified as PW6 (Joseph Mumbira), at the outset stated that he went to Techpak where he arrested the 1st Respondent on a purported complaint and or suspicion that he was colluding with one Abraham and Ibrahim (who were 1st Respondent’s co-accused in the criminal matter) to defraud the Appellant. He recorded the 1st Respondent statement and bonded him to appear in Court whereas according to the report by the Appellant, the 1st Respondent alongside others were alleged to have delivered goods which were never received at the former's store. 24.Interestingly, the investigating officer on cross examination, before the criminal Court, despite stating that he was investigating fraud and theft, equally relied and adduced into evidence a report written by one Musa Juma. It was his evidence that the said report did not bear the 1st Respondent’s name whereas he did not know how the latter was charged. Palpably his evidence was quite paradoxical, as one had he carried out an investigation and later did not know how the 1st Respondent was charged with offence. While it appears that the investigating officer performed some form of investigation it is not apparent what informed the decision to prosecute the 1st Respondent. Evidently, the link between the Appellant (as complainant), the 1st Respondent (as Accused) and the offence he was later charged with, is that he was a driver at Techpak Ltd which was a supplier of punnets to the Appellant. And that the latter’s complaint was to the effect that there were goods delivered to it which were never received. 25.To thus contemporaneously consider the question of reasonable or probable cause to prefer the charge as against the 1st Respondent alongside the question of malice, the Court of Appeal in Commissioner of Customs & Excise v Hasmukh Shamji Halai & 3 others [2018] eKLR while pronouncing itself on the latter stated as follows-;“ 31.The final element for proof was malice. For it would not matter that there was an acquittal of the two respondents; that the commissioner was the instigator of the prosecution; and that there was no probable or reasonable cause for it, if it is established that there was no malice. All the elements must dovetail in order to establish a cause of action. As this Court stated in Nzoia Sugar Company Ltd vs Fungututi [1988] KLR 399:“Acquittal per se on a criminal charge is not sufficient basis to ground a suit for malicious prosecution. Spite or ill-will must be proved against the prosecutor.” 32.In the Githaiga case (supra) the court explained as follows:-"The malice requirement is the key to striking the balance that the tort was designed to maintain: between society’s interest in the effective administration of criminal justice and the need to compensate individuals who have been wrongly prosecuted for a primary purpose other than that of carrying the law into effect."Referring to the element of malice, the former East African Court of Appeal in the Mbowa case (supra) stated:-"the defendant must have acted maliciously in that he must have acted, in instituting criminal proceedings, with an improper and wrongful motive, that is, with an intent to use the legal process in question for some purpose other than its legally appointed and appropriate purpose." (sic) 26.Grappling with the question on whether the Appellant alongside the 2nd Respondent acted without reasonable or probable cause, the trial Court observed that the evidence against the 1st Respondent was lean and that by failing to call any evidence linking the latter to the offence compounded with the investigating officer’s evidence, was malicious. In my view this was a serious misdirection. The fact that the police conducted shoddy investigations in a matter or failed to link the 1st Respondent to the offence cannot, without more, be proof of malice or having acted without reasonable or probable cause, in preferring the charges. Notwithstanding, 2nd Respondent’s failure to call evidence before the lower Court, the 1st Respondent ought to have demonstrated ill will or spite on the part of the defendants before the trial court. In the Court’s reasoned deduction, given the linkage earlier highlighted in this judgment, there was a reasonable and probable honest belief in the guilt of the accused person that would reasonably have led any ordinary prudent and cautious man, placed in the position of an accuser, to conclude that the person charged was probably guilty of the crime. Hence the Appellant’s complaint to police for investigation. 27.Further, there was no evidence before the trial court that the Appellant and the 2nd Respondent colluded out of spite or ill will to prosecute the 1st Respondent. All with an intent to use the legal process in question for some purpose other than its legally appointed and appropriate purpose. Notably, the 1st Respondent was acquitted under Section 215 of the Criminal Procedure Code, upon being placed on his defence after the criminal Court had determined that the prosecution had established a prima facie case and that the 1st Respondent had a case to answer. It was incumbent upon the 1st Respondent to discharge the burden by conjunctively proving the various ingredients required in a suit premised on malicious prosecution. 28.In my own evaluation of the trial evidence, the 1st Respondent’s case in the lower court did not rise to the standard of proof on a balance of probabilities of the ingredients necessary to establish a case of malicious prosecution against the Appellant and 2nd Respondent. The trial Court’s questions surrounding “………… was for example the plaintiff’s version sought with regard to the complaints, if any, made against him? Why did the 1st and 2nd defendant not conduct the internal investigations before instituting the criminal proceedings against the plaintiff? How comes all the witnesses who testified in the criminal case did not link the accused with the offence alleged to have been committed?” (sic) at the risk of repetition all point towards the prosecution failing to dot the proverbial “i” and “t’s” before preferring charges as against the 1st Respondent and not necessarily acting without reasonable and probable cause actuated by malice. The Court of Appeal in Hassan Magiya Kiage v Attorney General & Another [2017] eKLR cited with approval the words of the Supreme Court of Canada in Nelles vs. Ontario [1989] 2SCR 170 to the effect that:“Finally, the initiation of criminal proceedings in the absence of reasonable and probable grounds does not itself suffice to ground a plaintiff’s case for malicious prosecution, regardless of whether the defendant is a private or public actor. Malicious prosecution, as the label implies, is an intentional tort that requires proof that the defendant’s conduct in setting the criminal process in motion was fueled by malice. The malice requirement is the key to striking the balance that the tort was designed to maintain between society’s interest in the effective administration of criminal justice and the need to compensate individuals who have been wrongly prosecuted for a primary purpose other than that of carrying the law into effect.” 29.The 1st Respondent having failed to conjunctively establish the said ingredient on malicious prosecution, the trial court misdirected itself in law and fact in concluding otherwise and its conclusion cannot stand. In the result, the Court finds the appeal merited and will allow it by setting aside the judgment of the lower court and substituting therefore an order dismissing the lower Court suit with no order as to costs. 30.The Court further directs that each party bears their own costs of the appeal. DELIVERED, DATED AND SIGNED AT NAIROBI THIS 9TH DAY OF JULY 2026DAVID MBURUJUDGEIn the presence of:M/s Oduo for AppellantMr. Waithaka for 1st RespondentM/s Mutsoli for 2nd RespondentCourt Assistant – Kalondu