https://new.kenyalaw.org/akn/ke/judgment/kehc/2026/6474

VWM v SM (Matrimonial Cause E015 of 2022) [2026] KEHC 6474 (KLR) (Family) (14 May 2026) (Judgment) Neutral citation: [2026] KEHC 6474 (KLR) Republic of Kenya In the High Court at Nairobi (Milimani Law Courts) Family Matrimonial Cause E015 of 2022 H Namisi, J May 14, 2026 Between VWM Applicant and SM Respondent Judgment 1.Before this Court is Originating Summons dated 16 February 2022, brought pursuant to sections 7, 12, and 17 of the Matrimonial Property Act, Order 37 Rule 11 of the Civil Procedure Rules (2010), and Sections 3 and 3A of the Civil Procedure Act. The Applicant seeks the intervention of this Court to determine and apportion proprietary rights over a specific parcel of land acquired and developed during the subsistence of her marriage to the Respondent. Specifically, the Applicant seeks the following reliefs:(i)A declaration that the property acquired during the pendency of the marriage between the Applicant and the Respondent constitutes matrimonial property and is therefore subject to equal sharing;(ii)An order compelling the formal subdivision of the property known as Land Parcel No. Dagoretti/Riruta/3xx9 by the Respondent, in strict compliance with a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) executed between the parties.(iii)An order directing that 2.0 acres of the aforementioned Land Parcel No. Dagoretti/Riruta/3xx9 be issued and registered in the name of the Applicant.(iv)An order compelling the Respondent to effectuate the transfer of the said property at his own cost and expense.(v)An order that the costs of the summons be borne by the Respondent. 2.The foundational facts of this dispute are largely uncontested, having been established through documentary evidence and the oral testimonies of the parties. However, the legal inferences to be drawn from these facts are subject to sharp divergence. 3.The Applicant and the Respondent entered into a Christian marriage on 18 September 1971. The ceremony was solemnized at [Particulars Withheld] Catholic Church in Nairobi, as evidenced by the Certificate of Marriage. Over the course of their long union, the couple was blessed with five children. 4.The socioeconomic dynamics of the household were established early in the marriage. The Applicant was employed as a secretary at the University of [Particulars Withheld], a position she held even prior to the formalization of the marriage. The Respondent was employed as a Payroll Administrator and previously served at the Ministry of [Particulars Withheld]. 5.During the subsistence of the marriage, the couple established their primary residence on a portion of ancestral land. In October 1978, the Respondent obtained a financial facility from the Ukulima Cooperative Society to construct a permanent residential house on this land. This house served as the matrimonial home where the parties resided and raised their five children. 6.The land upon which the matrimonial home was erected originally belonged to the Respondent’s late father, PK. Following the demise of the patriarch, a succession process ensued. The Respondent utilized his income from employment to finance the legal proceedings required to secure his inheritance. The Applicant testified that due to the Respondent's financial commitment to the succession litigation, the burden of Maintaining the household and providing for the daily needs of the children fell squarely upon her, utilizing her salary from the University of [Particulars Withheld]. 7.Following the successful conclusion of the succession process and a subsequent subdivision of the parent parcel (Dagoretti/Riruta/2xx3), the specific parcel in dispute—Dagoretti/Riruta/3xx9, measuring approximately 2.206 Hectares (roughly 5.45 acres)—was registered as an absolute title in the name of the Respondent on 23 October 1995. 8.On 28 January 2011, forty years into the marriage, the Respondent executed a formal Memorandum of Understanding (MOU). This document, drafted by the law firm of Mbichi Mboroki & Co. Advocates and signed by the Respondent, the Applicant, and their adult children, explicitly outlined the Respondent's intention to subdivide and distribute Dagoretti/Riruta/3xx9 among his family members. The stated consideration within the MOU was "natural love and affection and interests of peace and unity in his household". 9.The distribution schedule articulated in the 2011 MOU was detailed and specific. To contextualize the intended division of the 5.45-acre estate, the allocations are summarized as follows:i.2.0 acres allocated to SMW & VWM (husband and wife) to be registered jointly between the registered proprietor and his wife;ii.0.5 acres allocated to each of the four children, subject to subdivision within 90 days;iii.0.5 acres to be allocated to MNK, the Respondent’s mother, to satisfy High Court Decree in HCCC NO. 3081 of 1995;iv.0.4 acres to be allocated to PMK, a third party, subject to subdivision within 90 days. 10.Clause 2 of the MOU contained a specific performance window, mandating the registered proprietor, the Respondent, to undertake the subdivision and transfer process and complete the same within 90 days from the date of execution. Furthermore, Clause 5 contained a strict non-variation clause, stating: "This agreement cannot be altered or changed without consent of all the parties hereto." 11.Despite the explicit 90-day completion clause, the Respondent failed to effectuate the subdivisions and transfers. As the years progressed, the marital relationship deteriorated significantly. The Respondent testified that the Applicant relocated to the United States in 2003 to visit their children and subsequently abandoned the matrimonial home. The Applicant disputes this characterization, asserting that she remains a Kenyan citizen who frequently returns home, but found herself rendered an internally displaced person (IDP) after the Respondent locked her out of the matrimonial residence and withheld her personal belongings. 12.The irreconcilable differences between the parties culminated in formal divorce proceedings. A Decree Nisi was issued on 11 January 2020 by the ChieFMagistrate’s Court at Nairobi (Divorce Cause No. 401 of 2019), which was subsequently made Absolute on 11 February 2020. Following the legal dissolution of the marriage, the Applicant instituted the present Originating Summons to claim her proprietary rights over the matrimonial home and to enforce the terms of the 2011 MOU. The Applicant's Case 13.The Applicant's case is constructed upon her Originating Summons, her Written Statement, a Supplementary Affidavit, and oral testimony adduced during the plenary hearing. The Applicant advances a dual-pronged legal strategy, relying simultaneously on statutory matrimonial property rights and the specific performance of a valid contract. 14.Firstly, the Applicant asserts that Dagoretti/Riruta/3xx9 constitutes matrimonial property as defined under section 6 of the Matrimonial Property Act. She acknowledges that the land traces its origins to the Respondent's ancestral inheritance. However, she argues that because the specific title was issued in 1995—during the subsistence of the marriage—and because the property houses the very home where the marriage was consummated and the family raised, it falls squarely within the statutory definition of a matrimonial home. The Applicant relies on the decisions in s n v FM eKLR and ENK v JNK eKLR, which establish that property inherited during the subsistence of a marriage cannot be arbitrarily excluded from the matrimonial estate. 15.Secondly, the Applicant deposes that her contribution to the marital estate was substantial, continuous, and highly valuable. During her cross-examination, she testified that the Respondent was preoccupied with succession litigation, which drained his financial resources. Consequently, she utilized her salary from the University of [Particulars Withheld] to manage the household, feed the family, and raise their five children. She posits that under the Matrimonial Property Act, non-monetary contributions—including domestic work, childcare, and household management—are explicitly recognized as valid forms of contribution. 16.Thirdly, the Applicant relies heavily on the 2011 Memorandum of Understanding. She characterizes the MOU as a binding post-nuptial contract that expressly recognized and quantified her entitlement to the property. The Applicant submits that under established principles of contract law, a signed agreement cannot be unilaterally altered. She relies on the persuasive precedent of Joel Phenehas Nyaga v Aloysius Nyaga Kanyua eKLR, which adopted the common law rule from L'Estrange v F Graucob Ltd, asserting that a party who signs a document is bound by its terms absent fraud or duress. She maintains that the Respondent's failure to execute the transfers within the stipulated 90 days does not extinguish her rights, particularly because Clause 5 of the MOU prohibited any alterations without the mutual consent of all signatories. The Respondent's Defence 17.The Respondent’s defence is contained in his Replying Affidavit, his written submissions, and his oral testimony before the Court. He vehemently opposes the Originating Summons, urging the Court to dismiss it with costs based on three primary legal arguments. 18.First, the Respondent contends that Land Parcel No. Dagoretti/Riruta/3xx9 is ancestral land inherited directly from his late father. He relies on Section 5 of the Matrimonial Property Act, which stipulates that the interest of any person in property acquired or inherited before marriage shall not form part of the matrimonial property. He testified that he single-handedly secured the loan from Ukulima Cooperative to construct the house and that the Applicant made no direct financial contribution to the acquisition or development of the real estate. He further relies on the Supreme Court decision in J O O v M B O KESC 4 (KLR) to argue that Article 45(3) of the Constitution does not mandate the automatic 50:50 reallocation of proprietary rights to a non-contributing spouse. 19.Second, the Respondent attacks the legal validity and enforceability of the 2011 MOU. He admits to drafting and signing the document but raises the defence of a failure of consideration. He argues that the agreement was founded entirely on natural love and affection and the interests of peace and unity in his household. Because the marriage irrevocably broke down and culminated in a Decree Absolute, the Respondent contends that the underlying foundation of love and affection evaporated, rendering the MOU void and unenforceable. During his testimony, he stated: "The consideration was love and affection, that is what inspired me. The love does not exist now... The MOU cannot be valid, there is no more love". 20.Third, the Respondent relies on the strict construction of the temporal clause within the MOU. Clause 2 mandated that the subdivision and transfer be completed within 90 days of the agreement's execution on 28 January 2011. The Respondent argues that because this 90-day period lapsed over a decade ago without any action being taken, the agreement expired by the effluxion of time and is legally dead. He asserts that the Applicant slept on her rights and cannot now seek the specific performance of a time-barred contract. Analysis & Determination 21.The Court isolates the following four core issues for determination:i.Whether Land Parcel No. Dagoretti/Riruta/3xx9 constitutes matrimonial property under the Matrimonial Property Act, or whether it is excluded as inherited ancestral land.ii.Whether the Memorandum of Understanding dated 28 January 2011 is a valid, binding, and enforceable post-nuptial agreement under contract and family law.iii.Whether the 90-day completion clause within the Memorandum of Understanding rendered the agreement void and unenforceable upon its lapse.iv.Whether the Applicant has proved sufficient contribution to warrant the equitable reliefs sought under Article 45(3) of the Constitution; The Dichotomy of Ancestral Inheritance and Matrimonial Property 22.The Respondent’s primary line of defence rests on the assertion that the suit property, being an inheritance from his father, is entirely immune from matrimonial division. 23.Section 6(1) of the Matrimonial Property Act defines matrimonial property comprehensively to include:(a)the matrimonial home or homes;(b)household goods and effects in the matrimonial home or homes; or(c)any other immovable and movable property jointly owned and acquired during the subsistence of the marriage. 24.Conversely, section 5 of the Act provides a statutory shield for specific assets, stating: "Subject to section 6, the interest of any person in any immovable or movable property acquired or inherited before marriage shall not form part of the matrimonial property". The Respondent relies heavily on section 5 to ring-fence Dagoretti/Riruta/3xx9. 25.The interpretation of section 5 has been the subject of extensive judicial scrutiny, particularly regarding the temporal nexus of the inheritance. The critical question is whether the inheritance crystallized before or during the marriage. In the persuasive decision of ENK v JNK [2015] KEHC 2041 (KLR), Musyoka J. provided a definitive interpretation of this statutory tension. The learned Judge observed:“From the language of the said Act, there is no provision which excludes inherited property from the definition of Matrimonial property. Indeed, Section 5 of the Act impliedly includes it in the definition. According to Section 5, the only time such property would not form part of Matrimonial property where the inheritance was before the marriage. In this case, the asset in question was inherited during matrimony and therefore it forms part of Matrimonial property.” 26.This judicial posture was subsequently affirmed and expanded by Mabeya J. in SN v FM [2019] KEHC 6924 (KLR), where the Court unequivocally held: “To my mind, the net result of the foregoing is that; parties to a marriage are at all times equal from its celebration until its dissolution. However, that equality does not mutate into equal proprietary rights, that is, it does not mean that on dissolution of the marriage the matrimonial property is to be divided 50:50.” The yardstick for determining the character of the property is its period of acquisition, as echoed in TMW vs FMC [2018] eKLR. 27.Furthermore, the courts have consistently held that the character of an inherited property changes fundamentally once it is utilized as the primary residence of the married couple. In AMM v SMN [2022] KEHC 367 (KLR), the Court determined that even if a property is inherited, once the couple resides on it and utilizes it as their primary dwelling, it assumes the unassailable character of a matrimonial home under section 6(1)(a) of the Act, thereby subjecting it to the legal presumptions of joint beneficial interest. 28.Applying this robust jurisprudence to the chronological facts of the present case, the Respondent's defence collapses. The parties were married in September 1971. The Respondent admits to constructing the house on the ancestral land in 1978, seven years into the marriage. The parent parcel was formally subdivided, and the specific title for Dagoretti/Riruta/3xx9 was issued and registered in the absolute name of the Respondent on 23 October 1995. 29.Therefore, the property was legally acquired and vested in the Respondent 24 years into the marriage. It was undeniably inherited and registered during the coverture. Furthermore, it is a matter of common ground that the property housed the permanent structure where the family lived for decades, thereby perfectly meeting the statutory definition of a matrimonial home. 30.The Court thus finds and declares that Land Parcel No. Dagoretti/Riruta/3xx9 is matrimonial property. It is not shielded by the exclusionary provisions of Section 5 of the Matrimonial Property Act, as it was inherited and registered during the subsistence of the marriage, and unequivocally served as the matrimonial home. The Sanctity of Spousal Agreements and Natural Love and Affection 31.The most contentious element of this dispute revolves around the validity of the 2011 Memorandum of Understanding. The Applicant relies on it as an ironclad contract, while the Respondent dismisses it as an expired gratuitous promise vitiated by the collapse of love and affection. 32.In law, the right of spouses to contract with one another regarding their property is expressly recognized and protected. Section 6(3) of the Matrimonial Property Act states: "Despite subsection (1), the parties to an intended marriage may enter into an agreement before their marriage to determine their property rights". While section 6(3) specifically references pre-nuptial agreements, the courts have definitively extended this contractual freedom to post-nuptial agreements and separation deeds. As elucidated in JJM v JLM (Matrimonial Cause E057 of 2021), post-nuptial agreements are treated as contracts sui generis enforceable under general principles of contract law. This Court in JJM v JLM held that legislative silence on post-nuptial agreements does not render them unenforceable; they are binding if executed voluntarily, with full disclosure, and without fraud or duress. 33.The Respondent admits to drafting and signing the MOU but raises the defence of a failure of consideration. He argues that the agreement was founded on natural love and affection, which evaporated upon the issuance of the divorce decree. 34.This argument necessitates a deep analysis of "love and affection" as consideration in contract law. Under classical English common law doctrines of assumpsit (as demonstrated in archaic cases such as White v Bluett), natural love and affection were generally deemed insufficient economic consideration to enforce a contract. However, modern Kenyan property and conveyancing laws explicitly depart from this rigid framework. Section 2 of the Stamp Duty Act (Cap 480) broadly defines consideration to include valuable consideration in money or money's worth, marriage and natural love and affection. Consequently, familial transfers, settlements, and trust deeds utilizing love and affection as the primary consideration are routinely enforced by the courts to formalize the equitable distribution of assets among family members. 35.More importantly, the execution of the MOU elevated the Respondent's intention from a mere oral promise to a formal, written, and witnessed legal instrument. The jurisprudential anchor for evaluating signed agreements is the venerated rule in L'Estrange v F Graucob Ltd 2 KB 394. This rule stipulates that when a document containing contractual terms is signed, in the absence of fraud or misrepresentation, the party signing it is strictly bound, and it is wholly immaterial whether they fully comprehended the eventual consequences. This doctrine has been wholly domesticated in Kenya. In Joel Phenehas nyaga v Aloysius nyaga Kanyua eKLR, the Court reiterated that a person who signs a lawful contractual document cannot escape its terms unless they establish fraud, misrepresentation, duress, undue influence, or the defence of non est factum. 36.The Matrimonial Property Act further codifies this high threshold for invalidation. Section 6(4) dictates that a court may only set aside a spousal property agreement if it determines that the agreement was influenced by fraud, coercion or is manifestly unjust. 37.The Respondent has pleaded none of these vitiating factors. He does not allege that the Applicant defrauded him, misrepresented facts, or coerced him into signing the MOU in the presence of his advocate. He merely asserts that he changed his mind because the marriage ended. A change of heart, or the subsequent dissolution of a marriage, does not constitute a manifest injustice capable of retroactively voiding a valid contract. An agreement designed to secure the financial futures of a spouse and children crystallizes proprietary rights at the moment of execution. The subsequent divorce is the very contingency that makes the enforcement of such property settlements necessary, not the catalyst for their invalidation. 38.Consequently, the Court finds that the Memorandum of Understanding dated 28 January 2011 is a valid, binding, and enforceable post-nuptial contract. The Respondent cannot unilaterally rescind it on the basis of diminished affection. The Doctrine of "Time is of the essence" 39.The Respondent's tertiary defence is that the MOU contained a specific temporal limitation. Clause 2 of the agreement stipulated: "The registered proprietor to undertake the subdivision and transfer process and complete the same within 90 days from the date of execution of this agreement". The Respondent argues that because 90 days lapsed over a decade ago, the agreement expired by the effluxion of time and is legally dead. 40.This argument fundamentally misapprehends the doctrine of contractual completion periods in conveyancing and property law. The mere inclusion of a timeframe in a contract does not automatically render the contract void upon the expiry of that time. For a time-lapse to be fatal to a contract, time must be deemed of the essence. 41.Under contract law, time is only of the essence if it is expressly stated as a condition of the contract, or if it is made so by necessary implication, usually through the issuance of a formal completion notice by the innocent party. As articulated in the persuasive English authority of Barclays v Messenger 3 All ER 492, and universally applied by Environment and Land Court, a failure to complete within a stipulated period allows the innocent party the option to pursue remedies for breach (including specific performance) or to issue a notice making time of the essence and subsequently rescinding the contract. 42.In cases such as Jane Watiri Gitungo v Johnson Gitungo Kamau (ELCA E034 of 2023) and similar property disputes, Courts have held that where parties fail to meet a 90-day completion clause, the contract is not automatically voided unless the innocent party issues a 21-day or 30-day notice demanding completion and threatening rescission. 43.In the present case, the MOU did not contain a "time is of the essence" clause. Furthermore, it is a basic tenet of equity that a party cannot benefit from their own breach. The Respondent cannot rely on his own default and failure to execute the 90-day obligation to argue that the contract is frustrated. The obligation to subdivide rested squarely on his shoulders. 44.Crucially, Clause 5 of the MOU explicitly states: "This agreement cannot be altered or changed without consent of all the parties hereto". Because the Applicant never consented to the rescission of the MOU, and never issued a notice terminating the agreement, the Respondent's obligation to transfer the land remains fully intact and legally enforceable. The passage of time has not extinguished the Applicant's equitable rights; it has merely delayed their realization. Constitutional Equality, Equitable Distribution, and the Metric of Contribution 45.Even if the Court were to look beyond the strict contractual enforcement of the MOU, the Applicant's entitlement to a share of the property is firmly rooted in constitutional and statutory law. 46.Article 45(3) of the Constitution states that parties to a marriage are entitled to equal rights at the time of the marriage, during the marriage, and at the dissolution of the marriage. The interpretation of "equal rights" in the context of property division has been conclusively settled by the Supreme Court in the landmark decision of J O O v M B O; Federation of Women Lawyers (FIDA Kenya) & another (Amicus Curiae) KESC 4 (KLR). The Supreme Court dispelled the popular misconception that Article 45(3) operates as a passport to an automatic 50:50 division of Matrimonial property. The apex Court clarified that equality in the context of Marital dissolution means "equitable entitlement based on demonstrated contribution". The Court reaffirmed the legal principles originating from the Court of Appeal decision in Peter Mburu Echaria v Priscilla Njeri Echaria eKLR, emphasizing that a spouse does not acquire a beneficial interest in property registered in the other spouse's name merely by the fact of Marriage; specific contribution must be proved on a case-by-case basis. 47.However, the Supreme Court in J O O v M B O, reading together with section 2 of the Matrimonial Property Act, broadly defined contribution to include both monetary and non-monetary inputs. Non-monetary contribution encompasses domestic work, management of the matrimonial home, childcare, companionship, and the management of family property. The courts have increasingly recognized that the spouse who manages the household provides the foundational support that enables the other spouse to acquire, develop, or protect financial assets. As eloquently stated by Kiage J.A. in PNN v ZWN [2017] eKLR, the division of property must proceed on the basis of fairness and conscience, recognizing the industry, economy, effort, and frugality that spouses invest in the family unit. 48.The evidence adduced in the present matter reveals a marriage that subsisted for a remarkable 49 years. The Applicant testified that while she was employed as a secretary at the University of [Particulars Withheld], she utilized her earnings to support the household and raise their children. Concurrently, the Respondent utilized his income from employment to fund the protracted legal battles required to secure the inheritance of the ancestral land. The Applicant’s non-monetary contribution—in managing the home, providing companionship, and raising a large family—coupled with her direct monetary contribution to the daily upkeep of the household over nearly five decades, constitutes overwhelming proof of contribution. 49.The Respondent's assertion that the Applicant contributed nothing is entirely unsupported by the realities of a 49-year coverture. Section 107 of the Evidence Act places the burden of proof on the party asserting a fact. The Applicant has successfully discharged this burden, proving that her lifelong dedication to the family unit facilitated the preservation and development of the matrimonial estate. Therefore, under Section 7 of the Matrimonial Property Act, the Applicant has amply demonstrated her right to a substantial beneficial interest in Dagoretti/Riruta/3xx9. Disposition 50.Having established the Applicant's constitutional, statutory, and contractual entitlement, the Court must determine the exact quantum of her share. While the assessment of indirect contribution can often lead to complex judicial estimations of percentages, the present case is uniquely straightforward. The parties themselves pre-quantified the equitable distribution of the estate through the 2011 MOU. By allocating 2.0 acres to the marital unit (out of the 5.45 available acres) and distributing the remainder to the children and extended family, the Respondent explicitly acknowledged the Applicant's stake in the property. 51.A close reading of the MOU reveals a critical nuance in the text. Clause 1(a) states: "2 acres will be registered jointly between the registered proprietor and his wife VWM". In her Originating Summons, the Applicant prays that 2 acres be issued to the Applicant herein. 52.Because the marriage has been irreparably dissolved via a Decree Absolute, an order directing the joint registration of the 2.0 acres would trap the estranged parties in an untenable co-tenancy, inevitably breeding further hostility and litigation. Family law jurisprudence prioritizes the clean break principle upon divorce. Equity dictates that where a joint tenancy is ordered pursuant to a marital settlement, the subsequent dissolution of the marriage warrants the severance of that joint tenancy. 53.Looking holistically at the Applicant's lifelong contribution to the entire 5.45-acre estate, and recognizing that she seeks the enforcement of the MOU to secure 2.0 acres for herself, the Court must harmonize the contractual intent with equitable division. The MOU explicitly carved out 2.0 acres for the benefit of the Applicant alongside the Respondent, while alienating the rest to the children. Given the Respondent's blatant breach of the agreement, his subsequent eviction of the Applicant from the matrimonial home, and the Applicant's extensive 49-year contribution to the family, it is just and equitable to award the Applicant 1.0 acres outright as her definitive and final share of the matrimonial property. This prevents unjust enrichment, honours the quantum negotiated in the MOU, and finalizes the financial decoupling of the parties. 54.The sanctity of contracts cannot be discarded at the altar of Marital discord. When a spouse voluntarily executes a property settlement agreement to secure the future of their family, the law will hold them to their bargain. Land Parcel No. Dagoretti/Riruta/3xx9, though originating as ancestral land, morphed into matrimonial property by virtue of its acquisition during the marriage and its use as the matrimonial home. The 2011 Memorandum of Understanding is a valid post-nuptial contract that was never legally rescinded, and the Applicant has irrefutably proven her immense contribution to the marriage over five decades. 55.Accordingly, the Court enters judgment in favor of the Applicant and makes the following final orders:i.It is hereby declared that the property known as Land Parcel No. Dagoretti/Riruta/3xx9 constitutes matrimonial property within the meaning of Section 6 of the Matrimonial Property Act, 2013.ii.It is hereby declared that the Memorandum of Understanding dated 28 January 2011 is a valid, binding, and enforceable post-nuptial contract.iii.An order is hereby issued directing the Respondent to execute the subdivision of Land Parcel No. Dagoretti/Riruta/3xx9 in accordance with the spirit of the Memorandum of Understanding.iv.An order is hereby issued that upon the said subdivision, a distinct title measuring exactly 1.0 acres shall be excised and transferred absolutely to the Applicant as her rightful and equitable share of the matrimonial property.v.The Respondent shall bear all reasonable costs of the subdivision, surveying, and transfer of the said 1.0 acres to the Applicant. Should the Respondent fail or refuse to execute the necessary subdivision, consent, and transfer documents within ninety (90) days of the date of this Judgment, the Deputy Registrar is hereby authorized and directed to execute all necessary documents to effectuate this order.vi.Given the nature of Matrimonial litigation and the familial relationship between the parties, each party shall bear their own costs of this suit. DATED AND DELIVERED AT NAIROBI THIS 14 DAY OF MAY 2026HELENE R. NAMISIJUDGE OF THE HIGH COURTDelivered on virtual platform in the presence of:Court Assistant: Lucy Mwangi