https://new.kenyalaw.org/akn/ke/judgment/keelrc/2026/1522

Weson Investment Ltd t/a Shell Radiant Service Station v Barasa (Employment and Labour Relations Appeal E020 of 2025) [2026] KEELRC 1522 (KLR) (4 June 2026) (Judgment) Neutral citation: [2026] KEELRC 1522 (KLR) Republic of Kenya In the Employment and Labour Relations Court at Nakuru Employment and Labour Relations Appeal E020 of 2025 AN Mwaure, J June 4, 2026 Between Weson Investment Ltd t/a Shell Radiant Service Station Appellant and Christopher Barasa Respondent (Being an Appeal from the Judgment and Order of the Honourable Aloyce Peter Ndege, Senior Principal Magistrate, delivered on 4th March 2025 in Nakuru MCELRC NO. E100 of 2024) Judgment 1.The Appellant, being dissatisfied with the Judgment and Decree of the Honourable Aloyce Peter Ndege, Senior Principal Magistrate, filed this appeal vide a Memorandum of Appeal dated 27th March 2025, on the following grounds that: -1.The Learned Magistrate erred in law and fact by failing to take Judicial notice of the three (3) years limitation period prescribed under section 90 of the Employment Act in granting the reliefs sought.2.The Learned Magistrate erred in law and fact by computing and awarding reliefs of leave days not taken, unpaid public holidays, and unpaid house allowance over a period of twelve and a half years (12.6) contrary to the legal limitation of three (3) years.3.The Learned Magistrate erred in law and fact in arriving at conclusions and inferences in regard to leave days not taken, unpaid public holidays, unpaid house allowance and voluntary savings, which are not supported by evidence, and/or based on any documentation.4.The Learned Magistrate erred in law and fact in making a finding that the Respondent/Claimant was entitled to unpaid house allowance and making a consequent erroneous award of Kshs.425,250.00 as the compensation of unpaid house allowance.5.The Learned Magistrate erred in law and fact by failing to consider and appreciate the fact that as a matter of house allowance, the Respondent/Claimant was paid a consolidated salary inclusive of house allowance.6.The learned Magistrate erred in law and fact and/or applied wrong principles and/or failed to consider the evidence adduced by the Respondent/Appellant and parameters by awarding the Respondent/Claimant Kshs.436,973.24/= for prohibited annual leave.7.The learned Magistrate erred in law and fact and/or applied wrong principles and/or failed to consider the evidence adduced by the Respondent/Appellant and parameters by awarding the Claimant/Respondent Kshs.249,699.24/= unpaid public holiday.8.The Learned Magistrate erred in law and fact in arriving at conclusions and inference on voluntary savings of Kshs. 150,000/= which are not supported by evidence and /or based on any documentation.9.The Learned Magistrate erred in law and fact in disregarding the evidence tendered by the Appellant and/or failing to properly and exhaustively evaluate the evidence on record.10.The Learned Magistrate erred in law and fact by failing to consider the Appellant’s submissions which were duly filed to the prejudice and detriment of the Appellant.11.The learned Magistrate erred in law and fact by entering judgement that was ambiguous and imprecise.12.Other grounds and reasons to be adduced at the hearing hereof. 2.The Appellant prays that:a.The instant appeal be allowed.b.The Judgment of Hon. Hon. Aloyce Peter Ndege (SPM) dated and delivered at Nakuru on 4th March 2025 be reviewed/set aside.c.The Respondent to bear costs of this Appeal. 3.The Respondent, on the other hand, filed a cross appeal vide a Memorandum of cross appeal dated 3rd April 2025 on the following grounds that:1.The Learned Trial Magistrate erred in law and fact in finding that the Respondent’s termination was substantively fair.2.The Learned Trial Magistrate erred in law and in fact in failing to take into account that the Appellant failed to prove the essentials under section 45(2) of the Employment Act 2007 in arriving to a conclusion that the Respondent’s termination was substantive fair.3.The Learned Trial Magistrate erred in law and fact in disregarding the undisputed evidence of the Respondent that the responsibility of offloading fuel was outside his job mandate.4.The Learned Trial Magistrate erred in law and fact in awarding only one-half (1/2) of the Respondent’s monthly gross salary despite arriving to a conclusion that the termination of the Respondent was procedurally fair.5.The Learned Trial Magistrate erred in law and fact in failing to award overtime yet it was part of the prayers sought in the claim. 4.The Respondent prays that:1.This cross appeal be allowed2.The Honourable Court be pleased to re-view the Judgment and make the appropriate award on the grounds sought3.The costs of this Appeal be borne by the Appellant herein 5.Both the appeal and cross appeal were disposed of by way of written submissions. Appellant’s written submissions 6.The Appellant submitted that the Respondent’s claim sought compensation for employment-related dues covering 12.6 years, including underpayment, rest days, leave, public holidays, overtime, and house allowance. The trial court awarded these reliefs as requested. However, the Appellant argued that such claims are time-barred under section 90 of the Employment Act, which limits actions to three years from the date of the alleged breach, or twelve months in cases of continuing injury. 7.Despite raising this issue in its submissions, the Appellant submitted that the trial court failed to address the limitation period and wrongly awarded reliefs beyond the statutory three-year limit. The Appellant relied on the case of Edward Ochieng v Dan Okumu [2022] KEELRC 401 (KLR), the court held that:“By reason of the aforegoing premise, I am persuaded to hold that the Claimant’s Claim as relates to acts that fall outside of the 3 [three] years to the date of filing the claim herein is time barred and is dismissed. The Claim as herein above stated related largely to a period outside the three years immediately prior to the date of filing this suit. Therefore, the Claimant’s Claim for reliefs sought in respect of the years 2003, 2004, 2005 and 2006 is dismissed. The reliefs cannot be availed to him.” 8.The Appellant also relied on the case of Samwel Onderi Choi v Absolute Security Limited [2021] KEELRC 977 (KLR), where the court stated that:“I note that the claimant’s claim herein was filed on the 12th October 2015. Consequently, in line with provisions afore-stated, I take a view that any claim for the alleged unfair payment, for the period 1st May 2012 – 11th October 2012, was time barred as at that time of filing of the claim. Therefore, in considering a period for which a payment may be ordered, this period shall be excluded.” 9.The Appellant submitted that the suit was filed on 20th May 2024, meaning the Respondent could only lawfully claim reliefs for the three years preceding that date. Since the dismissal occurred on 26th May 2023, the recoverable period was effectively two years (from 20th May 2021 to 26th May 2023). The Appellant therefore submitted that the trial court erred in computing reliefs over 12.6 years and urges this Honourable Court to limit any award to a maximum of two years (24 months). 10.The Appellant submitted that the Respondent’s claims for house allowance, annual leave, public holidays, and voluntary savings were wrongly awarded by the trial court. First, RW1 confirmed the salary was consolidated, meaning house allowance was already included; even if payable, section 90 of the Employment Act limits recovery to 24 months, amounting to Kshs.68,040/= only. 11.Second, the Appellant submitted that the award of Kshs. 436,973.24/= for annual leave, which ignored the statutory limit, as only two years (21 days per year) were claimable, totalling Kshs.26,460/= 12.Third, the Appellant submitted that the blanket award for public holidays was unsupported by evidence, contrary to binding precedents in Edward Ochieng v Dan Okumu(Supra), Reef Hotel Limited v Josephine Chivatsi [2021] KEELRC 1681 (KLR), and Rogoli Ole Manadiegi v General Cargo Services Limited [2016] KEELRC 1607 (KLR), which require specificity of dates worked. 13.The Respondent failed to prove any entitlement, yet the trial court awarded compensation for 12.6 years, grossly exaggerating the claim. 14.Finally, the Appellant submitted that the award of Kshs. 150,000/= for voluntary savings lacked proof, as only two payslips were produced showing contributions of Kshs. 1,000/=, and the Appellant admitted only Kshs.83,000/=. The trial court therefore erred in law and fact by granting exaggerated, time-barred, and unproven awards, and this Honourable Court is urged to review and limit reliefs strictly to what is legally justifiable. 15.In conclusion, the Appellant submitted that the trial court’s awards on house allowance, annual leave, public holidays, and voluntary savings were erroneous, exaggerated, and unlawful. The court failed to apply the statutory three-year limitation under Section 90 of the Employment Act and instead granted reliefs spanning 12.6 years, which were time-barred. Moreover, the awards were based on claims pleaded without specificity or supporting evidence, amounting to assumptions rather than proof. 16.The Appellant urged this Honourable Court to review the judgment delivered on 4th March 2025 and allow the appeal to the extent sought. Respondent’s written submissions 17.The Respondent submitted that section 90 of the Employment Act sets a three-year limitation period for filing employment-related claims from the date the cause of action arises, or twelve months in cases of continuing injury after its cessation. It emphasizes that this limitation applies to the filing of the suit itself, not to restricting how far back financial reliefs can be calculated. Since the claim in question was filed within one year of termination, it was well within the statutory timeframe, and the Respondent argues that the alleged breaches constituted a continuing injury, meaning the three-year bar does not apply to the reliefs sought. 18.The Respondent relied on the case of Nganga v Christ the King & another [2023] KECA 1100 (KLR) where the court placed reliance on the case of German School Society & Another v Obany & Another [2023] KECA 894(KLR) observed as follows:“We agree with the interpretation adopted in the decisions referenced above. Perhaps to add our understanding, a continuing wrong simply put, is a wrong arising out of a continuous breach of an obligation which transcends a single completed act or omission. The obligation so breached must be one borne of law or agreement between parties and which gives rise to an actionable claim. And, as this Court stated German School Society & Ano v Obany & Another (Supra), the existence of a continuing wrong is an exception to the rules of limitation of actions hence the claimant is within their right to seek reliefs emanating from the date when the continuing wrong commenced. We therefore reject the respondents defence that the appellant did not raise these grievances with the respondents during her term of service. We find that the appellant's claim is one of a continuing injury and the claims ought to be considered dating back to the year 2000 when she was first employed by the respondents.”On this we find comfort in the holding in German School Society & Another v Obany & Another“Normally, a belated service related claim will be rejected on the ground of delay and laches or limitation. One of the exceptions to the said rule is cases relating to a continuing wrong. Where a service related claim is based on a continuing wrong, relief can be granted even if there is a long delay in seeking remedy, with reference to the date on which the continuing wrong commenced, if such continuing wrong creates a continuing source of injury. Borrowing from the excerpts reproduced above and considering that the respondent continued to work under the same circumstances, we find and hold that the breach complained of was of a continuing nature, capable of giving rise to a legal injury which assumes the nature of a continuing wrong. It follows that the appellant's argument that the claims were time barred fails. On the contrary, the said claims fall within the ambit of a continuing wrongs contemplated under section 90.” 19.The Respondent argued that the three-year limitation period under section 90 of the Employment Act applies only to the filing of claims, not to restricting reliefs, since the breaches complained of were of a continuing nature. The Respondent’s claims, therefore fall within the ambit of continuing wrongs, making the time-bar argument inapplicable. 20.On house allowance and annual leave, the Respondent submitted that the trial court correctly found that the employment contract did not provide for house allowance and that the employer failed to discharge its statutory obligation under Section 31(1) of the Employment Act. The Respondent relied on the case of Robai Musinzi v Safdar Mohamed Khan [2012] KEELRC 261 (KLR) where the court cited the case of Milkah Khakayi Kulati v Sandstorm (Africa) Limited [2014] KEELRC 843 (KLR) where the court held that,“Where an employer fails to document the terms of conditions of employment, it is left to the court to interpret these terms. From my analysis of the evidence presented to the court, I did not find any expressed intention that the Claimant’s salary was inclusive of house allowance.” 21.The Respondent argued that although the Appellant insisted the Respondent’s salary was consolidated, no evidence was produced to prove this. Neither the employment contract nor the payslips indicated that the house allowance was included. As a result, the Appellant was found to have breached its statutory obligation under Section 31(1) of the Employment Act, and the trial court was correct in awarding house allowance to the Respondent. The Respondent submitted that the claim for house allowance was not time-barred since failure to pay it amounts to a continuing injury under Section 90 of the Employment Act, citing Milkah Khakavi Kulati v Sandstorm Africa Ltd [2014] eKLR in support of that proposition. 22.On unpaid public holidays, the Respondent submitted that the trial court correctly relied on attendance records produced by the Appellant, which showed the Respondent worked on such days, and this evidence was not challenged. Regarding voluntary savings, payslips confirmed monthly deductions of Kshs.1,000/=, and although only sample payslips were provided, it was unreasonable to expect all 150 months to be attached. Moreover, the Appellant admitted owing Kshs. 83,000/= but failed to prove which amounts had been refunded, thereby justifying the Respondent’s claim. 23.For the cross-appeal, the Respondent submitted that his dismissal on 23rd May 2023 was procedurally and substantively unfair. He was terminated abruptly without notice, warning, or a chance to be heard, contrary to Section 41 of the Employment Act, which requires employers to explain reasons for termination and allow the employee to respond with representation. While the trial court correctly found the dismissal procedurally unfair, it erred in deeming it substantively fair without considering the Respondent’s testimony. The Respondent emphasize that the termination lacked valid grounds and failed to meet the fairness requirements under section 41 of the Employment Act. 24.The Respondent submitted that under section 45(2) of the Employment Act, termination must be based on fair and valid reasons related to an employee’s conduct or performance. The Respondent testified that he had worked diligently for 13 years without any warning letters, demonstrating discipline, hard work, and self-motivation. He maintained that he was innocent of the allegations, describing them as acts of witch hunt, malice, and victimization. Importantly, the duty of offloading fuel lay with the manager and supervisor, not him, a fact admitted by the Appellant. Thus, the claims against him lacked substance, making the termination unfair and unjustified. 25.The Respondent submitted that his dismissal was both procedurally and substantively unfair. Citing Milkah Khakavi Kulati v Sandstorm Africa Ltd(supra), the Respondent notes that the employer relied on hearsay and failed to provide substantive justification, making the termination unlawful. Under Section 47(5) of the Employment Act, the burden of proving valid grounds for dismissal rests on the employer, which the Appellant failed to discharge. Section 45(2) further requires that termination be based on valid and fair reasons and follow due procedure, yet the Respondent was implicated in duties outside his mandate, such as offloading fuel. The Respondent therefore argued that the dismissal was arbitrary, lacked evidence, and should be declared unfair, warranting maximum compensation and pay in lieu of notice. 26.The Respondent submitted that the trial court erred in awarding only half a month’s salary as compensation for unfair termination. Since the court had already found the dismissal procedurally unfair, the award was deemed unjustified and unreasonable. The Respondent contended that he deserved maximum compensation, specifically up to 12 months’ salary, as appropriate redress for the unfair termination. 27.The Respondent submitted that he was entitled to overtime pay since the trial court did not properly address the claim, and the Appellant failed to produce documents to rebut the evidence. The Respondent further contended that costs should follow the event, citing Joseph Oduor Anode V Kenya Red Cross Society [2012] KEHC 3607 (KLR), where Justice Odunga emphasized that costs generally follow the event unless the court records clear reasons otherwise. The Respondent also relied on Justice (Rtd) Kuloba’s Judicial Hints on Civil Procedure (2nd ed., 2011), which underscores that costs are meant to reimburse the successful party rather than punish any party. 28.Based on these principles, the Respondent concluded having successfully defended the appeal, he is entitled to both overtime compensation and the costs of the appeal. Analysis and determination 29.Being the first appeal, it is the court’s duty to reassess the evidence presented, conduct its own analysis, and reach independent conclusions in order to determine whether the trial court’s findings align with both the evidence and the applicable law. The court should, however, bear in mind that it did not see the witnesses as they testified and give due allowance. (See Selle v Associated Motor Boat Co Ltd & Others [1968] EA 123 and Peters vs Sunday Post Limited (1968) EA 123). 30.Having looked at the grounds of the memorandum of appeal, record of appeal, and the rival submissions by both parties; the issue for determination is: -1.Whether the court should revise the trial courts awards2.Should the Respondent be confirmed, he was unlawfully terminated?3.Who bears the costs. 31.Section 45(2) of the Employment Act provides as follows:“A termination of employment by an employer is unfair if the employer fails to prove—(a)that the reason for the termination is valid;(b)that the reason for the termination is a fair reason(i)related to the employees conduct, capacity or compatibility; or(ii)based on the operational requirements of the employer; and(c)that the employment was terminated in accordance with fair procedure.” 32.In Walter Ogal Anuro v Teachers Service Commission [2013] KEELRC 386 (KLR) where it was held that:“For termination of employment to pass the fairness test, there must be both substantive justification and procedural fairness.” 33.In Mary Chemweno Kiptui v Kenya Pipeline Company Limited [2014] KEELRC 905 (KLR) the court held as follows:“Summary dismissal on the other hand is largely at the instance of an employer. The standard applicable therefore are of a higher nature as this process is prone to abuse as the employer is in a more superior position than an employee. Summary dismissal can take place when an employer terminates the employment of an employee without notice or with less notice than that which the employee is entitled by any statutory provision or contractual term. However, even in cases of serious breach of a contract as under section 44(3) or on committing acts as outlined under section 44(4) of an employee being absent from work, being intoxicated, negligence, abusive, failure to obey lawful orders, criminal arrest or charges, suspect in a criminal case, all these serious acts, such an employee is subject to be treated as under section 41 of the Employment Act with regard to being accorded a hearing.”“Under subsection 43 (2) of the Employment Act, 2007, the reason or reasons for termination of a contract are the matters that the employer at the time of termination of the contract genuinely believed to exist and which caused the employer to terminate the services of the employee. However, these reason or reasons must be addressed before the termination notice is issued and subjected to a hearing to establish if the employee has a defence that is worth consideration. The reasons should never be given after the termination has taken effect. This would be an outright negation of the purpose, intent and validity of any reason or reasons an employer may have against the affected employee.” 34.Section 89 of the Employment Act provides as follows:“Notwithstanding the provisions of section 4(1) of the Limitation of Actions Act (Cap. 22), no civil actionor proceedings based or arising out of this Act or a contract of service in general shall lie or be institutedunless it is commenced within three years next after the act, neglect or default complained or in the caseof continuing injury or damage within twelve months next after the cessation thereof. 35.In the appeal, it is undisputed that the Appellant employed the Respondent as a service attendant earning a monthly wage of Kshs.18,900/=. Looking at the record of appeal, the Respondent had a contract with the Appellant. The Respondent argues that he was summarily dismissed on allegations of theft of 3,208 gallons of petrol, while the Appellant maintains that CCTV footage implicated the Respondent, resulting in his arrest and subsequent dismissal. The Appellant challenges the learned Magistrate’s finding that, although the reasons provided for termination were considered justifiable, the procedure followed was unfair. Furthermore, the Appellant disputes the trial court’s award of remedies as pleaded in the statement of claim, including compensation for unfair termination, unpaid house allowance, annual leave, and public holiday entitlements. 36.The court is persuaded that the learned trial Magistrate fell into error in holding that the procedure adopted in terminating the Respondent was unfair while at the same time finding the reasons for termination were justifiable. In law, an employer is bound to adhere to the twin requirements of substantive justification and procedural fairness, which are inseparable and must be satisfied concurrently, though even if one is proved and the other one is not proved the termination will still be held unlawful. In the instant case, although the Respondent was arrested on allegations of theft, the police investigations yielded no evidence sufficient to warrant criminal charges, and he remained innocent until proven guilty. Accordingly, this court holds that the termination of the Respondent was both procedurally and substantively unfair, and the learned Magistrate erred in failing to so find. The court finds the reason for Respondent’s dismissal was more of a presumption with no valid proof and so the dismissal was not fair. 37.For the reliefs sought, the court will deal first with the compensation for unfair termination, in Postal Corporation of Kenya v Tanui [2019] KECA 489 (KLR) the Court of Appeal held as follows:“We are alive to the principle that this Court will not interfere with an award of damages unless the same was inordinately high or low or the judge proceeded on wrong principles. See International Planned Parenthood Federation vs Pamela Ebot Arrey Effiom [2016] eKLR. But this Court has in several previous decisions decried the awarding of maximum compensatory damages for wrongful or unfair termination without a firm factual and legal foundation for such awards. It did so in CMC Aviation Limited vs Mohammed Noor [2015] eKLR, stating:-"The trial court did not state why it opted to give the remedy provided under section 49 (1) (c) that is, twelve months gross salary, and not the other remedies under section 49 (1) (a) or (b). The court should have been guided by the provisions of section 49 (4) but the trial judge said nothing about the reasons that led him to exercise his discretion in the manner he did." 38.So too, in Ol Pejeta Ranching Limited vs David Wanjau Muhoro [2017] eKLR:-“The trial judge did not at all attempt to justify or explain why the respondent was entitled to the maximum award. Yes, the trial Judge may have been exercising discretion in making the award. However, such exercise should not be capricious or whimsical. It should be exercised on some sound judicial principles. We would have expected the Judge to exercise such discretion based on the aforesaid parameters. In the absence of any reasons justifying the maximum award, we are inclined to believe that the trial Judge in considering the award took into account irrelevant considerations and or failed to take into account relevant considerations, which act then invites our intervention.” 39.The court is persuaded that the compensation for unfair termination under section 49(1)(c) of the Employment Act was excessively low by awarding only one half (1/2) of his monthly gross salary and the explanation by the learned Magistrate does not make logical sense as the reason given for termination is also not proved. The court will substitute and set aside the award and compensate the Respondent with six (6) months compensation for unfair termination. The court has also considered the period the Appellant worked for the Respondent. Parties to work out this by consent. 40.For the house allowance, looking at the payslip, there was no inclusion of the house allowance in the payslip and there was no mention of the house allowance in the written contract. Section 31(1) of the Employment Act provides for house allowance. In Grain Pro Kenya Inc. Ltd v Andrew Waithaka Kiragu [2019] KECA 563 (KLR) the Court of Appeal held that house allowance is part of minimum terms of employment unless the employer provides accommodation. The court is of the view that the Respondent is entitled to house allowance but not for the 12 years and 6 months as it is statute barred as per section 89 of the Employment Act thus will calculate it from 2021 to 2023 amounting to 2 years. 41.The court finds it unfair for the Claimant not to give the exact amount and expect the court to do his work. The parties are to avail these figures. 42.For unpaid leave, the court is persuaded that the Respondent is entitled to unpaid leave but the same should be calculated between 2021 to 2023 and not for 12 years as it is statute barred as per section 89 of the Employment Act. To be worked out by the parties by consent for 3 years. 43.For public holidays, the court is not persuaded with this award as the same was not proved as per sections 107, 108 and 109 of the Evidence Act which states that he who alleges must prove and therefore set aside the award by the trial court. 44.As regards the Respondent’s cross-appeal, the court finds that the learned Magistrate erred in holding the procedure was unfair but substantive justification was proved-meaning there was a valid ground for dismissal. The court finds the grounds for dismissal have not been clearly set out by the Appellant. The Appellant failed to prove both substantive justification and procedural fairness. On that regard the court faults the trial Magistrate holding he did not clarify the exact reasons why the Respondent was summarily dismissed. The twin test of proof of procedural fairness and substantive justification as provided in various case laws among them, WALTER OGAL ONURO -VS- TEACHERS SERVICE COMMISSION have not been proved. The Claimant was therefore unlawfully and procedurally dismissed. This declaration however does not translate to reviewing the awards already set out above by this court as the court has carefully given the justification for its revised awards. 45.In conclusion, the court has partially allowed the appeal and cross-appeal as already explained above.The Respondent was unfairly terminated in both substantive and procedural tests. The award for unfair termination is revised to six (6) months’ salary considering his unfair termination of employment and the period he served the Respondent. This works out to 18,900 X 6 = Kshs.113,700/=. 46.Further, to the above, the Respondent will be awarded house allowance for 3 years to be within the time for claiming for compensation under Section 89 of the Employment Act and will be worked out by the parties. 47.The Respondent to be awarded three (3) years unpaid leave to be worked out by the parties by consent. 48.The Respondent will be refunded his voluntary contributions to be agreed by the parties. 49.Costs of the lower court proceedings will be paid to the Respondent BUT in this appeal each party will meet their respective costs as per this court’s inherent discretion. 50.Interest will apply at 14% per annum from the date of the final award till final payment.Case to be mentioned on 6th July 2026 to align the awards as will be agreed by the parties. It Is So Ordered. DATED, SIGNED AND DELIVERED VIRTUALLY AT NAKURU THIS 4TH DAY OF JUNE, 2026.ANNA NGIBUINI MWAUREJUDGEOrderIn view of the declaration of measures restricting Court operations due to the COVID-19 pandemic and in light of the directions issued by His Lordship, the Chief Justice on 15th March 2020 and subsequent directions of 21st April 2020 that judgments and rulings shall be delivered through video conferencing or via email. They have waived compliance with Order 21 Rule 1 of the Civil Procedure Rules, which requires that all judgments and rulings be pronounced in open Court. In permitting this course, this Court has been guided by Article 159(2)(d) of the Constitution which requires the Court to eschew undue technicalities in delivering justice, the right of access to justice guaranteed to every person under Article 48 of the Constitution and the provisions of Section 1B of the Civil Procedure Act (Chapter 21 of the Laws of Kenya) which impose on this Court the duty of the Court, inter alia, to use suitable technology to enhance the overriding objective which is to facilitate just, expeditious, proportionate and affordable resolution of civil disputes.A signed copy will be availed to each party upon payment of Court fees.