Willy Kihara Njoki Kanyotu v The Honourable Speaker of Kenya Senate & 6 others

Kanyotu v Speaker of Kenya Senate & 6 others (Petition E514 of 2026) [2026] KEHC 13384 (KLR) (Constitutional and Human Rights) (7 September 2026) (Ruling) Neutral citation: [2026] KEHC 13384 (KLR) Republic of Kenya In the High Court at Nairobi (Milimani Law Courts) Constitutional and Human Rights Petition E514 of 2026 D Mburu, J September 7, 2026 IN THE MATTER OF CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION, PROTECTION AND ENFORCEMENT OF HUMAN RIGHTS AND FUNDAMENTAL FREEDOMS UNDER ARTICLE 19, 29, 25, 27, 28, 47, 50, 96, 159, 162 AND 165 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF KENYA 2010 AND IN THE MATTER OF THE PARLIAMENT OF KENYA, THE SENATE AND IN THE MATTER OF THE CONSTITUTION OF KENYA (PROTECTION OF RIGHTS AND FUNDAMENTAL FREEDOMS) PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE RULES 2013 Between Willy Kihara Njoki Kanyotu Petitioner and The Honourable Speaker of Kenya Senate 1st Respondent The Clerk of the Kenya Senate 2nd Respondent The Standing Committee on Land, Environment and Natural Resources Of The Senate 3rd Respondent The Honourable Attorney General 4th Respondent and Felistas Njeri Mwihia 1st Interested Party Esther Wambui Mburu 2nd Interested Party Elius Muriithi Ngure 3rd Interested Party Ruling Introduction 1.By a notice of motion application dated 29th July, 2026 filed under certificate of urgency, the Petitioner/applicant sought the following orders: -A.Pending the hearing and determination of this Application Conservatory orders be issued to restrain the Senate through its Committee on Land, Environment and Natural Resources from summoning the Petitioner to appear before it to answer questions in regards to the Protection of Property Rights and Security of Residents of Two Rivers Cresent Estate, Ruiru Kiambu County;B.Pending the hearing and determination of this Application Conservatory orders be issued to restrain the Senate through its Committee on Land, Environment and Natural Resources from deliberating and inquiring about the Protection of Property Rights and Security of Residents of Two Rivers Cresent Estate, Ruiru Kiambu County;C.Pending the hearing and determination of the Petition filed herein Conservatory orders be issued to restrain the Senate through its Committee on Land, Environment and Natural Resources from summoning the Petitioner to appear before it to answer questions in regards to the Protection of Property Rights and Security of Residents of Two Rivers Cresent Estate, Ruiru Kiambu County;D.Pending the hearing and determination of the Petition filed herein Conservatory orders be issued to restrain the Senate through its Committee on Land, Environment and Natural Resources from deliberating and inquiring about the Protection of Property Rights and Security of Residents of Two Rivers Cresent Estate, Ruiru Kiambu County;E.Costs of this Application be provided for. Petitioner’s Case 2.The application is supported by the affidavit of Willy Kihara Njoki Kanyotu sworn on even date and the grounds on the face of the application. 3.He asserts that he is a son and beneficiary of the Estate of the late James Kanyotu. He relies on a Partial Confirmed Grant dated 20 July 2020 issued in High Court Succession Cause No. 1239 of 2008, Estate of James Kanyotu, as evidence of that position. 4.The Petitioner states that the deceased, James Kanyotu, was the majority shareholder of Kangaita Coffee Estate Limited, which is the registered owner of parcels L.R. Nos. 11261/11, 11261/24, 11261/38, 11261/39, 11261/48 and 11261/51, situated at Two Rivers Crescent Estate, Ruiru, Kiambu County. 5.He states that Margaret Nyakinyua Murigu, an administratrix of the Estate of James Kanyotu, challenged the alleged sale and purchase of the above parcels of land, among others, in High Court Succession Cause No. 1239 of 2008 through an application dated 29th January 2025, which was pending hearing on 1st October 2026. 6.According to the Petitioner, residents of Two Rivers Crescent Estate and alleged purchasers of the parcels have also individually and jointly instituted suits against him concerning the disputed ownership of the parcels. He has listed the following pending proceedings:i.ELCLC/E088/2024 – Patrick Maina Ndungu v State Law and Office of the Land Registrar & 2 Others, scheduled for hearing on 9 February 2027 at Thika ELC;ii.ELCLC/E002/2025 – Johnson Maina Muigai and Peter Kinganga Mutugu & 1 Other v Willy Kihara Njoki, scheduled for hearing on 21 September 2026 at Thika ELC;iii.ELCLC/E054/2025 – Hezekiah Kariuki Mwangi v Willy Kihara Kanyotu, pending a ruling on 15 October 2026 before the Thika ELC;iv.ELCLC/E255/2025 – Joseph Muturi Mukia v Willy Kihara Njoki and Hezekiah Kariuki Mwangi, pending a ruling on 29 September 2026 before the Thika ELC;v.ELCLC/E270/2025 – Beyond Twenty Fourteen Investments Limited v Willy Kihara Njoki, pending a ruling on 1 October 2026 before the Thika ELC; andvi.ELCLC/E326/2026 – Elilas Ngure Muritihi & 42 Others v Kangaita Coffee Estate Ltd & 8 Others. 7.The Petitioner states that, by a letter dated 21st July 2026, the Respondents summoned him, together with other members of James Kanyotu's family and residents of Two Rivers Crescent Estate, to deliberate upon the legal status and ownership of the parcels of land, the legal status and capacity of himself in relation to the Estate of James Kanyotu, and the status and integrity of the ownership records relating to the parcels. Through his advocate, the Petitioner responded by a letter dated 27 July 2026, informing the Respondents that they had no jurisdiction to deliberate and inquire into the matters, because the disputes were already before courts of competent jurisdiction. He contended that proceeding with the inquiry would amount to sub judice, contrary to section 6 of the Civil Procedure Act and Standing Order 92 of the Senate Standing Orders. 8.Despite that objection, the Petitioner's counsel appeared before the Respondents on 28 July 2026 and informed the members of the Respondents of the status of the pending suits. According to the Petitioner, the Respondents nevertheless proceeded to deliberate upon the issues and subsequently directed his counsel to avail the Petitioner before them on 6 August 2026 to answer questions concerning the disputed ownership of the parcels at Two Rivers Crescent Estate. 9.The Petitioner maintains that the Respondents have no jurisdiction to deliberate and inquire into the ownership of private property, nor jurisdiction over succession and inheritance matters. He further contends that the ownership dispute is already before several courts of competent jurisdiction and that the Respondents are therefore usurping the jurisdiction of the courts by discussing and deliberating upon those issues. He argues that this would offend the sub judice rule and the Respondents' own Standing Order No. 92. 10.The Petitioner further deposes that the Respondents' conduct amounts to an illegality, from which the Court should protect him. He contends that his right to a fair hearing under Article 50(1) of the Constitution will be gravely violated if the application is not heard and the orders sought are not granted. 11.Finally, he states that unless the Court intervenes, the Petition will be rendered nugatory because the intended proceedings by the Respondents scheduled for 6 August 2026 will proceed. He therefore seeks the Court's intervention through the conservatory orders contained in the Notice of Motion. The Respondents’ Case 12.The 4th Respondent filed grounds of opposition to oppose the Petitioner’s Notice of Motion dated 29 July 2026 principally on the question of jurisdiction. Their position is as follows: 13.The Respondents contend that the substance of the dispute concerns ownership and title to Two Rivers Crescent Estate in Ruiru, Kiambu County, which was excised from the Estate of the late James Kanyottu. They argue that, pursuant to Article 162(2)(b) of the Constitution, jurisdiction over questions concerning ownership of land lies with the Environment and Land Court (ELC). 14.With respect to the 3rd Respondent, the Senate Standing Committee on Land, Environment and Natural Resources, the Respondents acknowledge that it has powers equivalent to those of the High Court but contend that it does not have the exclusive mandate to determine questions of ownership and title to land. 15.They rely on Standing Order No. 228(3) of the Senate Standing Orders, which empowers the 3rd Respondent to consider matters relating to land and settlement, environment, forestry, wildlife, mining and water resources management and development. However, they maintain that this mandate does not confer upon the Committee the exclusive power to determine land ownership and title, which falls within the jurisdiction of the ELC under sections 13(1) and (2) of the Environment and Land Court Act. 16.The Respondents further contend that the ELC has wide powers under section 13(5) of the Environment and Land Court Act to make appropriate orders and grant relief capable of adequately addressing the concerns raised by the Senate Committee. Consequently, the mandate of the Senate Committee cannot override that of the ELC, which is a specialized court constitutionally established to deal specifically with questions relating to ownership and title to land. 17.Finally, the Respondents contend that if the High Court accedes to the Senate Committee’s request, it would be required to interrogate the underlying questions of ownership and title to land. Their position is that the High Court itself lacks the requisite jurisdiction and mandate to determine those questions. 18.The 1st, 2nd and 3rd Respondents also filed their grounds of opposition oppose the Petitioner’s application for conservatory orders on the following grounds: 19.Threshold for conservatory orders, the Respondents contend that the Petitioner has failed to satisfy the principles governing the grant of conservatory orders as set out in Gatirau Peter Munya v Dickson Mwenda Kithinji & 2 Others [2014] eKLR, namely: establishing a prima facie case with a likelihood of success; demonstrating likely prejudice in the absence of the orders; showing that the Petition or its substratum would otherwise be rendered nugatory; and establishing that the orders are in the public interest. 20.That the Petitioner has been afforded an opportunity to be heard. The Respondents state that the Petitioner was invited to appear before the Committee and respond to the allegations against him. Instead of taking that opportunity, he approached the Court seeking to prevent the Committee from hearing his representations. 21.The Committee's inquiry extends beyond the private land dispute: They maintain that the Committee is considering broader public and oversight matters, including the integrity of public land records, measures by security agencies to protect affected residents, and measures by the Ministry responsible for land to protect innocent purchasers and prevent fraudulent claims, loss of land records and unlawful dispossession. 22.Public interest: The Respondents contend that it would not be in the public interest to restrain a parliamentary committee from considering a petition concerning the rights, safety, security and wellbeing of citizens who have petitioned Parliament for redress pursuant to Articles 37 and 119 of the Constitution. They further rely on Article 94(4), which requires Parliament to protect the Constitution and promote democratic governance. 23.Constitutional mandate of parliamentary committees: The Respondents rely on Article 124 of the Constitution, arguing that parliamentary committees are constitutionally established and discharge their functions in accordance with the relevant Standing Orders. 24.Power to summon witnesses: Under Article 125 of the Constitution, Parliament and its committees may summon persons to give evidence or provide information and possess powers equivalent to those of the High Court in relation to attendance of witnesses, examination of witnesses and production of documents. The Respondents also rely on section 18 of the Parliamentary Powers and Privileges Act as conferring corresponding powers to invite or summon witnesses. 25.They additionally rely on Articles 93 and 96 of the Constitution concerning the establishment of Parliament and the constitutional role of the Senate, including its representation and protection of the interests of counties and county governments. 26.Right to petition Parliament: The Respondents contend that Article 119, read together with Article 37, entitles persons to petition Parliament on matters falling within its authority. Consequently, the affected residents were entitled to approach Parliament for redress. 27.Parliament is not precluded from considering land matters: The Respondents reject the Petitioner's contention that Parliament cannot consider the matter merely because it concerns land. They rely on Speaker of the National Assembly v Mombasa Cement Limited & 4 Others (Civil Appeal 100 of 2019 & E021 of 2020 (Consolidated)) [2023] KECA 33 (KLR) for the proposition that Parliament, as an elected Assembly, has a duty to investigate, deliberate, inform and make recommendations on important public issues, and may collect information and call for evidence in carrying out its oversight responsibilities. 28.On that basis, the Respondents maintain that the Petitioner has not established a prima facie case with a likelihood of success and that granting the conservatory orders would improperly suspend Parliament's constitutional powers and prevent it from performing its representative and oversight functions. 29.They argue that the Petitioner has been afforded an opportunity to be heard before the Committee. If dissatisfied with the Committee's eventual actions or decision, he may approach the Court thereafter. Accordingly, he has not demonstrated what prejudice he would suffer if the conservatory orders are refused. 30.Although the Respondents acknowledge that the High Court has jurisdiction under Article 165 of the Constitution to review the Senate's actions and determine whether Parliament acted within constitutional limits, they contend that such jurisdiction should be invoked after Parliament has completed its process and rendered its decision. 31.Finally, they argue that allowing the parliamentary process to proceed will not render the Petition nugatory. If the Petition subsequently succeeds, the Court retains jurisdiction to issue appropriate relief. They therefore seek dismissal of the Notice of Motion with costs to the 1st, 2nd and 3rd Respondents. The 1st- 3rdRespondents’ Application 32.The Respondents also filed an application dated 20th August ,2026 in which they seek the following prayers: 1.That pending the hearing and determination of this Application inter partes, an order of stay be and is hereby granted in respect of the conservatory orders issued by this Court on 3rd August, 2026 in the following terms: “8. That pending hearing and determination of the application, the Senate summons to the petitioner dated 29th July 2026 summoning the petitioner to appear before its Committee on Land, Environment and Natural Resources on 6th August 2026 or any other date is hereby stayed and/or suspended.” 2.That this Honourable Court be pleased to discharge, vacate, vary and/ or set aside its orders of 3rd August, 2026 issued in the following terms: “8.That pending hearing and determination of the application, the Senate summons to the petitioner dated 29th July 2026 summoning the petitioner to appear before its Committee on Land, Environment and Natural Resources on 6th August 2026 or any other date is hereby stayed and/or suspended.” 3.That costs of this Application be borne by the Petitioner. 33.The Supporting Affidavit is sworn by Mohamed Ali, the Deputy Clerk of the Senate, on behalf of the 1st, 2nd and 3rd Respondents/Applicants, in support of their application to set aside the ex parte conservatory orders issued on 3 August 2026. 34.He deposes that the 3rd Respondent is a standing committee established under Standing Order 228(3) and mandated to consider matters relating to lands and settlement, environment, forestry, wildlife, mining and water resource management and development. On 4 June 2026, the Senator for Kiambu County, Sen. Karungo Thang’wa, made a Statement pursuant to Standing Order 53(1) concerning the protection of property rights and security of residents of Two Rivers Crescent Estate, Ruiru, Kiambu County, which was committed to the Committee. 35.The Statement required the Committee to inquire into and report on several matters, including the legal status of the parcels and integrity of ownership records, the Ministry responsible for lands' response to the asserted ownership, action taken by the DCI following complaints of threats, intimidation, destruction of property and attempted unlawful eviction, measures to secure residents, and measures to protect innocent purchasers and prevent similar land disputes, fraudulent claims, loss of records and unlawful dispossession. 36.The deponent states that under Standing Order 56, the Committee Chairperson is required to report to the Senate on the status and progress of the inquiry, with that duty falling within the current Session of the Senate, which terminates on the first Thursday of December 2026. 37.In the course of the inquiry, the Committee sought information from relevant persons. By a letter dated 21 July 2026, the Petitioner, together with Jane Gathoni Kanyotu, a Director of Kangaita Coffee Estate Limited, was invited to attend a meeting on 28 July 2026 to provide information. 38.The Petitioner did not personally provide the requested information but responded through his advocates by a letter dated 27 July 2026, objecting to the meeting. His advocate attended the meeting of 28 July 2026 and was heard on the objection. According to the deponent, the Committee considered that the Petitioner's attendance was necessary and invited him, together with his advocate, to attend its meeting of 6 August 2026, at which residents and other stakeholders were also expected to attend. 39.The Petitioner subsequently obtained conservatory orders barring his attendance before the Committee on 6 August 2026 or any other date. The deponent states that this prevents the Committee from obtaining information from the Petitioner which it considers necessary to conclude its inquiry and answer the Statement. 40.The Respondents rely on Rule 25 of the Constitution of Kenya (Protection of Rights and Fundamental Freedoms) Practice and Procedure Rules (Mutunga Rules) as empowering the Court to set aside, vary or discharge orders. They additionally invoke section 80 of the Civil Procedure Act and Order 45 Rule 1 of the Civil Procedure Rules, contending that the Court has power to review its own orders on grounds including discovery of new evidence, error apparent on the face of the record or other sufficient reason. 41.A central contention of the affidavit is that the Petitioner allegedly misled the Court by stating that he had been summoned by the Senate Committee. According to the Respondents, he had merely been invited to respond to allegations against him in a matter brought to the Senate and referred to the Committee for investigation and reporting. They therefore maintain that there were no summons against the Petitioner and that his attendance was intended to afford him an opportunity to respond to adverse allegations and secure his right to a fair hearing. 42.The deponent contends that, by granting the ex parte conservatory orders, the Court restrained the 1st, 2nd and 3rd Respondents from performing their constitutional functions and, in effect, condemned them unheard on the basis of what the Respondents characterize as erroneous assertions concerning the alleged summons. 43.The Respondents further contend that the Petitioner obtained the ex parte orders through non-disclosure of material facts. In particular, they allege that he failed to disclose the decision of the Court of Appeal in Speaker of the National Assembly v Mombasa Cement Limited & 4 Others (Civil Appeal 100 of 2019 & E021 of 2020 (Consolidated)) [2023] KECA 33 (KLR). They rely on that decision for the proposition that Parliament may proceed with a matter despite related legal and constitutional proceedings where it is performing its political and deliberative functions, including investigating, deliberating, informing and making recommendations on public issues. 44.They also allege that the Petitioner failed to disclose that the letter sent to him was an invitation rather than a summons, that the Statement before the Senate adversely mentioned him and therefore necessitated an opportunity for him to be heard, and that he was allegedly not truthful in pleading that he had been issued with summons. The deponent consequently maintains that the conservatory orders were obtained through material misrepresentation and non-disclosure, and that the Respondents are substantially aggrieved because the orders prevent a parliamentary committee from investigating a petition presented to Parliament pursuant to Articles 1, 37 and 119 of the Constitution. 45.Further, the deponent asserts that unless the application is allowed, the 1st, 2nd and 3rd Respondents will be barred from discharging their constitutional duties. It contends that the High Court's jurisdiction should only be invoked where there has been an excess of jurisdiction or breach of the Constitution, neither of which, according to the Respondents, has occurred. The deponent therefore maintains that fairness and justice require the application to be allowed. 46.The court directed that the two applications would be heard concurrently and parties filed their submissions. The Petitioner’s Submissions 47.The Petitioner advances three principal grounds for the application:i.That the Respondents' actions violate his constitutional rights;ii.That the Senate lacks jurisdiction to inquire into the matters in question; andiii.That the inquiry interferes with judicial authority and violates the doctrine of separation of powers. 48.The Petitioner relies on Article 23 of the Constitution, which empowers the High Court to grant appropriate relief, including conservatory orders, for the violation or threatened violation of constitutional rights. 49.Reliance is placed on Centre for Rights Education and Awareness (CREAW) & another v Speaker of the National Assembly & 2 others [2017] eKLR, that an applicant for conservatory orders must demonstrate that his rights are being violated or threatened with violation and that the violation is likely to continue unless the Court intervenes. 50.The Petitioner argues that this threshold is satisfied because the Senate intends to interrogate him on matters already pending before the High Court and Environment and Land Court. 51.On whether the Petitioner’s rights are under threat of violation; are being violated or will be violated, the Petitioner acknowledges that Article 125 of the Constitution and section 18 of the Parliamentary Powers and Privileges Act empower Parliament and its committees to summon persons to give evidence, provide information and produce documents. However, he argues that this power is exercisable only within Parliament's constitutional and statutory mandate. He relies on George Owino Okode & another v Senate [2018] KEHC 64 (KLR). 52.The Petitioner submits that the Senate's constitutional role under Article 96, read with Articles 110–112, principally concerns representation of counties, legislation relating to counties, allocation and oversight of national revenue allocated to county governments, and specified oversight functions. Reliance is placed on Mwangi Wa Iria & 2 Others v Speaker Murang'a County Assembly & 3 Others and Republic v Speaker of the Senate & another Ex parte Afrison Export Import Limited & another [2018] KEHC 9509 (KLR). 53.According to the Petitioner, the matters which the Committee intends to investigate concern ownership and title to private land, succession and administration of the Estate of James Kanyotu, the Petitioner's status as a beneficiary of that estate and the exercise of State authority over private citizens. He argues that these matters fall outside the Senate's constitutional mandate and properly belong to the courts. He further emphasizes that he is a private citizen, not a public or government official accountable to the Senate for the utilization of county or public resources. 54.Reliance is also placed on International Legal Consultancy Group v Senate & another [2014] eKLR, where the Court stated that although the Senate has power under Article 125 to summon persons, that power cannot be exercised arbitrarily or in isolation from other constitutional provisions allocating powers and functions among State organs. The Petitioner therefore characterizes the Respondents' actions as unlawful and ultra vires. 55.The Petitioner contends that the Senate's conduct violates his right to fair administrative action under Article 47, because the invitation/summons is allegedly unlawful and procedurally unfair. He further alleges violation of his dignity under Article 28, arguing that he has been subjected to harassment through an unlawful invitation/summons, and also alleges a threat to his liberty and freedom. 56.On separation of powers, the Petitioner's case is that the matters the Senate intends to investigate are already pending before the High Court and the Environment and Land Court. He relies on Articles 1(3), 94, 96, 109, 159 and 160 of the Constitution to distinguish the legislative role of Parliament from the judicial authority vested in courts and tribunals. 57.Reliance is placed on Institute for Social Accountability & another v National Assembly & 5 others [2022] KESC 39 (KLR) for the principle that separation of powers requires the three arms of government to remain institutionally and functionally distinct and prevents one arm from usurping the functions of another. The Petitioner consequently argues that the Senate cannot determine the rightful ownership of private land or whether he is a rightful heir or beneficiary of the Estate of James Kanyotu, as those are matters reserved for courts of competent jurisdiction. By interrogating those issues while related proceedings are pending, the Senate is said to be assuming a judicial function and interfering with the Judiciary. 58.The Petitioner further states that his status as a legitimate beneficiary of the Estate of James Kanyotu has already been determined in High Court Succession Cause No. 1239 of 2008, with no appeal or review having been filed. He contends that the Senate's inquiry therefore also implicates his rights under Articles 27, 40 and 50, particularly because consideration of matters pending before courts risks prejudicing his right to a fair hearing. 59.Finally, the Petitioner submits that the Senate's proposed inquiry violates the sub judice doctrine, relying on section 6 of the Civil Procedure Act and the Senate Standing Orders, because the matters which the Committee seeks to interrogate are already pending before courts of competent jurisdiction. The Petitioner therefore asks the Court to allow the application and grant the conservatory orders. 60.The Petitioner filed rejoinder submissions against the 1-3 Respondents application dated 20th August, 2026. 61.The Petitioner states that his application is principally founded on sub judice, while the Senate relies on separation of powers and alleged material non-disclosure/misrepresentation. 62.On the threshold for conservatory orders he relies on Gatirau Peter Munya v Dickson Mwenda Kithinji & 2 Others [2014] eKLR, the Petitioner submits that conservatory orders are public-law remedies intended to preserve constitutional values, orderly functioning of public bodies and the Court's adjudicatory authority. The Petitioner identifies the relevant considerations as whether: there is a prima facie case with a likelihood of success; the applicant is likely to suffer prejudice from an actual or threatened constitutional violation; refusal of the order would render the Petition nugatory; and the public interest favours the order. 63.Relying on Mrao Ltd v First American Bank of Kenya Ltd & 2 Others, Gachagua & 40 Others v Speaker, National Assembly & 15 Others, and Trusted Society of Human Rights Alliance v KRA & another, the Petitioner argues that the pleadings and evidence disclose a prima facie constitutional case. The principal basis of that case is sub judice. The Petitioner relies on Senate Standing Order 103, which prohibits reference to a matter that is sub judice where there are active civil or criminal proceedings and discussion is likely to prejudice their fair determination. The submissions also refer to a 2018 ruling by the Speaker of the Senate concerning the Solai Dam tragedy, which recognized that the sub judice rule applies to parliamentary proceedings where both active proceedings and the likelihood of prejudice are demonstrated. 64.Accordingly, the Petitioner submits that three matters must be demonstrated: the subject of parliamentary consideration is pending before a court; the proceedings are active and have been set down for hearing or trial; and parliamentary consideration would prejudice their fair determination. 65.The Petitioner contends that these requirements are satisfied because pleadings from the pending cases have been placed before the Court. In particular, the alleged sale and purchase of the disputed parcels is challenged in High Court Succession Cause No. 1239 of 2008 through an application dated 29 January 2025, which was scheduled for hearing on 1 October 2026. 66.In response to the Senate's reliance on separation of powers, the Petitioner relies on In the Matter of the Speaker of the Senate & Another, Advisory Opinion Reference No. 2 of 2013 [2013] KESC 7 (KLR).The Petitioner argues that separation of powers does not create absolute institutional isolation. Rather, the Constitution establishes a system of checks and balances, under which each arm must respect the constitutional mandate of the others. 67.Reliance is also placed on In the Matter of the Kenya National Commission on Human Rights, Advisory Opinion Reference No. 1 of 2017 [2020] KESC 1 (KLR) for the argument that separation of powers cannot shield unconstitutional conduct from judicial scrutiny. 68.The Petitioner relies on CREAW & 7 Others, Nairobi High Court Petition No. 16 of 2011 and Martin Nyaga Wambora v Speaker of the County Assembly of Embu & 3 Others [2014] eKLR for the requirement that an applicant demonstrate a real, imminent and actual danger of prejudice. Stating the prejudice is the risk of the Senate considering matters already pending before courts and thereby creating the possibility of conflicting decisions or findings over the same subject matter, with consequent prejudice to the Petitioner's right to a fair hearing and uncertainty regarding ownership of the disputed land. 69.The Petitioner responds directly to the Senate's allegation that he misrepresented to the Court that he had been summoned, when the letter of 21 July 2026 actually stated that he was invited to attend the Committee meeting. He acknowledges that the letter used the word “invite”, but submits that the distinction between an invitation and summons is immaterial. His argument is that Article 125(1) of the Constitution itself uses the term “summon” in describing Parliament's power to require persons to appear to give evidence or provide information. 70.The Petitioner submits that if the Senate proceedings are allowed to continue before determination of the Petition, the subsequent success of the Petition would be of no practical value. 71.Relying on Cabinet Secretary, National Treasury & Economic Planning & 3 Others v Benjamin & 10 Others [2025] KECA 1959 (KLR) and Ngatuny & 2 Others v Mosoiko & 2 Others [2024] KECA 1656 (KLR), he argues that the relevant consideration is whether what is sought to be prevented is reversible or can adequately be compensated by damages. 72.The Petitioner contends that once he has appeared before the Senate and the hearings, debates, questions and comments have occurred, they cannot subsequently be reversed. The conservatory orders are therefore necessary to preserve the subject matter of the Petition. 73.The Petitioner submits that public interest favours maintaining the conservatory orders because doing so would, avoid multiple centres of decision-making concerning the same dispute, prevent potentially conflicting findings or decisions, preserve the integrity of judicial dispute resolution, prevent prejudicial parliamentary comments and debates; and facilitate the just, fair and expeditious determination of the pending cases. He again relies on Gatirau Peter Munya, particularly the principle that conservatory orders serve the public interest by preserving the ordered functioning of public institutions and the adjudicatory authority of courts. 74.The Petitioner ultimately asks the Court to allow his Application dated 29 July 2026 and dismiss the Senate Respondents’ Application dated 20 August 2026 with costs. The 1-3 Respondents Submissions 75.The 1-3 Respondents oppose the Application dated 9th July, 2026. They give a factual narrative as reproduced above in its affidavit and state that the application does not meet the threshold for conservatory orders. 76.The Respondents rely on Gatirau Peter Munya v Dickson Mwenda Kithinji & 2 Others [2014] eKLR, identifying the relevant considerations as whether, the Applicant has established a prima facie case with a likelihood of success, absence of the orders would expose him to prejudice, refusal of the orders would render the Petition or its substratum nugatory; and granting the orders would be in the public interest. They contend that the Petitioner satisfies none of these requirements. 77.The Respondents argue that the Petitioner has been afforded an opportunity to be heard but has instead sought to prevent the Committee from hearing his response to the allegations against him. They further argue that the Committee is dealing with broader public and oversight concerns, including the integrity of public land records, security of residents, protection of innocent purchasers and prevention of fraudulent claims and unlawful dispossession. Consequently, the inquiry extends beyond the private interests of the parties litigating before the courts. 78.Relying on Mrao v First American Bank of Kenya Ltd & 2 Others [2003] eKLR, the Respondents contend that the Petitioner has not demonstrated an apparently infringed constitutional right sufficient to establish a prima facie case. They further argue that he has not identified with reasonable precision the rights allegedly violated or threatened. 79.The Respondents rely on Article 124 of the Constitution for the establishment and operation of parliamentary committees and Article 125 for Parliament's power to summon persons to provide evidence or information. They emphasize that Article 125 gives parliamentary committees powers equivalent to those of the High Court concerning attendance of witnesses, examination of witnesses and production of documents. 80.They further rely on Articles 93 and 96 regarding the establishment of Parliament and the constitutional role of the Senate, section 18 of the Parliamentary Powers and Privileges Act, empowering Parliament and its committees to invite or summon persons to provide information or evidence, Article 119, which gives every person the right to petition Parliament on matters within its authority; and Article 37, concerning the right to present petitions to public authorities 81.The Respondents reject the Petitioner's argument that the Senate cannot consider the matter merely because it concerns land. They rely principally on Speaker of the National Assembly v Mombasa Cement Limited & 4 Others [2023] KECA 33 (KLR) for the proposition that Parliament, as an elected assembly, has a legitimate role in investigating, deliberating, informing and making recommendations on important public issues. 82.According to the Respondents, Parliament's investigative function enables it to collect information, assess the effectiveness of State organs and promote democratic accountability. They therefore maintain that the Petitioner has not demonstrated a prima facie case warranting conservatory orders. 83.The Respondents argue that the orders sought would effectively suspend Parliament's constitutional powers under Article 125 and prevent it from exercising its representative and oversight functions on behalf of citizens. They maintain that such restraint would not serve the public interest, particularly because the inquiry concerns the rights, safety, security and wellbeing of residents who approached Parliament seeking redress. 84.The Respondents contend that the Petitioner has been afforded an opportunity to be heard before the Committee. If he is ultimately dissatisfied with the Committee's actions or decision, he may thereafter approach the High Court for appropriate relief. Accordingly, they argue that the Petitioner has not demonstrated any actual prejudice that would arise from allowing the Committee proceedings to continue. 85.The Respondents acknowledge the High Court's supervisory and constitutional jurisdiction under Article 165 to review parliamentary action and determine whether Parliament has acted within constitutional limits. Their position, however, is that such jurisdiction should be exercised after Parliament has concluded its process and rendered a decision, rather than stopping the Committee before it completes its inquiry. 86.The Respondents argue that allowing the Senate inquiry to proceed will not render the Petition nugatory. If the Petition subsequently succeeds, the High Court retains jurisdiction to grant appropriate relief against any unconstitutional action or decision of the Senate. They therefore contend that there is no necessity to preserve the Petition by restraining the Committee at the interlocutory stage. They ask for dismissal of the application. 87.The 1-3 Respondents equally filed Submissions on their application dated 20 August 2026 Their case is principally that the ex parte orders were obtained through material misrepresentation and non-disclosure, particularly the Petitioner's characterization of the Committee's communication as a “summons” rather than an “invitation.” 88.The Respondents state that the Committee is established under Standing Order 228(3) and has responsibility over matters relating to land, settlement, environment and natural resources. On 4 June 2026, the Senator for Kiambu County sought a Statement concerning the protection of property rights and security of residents of Two Rivers Crescent Estate, Ruiru. The inquiry concerns, among other things, the legal status of the parcels and integrity of land records, the Petitioner's asserted ownership, action by the National Police Service and DCI concerning alleged threats and attempted evictions, security of residents, and protection of purchasers for value. The Committee invited the Petitioner and Jane Gathoni Kanyotu, as directors of Kangaita Coffee Estate Limited, to attend its meeting of 28 July 2026. The Petitioner objected through his advocate. After considering that objection, the Committee maintained that his personal attendance was necessary and invited him to attend another meeting on 6 August 2026. The Respondents contend that the conservatory orders now prevent the Committee from obtaining information necessary to complete its inquiry. 89.On Court’s jurisdiction to set aside, the Respondents rely on Rule 25 of the “Mutunga Rules”, which expressly permits a court to discharge, vary or set aside an order issued under Rule 22 either on its own motion or upon application by an aggrieved party. They additionally rely upon Section 80 of the Civil Procedure Act and Order 45 Rule 1 of the Civil Procedure Rules, arguing that review may be granted for discovery of new and important evidence, mistake or error apparent on the face of the record, or any other sufficient reason. 90.A major basis of the Senate's application is the duty of an applicant seeking ex parte relief to make full and frank disclosure. The Respondents rely on Matatu Owners Association v National Council on Administration of Justice & Another; Invesco Assurance Company Ltd & 4 Others (Interested Parties) [2020] eKLR, for the proposition that an applicant for ex parte orders must disclose all relevant material facts and risks having the orders vacated where they were obtained through deliberate misrepresentation or material non-disclosure. 91.The Respondents argue that the orders issued on 3 August 2026 prevent Parliament from exercising its constitutional mandate under, among others, Articles 37, 93, 94, 119 and 125 of the Constitution. They rely particularly on Article 125, which empowers either House of Parliament and its committees to summon persons to provide evidence or information and confers powers equivalent to those of the High Court for that purpose. They also rely on section 18 of the Parliamentary Powers and Privileges Act, together with Articles 37 and 119, to contend that Parliament may receive petitions from citizens and invite or summon persons to provide information necessary to investigate such matters. 92.The Respondents contend that the Petitioner misled the Court by stating that he had been summoned by the Senate Committee. According to them, no summons had been issued. Rather, the Petitioner had been invited because adverse allegations had been made against him and the Committee wished to afford him an opportunity to respond. They therefore characterize the invitation as being intended to protect, rather than violate, the Petitioner's right to a fair hearing 93.The Respondents further rely on Nehanda Housing Coop Society Others v Moyo Others and Rex v Kensington Income Tax Commissioners, ex parte Princess Edmond de Polignac on the consequences of obtaining ex parte orders through a misleading or insufficiently candid affidavit. They identify four alleged instances of material non-disclosure/misrepresentation by the Petitioner;i.Failure to disclose Speaker of the National Assembly v Mombasa Cement Limited & 4 Others [2023] KECA 33 (KLR), which the Respondents interpret as recognizing Parliament's ability to proceed with its political and deliberative functions despite related proceedings before other legal or constitutional bodies.ii.Failure to disclose that the letter sent to the Petitioner was an invitation and not a summons.iii.Failure to disclose that the Senate Statement contained adverse allegations against the Petitioner, making it necessary to afford him an opportunity to be heard.iv.Allegedly falsely pleading that he had actually been issued with a summons. 94.Their position is that Parliament performs a distinct political and deliberative role when receiving and considering complaints from citizens or Members of Parliament. As an elected assembly, Parliament may investigate, deliberate, obtain information and make recommendations concerning important public issues in furtherance of democratic governance and accountability. Accordingly, the existence of related proceedings before other bodies does not, in their view, automatically prevent Parliament from carrying out that constitutional function. 95.The Respondents argue that the Court granted the orders without hearing them and on the basis of the Petitioner's allegedly erroneous representation that he had been summoned. They contend that this has effectively restrained a constitutional organ from performing its functions, despite the fact that the Committee merely sought to afford the Petitioner an opportunity to respond to allegations against him. They consequently characterize the ex parte orders as having been obtained through material misrepresentation and material non-disclosure. 96.They therefore ask the Court to allow the Application dated 20 August 2026 with costs. The 4thRespondents Submissions 97.The Attorney General, as 4th Respondent, filed submissions concerning the Petitioner’s Application dated 29 July 2026 for conservatory orders restraining the Senate Standing Committee on Land, Environment and Natural Resources from summoning the Petitioner or deliberating upon matters concerning the property rights and security of residents of Two Rivers Crescent Estate. 98.Unlike the Senate Respondents, the Hon. Attorney General's principal concern is jurisdiction. Their position is essentially that while the Senate possesses legitimate investigative and oversight powers, it cannot determine ownership or title to land, as that jurisdiction belongs to the Environment and Land Court (ELC). 99.The Hon. Attorney General notes that the Petitioner is a son and beneficiary of the late James Kanyotu, whose estate is the subject of Succession Cause No. 1239 of 2008. The disputed parcels forming Two Rivers Crescent Estate were registered in the name of Kangaita Coffee Estate Limited, in which the deceased was the majority shareholder. The AG observes that ownership of the parcels is already contested in the Succession Cause and in at least six separate proceedings before the Environment and Land Court at Thika 100.The Attorney General identifies two central issues for determination:i.Whether the substance of the dispute concerns ownership and title to land within Article 162(2)(b) of the Constitution; andii.Whether the Senate Committee, in exercising its investigative and oversight mandate, has jurisdiction to inquire into matters relating to ownership and title of the disputed property. 101.The 4th respondent submits that jurisdiction is foundational and that where the Constitution or legislation assigns a dispute to a specialized court, another body cannot confer that jurisdiction upon itself. Reliance is placed on Article 162(2)(b) of the Constitution and section 13 of the Environment and Land Court Act, which confer jurisdiction upon the ELC over disputes concerning the environment, use and occupation of land, title, tenure and proprietary interests. 102.The 4th respondent relies on Republic v Karisa Chengo & 2 Others [2017] KESC 15 (KLR) and Samuel Kamau Macharia & Another v Kenya Commercial Bank Ltd & 2 Others [2012] KESC 8 (KLR) for the principle that jurisdiction derives exclusively from the Constitution or statute and cannot be assumed by a court or other body. They also cite Muli v Mbuli & another [2025] KEHC 3745 (KLR), Paul Mwai & another v John Muiruri and Amina Mohamed Harith v Chakama Ranching Company Ltd & 5 others . 103.Applying those principles, the 4th respondent considers the substantive dispute to concern ownership and proprietary interests in Two Rivers Crescent Estate. Consequently, where determination of the Petitioner's rights requires a decision on ownership, title or proprietary interests, those questions must be determined by the ELC and not by the Senate Committee or another court lacking that jurisdiction. The 4th respondent submits that where another body calls for documents and hears witnesses with a view to determining ownership and title, such a process would be a “nonstarter” and “null and void.” 104.On the second issue, the 4th respondent acknowledges the Senate's constitutional powers under Articles 94, 96 and 125, including the power to summon persons and obtain evidence and information. They expressly recognize the importance of parliamentary committees in gathering information, scrutinizing matters of public concern and making recommendations. However, the 4th respondent draws an important distinction between investigation and adjudication. 105.According to the 4th respondent, Article 125 confers an investigative and facilitative power, not judicial jurisdiction to finally adjudicate competing proprietary claims. A Senate Committee may investigate the circumstances surrounding a dispute, receive information, obtain documents and make recommendations within its constitutional mandate, but it cannot determine as a matter of law who holds valid title to land. 106.Relying on Attorney General v Okoiti & 3 Others [2025] KECA 309 (KLR) and Speaker of the Senate & Another v Attorney General, Advisory Opinion No. 2 of 2013, the 4th respondent submits that constitutional provisions cannot be interpreted in isolation. 107.Accordingly, the Senate's Article 125 powers must be harmonized with the constitutional provisions establishing specialized courts. The power to summon witnesses cannot be interpreted as giving parliamentary committees jurisdiction to determine land ownership or title when the Constitution specifically reserves that adjudicative function for a specialized court. 108.The 4th respondent relies on Republic v Speaker of the National Assembly & 4 Others ex parte Edward R.O. Ouko [2017] KEHC 9414 (KLR) for the proposition that although courts should not micromanage parliamentary proceedings, they have a duty to ensure that Parliament acts in accordance with the Constitution and the law. 109.The 4th respondent therefore submits that Parliament's investigative powers should not be interpreted as conferring adjudicative jurisdiction that the Constitution has not granted. Even where the Senate is permitted to conduct an inquiry concerning Two Rivers Crescent Estate, the ultimate result of that inquiry cannot lawfully constitute a determination of ownership or title. Any such determination would, according to the 4th respondent, be a nullity. 110.The 4th respondent further submits that judicial intervention in parliamentary proceedings does not necessarily violate separation of powers. Relying again on the Speaker of the Senate Advisory Opinion, he argues that while courts should ordinarily respect parliamentary processes, they may intervene where Parliament is alleged to have acted contrary to the Constitution. In such circumstances, the Court is simply performing its constitutional obligation to protect the Constitution. 111.The Senate may therefore exercise its investigative powers under Article 125 and its Standing Orders, but those powers cannot culminate in a binding judicial determination of ownership or title to land. 112.The 4th respondent therefore substantially agrees with the Petitioner on the jurisdictional limit, while not necessarily agreeing that the Senate inquiry itself must be stopped altogether. Instead, it asks the Court to affirm the constitutional boundary between the Senate's investigative role and the Environment and Land Court’s adjudicative jurisdiction. Analysis and Determination 113.From the record, I discern the following issues for determination:A.Whether the application dated 29th July, 2026 meets the threshold for grant of conservatory orders sought.B.Whether the application dated 20th August, 2026 is merited. 114.Article 23 (3) of the Constitution basically affords a party to proceedings brought pursuant to Article 22, asserting violation or threat of violation of any Constitutional right or fundamental freedom, to prompt the court for any relief, including temporary reliefs. The said Article 23 provides as follows:“23(3)In any proceedings brought under Article 22, a court may grant appropriate relief, including-a.a declaration of rights;b.an injunction;c.a conservatory order;d.a declaration of invalidity of any law that denies, violates, infringes, or threatens a right or fundamental freedom in the Bill of Rights and is not justified under Article 24;e.an order for compensation; andf.an order of judicial review.” (emphasis supplied) 115.In Invesco Assurance Co v MW (Minor suing thro' next friend and mother (HW) [2016] KEHC 5318 (KLR) the Court defined Conservatory orders as follows:“A conservatory order is a judicial remedy granted by the court by way of an undertaking that no action of any kind is taken to preserve the subject until the motion of the suit is heard. It is an order of status quo for the preservation of the subject matter.” 116.The Court in Nkunja v Magistrates and Judges Vetting Board & another [2016] KEHC 7269 (KLR) summarized three main principles for consideration when dealing with such applications as follows:“(a)An applicant must demonstrate that he has a prima facie case with a likelihood of success and that unless the court grants the conservatory order, there is a real danger that he will suffer prejudice as a result of the violation or threatened violation of the Constitution.(b)Whether, if a conservatory order is not granted, the Petition alleging violation of, or threat of violation of rights will be rendered nugatory; and(c)The public interest must be considered before grant of a conservatory order.” 117.In the case of Centre for Rights Education and Awareness and 7 Others –v- The Attorney General [HCCP No. 16 of 2011]:“Arguments in this ruling relate to the prayer for a conservatory order in terms of prayer 3 of the Petitioner’s application and not the Petition. I will therefore not delve into a detailed analysis of facts and law. At this stage, a party seeking a conservatory order only requires to demonstrate that he has a prima facie case with a likelihood of success and that unless the court grants the conservatory order, there is real danger that he will suffer prejudice as a result of the violation or threatened violation of the Constitution”. 118.It is therefore clearly not enough to merely establish a prima facie case and show that it is potentially arguable. To justify a conservatory order, there must also be evident a likelihood of success. The prima facie case ought to be beyond a speculative basis. In Muslims for Human Rights [MUHURI] & Others –v- Attorney General & Others CP No. 7 of 2011, the court stated that an “applicant seeking conservatory orders in a Constitutional case must demonstrate that he has a prima facie case with a likelihood of success.” 119.Once the applicant has established to the court’s satisfaction a prima facie case with a likelihood of success, the court is then to decide whether a grant or a denial of the conservatory relief will enhance the Constitutional values and objects of the specific right or freedom in the Bill of rights. (See Patrick Musimba –v- The National Land Commission & 4 Others HCCP 613 of 2014 (No. 1) [2015] eKLR and also Satrose Ayuma & 11 Others –v- Registered Trustees of Kenya Railways Staff Retirements Benefits Scheme [2011] eKLR). 120.The third consideration is whether if an interim Conservatory order is not granted, the petition or its substratum will be rendered nugatory. It is indeed the business of the court to ensure and secure so far as possible that any transitional motions before the court do not render nugatory the ultimate end of justice. In these respects, the case of Martin Nyaga Wambora –v- Speaker of the County Assembly of Embu & 3 Others CP No. 7 of 2014, is relevant. 121.I have considered the petition as pleaded by the petitioner. It is not without a doubt that for a party to prove violation of their rights under the Bill of Rights in the Constitution, they must not only state the provisions of the Constitution allegedly breached, but also the manner of infringement, the nature and extent of injury suffered. A party who alleges violation of his rights must plead his or her case with precision as was held in the case of Anarita Karimi Njeru vs Republic (1979) KECA 12 (KLR). 122.The Petitioner’s main issue is the respondents dealing with a matter presently and actively in court by summoning him to attend to senate for inquiry. He pleads Article 27, 28, 47, 48 and 50 of the constitution. 123.There is clearly no contest that the Senate possesses the power to make inquiries, or to debate, or deliberate, on any matter that may be presented before it, as being one that is of concern to the people. It can indeed do this through its Committees. 124.Article 125(1) of the Constitution provides that either House of Parliament, or any of its committees, have power to summon any person to appear before it for the purpose of giving evidence or providing information. 125.Article 125(2) further clothes the Houses and their committees with powers akin to those of the High Court for purposes including enforcing attendance of witnesses, examining witnesses and compelling production of documents. The power is further recognized under section 18 of the Parliamentary Powers and Privileges Act. 126.It is, however, equally settled that Article 125 does not exist in isolation. In International Legal Consultancy Group v Senate & another [2014] KEHC 7533 (KLR), the Court observed that although the Senate has power under Article 125 to summon persons, that power cannot be exercised arbitrarily or in isolation from the other provisions of the Constitution allocating powers and functions to State organs. 127.Similarly, in George Owino Okode & another v Senate [2018] KEHC 64 (KLR), the Court recognized the Senate's constitutional powers while emphasizing that their exercise must remain within the constitutional architecture and respect the functional and institutional integrity of other organs. 128.The Senate and its Committees cannot purport to utilize their deliberative or oversight role to hear disputes over land. Neither does the Senate have the power to cancel title, or direct the Ministry or the National Land Commission to cancel a title, or make decisions on occupation of land. In short, land disputes do not fall within the jurisdiction of the Senate. 129.That, however, does not necessarily mean that the Senate is constitutionally prohibited from inquiring into a broader matter of public concern merely because the inquiry touches upon land in respect of which litigation exists. The limit of the 1st – 3rd Respondents therefore stops at inquiry and recommendation and does not proceed to determine matters of ownership of land, which are the subject of the multiple suits pending before the courts. This court also retains the power to intervene where Parliament exceeds constitutional limits through Judicial Review. 130.The Petitioner has not demonstrated how the parliament carrying out its mandate under Article 125 would directly affect the outcome of the multiple suits pending before court, as parliament cannot determine ownership of land. He has not demonstrated how the summons are discriminative towards him as a person and that no other person has ever been summoned to appear before the senate for similar investigations. 131.Pending litigation alone does not automatically trigger the sub judice rule against Senate, actual prejudice or interference with pending judicial proceedings must be demonstrated, and none have been demonstrated in by the petitioner herein. The petition does not outline the particular manner in which the respondents’ actions infringe upon the petitioner’s rights and what would happen if both processes run concurrently. 132.This court is not convinced that the petitioner has discharged his burden of proof on the alleged violation of his rights and/or a threat of infringement thereof, the nature and extent of the injury suffered (if any) and that the petition would be rendered nugatory if the conservatory orders sought are not issued. To this extent, I do hereby find and hold that the petitioner has not established a prima facie case with a likelihood of success. 133.The material before this Court shows that the Committee's inquiry is not confined to the narrow question of who holds valid title to the disputed parcels. It extends to the integrity of records held by the Ministry responsible for lands; action taken by the National Police Service and the Directorate of Criminal Investigations concerning complaints of threats, intimidation and attempted unlawful evictions; the security of affected residents; protection of purchasers for value; and measures aimed at preventing fraudulent claims, loss of public records and unlawful dispossession. 134.Those are matters capable of falling within Parliament's legitimate investigative, representative and deliberative functions. I therefore agree with the 4th respondent to this limited but important extent; the Committee may investigate and receive information concerning the wider circumstances surrounding Two Rivers Crescent Estate, but it may not assume the role of a court and purport to render a binding determination of competing claims to ownership, title or succession. 135.That being said, the court is not convinced that the petitioner is bound to suffer any prejudice if the conservatory orders are not issued. There is also no public interest that will suffer as a result of this Court declining to grant the conservatory orders. 136.At this interlocutory stage, the Petitioner asks the Court to restrain the Committee from proceeding with the inquiry altogether. In my view, such an order would go beyond preserving the jurisdiction of the courts over title and succession and would effectively prohibit the Senate from undertaking even those aspects of the inquiry that legitimately fall within its constitutional sphere. 137.The petitioner retains the option of approaching this court if the Respondents ultimately act ultra vires in their inquiry and recommendations. 138.In the present matter, the Petitioner has demonstrated that proceedings concerning ownership and proprietary rights over the parcels are pending before courts of competent jurisdiction. What has not, at this interlocutory stage, been sufficiently demonstrated is that the Senate's continued investigation will necessarily determine those proceedings, bind the courts seized of them or otherwise occasion an identifiable prejudice incapable of judicial correction. Any opinion or recommendation made by the Committee cannot displace a judicial determination by a court vested with jurisdiction over title or succession. The courts remain constitutionally independent and are not bound by a parliamentary committee's view on who owns a parcel of land. 139.I am therefore not persuaded that the existence of the pending court proceedings, standing alone, is sufficient to justify the broad conservatory orders sought. 140.This is not to say that Parliament enjoys an unrestricted license to deliberate upon pending court proceedings. Parliamentary restraint remains necessary, particularly where statements or findings may prejudice pending litigation. But the threshold for the extraordinary intervention of this Court by way of conservatory orders must be established on the basis of the evidence before it. 141.Flowing from the foregoing, the court is not convinced that the petitioner deserves the conservatory orders sought in the Notice of Motion application dated 29th July 2026. The said application lacks merit and is hereby is hereby dismissed with no order as to costs. SUBDIVISION - Whether the Application Dated 20th August,2026 is Merited. 142.I now turn to the 1st, 2nd and 3rd Respondents' application seeking the discharge of the ex parte orders issued on 3rd August 2026. 143.The Respondents contend that the Petitioner misled the Court by characterizing the communication from the Committee as a “summons” when it was in fact an “invitation”. In my view, the distinction between the words is not determinative of the dispute. The Court must consider the substance and effect of the communication and the surrounding circumstances. Parliament undoubtedly possesses both the power to invite and, where constitutionally permissible, to summon persons. 144.I am therefore not able to hold that the mere use of the word “summons” by the Petitioner, without more, amounted to such deliberate deception as would independently justify denying him a hearing on the merits of his application. Nevertheless, the Court is presently seized of the matter inter partes and has now had the benefit of the full factual matrix and the arguments of all parties. 145.More importantly, upon considering the competing constitutional interests and the applicable threshold for conservatory relief, I have found that the Petitioner has not demonstrated sufficient grounds for continuation of the interim restraint. 146.An interlocutory conservatory order exists to preserve constitutional rights and the substratum of proceedings pending final determination. It ought not to remain in force where, after inter partes consideration, the legal and evidential basis necessary for its continuation has not been established. 147.Accordingly, upon reconsideration of the conservatory relief inter partes; there is sufficient basis for discharging the orders issued on 3rd August 2026. 148.Before concluding, I consider it necessary to address the competing arguments on separation of powers. The doctrine does not place parliamentary proceedings beyond constitutional scrutiny. Parliament, like every State organ, is bound by the Constitution and the constitutional jurisdiction of this Court does not permit it to assume the functions of Parliament or to prevent Parliament from exercising a constitutional mandate merely because the Court might consider another course preferable. 149.As the Court observed in International Legal Consultancy Group v Senate & another (Supra), separation of powers is not an end in itself but forms part of the constitutional system of checks and balances. Judicial intervention is therefore justified where Parliament acts outside the Constitution. Conversely, judicial restraint is required where Parliament is acting within its legitimate constitutional sphere and no sufficient threat to constitutional rights or the administration of justice has been demonstrated. 150.At the present stage, the Court has not been persuaded that the mere continuation of the Committee's inquiry amounts to an unconstitutional assumption of judicial authority. 151.Should the Committee cross the constitutional boundary and purport to determine, conclusively and as a matter of law, the ownership or validity of title to the disputed parcels or questions of succession properly before the courts, such action would present a materially different constitutional question. Dispositioni.The Petitioner’s Notice of Motion Application dated 29th July 2026 is hereby dismissed.ii.The 1st, 2nd and 3rd Respondents’ Notice of Motion Application dated 20th August 2026 is hereby allowed.iii.The ex parte conservatory orders issued by this Court on 3rd August 2026 staying and/or suspending the Senate proceedings requiring the Petitioner to appear before the Standing Committee on Land, Environment and Natural Resources are hereby discharged and set aside.iv.Given the constitutional and public-interest nature of the dispute, each party shall bear its own costs. 152.Orders accordingly. DATED, SIGNED AND DELIVERED VIRTUALLY AT NAIROBI THIS 7TH DAY OF SEPTEMBER, 2026.DAVID MBURUJUDGE