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Abdikadir v Toto & another (Civil Appeal E077 of 2021) [2026] KECA 1505 (KLR) (24 July 2026) (Judgment) Neutral citation: [2026] KECA 1505 (KLR) Republic of Kenya In the Court of Appeal at Nyeri Civil Appeal E077 of 2021 W Karanja, A Ali-Aroni & JM Ngugi, JJA July 24, 2026 Between Zeinab Abdikadir Appellant and Golicha Roba Toto 1st Respondent County Government of Isiolo 2nd Respondent (Being an Appeal from the Judgment and Decree of the Environment and Land Court at Meru, (Mbugua, J.) dated 27th May, 2021 in ELCA No. 122 of 2019) Judgment 1.This is a second appeal from the Environment and Land Court judgment allowing the plaintiff’s (1st respondent herein) appeal against the judgment and decree of the trial court in Isiolo CMCC No. 29 of 2017. 2.The procedural history of this litigation is somewhat protracted, but it is important to recount it in some detail because it provides the context within which the issues in this second appeal arise. 3.The dispute traces its formal origins to 8th March, 2013, when the 1st respondent instituted suit against the appellant and the County Government of Isiolo. The suit was subsequently amended on 17th July, 2014 through an amended plaint which crystallized the claims and reliefs sought by the 1st respondent. The matter was later processed and proceeded to hearing before the Chief Magistrate’s Court at Isiolo as CMCC No. 29 of 2017, with the County Government of Isiolo being sued as successor to the defunct County Council of Isiolo. In the amended plaint, the 1st respondent sought the following prayers:a.That the 2nd defendant (2nd respondent herein) be ordered to rectify its records and maps to their original state and remove Plot No. 24 on the site of Plot No. 20 Isiolo Town.b.An order of eviction of the 1st defendant (appellant herein) from original Plot No. 20 Isiolo Town, plus damages and mesne profits.c.Costs and interest.d.Any further relief this Honourable Court may deem fit to grant. 4.The gravamen of the 1st respondent’s claim was that sometime in 1992, the defunct County Council of Isiolo allocated him Residential Plot No. 20 in Isiolo Township through a balloting process. He pleaded that following the allocation, he paid the requisite fees; was shown the physical location of the plot; took possession; fenced it; and constructed a semi-permanent structure thereon. 5.His complaint was that, years later, the appellant, acting in collusion with officers of the 2nd respondent, unlawfully and fraudulently caused the suit property to be redesignated as Plot No. 24 Tuluroba and reallocated to herself. According to the 1st respondent, this unlawful reallocation enabled the appellant to enter the suit property; interfere with his possession; and damage the developments he had made on the land. 6.The appellant filed a defence denying the claim in its entirety. Her position was based on a simple proposition: she was the lawful owner of Plot No. 24 Tuluroba Estate, a parcel she insisted had no connection whatsoever with Plot No. 20 claimed by the 1st respondent. She denied any fraud, collusion, or unlawful conduct and maintained that her allotment was valid and independent. 7.The 2nd respondent likewise denied liability. It rejected the allegations of fraud and collusion and denied having unlawfully altered records or reallocated the 1st respondent’s plot. It further challenged the validity of the 1st respondent’s allotment documents, questioned the authenticity and legal sufficiency of the supporting planning documentation, and contended that the documents produced did not establish a legally enforceable proprietary interest. 8.At trial, the 1st respondent testified as the sole witness in support of his case. He adopted his witness statement and produced documentary evidence including the ballot documentation; an allotment letter dated 14th January, 1993; receipts evidencing payments; and related documents. His evidence was that although payment was made outside the thirty-day period stipulated in the allotment letter, the payment was nonetheless accepted and receipted by the allocating authority. He also relied on a publication in the Kenya Times newspaper of 25th August 1995 listing him among those allocated plots in 1993. 9.The defence case was considerably more elaborate. The appellant and the 2nd respondent called a total of seven witnesses. The appellant testified that Plot No. 24 had been allocated to her and that she had occupied and developed it over many years. The defence witnesses included village elders from Tuluroba, tenants, officers of the defunct County Council of Isiolo, the County Surveyor, and the County Chief Officer in charge of Lands and Physical Planning. 10.Their collective evidence sought to establish four propositions: first, that Plot No. 24 belonged to the appellant; second, that Plot No. 20 and Plot No. 24 were distinct parcels; third, that the 1992– 1993 allocations to ballot allottees became impracticable because squatters had occupied the land; and fourth, that in or around 2011, the County undertook a reallocation exercise to regularize occupation on the ground. 11.Of particular significance was the testimony of the County Surveyor and the County Chief Officer for Lands. Their evidence revealed that while plots had indeed been allocated to ballot allottees in the early 1990s, those allottees were largely unable to take possession because of occupation by squatters. The County consequently undertook a reallocation process in 2011 to accommodate those found in occupation on the ground. Yet, crucially, they testified that the original allottees were not formally notified of revocation, nor were they accorded a hearing before the reallocation exercise. 12.Upon evaluating the evidence, the learned trial magistrate dismissed the 1st respondent’s suit. The trial court found that the 1st respondent had failed to prove, on a balance of probabilities, that Plot No. 24 allocated to the appellant was the same parcel as Plot No. 20 claimed by him. The trial court further held that collusion and fraud had not been proved to the required standard and concluded that the evidentiary basis for the 1st respondent’s claim was insufficient. 13.Aggrieved by that dismissal, the 1st respondent appealed to the Environment and Land Court at Meru in ELCA No. 122 of 2019. 14.Sitting as a first appellate court, the learned Judge of the Environment and Land Court (L. N. Mbugua, J.) undertook a fresh evaluation of the record. The learned Judge identified three principal issues for determination: whether the trial court erred in dismissing the suit; whether the claim was statute-barred; and the question of costs. 15.On re-evaluation of the evidence, the learned Judge reached conclusions materially different from those of the trial court. First, the learned Judge found that the 1st respondent had indeed established a prior valid allotment of Plot No. 20 through ballot, allotment letter, payment, and subsequent recognition by the allocating authority. 16.Second, the learned Judge held that once a valid allotment had been made, the land could not lawfully be reallocated to another person unless the earlier allotment was first lawfully revoked. The learned Judge found no evidence that such lawful revocation had occurred. 17.Third, the learned Judge concluded that the 2011 reallocation exercise failed to comply with due process because the original allottees were not notified; were not heard; and were not accorded procedural fairness before their interests were adversely affected. 18.Fourth, on the appellant’s contention that Plot No. 20 and Plot No. 24 were distinct parcels, the learned Judge rejected that argument, relying in part on evidence from defence witnesses - particularly the site visit evidence - which indicated that both the appellant and the 1st respondent were laying claim to the same physical parcel. 19.On whether the 1st respondent’s suit was time-barred, the learned Judge held that the issue had not been properly raised in the pleadings and, in any event, that the cause of action accrued not at the time of original allocation in 1992, but when the alleged wrongful reallocation occurred in 2011 or thereabouts. 20.The learned Judge consequently allowed the appeal, set aside the judgment of the trial court, and entered judgment in favour of the 1st respondent in terms of the substantive prayers in the amended plaint, save for damages and mesne profits. Costs of both the suit and the appeal were awarded to the 1st respondent. 21.It is that judgment of the Environment and Land Court that provoked the present appeal. 22.Before turning to the parties’ submissions and the substantive issues arising in this appeal, it is necessary to explicitly state the scope of our mandate. This is a second appeal. It comes to this Court from the judgment of the Environment and Land Court which itself was sitting as a first appellate court from the decision of the Chief Magistrate’s Court. That procedural posture is not merely descriptive; it is legally significant because it defines and constrains the jurisdiction of this Court. 23.The law on second appeals is settled. This Court’s mandate is limited to questions of law. We do not sit as a third fact-finding forum. We do not rehear the evidence afresh merely because one party is dissatisfied with factual findings reached by the two courts below or because another factual inference may appear plausible. The principles governing our jurisdiction on second appeal have been restated in a long line of authorities. In M’Riungu v Republic [1983] KLR 455, this Court explained that on second appeal, the Court is concerned only with points of law and will not interfere with concurrent findings of fact unless it is shown that the findings were based on no evidence at all, were founded on a misapprehension of the evidence, or that the courts below demonstrably acted on wrong principles. Similar principles were reiterated in Stanley N. Muriithi & Another v Bernard Munene Ithiga [2016] eKLR and Charles Kipkoech Leting v Express (K) Ltd & Another [2018] eKLR. 24.Put differently, this Court may interfere where it is shown that the court below considered matters it ought not to have considered, failed to consider matters it ought to have considered, misapprehended the law, or arrived at a conclusion so plainly unsustainable on the record as to be properly described as perverse. 25.There is a second doctrinal layer worth emphasizing. Because the Environment and Land Court was sitting as a first appellate court, it bore the duty - well known since Selle v Associated Motor Boat Co. [1968] EA 123 - to re-evaluate the entire evidence, draw its own independent conclusions, and determine whether the trial court’s findings were sustainable, while giving due allowance to the fact that it had neither seen nor heard the witnesses testify. 26.Accordingly, one of the threshold questions in this appeal is whether the Environment and Land Court properly discharged that first appellate duty or whether, as the appellant suggests, it misapprehended the evidence and exceeded the permissible bounds of appellate interference. 27.Once that threshold issue is addressed, the substantive questions that arise for our determination narrow considerably. At their core, they concern whether the 1st respondent established a prior valid allotment of the suit property; whether the subsequent reallocation process complied with the law; and whether the appellant has demonstrated any legal error in the first appellate court’s resolution of those questions. 28.It is to the parties’ arguments on those questions that we now turn. 29.This appeal came up for plenary hearing before us on 9th February, 2026. Appearing for the appellant was Mr. Ouma, learned counsel. The 1st respondent was represented by Ms. Abubakar, learned counsel. There was no representation for the 2nd respondent despite proof of service. Similarly, the 2nd respondent did not file any written submissions; but the appellant and 1st respondent had. Their counsel relied on the submissions and made oral clarifications in response to questions from the Court. 30.The appellant’s central complaint was that the learned Judge of the Environment and Land Court erred both in law and in fact by reversing the judgment of the trial court and by entering judgment in favour of the 1st respondent on what was said to be insufficient and legally defective evidence. The appellant submitted that the learned Judge misdirected himself by failing to properly appreciate the distinction between Plot No. 20 claimed by the 1st respondent and Plot No. 24 Tuluroba claimed by the appellant. It was argued that these were separate and distinct parcels situated in different physical locations, and that the learned Judge erred in conflating them without adequate evidentiary basis. The appellant maintained that the 1st respondent’s entire case depended on proving that the two plot numbers referred to the same parcel, and that he failed to discharge that burden. 31.Relatedly, the appellant submitted that the first appellate court improperly interfered with factual findings made by the trial court without demonstrating sufficient basis for doing so. It was argued that the trial magistrate had the benefit of hearing and observing witnesses and had correctly concluded that the 1st respondent had failed to prove fraud, collusion, or identity of the suit property. According to the appellant, the Environment and Land Court exceeded the proper limits of appellate intervention by substituting its own factual conclusions without sufficient justification. 32.The appellant further challenged the legal validity of the 1st respondent’s allotment. She argued that the allotment letter relied upon by the 1st respondent did not create a legally enforceable proprietary interest because the mandatory conditions attached to the allotment were never satisfied. In particular, the appellant emphasized that the 1st respondent neither formally accepted the allotment within the stipulated period nor paid the required charges within thirty days as expressly required by the allotment letter. On that basis, the appellant argued that the allotment automatically lapsed by operation of its own terms, thereby extinguishing any rights that might otherwise have arisen from it. It was submitted that once the allotment lapsed, the 1st respondent could not lawfully assert priority over subsequent allocations. Further, it was argued that the allotment was unsupported by a properly approved Part Development Plan and therefore lacked the legal foundation necessary to sustain a valid allocation of public land. In the appellant’s submission, the first appellate court failed to properly interrogate this issue. 33.On the allegations of fraud, appellant submitted that the 1st respondent bore a heightened evidentiary burden which he failed to satisfy. Since fraud had been specifically pleaded, the appellant argued, it had to be proved to a standard higher than a mere balance of probabilities, though not as high as beyond reasonable doubt. The appellant’s position was that no evidence meeting that threshold was produced against her. 34.The appellant further submitted that the 1st respondent’s claim was tainted by delay and ought not to have succeeded in equity. It was argued that the 1st respondent had waited for an inordinately long period - close to two decades - before asserting his claim, during which time the appellant had remained in occupation and undertaken developments on the suit property. In the appellant’s view, the first appellate court failed to adequately account for the practical and equitable consequences of disturbing the status quo. 35.The 1st respondent opposed the appeal and urged us to uphold the judgment of the Environment and Land Court in its entirety. He submitted that the learned Judge properly appreciated both the facts and the law and arrived at the correct conclusion. The 1st respondent submitted that the evidence on record established beyond serious controversy that the 1st respondent was lawfully allocated Residential Plot No. 20, Section A, Isiolo Township through a balloting exercise conducted by the defunct County Council of Isiolo in 1992. The 1st respondent pointed to the ballot records; allotment letter dated 14th January, 1993; receipts evidencing payment; beacon certificate; and evidence of possession and development as collectively establishing a valid and enforceable proprietary interest. The 1st respondent submitted that the appellant’s claim could not defeat that earlier allocation because the law is settled that where land has already been validly allotted, the allocating authority lacks power to allocate the same parcel to a second allottee unless the first allotment has first been lawfully revoked. 36.It was emphasized that no lawful revocation of the 1st respondent’s allotment was ever shown; that there was no evidence that the 1st respondent was notified of any intended revocation, afforded an opportunity to be heard, compensated, or offered alternative land before his interest was adversely affected. According to the 1st respondent, this failure of procedural fairness was fatal to the reallocation process. Even assuming there were practical difficulties arising from occupation by squatters or settlement pressures on the ground, those difficulties, the 1st respondent argued, could not justify extinguishing accrued rights through opaque or unilateral administrative action. 37.The 1st respondent further submitted that the appellant’s insistence that Plot No. 20 and Plot No. 24 were different parcels was inconsistent with the evidence led at trial, including evidence from the defence witnesses themselves. In particular, counsel pointed to site evidence and testimony from County officials which, in counsel the 1st respondent’s view, demonstrated that both parties were, in truth, laying claim to the same physical parcel. 38.On fraud and collusion, the 1st respondent insisted that while the evidentiary burden was indeed elevated, the totality of the evidence - including the unexplained transformation of Plot No. 20 into Plot No. 24 Tuluroba and the circumstances surrounding the reallocation - supported the inference drawn by the first appellate court that the reallocation was tainted by unlawful conduct. 39.Finally, counsel submitted that the learned Judge correctly applied the settled principles governing first appeals by independently re-evaluating the evidence in accordance with Selle v Associated Motor Boat Co. (supra) and by giving cogent reasons for departing from the conclusions of the trial court. Accordingly, counsel urged us to dismiss the appeal with costs. 40.Having considered the record of appeal, the judgment of the Environment and Land Court, the memorandum of appeal, and the rival submissions of counsel, we are of the respectful view that the appeal crystallizes into the following issues for determination:i.First, whether the Environment and Land Court, in its capacity as a first appellate court, properly discharged its duty to re-evaluate and re-analyse the evidence on record in accordance with the settled principles governing first appeals.ii.Second, whether the 1st respondent proved a prior valid allotment of Residential Plot No. 20, Section A, Isiolo Township, sufficient to create a legally protectable proprietary interest.iii.Third, whether the evidence supported the conclusion reached by the Environment and Land Court that Plot No. 20 claimed by the 1st respondent and Plot No. 24 Tuluroba claimed by the appellant referred, in substance, to the same physical parcel of land.iv.Fourth, if the 1st respondent established a prior valid allotment, whether the subsequent allocation to the appellant could lawfully override that earlier allotment in the absence of lawful revocation, notice, and procedural fairness.v.Fifth, whether the allegations of fraud, collusion, and unlawful administrative conduct were proved to the requisite legal standard and, if not, what effect that has on the ultimate disposition of the appeal.vi.Sixth and finally, whether the appellant has demonstrated any error of law, misdirection, or perversity in the judgment of the Environment and Land Court sufficient to justify interference by this Court on second appeal. 41.We propose to analyse these issues sequentially, though, as will become apparent, there is considerable overlap between them. 42.We begin with the appellant’s complaint that the Environment and Land Court exceeded its mandate as a first appellate court by improperly interfering with factual findings made by the trial court. 43.The duty of a first appellate court is now trite. In Selle v Associated Motor Boat Co. [1968] EA 123, the predecessor of this Court stated that a first appellate court must reconsider the evidence, evaluate it itself, and draw its own conclusions, while bearing in mind that it neither saw nor heard the witnesses and should therefore make due allowance for that disadvantage. The first appellate court is not bound to mechanically defer to the factual conclusions of the trial court merely because the trial court had the advantage of seeing witnesses testify. Rather, its constitutional and statutory function is precisely to examine whether those conclusions are supported by the evidence and the law. 44.It follows that appellate interference by a first appellate court is not an exceptional act requiring extraordinary justification. It is part of the court’s ordinary judicial duty whenever, upon fresh evaluation of the record, it becomes persuaded that the trial court misapprehended the evidence, applied the wrong legal principles, ignored material evidence, or reached conclusions not reasonably supported by the record. 45.We have carefully read the impugned judgment of the Environment and Land Court. The learned Judge expressly identified and applied the governing first appellate principles. More importantly, the learned Judge did not merely announce disagreement with the trial court. Rather, the learned Judge undertook an independent and fairly detailed re-evaluation of the documentary evidence and oral testimony before explaining why the conclusions reached by the trial court could not stand. 46.In particular, the learned Judge revisited the documentary trail relating to the 1st respondent’s allotment; re-examined the evidence concerning possession and development of the suit property; analysed the evidence regarding the 2011 reallocation exercise; and evaluated the testimony of the County officials concerning notice, revocation, and site identification. That exercise was neither superficial nor perfunctory. It was a genuine appellate reappraisal of the evidentiary record. 47.The appellant’s complaint, upon closer examination, is not truly that the Environment and Land Court failed to perform its appellate duty. Rather, the complaint is that the court performed that duty and arrived at conclusions unfavourable to the appellant. That, without more, is not a legal error. We therefore find no basis for the contention that the Environment and Land Court exceeded or misapprehended its role as a first appellate court. 48.We next consider whether the 1st respondent proved a prior valid allotment sufficient to ground a legally protectable proprietary interest in the suit property. In our view, the evidentiary record strongly supports the conclusion reached by the Environment and Land Court that he did. The 1st respondent’s claim was not founded on bare assertion. He produced a coherent chain of documentary and oral evidence showing the origin and nature of his claim. This evidence included the ballot records from the 1992 allocation exercise conducted by the defunct County Council of Isiolo; the allotment letter dated 14th January, 1993; receipts evidencing payment of the required charges; the beacon certificate identifying the plot; and evidence that he took possession and undertook development on the land. 49.The appellant attacked this chain of evidence on several fronts. The most prominent challenge was that the argument that the allotment lapsed because the 1st respondent failed to accept the offer and pay the stipulated charges within thirty days as required by the allotment letter. It is factually true that the 1st respondent did not pay the stipulated charges within thirty days. That argument has superficial attraction, but ultimately fails when examined against the full factual context. It is true that allotment letters ordinarily contain strict timelines within which the allottee must accept the offer and comply with payment conditions. It is also true that non-compliance may, depending on the circumstances, cause the offer to lapse. However, whether an allotment has lapsed is not always determined by the mechanical passage of time alone. The conduct of the allocating authority after the lapse period is also legally significant. 50.In the present case, although payment was made outside the stipulated thirty-day period, the allocating authority nonetheless accepted the payment and issued official receipts. That conduct is legally consequential. By accepting payment and continuing to treat the 1st respondent as an allottee, the allocating authority effectively waived strict insistence on the thirty-day condition. 51.That conclusion is fortified by subsequent conduct of both the 2nd and 1st respondents. The record contains evidence that the 2nd respondent continued to recognise the 1st respondent as one of the allottees from the 1992 - 1993 exercise, including through later official documentation and publication of his name in list of allottees. Such continued recognition is fundamentally inconsistent with the argument that the allotment had already lapsed and became a nullity. 52.We therefore agree with the learned Judge that the 1st respondent established more than a mere speculative claim or an inchoate expectation. He established a sufficiently concrete proprietary interest arising from a valid allotment process; acceptance by the allocating authority; and subsequent recognition by the 2nd respondent of his status as an allottee. 53.It is important to make an important doctrinal clarification: A letter of allotment does not, by itself, necessarily confer indefeasible title in the same manner as a registered grant or certificate of title. However, where a lawful allotment is shown, the allottee acquires a legally enforceable proprietary interest capable of protection by the courts, particularly against unlawful subsequent allocation of the same parcel to another person. In other words, while the 1st respondent may not at that stage have held perfected title in the strict registrable sense, he possessed a prior proprietary claim which the allocating authority (the 2nd respondent) could not lawfully ignore, extinguish, or defeat through unilateral and opaque administrative action. 54.Consequently, we answer the second issue in the affirmative: the 1st respondent proved a prior valid allotment sufficient to create a legally protectable proprietary interest. 55.We now turn to the third issue: whether the evidence supported the conclusion reached by the Environment and Land Court that Plot No. 20 claimed by the 1st respondent and Plot No. 24 Tuluroba claimed by the appellant referred, in substance, to the same physical parcel of land. 56.This issue lies at the heart of the appellant’s case. Indeed, if the appellant were correct that the two plot numbers refer to entirely separate parcels situated in distinct locations, much of the 1st respondent’s claim would collapse. In that event, there would be no double allocation; no competing claims to the same parcel; and no basis for impugning the appellant’s allotment by reference to the 1st respondent’s earlier allocation. It is therefore necessary to examine this contention carefully. 57.The appellant consistently maintained that Plot No. 20 and Plot No. 24 Tuluroba were distinct parcels. However, beyond assertion, the evidentiary foundation for that contention was remarkably thin. Most tellingly, the evidence from the defence witnesses themselves materially weakened the appellant’s position. The evidence of the County officials who testified revealed that the original 1992 - 1993 balloting exercise had allocated plots, including Plot No. 20, to successful allottees. It was also common ground that many such allottees did not immediately settle on the allocated plots because of pre-existing occupation by squatters. This later precipitated the 2011 regularization and reallocation exercise. 58.However, the defence evidence did not satisfactorily demonstrate that Plot No. 20 disappeared and was replaced by an entirely separate parcel unconnected to the original allocation. Nor did the 2nd respondent produce clear mapping, survey, or planning evidence conclusively showing two distinct parcels physically existing in different locations. To the contrary, the site evidence and the testimony of key defence witnesses suggested that both parties were, in reality, asserting competing claims over the same physical space. 59.This is important because courts dealing with land disputes involving administrative renumbering or reclassification must be attentive not merely to labels, but to substance. Plot numbers may change. Settlement schemes may be reorganized and planning nomenclature may evolve but administrative re-labelling and re- numbering cannot, without more, alter underlying proprietary rights. The law is concerned not with nomenclature for its own sake, but with the identity of the physical parcel and the legal rights attaching to it. 60.In our view, the learned Judge of the Environment and Land Court correctly appreciated this. The learned Judge looked beyond the formal distinction between “Plot No. 20” and “Plot No. 24 Tuluroba” and interrogated whether the evidence showed two genuinely distinct parcels or one parcel subjected to later administrative redesignation. On the record before us, we are unable to say that the learned Judge’s conclusion - that both parties were claiming the same parcel - was unsupported by evidence, irrational, or perverse. To the contrary, it was a conclusion reasonably open to the court on the evidence presented to the trial court. Since this is a second appeal, that finding alone significantly narrows the scope of our intervention. Even if another court might have drawn a different factual inference, that is not the test. The question is whether the inference drawn by the first appellate court was legally unsustainable. We are unable to so hold. 61.We therefore affirm the finding that the competing claims concerned, in substance, the same physical parcel. 62.That conclusion brings us to the fourth issue, which in our view is the doctrinal centre of this appeal: Given our conclusion that the 1st respondent established a prior valid allotment the question becomes whether the subsequent allocation of the same parcel to the appellant could lawfully override that earlier allotment. Fortunately, the law on this question is now well settled. Where public land has been lawfully allocated to a person and the allottee has complied with the conditions of allotment or where the allocating authority has otherwise continued to recognize the allottee’s rights, the allocating authority cannot validly allocate the same parcel to a second allottee unless the first allocation has first been lawfully revoked. 63.This principle has been affirmed repeatedly by our courts. In Benja Properties Limited v Syedna Mohammed Burhannudin Sahed & 4 Others [2015] eKLR, this Court reaffirmed that once land has been validly alienated, it ceases to be available for subsequent allocation unless the earlier allocation is lawfully nullified. Similar principles were expressed in Henry Muthee Kathurima v Commissioner of Lands & Another [2015] eKLR and Rukaya Ali Mohamed v David Gikonyo Nambacha & Another [2004] eKLR. The rationale for this rule is not difficult to appreciate. Public authorities exercising allocation powers are trustees of public power. They cannot distribute land arbitrarily, nor can they extinguish accrued rights through informal, opaque, or unilateral administrative action. To permit otherwise would produce uncertainty, reward administrative disorder, and undermine public confidence in land administration. 64.In the present case, since we have already concluded that the 2nd respondent had already allocated the suit property to the 1st respondent, the appellant’s claim can only prevail if the 2nd respondent demonstrates that the 1st respondent’s earlier allotment was lawfully extinguished before the later allocation. No such evidence was produced. There was no evidence that the 1st respondent was served with notice that his allotment was under review or that he was invited to appear before any committee or decision-making body. There was no evidence that he was afforded an opportunity to explain his position or that he was offered compensation or alternative allocation prior to the reallocation. In short, there was no evidence of lawful revocation. 65.We accept that the County faced real practical difficulties in dealing with the allocated plots. The evidence suggests that by the time many original allottees sought possession, squatters had occupied significant portions of the affected land. That undoubtedly created difficult governance and planning challenges. Yet, administrative difficulty does not suspend the rule of law. Even where regularization, re-planning, or relocation becomes necessary, public authorities remain bound by minimum requirements of legality and procedural fairness. At the very least, persons holding prior proprietary interests must be notified, heard, and treated fairly before adverse decisions affecting their interests are made. That did not happen here. Consequently, even assuming the reallocation exercise was motivated by genuine administrative necessity, the process by which the 1st respondent’s rights were displaced was legally deficient. 66.We therefore agree with the learned Judge that the subsequent allocation to the appellant could not, in law, defeat the 1st respondent’s earlier and superior proprietary interest. 67.We next address the fifth issue: whether fraud, collusion, and unlawful administrative conduct were proved to the requisite standard and, if not, what effect that has on the ultimate disposition of this appeal. 68.The appellant correctly submitted that fraud is a serious allegation and must be specifically pleaded and strictly proved. The law is settled that although the standard of proof for fraud does not rise to the criminal threshold of proof beyond reasonable doubt, it is appreciably higher than proof on a mere balance of probabilities. Courts do not lightly infer fraud. We accept that principle without reservation. We also agree that care must be taken not to conflate administrative irregularity, bureaucratic disorder, or even serious unlawfulness with fraud properly so called. Not every unlawful administrative act is fraudulent. Fraud imports an element of deliberate deceit, dishonesty, or conscious wrongdoing. In the present case, the 1st respondent alleged that there was collusion between the appellant and officials of the 2nd respondent in the redesignation and reallocation of the suit property. The Environment and Land Court agreed and drew an inference that the reallocation process was tainted by fraud and collusion. Having carefully reviewed the record, we think it unnecessary, for purposes of determining this appeal, to conclusively affirm or reject that characterization in its strongest form. 69.We say so because the ultimate disposition of this appeal does not turn on whether personal fraud by the appellant was proved to the heightened evidentiary standard. Even if we were to assume, in the appellant’s favour, that fraud and collusion were not strictly proved against her personally, the appeal would still fail. That is because the central legal defect identified by the Environment and Land Court - and which we have independently affirmed - lies elsewhere: it is that the 1st respondent had established a prior valid proprietary interest; that no lawful revocation of that interest was shown; and that the subsequent reallocation process was undertaken without compliance with minimum legal requirements of notice, hearing, and procedural fairness. Those conclusions are independently sufficient to dispose of the appeal without the necessity to make a definitive finding on whether fraud was proved. 70.Put differently, the appellant need not have been shown to be a knowing participant in fraud for the second allocation to fail in law. The subsequent allocation would still be vulnerable if it originated from an administrative process that unlawfully ignored or extinguished pre-existing rights. This distinction is important. The law’s protection of prior proprietary interests does not depend exclusively on proof of moral blameworthiness by a subsequent allottee. It depends, more fundamentally, on the legality of the allocation process itself. In the circumstances, while the evidentiary record certainly raises troubling questions about how Plot No. 20 came to be redesignated and allocated as Plot No. 24 Tuluroba, we consider it unnecessary to make a definitive finding of personal fraud against the appellant. It is sufficient for present purposes to conclude that the reallocation process was legally defective and incapable of extinguishing the 1st respondent’s prior rights. 71.That brings us to the final issue: whether the appellant has demonstrated any error of law, misdirection, or perversity in the judgment of the Environment and Land Court sufficient to justify interference by this Court on second appeal. Given our detailed analysis above, our answer is in the negative. When stripped to their analytical core, most of the appellant’s grounds of appeal amount to invitations to this Court to re-open factual controversies already examined by the trial court and comprehensively re-evaluated by the first appellate court. She requests us to revisit the evidence relating to the identity of the suit property; the chronology of allocation; the weight to be given to documentary evidence; the credibility of witnesses; and the inferences to be drawn from the conduct of the parties and County officials. That is not the function of this Court on second appeal unless it is shown that the findings of the court below were unsupported by evidence, based on misapprehension of evidence, or otherwise legally untenable. No such showing has been made here. 72.On the contrary, we are satisfied that the Environment and Land Court properly appreciated its appellate mandate; correctly identified the governing legal principles; carefully re-evaluated the evidentiary record; and reached conclusions that were not only reasonably open on the evidence, but, in our respectful view, were legally correct. 73.For all these reasons, we find no basis upon which to interfere with the judgment of the Environment and Land Court. In theresult, this appeal is devoid of merit and is hereby dismissed in its entirety. 74.The appellant shall bear the costs of this appeal. 75.It is so ordered. DATED AND DELIVERED AT NYERI THIS 24TH DAY OF JULY, 2026.W. KARANJA………………………… JUDGE OF APPEALALI-ARONI………………………… JUDGE OF APPEALJOEL NGUGI………………………… JUDGE OF APPEALI certify that this is a true copy of the original.SignedDEPUTY REGISTRAR