Denver Auto Body Repairers CC v Stand 637 Isando CC and Others (35238/12) [2012] ZAGPJHC 266 (18 October 2012)
The court found that the applicant did not exercise its right of first refusal in accordance with the lease agreement. The correspondence from the applicant was not an unequivocal acceptance of the offer to purchase but rather a protest and an attempt to negotiate terms. Furthermore, the attempt to exercise the...
Source-derived case information.
- Citation
- [2012] ZAGPJHC 266
- Parties
- Applicant: Denver Auto Body Repairers CC; Respondent: Stand 637 Isando CC; Respondent: Teraco Properties (Pty) Ltd; Respondent: The Registrar of Deeds, Johannesburg
- Court
- South Gauteng High Court, Johannesburg
- Jurisdiction
- South Africa
- Case Number
- 35238/12
- Procedural Posture
- Urgent Application / Judgment
- Outcome
- Application dismissed with costs.
- Judges
- Willis
- Legal Topics
- Right of First Refusal, Preemptive Rights, Sale of Immovable Property, Corporate Personality
Source-derived case record
Summary, issues, holding and outcome
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Parties
Denver Auto Body Repairers CC
Applicant
Stand 637 Isando CC
Respondent
Teraco Properties (Pty) Ltd
Respondent
The Registrar of Deeds, Johannesburg
Respondent
Procedural Posture
Urgent Application / Judgment
Legal Issues
- 1 Did the applicant validly exercise its right of first refusal in terms of the lease agreement?
- 2 Can the applicant's right of first refusal be exercised by another legal entity on its behalf?
- 3 Does the correspondence from the applicant constitute acceptance of the offer as contemplated by the agreement?
Ratio Decidendi
The court found that the applicant did not exercise its right of first refusal in accordance with the lease agreement. The correspondence from the applicant was not an unequivocal acceptance of the offer to purchase but rather a protest and an attempt to negotiate terms. Furthermore, the attempt to exercise the right through Rajaca Investments CC was invalid, as only the applicant itself could exercise the right. The principle of separate legal personality precluded the applicant from delegating its contractual rights to another entity. Consequently, the applicant failed to make out a case for enforcement of the right of first refusal.
Court Disposition
Application dismissed with costs.
Orders
- The application is dismissed with costs.
Full Case Text
Judgment text and source record
28 paragraphs
IN THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA (SOUTH GAUTENG)
JOHANNESBURG
CASE NO: 35238/12
DATE: 2012-10-18
In the matter between
DENVER AUTO BODY REPAIRERS CC.......................................................Applicant
and
STAND 637 ISANDO CC …..........................................................................First Respondent
TERACO PROPERTIES (PTY) LTD …..........................................................Second Respondent
THE REGISTRAR OF DEEDS, JOHANNESBURG ….................................Third Respondent
J U D G M E N T
WILLIS, J:
[1] This is an application in terms of which the applicant seeks to enforce a right of first refusal (otherwise known as a pre-emptive right) which, it is common cause, it had in respect of a property known as Earth 637 Isando, Extension 1 Township, Registration Division, IR, Province of Gauteng, which measures 5 173 square meters.
[2] It is common cause that the first and second respondents entered into an agreement in terms of which the first respondent sold the second respondent the property in question, subject to a significant suspensive condition. This suspensive condition was that the applicant did not exercise the right of first refusal, which the applicant had in its favour.
[3] Despite voluminous papers and despite some tension in the arguments, it is clear that the issue turns on a simple point: did the applicant exercise its right of first refusal in terms of the agreement or did it not? Critical to the issue is a letter is sent by Mervyn Smith, written on behalf of the applicant, on 6 July 2012 to the first respondent. In that letter, the following appears:
“We confirm that we act on behalf of Denver Auto Body Repairers CC, and that all correspondence is to be addressed to our offices directly.”
The letter continues with a protest:
“Although the agreement of sale is not an offer as contemplated by clause 16 of the agreement of lease, this omission of a concluded agreement of sale as opposed to an offer flies in the face of clause 16 aforesaid. Our client regards your conduct as a repudiation of the lease, which repudiation our client does not accept. You are advised that our client intends to purchase the property at a commercially realistic or market-related price. You are called upon to submit to our client an offer of sale for our client to consider.”
[4] By no stretch of the imagination, can this be regarded as an acceptance or an exercise of the right of a first refusal. Not only is it a statement of an intention rather than an actual acceptance of the terms and conditions of the sale, but it contains a protest and an attempt to negotiate to reach a “commercially realistic or market-related price”.
[5] Later, on 3 August 2012, Mervyn Smith, attorneys again acting for the applicant, address a letter to Möller and Pienaar, the attorneys acting for the first respondent, in which they offer to purchase the property in the name of another legal entity. That legal entity is Rajaca Investments CC, not the applicant.
[6] We cannot ‘lift the corporate veil’ in a matter such as this. It is trite that separate legal personality is a strongly entrenched principle in our law. It cannot operate as compliance with the agreement conferring a right of first refusal if the party having that right decides, unilaterally, that somebody else can exercise its rights of pre-emption on its behalf. Mr Cohen, who acts for the applicant, then referred me to a letter dated, 10 August 2012. He drew my attention to the fact that the letter for the attorneys, acting on behalf of the first respondent, records:
“Our client notes your indication that it exercises its right to purchase the property as it was offered to Teraco Properties (Pty) Ltd.”
That is an interesting clause, but the letter goes on to say:
“An offer by Rajaca Investments CC does not constitute an acceptance by Denver Auto Body Repairers CC, as envisaged in the lease agreement. The offer to purchase should be from Denver Auto Body Repairers ... Your client’s difficulty to raise funding in Denver Auto Body Repairers CC is not our client’s
concern. As you correctly pointed out, it is different legal entities and Denver Auto Body Repairers CC has the right to demand
transfer of the property on the same terms and conditions as Teraco Properties (Pty) Ltd, not Rajaca Investments CC.”
[7] Against this background, the applicant has failed to make out a case. There is only one appropriate order that can be made. It is the following:
The application is dismissed with costs.