Lavers v Hein & Far BK (240/96) [1998] ZASCA 19; 1998 (3) SA 195 (SCA); (25 March 1998)
- Citation
- [1998] ZASCA 19
- Status
- Judgment
- Jurisdiction
- South Africa
- Court
- Supreme Court of Appeal
- Panel
- Hefer, Eksteen, Howie, Schutz
- Case number
- 240/96
More details
- Court
- Supreme Court of Appeal
- Panel
- Hefer, Eksteen, Howie, Schutz
- Case number
- 240/96
On this page
Professional case brief
Research organized from the available case record
01
Holding and result
The court held that prescription began to run when the respondent received the police letter dated 30 November 1988, which clearly stated that the vehicle had been identified as stolen and would not be returned to him. The respondent's attorney was obliged to concede that prescription commenced at that point. The court further found that none of the correspondence exchanged between the parties' attorneys after the seizure of the vehicle contained any acknowledgment of liability by the appellant. Therefore, prescription was not interrupted under section 14(1) of the Prescription Act. The respondent's claim was accordingly prescribed.
Court disposition
Appeal upheld; respondent's claim dismissed with costs.
Orders
- The defence of prescription is upheld.
- The respondent's claim is dismissed with costs.
02
Material facts
Parties
Lavers
AppellantHein & Far BK
Respondent03
Procedural history
Posture
Civil Appeal / Appeal From Lower Court Judgment
04
Questions and positions
Legal issues
- 01
When did prescription begin to run in respect of the respondent's claim for the return of the vehicle or its value.
- 02
Whether the appellant's conduct amounted to an acknowledgment of liability sufficient to interrupt prescription under section 14(1) of the Prescription Act.
Party arguments
- Applicant
- The appellant argued that prescription commenced either in May 1988 when the vehicle was seized or in November 1988 when the respondent was informed by the police that the vehicle had been stolen and would not be returned. Therefore, the claim had prescribed by the time proceedings were instituted.
- Respondent
- The respondent contended that prescription only began to run in January 1992 when he was officially notified that the vehicle would not be returned. Alternatively, he argued that prescription was interrupted by the appellant's express or tacit acknowledgment of liability through correspondence between the parties' attorneys.
05
Court’s reasoning
Legal principles
- 01
Section 12 of the Prescription Act 68 of 1969
Prescription begins to run when the creditor becomes aware of the facts from which the debt arises, or could have acquired such knowledge by exercising reasonable care.
- 02
Section 14(1) of the Prescription Act 68 of 1969
Prescription is interrupted by an express or tacit acknowledgment of liability by the debtor.
06
Ratio, limits and disposition
Ratio decidendi
The court held that prescription began to run when the respondent received the police letter dated 30 November 1988, which clearly stated that the vehicle had been identified as stolen and would not be returned to him. The respondent's attorney was obliged to concede that prescription commenced at that point. The court further found that none of the correspondence exchanged between the parties' attorneys after the seizure of the vehicle contained any acknowledgment of liability by the appellant. Therefore, prescription was not interrupted under section 14(1) of the Prescription Act. The respondent's claim was accordingly prescribed.
Obiter and limits
- The court noted that the respondent's attorney's concession regarding the commencement of prescription was unavoidable in light of the police letter.
- The court observed that the respondent's alternative argument regarding interruption of prescription was without merit, as the correspondence did not amount to an acknowledgment of liability.
Court disposition
Appeal upheld; respondent's claim dismissed with costs.
- The defence of prescription is upheld.
- The respondent's claim is dismissed with costs.
Source and reliance status
Supreme Court of Appeal
This page organises the available record for research. Confirm quotations, current status, and subsequent treatment against the official source before relying on the case.
Judgment reading view
Judgment text
The complete available source text.
Supreme Court of Appeal
Judgment
Saak No: 240/96
HEFER AR
3
waaruit die skuld ontstaan, of sodanige kennis deur die beoefening van redelike sorg kon bekom. Volgens die respondent het hy eers gedurende Januarie 1992 amptelik verneem dat die voertuig aan die eienaar oorhandig sou word. Sy saak is - en die landdros en die Hof a guo het hom gelyk gegee - dat verjaring toe eers begin loop het. Volgens die appellant is aan die vereistes van art 12 reeds gedurende M ei 1988 voldoen toe die voertuig in beslag geneem is of gedurende November 1988 toe die respondent van die polisie verneem het dat dit inderdaad gesteel was en nie weer aan hom oorhandig sou word nie. Indien een van hierdie alternatiewe korrek is, het die skuld verjaar en het die landdros en die Hof a guo fouteer.
Ek vind dit nie nodig om die onderskeie standpunte volledig te bespreek nie. Die beslaglegging het geskied uit hoofde van art 20 van die Strafproseswet 51 van 1977 op grond van 'n redelike vermoede dat die voertuig gesteel was. Art 20 en die bepalings van die wet ten opsigte van die uiteindelike beskikking oor 'n voorwerp waarop beslag gel is, is breedvoerig bespreek in Minister van Wet en Orde en 'n
5 nie. Wat oorbly is die vraag wanneer dit vir die eerste maal tot die respondent se kennis gekom het dat die voertuig nie aan hom terugbesorg sou word nie. In hierdie verband kom 'n brief wat die polisie op 30 November 1988 aan die respondent se prokureurs gerig het, ter sprake. Voordat na die inhoud verwys word, is dit nodig om te meld dat die appellant in sy verweerskrif slegs gepleit het dat verjaring gedurende Mei 1988 by die beslaglegging begin loop het. In sy skriftelike betoogpunte in hierdie Hof het respondent se advokaat daarop gewys dat die verweerskrif nooit gewysig is nie en aangevoer dat 'n uitbreiding daarvan nie toegelaat behoort te word nie. Tydens sy mondelinge betoog het hy egtertoegegee dat die betmkke aspek volledig ondersoek is. Gevolglik kan die brief oorweeg word ten spyte daarvan dat die verweerskrif nie gewysig is nie. Die relevante gedeelte daarvan lui soos volg: "Hierdie kantoor wil dit graag duidelik stel dat die betrokke voertuig reeds as gesteel ge dentifiseer is en ook deur die regmatige eienaar positief uitgeken is as die voertuig wat vanaf hom gesteel is.... Die voertuig sal dus nie aan u kli nt terugbesorg word nie en sal
6
In die lig van die duidelike stelling dat die voertuig inderdaad gesteel was en nie aan die respondent terugbesorg sou word nie, was respondent se advokaat verplig om toe te gee dat verjaring by ontvangs van die brief begin loop het. Die toegewing was onvermydelik.
Respondent se advokaat het egter aangevoer dat verjaring ooreenkomstig art 14(1) van die Verjaringswet gestuit is deur die appellant se uitdruklike of stilswyende erkenning van aanspreeklikheid. Ek is nie van plan om breedvoerig uit te wei oor die betoog in hierdie verband nie omdat daar klaarblyklik niks in steek nie. Dit het geskied aan die hand van 'n reeks briewe wat na die beslaglegging tussen die partye se prokureurs gewissel is. Geeneen van hierdie briewe bevat 'n erkenning van aanspreeklikheid nie. Kort na die beslaglegging het respondent se prokureurs terugbetaling van die koopprys van die appellant ge is en in die briewe wat daarna deur appellant se prokureurs geskryf is, is redes aangevoer waarom daar nie aan die eis
'n bevel waarvolgens die verweer van verjaring
gehandhaaf word en die eiser se eis met koste van die
JJF
HE FER App lregter
EKSTEEN AR } HOWIE AR } SCHUTZ AR } Stem saam
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