Pretorius v S (705/2019) [2020] ZASCA 47 (4 May 2020)
- Citation
- [2020] ZASCA 47
- Status
- Judgment
- Jurisdiction
- South Africa
- Court
- Supreme Court of Appeal
- Panel
- Ponnan, Saldulker, Van der Merwe, Mokgohloa, Matojane
- Case number
- 705/2019
More details
- Court
- Supreme Court of Appeal
- Panel
- Ponnan, Saldulker, Van der Merwe, Mokgohloa, Matojane
- Case number
- 705/2019
On this page
Professional case brief
Research organized from the available case record
01
Holding and result
The Supreme Court of Appeal held that the only issue before it was whether leave to appeal should have been granted by the High Court, not the merits of the appeal itself. The appellant raised substantial grounds, including the improper administration of oath or admonition to key witnesses and alleged misdirections by the trial court. The State conceded that there were reasonable prospects of success on appeal. The court found that, in light of these concessions and the applicable legal principles, leave to appeal should have been granted. Accordingly, the refusal of leave to appeal was set aside and replaced with an order granting leave to appeal to the High Court against the conviction.
Court disposition
Appeal succeeds; refusal of leave to appeal set aside and replaced with order granting leave to appeal to the High Court against conviction.
Orders
- The appeal succeeds.
- The order refusing the appellant leave to appeal is set aside.
- The appellant is granted leave to appeal to the High Court (Pretoria) against his conviction on three counts of rape by the regional court.
02
Material facts
Parties
Andre Pretorius
Appellant Counsel: F van AsThe State
Respondent Counsel: AP WilsenachAmounts and remedies
- Sentence Imposed Years: 18
03
Procedural history
Posture
Leave to Appeal / Appeal Against Refusal of Petition for Leave to Appeal to the High Court
04
Questions and positions
Legal issues
- 01
Whether the High Court erred in refusing leave to appeal against conviction and sentence.
- 02
Whether the evidence of two key prosecution witnesses was inadmissible due to improper administration of oath or admonition.
- 03
Whether there were reasonable prospects of success in the envisaged appeal.
Party arguments
- Applicant
- The appellant argued that the complainant and her friend, both minors, were not properly placed under oath or admonished to speak the truth in accordance with sections 162, 163, and 164 of the Criminal Procedure Act. Consequently, their testimony was inadmissible. Additionally, the appellant alleged various misdirections by the regional magistrate, contending that the court erred in finding him guilty beyond reasonable doubt.
- Respondent
- Counsel for the State conceded that there was a sound, rational basis for concluding that there were prospects of success on appeal regarding both the point in limine and the sufficiency of the evidence. The State agreed that the appellant had made out a compelling case for reasonable prospects of success on appeal.
05
Court’s reasoning
Legal principles
- 01
S v Khoasasa 2003 (1) SACR 123 (SCA); [2002] 4 All SA 635 (SCA)
A refusal of leave to appeal by two judges of the High Court constitutes a judgment or order of that court on appeal to the Supreme Court of Appeal. The SCA cannot decide the merits of an appeal not yet considered by the High Court.
- 02
S v Kriel 2012 (1) SACR (1) (SCA) para 12
The test for granting leave to appeal is whether there is a reasonable prospect of success in the envisaged appeal.
- 03
S v Matshivha 2014 (1) SACR 29 (SCA) paras 10 and 11
Testimony of minors must be properly placed under oath or admonished to speak the truth in terms of sections 162, 163, and 164 of the Criminal Procedure Act.
06
Ratio, limits and disposition
Ratio decidendi
The Supreme Court of Appeal held that the only issue before it was whether leave to appeal should have been granted by the High Court, not the merits of the appeal itself. The appellant raised substantial grounds, including the improper administration of oath or admonition to key witnesses and alleged misdirections by the trial court. The State conceded that there were reasonable prospects of success on appeal. The court found that, in light of these concessions and the applicable legal principles, leave to appeal should have been granted. Accordingly, the refusal of leave to appeal was set aside and replaced with an order granting leave to appeal to the High Court against the conviction.
Obiter and limits
- Both parties agreed that the appeal could be disposed of without oral argument in terms of section 19(a) of the Superior Courts Act.
- The Supreme Court of Appeal emphasized that it cannot decide the merits of an appeal not yet considered by the High Court, reaffirming the procedural boundaries of appellate jurisdiction.
Court disposition
Appeal succeeds; refusal of leave to appeal set aside and replaced with order granting leave to appeal to the High Court against conviction.
- The appeal succeeds.
- The order refusing the appellant leave to appeal is set aside.
- The appellant is granted leave to appeal to the High Court (Pretoria) against his conviction on three counts of rape by the regional court.
Source and reliance status
Supreme Court of Appeal
This page organises the available record for research. Confirm quotations, current status, and subsequent treatment against the official source before relying on the case.
Judgment reading view
Judgment text
The complete available source text.
Supreme Court of Appeal
Judgment
THE
SUPREME COURT OF APPEAL OF SOUTH AFRICA
JUDGMENT
Not reportable
Case no: 705/2019
In the matter between
ANDRE
PRETORIUS
Appellant
and
THE
STATE
Respondent
Neutral citation: Pretorius v The State (705/2019) [2020] ZASCA 47 (4 May 2020)
Coram: Ponnan, Saldulker, Van der Merwe, Mokgohloa JJA and Matojane AJA
Delivered: This judgment was handed down electronically by circulation to the parties' representatives by email, publication on the Supreme Court of Appeal website and release to SAFLII. The date and time for hand-down is deemed to be 10:00 am on 4 May 2020.
Summary: Appeal to Supreme Court of Appeal against the refusal in a high court of a petition seeking leave to appeal against a sentence imposed in a regional court – leave to appeal to the high court should have been granted – merits of the appeal against sentence to be determined by the high court.
ORDER
On appeal from: Gauteng Division of the High Court, Pretoria (Louw and Baqwa JJ, sitting as court of first instance):
(a) The appeal succeeds.
(b) The order refusing the appellant leave to appeal is set aside and is replaced with an order granting the appellant leave to appeal to the High Court (Pretoria) against his conviction on three counts of rape by the regional court.
Ponnan JA (Saldulker, Van der Merwe and Mokgohloa JJA and Matojane AJA concurring)
[1] On 13 September 2012 the appellant, Mr Andre Pretorius, was convicted by the Regional Court, Pretoria of three counts of rape of his then step daughter. On 17 January 2013 the appellant was sentenced to an effective term of 18 years’ imprisonment. On 13 October 2013 the appellant sought leave from the regional magistrate to appeal to the High Court against his conviction in each instance, which was refused. The appellant then petitioned the Judge President of the Gauteng Division of the High Court, Pretoria in terms of s 309C of the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977 (the CPA) for leave to appeal. On 2 February 2016 the appellant’s application was dismissed by Louw and Baqwa JJ. The appellant thereupon petitioned this court for special leave to appeal in terms of s 16(1)(b) of the Superior Courts Act 10 of 2013 (the SCA), which succeeded on 10 June 2019 before the two judges of this court who considered the application.
[2] It is necessary at the outset, to say something about the scope and ambit of the present appeal. In S v Khoasasa,[1] after a detailed analysis of the relevant provisions relating to appeals, this court concluded that a refusal of leave to appeal by two judges of the high court constitutes a ‘judgment or order’ of that court on appeal to it. Thus, where leave to appeal has been refused by the high court circumstances such as these, the only order appealed against is the refusal of leave and not the appeal on the merits, with the result that this court cannot, upon the granting of special leave, decide the merits of an appeal that has not yet been considered by the High Court.[2]
[3] It follows, that the issue to be decided presently is whether leave should have been granted by Louw and Baqwa JJ, to the appellant, to appeal to the high court and not the appeal itself. The test in this regard is this simply whether there is a reasonable prospect of success in the envisaged appeal.[3]
[4] In heads of argument filed with this court, it was contended on behalf of the appellant that two key witnesses for the prosecution,
the complainant and her friend, both of whom were minors, had not been properly placed under oath or admonished to speak the truth in terms of ss 162, 163 and 164 of the CPA. Accordingly, so it was contended, the testimony of both witnesses lacked the status and character of evidence and was thus inadmissible.[4] Moreover, and in addition to the aforesaid point in limine, various misdirections on the part of the regional magistrate were alluded, culminating in the submission that the court had erred in concluding that the appellant was indeed guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.
[5] That was met in the heads of argument filed by counsel for the State, as follows:
‘. . . There is a sound, rational basis for the conclusion that there are prospects of success on appeal in respect of both the point in limine and whether on equal inspectors of the evidence as a whole the state has proven its case beyond reasonable doubt.
. . .
It is therefore respectfully submitted that the appellant has made out a compelling case that he has reasonable prospect of success on appeal.’
In my view, those concessions by counsel for the State were fairly and properly made.
[6] It remains to record that both counsel were agreed that this appeal could be disposed of without the hearing of oral argument in terms of s 19(a) of the SCA.[5]
[7] In the result:
_____
PONNAN
JA
JUDGE
OF APPEAL
Appearances
For appellant: F van As
Instructed by: Justice Centre Local Office, Pretoria
Justice Centre Local Office, Bloemfontein
For respondent: AP Wilsenach
Instructed by: Director of Public Prosecutions, Pretoria
Director of Public Prosecutions, Bloemfontein.
[1] S v Khoasasa 2003 (1) SACR 123 (SCA); [2002] 4 All SA 635 (SCA).
[2] S v Matshona [2008] 4 All SA 68 (SCA); 2013 (2) SACR 126 (SCA).
[3] S v Kriel 2012 (1) SACR (1) (SCA) para 12.
[4] S v Matshivha 2014 (1) SACR 29 (SCA) paras 10 and 11.
[5] Section 19(a) provides: ‘The Supreme Court of Appeal or a Division exercising appeal jurisdiction may, in addition to any power as may
specifically be provided for in any law - dispose of an appeal without the hearing of oral argument.
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