Scania Finance Southern Africa (Pty) Ltd v Mathafeng Investment Holdings (Pty) Ltd (Leave to Appeal) (65023/2020) [2024] ZAGPPHC 1162 (12 November 2024)
- Citation
- [2024] ZAGPPHC 1162
- Status
- Judgment
- Jurisdiction
- South Africa
- Court
- North Gauteng High Court, Pretoria
- Panel
- Ally
- Case number
- 65023/2020
More details
- Court
- North Gauteng High Court, Pretoria
- Panel
- Ally
- Case number
- 65023/2020
On this page
Professional case brief
Research organized from the available case record
01
Holding and result
The court found that the provisional winding up order granted on 14 November 2022 is not appealable in terms of Section 150(5) of the Insolvency Act as read with Section 339 of the Companies Act, unless expressly provided for, which the applicant failed to demonstrate. The court was not persuaded that another court would reach a different conclusion on the issues of lis alibi pendens or service on employees, as these were adequately addressed in the main judgment. Applying the heightened test for leave to appeal, the court concluded that there are no reasonable prospects of success and no compelling reasons to grant leave to appeal. Accordingly, the application for leave to appeal was dismissed with costs.
Court disposition
Application for leave to appeal dismissed with costs.
Orders
- The application for leave to appeal by the Respondent is dismissed with costs.
02
Material facts
Parties
Scania Finance Southern Africa (Pty) Ltd
Applicant Counsel: C. GibsonMathafeng Investment Holdings (Pty) Ltd
Respondent Counsel: G. Jacobs03
Procedural history
Posture
Leave to Appeal / Application for Leave to Appeal Against Provisional Winding Up Order
04
Questions and positions
Legal issues
- 01
Whether the provisional winding up order granted on 14 November 2022 is appealable under Section 150(5) of the Insolvency Act as read with Section 339 of the Companies Act.
- 02
Whether there are reasonable prospects that another court would reach a different conclusion regarding the provisional winding up order.
- 03
Whether the issues of lis alibi pendens and service on employees warrant leave to appeal.
Party arguments
- Applicant
- The applicant contends that the grounds for leave to appeal are set out in the application and maintains that there are reasonable prospects that another court would reach a different conclusion regarding the provisional winding up order. The applicant submits that the issues of lis alibi pendens and service on employees were not correctly decided and that leave to appeal should be granted.
- Respondent
- The respondent argues that the provisional winding up order is not appealable in terms of Section 150(5) of the Insolvency Act, as read with Section 339 of the Companies Act, unless expressly provided for. The respondent submits that the applicant has failed to demonstrate why Section 150 does not apply and that the application for leave to appeal must fail on this ground alone. The respondent further contends that the issues of lis alibi pendens and service on employees were correctly decided and do not warrant leave to appeal.
05
Court’s reasoning
Legal principles
- 01
Section 150(5) of the Insolvency Act 24 of 1936 as read with Section 339 of the Companies Act 73 of 1971
A provisional winding up order is not appealable unless provision is made in Section 150 of the Insolvency Act.
- 02
The Mont Chevaux Trust v Tina Goosen (unreported judgement LCC Case No: LCC14R/2014); The Acting National Director of Public Prosecution v Democratic Alliance (unreported case no: 19577/09 dated 24 June 2016); First Reality (Pty) Ltd v Mitchell & Others 2021 ZALCC 21
The test for granting leave to appeal is whether another court would come to a different conclusion, which is a heightened standard.
- 03
Standard Bank of South Africa Limited v Tsheola Dinare Tour and Transport Brokers (Pty) Limited 2022 GPJHC
A winding up application and an application for the return of a motor vehicle are separate actions, and the court retains discretion to grant a winding up order.
06
Ratio, limits and disposition
Ratio decidendi
The court found that the provisional winding up order granted on 14 November 2022 is not appealable in terms of Section 150(5) of the Insolvency Act as read with Section 339 of the Companies Act, unless expressly provided for, which the applicant failed to demonstrate. The court was not persuaded that another court would reach a different conclusion on the issues of lis alibi pendens or service on employees, as these were adequately addressed in the main judgment. Applying the heightened test for leave to appeal, the court concluded that there are no reasonable prospects of success and no compelling reasons to grant leave to appeal. Accordingly, the application for leave to appeal was dismissed with costs.
Obiter and limits
- The delay in setting down the application for hearing was not material as the application for leave to appeal was filed timeously and no condonation was required.
- The issues raised regarding service on employees and lis alibi pendens were thoroughly addressed in the main judgment and do not warrant further consideration.
Court disposition
Application for leave to appeal dismissed with costs.
- The application for leave to appeal by the Respondent is dismissed with costs.
Source and reliance status
North Gauteng High Court, Pretoria
This page organises the available record for research. Confirm quotations, current status, and subsequent treatment against the official source before relying on the case.
Judgment reading view
Judgment text
The complete available source text.
North Gauteng High Court, Pretoria
Judgment
IN
THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
GAUTENG DIVISION, PRETORIA
CASE NO: 65023/2020
(1) REPORTABLE: NO
(2) OF INTEREST TO OTHER JUDGES: NO
(3) REVISED: YES
Date: 12 November 2024
In the matter between:
SCANIA FINANCE SOUTHERN AFRICA (PTY) LTD
APPLICANT
and
MATHAFENG INVESTMENT HOLDINGS (PTY) LTD
RESPONDENT
JUDGMENT
LEAVE
TO APPEAL
ALLY
AJ
INTRODUCTION
[1] This is an application for leave to appeal my judgment dated 14 November 2022. On this date an order was granted placing Respondent under provisional winding up. The parties will be referred to as in the main application for convenience.
[2] The parties were represented as in the main application, namely, Adv. G. Jacobs for the Applicant for leave to appeal and Adv. C. Gibson for the Respondent in the application for leave to appeal.
[3] It is not clear why this application for leave to appeal has only now been set down for hearing but I indicated to Mr Jacobs that it would seem that this was water under the bridge and he should proceed with his submissions as there was no case of condonation, the application for leave to appeal having been timeously filed.
[4] The grounds for leave to appeal[1] are contained in the application and will not be repeated here.
[5] Mr Gibson raised the point that, in his view, was fatal to this application, namely, the appealability of the provisional order. In this regard Mr Gibson argued, that the order dated 14 November 2022 is a provisional order and in terms of Section 150 (5) of the Insolvency Act 24 of 1936, as amended, as read with Section 339 of the Companies Act 73 of 1971, cannot be appealed unless provision has been made for same in Section 150. Mr Gibson submits, that the applicant has not shown why Section 150 does not apply to them and accordingly the application must fail on this ground alone.
[6] In relation to the issue regarding /is alibi pendens, I remain unconvinced that another Court would find differently. Furthermore, I align myself with the judgment in Standard Bank of South Africa Limited v Tsheola Dinare Tour and Transport Brokers (Pty) Limited[2], wherein it is made clear that a winding up application and an application for the return of a motor vehicle are two separate actions and a Court still has a discretion whether to grant a winding up order.
[7] The issue regarding the service on the employees was dealt with extensively in the main judgment and will not be repeated here save to state that I remain unconvinced that another would come to a different conclusion.
[8] It has now become trite that the test in applications for leave to appeal has changed to one which is heightened[3]. The Applicant is accordingly required to convince this Court that another Court 'would' come to another conclusion.
[9] I remain unconvinced that another court would come to a different conclusion and accordingly I am of the view that there are no reasonable prospects of success and there are no compelling reasons to grant this application for leave to appeal. Accordingly, the application must fail and costs must follow the result.
[10] Accordingly, the following Order shall issue:
a). The application for leave to appeal by the Respondent is dismissed with costs.
ACTING
JUDGE OF THE HIGH COURT
GAUTENG DIVISION OF THE HIGH COURT, PRETORIA
Electronically submitted therefore unsigned
Delivered: This judgement was prepared and authored by the Judge whose name is reflected and is handed down electronically by circulation to the Parties/their legal representatives by email and by uploading it to the electronic file of this matter on CaseLines. The date for hand-down is deemed to be 12 November 2024.
Date of virtual hearing: 5 November 2024
Date of judgment: 12 November 2024
Appearances:
Attorneys for the Applicant:
SENEKAL SIMMONDS INC devon@sesi.co.za Counsel for the Applicant: Adv. C. Gibson Attorneys for the Respondent: KMG &
ASSOCIATES INC rudi@kmgattorneys.co.za Counsel for the Respondent: Adv. G. Jacobs
[1] Caselines: Section 035-1 - 035-2
[2] 2022 GPJHC
[3] The Mont Chevaux Trust v Tina Goosen 3 November 2014 (unreported judgement LCC Case No: LCC14R/2014; The Acting National Director of Public Prosecution v Democratic Alliance (unreported case no: 19577/09 dated 24 June 2016); First Reality (Pty) Ltd v Mitchell & Others 2021 ZALCC 21 dated 23 August 2021 @ para 2
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