South African Fruit Promoters (Edms) Bpk v Kemp N.O and Others (282/05) [2005] ZANCHC 55 (23 September 2005)

IN DIE HOOGGEREGSHOF VAN SUID-AFRIKA

(Noord-Kaapse Afdeling)

Saakno: / Case number: 282/05

Datum verhoor: / Date heard: 02/09/2005

Datum gelewer: / Date delivered: 23/09/2005

In die saak:

SOUTH AFRICAN

FRUIT PROMOTORS (Edms) Bpk Applikant

en

KEMP, P.J. (NO) & 3 ANDER Respondent

Coram: Lacock R

UITSPRAAK

LACOCK R:

Die applikant (hierna verwys as die eiser) doen aansoek vir summiere vonnis teen die respondente (hierna na verwys as die verweerders) met koste.

Die tersaaklike beweringe vervat in die eiser se besonderhede van vordering tot die dagvaarding, lees as volg:

During or about 30 July 2004 and at or near Keimoes, Northern Cape Province, a written agreement entitled ‘Memorandum of Agreement of Loan’, (which was accompanied by the standard terms of conditions of the Plaintiff which formed part of the document), was concluded between the Plaintiff and the Trust and Fourth Defendant in his personal capacity. A copy of this agreement is annexed hereto as annexure “A”.

The material terms of annexure “A” included inter alia:

The plaintiff undertook, upon execution of the agreement, to lend and advance to the Trust and the Fourth Defendant the sum of R600 000.00;

80 000 cartons of grapes (4.5 kilogram cartons) would be delivered to the Plaintiff for marketing, sale and distribution in terms of the Plaintiff’s standard terms and conditions (which was simultaneously signed as aforesaid);

The Trust and the Fourth Defendant undertook to utilise the aforesaid loan solely for the purpose of growing and producing the crop of the 2005 table grape season, which would be marketed, sold and distributed by the Plaintiff;

The Fourth Defendant would do all things necessary to allow the Plaintiff to register a notarial bond over any movable assets which the Plaintiff so required;

The loan would be repaid by the Trust and Fourth Defendant on the sale of the crop, and such monies owing in respect of the loan would be deducted as a charge against any monies owing to them by the Plaintiff in respect of the sale of the fruit crop during the 2004/2005 grape season; and

No addition to, variation of or agreed cancellation of the agreement, annexure “A” hereto, would be of any force and affect unless in writing and signed on behalf of the parties. Furthermore, no indulgence which might be granted by one party to the other would constitute a waiver of any of the rights of the grantor, unless recorded in writing and so signed.

Pursuant to the aforementioned agreement, annexure “A” hereto, the Plaintiff:

Performed all its obligations to the Trust and the Fourth Defendant; and

Paid the sum of R600 000.00 in terms of the agreement into the banking account at Standard Bank stipulated by the Trust and the Fourth Defendant.

During August 2004 a special and general notarial bond in respect of the property of Fourth Defendant was passed in respect of certain specific movable property. A copy thereof is annexed hereto marked annexure “B”.

during the course of the season, it came to the attention of the Plaintiff that the Trust and/or Fourth Defendant had concluded an agreement with a competitor of the Plaintiff, known as Capespan Grapes (Pty) Ltd, in terms of which the Trust and/or Fourth Defendant had undertaken to supply the entire crop exclusively to Capespan Grapes (Pty) Ltd, a competitor of the Plaintiff.

During late 2004 various meetings and negotiations took place between the Plaintiff and Fourth Defendant in his personal capacity, and in his capacity as representative of the Trust, in terms of which, inter alia:

The Plaintiff asserted that it was entitled to delivery of the agreed quantity of the fruit;

The Plaintiff asserted, in the alternative, that if it was not to receive the agreed quantity of fruit, then it was entitled to:

Repayment of the sum of R600 000.00 forthwith;

Payment of the sum of R50 000.00 representing a nominal amount for costs and expenses uselessly incurred by Plaintiff with regard to the Fourth Defendant and the Trust; and

Payment of an additional sum of R350 000.00, representing estimated loss of profit due to the failure of the Trust and Fourth Defendant to deliver the fruit as had been agreed.

Pursuant to the aforegoing negotiations, a compromise of the dispute was reached between the Plaintiff, the Trust and Fourth Defendant, which compromise was recorded in writing in a document entitled ‘addendum to standard terms and conditions of loan agreement’, signed on 17 January 2005, and a copy of which is annexed hereto as annexure “C”. As appears therefrom:

The Plaintiff, subject to the terms and conditions of the agreement, annexure “C”, abandoned the marketing rights obtained in respect of the fruit;

The Trust and Fourth Defendant acknowledged and admitted that, as at the date of the signature of annexure “C”, they were jointly and severally indebted to the Plaintiff for the following amounts, all of which were then due, owing and payable:

In the sum of R600 000.00 in respect of the amount lent and advanced;

In the sum of R50 000.00 being an agreed amount in respect of wasted costs incurred by the Plaintiff; and

In the sum of R350 000.00 being an agreement (sic) amount representing loss of profit due to the failure to receive the fruit as agreed.

The sum of R650 000.00 would be repaid by the Trust and Fourth Defendant to the Plaintiff as follows:

By way of a cash payment to the Plaintiff in the sum of R300 000.00, such to be made to the Plaintiff by no later than 1 February 2005; and

By the issue of an irrevocable bank guarantee by ABSA Bank Ltd, in the sum of R350 000.00, for the payment to the Plaintiff by no later than 30 April 2005.

In the event of any breach of the agreement, annexure “C”, the additional sum of R350 000.00, representing the agreed damages for loss of profit as aforesaid, would then also become immediately due, owing and payable by Fourth Defendant and the Trust to the Plaintiff.

Pursuant to the aforegoing compromise agreement signed on 17 January 2005, annexure “C”, hereto, and on 4 February 2005, ABSA Bank Ltd duly furnished a letter of undertaking, a copy of which is annexed hereto marked annexure “D”, and which afforded an irrevocable undertaking to pay the Plaintiff the sum of R350 000.00 on or before 30 April 2005.

The Trust and Fourth Defendant have, in breach of annexure “C”, failed to make payment of the sum of R300 000.00, or any part thereof, by 1 February 2005, as provided for in annexure “C”,, or at all.

On or about 7 February 2005 the Plaintiff’s attorneys, Gaby Gess Attorneys of Pinelands, addressed a letter of demand to the Trust and Fourth Defendant, a copy of which is annexed hereto as annexure “E”.

By reason of the aforementioned breach of the agreement, the further sum referred to in clause 6.1.3 of annexure “B”, (being the sum of R350 000.00 representing the agreed amount of loss of profit due to the Plaintiff, by reason of the failure to deliver fruit as agreed), also became due owing and payable by the Trust and the Fourth Defendant to the Plaintiff.”

Die eerste drie verweerders is gedagvaar in hul beweerde hoedanigheid as trustees van die Twee Nege Agt Bate Trust. Die vierde verweerder is in sy persoonlike hoedanigheid gedagvaar.

Die kern van die verweer van die verweerders is as volg geformuleer in die opponerende eedsverklaring tot die aansoek om summiere vonnis:

Die bedrag van R350 000.00 waarna verwys word in paragraaf 6.2.2 van bylaag ‘C’ is op 30 April 2005 betaal synde die datum waarop dit betaalbaar was ingevolge bylaag ‘D’. Die waarborg is uitbetaal op die korrekte datum.

Ingevolge paragraaf 6.2.1 van bylaag ‘C’ is die bedrag van R300 000.00 betaalbaar nie later nie as 1 Februarie 2005. Ek vestig egter die hof se aandag op die volgende:

Ingevolge paragraaf 6.4 het die partye ooreengekom dat die roerende goed wat ingevolge die notariële verband bewaar is verkoop sal word ten einde die bedrag in paragraaf 6.2.1 vervat te betaal. Dit is die R300 000.00.

Die ooreenkoms was dat die goedere deur Andrag verkoop sal word namens die eiser maar in oorleg met my.

Die opbrengs van die verkoping sal dan deur Andrag direk aan die eiser betaal word totdat die volle bedrag van R300 000.00 betaal is.

Ek het reeds voor ondertekening van bylaag ‘C’ en wel kort na 3 Januarie 2005 toe besluit is om te handel soos in bylaag ‘C’ uiteengesit, vir Andrag meegedeel dat die goedere wat deur die notariële verband beswaar is, na Andrag moet gaan vir verkoping.

Andrag het op daardie stadium nie voldoende spasie gehad om alles in ontvangs te neem nie en het my versoek dat die goedere bly by my op die plaas maar dat hulle dit in hulle rekords opneem vir verkopingsdoeleindes en dat hulle sal voortgaan om dit te

adverteer.

Mettertyd het hulle toegestem dat een trekker en een spuitpomp wel op hulle vloer ingeneem kan word omdat hulle voldoende ruimte daarvoor het maar nie voldoende ruimte vir die res nie.

Ek heg hierby aan gemerk bylaag ‘C’ ‘n beëdigde verklaring van mnr Rudolf Horn waarin hy dit bevestig. Ek vestig die aandag net daarop dat die goedere deur ‘n notariële verband gedek word en dat dit impliseer dat ek soos uiteengesit in paragrawe 13.1 glad nie daarmee mag handel anders as daarin uiteengesit nie. In effek het die ooreenkoms beteken dat die verband geperfekteer is omdat die eiser geregtig geword het om die goedere deur middel van Andrag te verkoop en is volle beheer daaroor geneem het. Andrag is die eiser se agent en hoewel die eiser nie fisiese besit van die bates geneem het nie, is dit minstens simboliese besit omdat die besit aan hulle beskikbaar gestel is en Andrag dit simbolies in besit geneem het maar my weer aangestel het as sy agent om dit namens Andrag te hou. Andrag het dit op sy beurt namens die eiser gehou. Ek is geadviseer dat hier duidelik of simboliese oordrag of constitium (sic)

possessorium plaasgevind het. Ek is adviseer dat dit ‘n vorm van besitsoordrag in die sakereg verteenwoordig.

Wat ek dus aanvoer is dat die eiser besit gekry het van die bates en dat ons ooreenkoms was dat daardie besitsverkryging ‘n prestasie vanaf my kant was vir doeleindes van betaling van die bedrag van R300 000.00. Andrag namens die eiser verkoop die goedere en sodra die volle bedrag R300 000.00 geïn is, word die res van die goedere of vrygelaat of die opbrengs daarvan aan my uitbetaal.

Ek het streng in terme van die ooreenkoms presteer. Ek het die goedere gelewer en as die eiser en sy agent Andrag nie daarin geslaag het om dit te gelde te maak nie, kan ek nie daarvoor verwyt word nie. Die pryse wat by ooreenkoms geplaas is op die goedere vir doeleindes van verkoping is realisties soos ook blyk uit die beëdigde verklaring van mnr Horn.

Die goedere wat aan Andrag gelewer is, se waarde is baie meer as die bedrag van R300 000.00 wat verskuldig is. Derhalwe verstaan ek nie hoe die eiser kan beweer dat daar kontrakbreuk gepleeg is of dat hulle geregtig is op enige skade nie. Ek het in alle opsigte presteer ooreenkomstig die ooreenkoms.

Indien bevind sou word dat die ooreenkoms bylaag ‘C’ nie bepaal soos ek hierin uiteensit nie, doen ek aan die hand dat die skriftelike dokumente nie die gemeenskaplike bedoeling van die partye korrek weergee nie weens ‘n gemeenskaplike fout en dat ek geregtig is op rektifikasie daarvan ooreenkomstig wat ek reeds hierin aangevoer het. Ek sal dan ook in die verweerskrif op die besonderhede van vordering vra vir rektifikasie in die alternatief. Dit was in elk geval hoe die partye ooreengekom het en dit was die bedoeling van die partye.”

Die tersaaklike inhoud van die skriftelike ooreenkoms gedateer 17 Januarie 2005 (bylae ‘C’ tot die besonderhede van eis) en waarop die eiser se skuldoorsaak sowel as die verweerders se verweer gegrond is, lees as volg:

“ACKNOWLEDGEMENT OF DEBT

The SUPPLIER/the DEBTOR admits that they as at the date of signature hereof then jointly and severally owe the following amounts to SAFPRO/ the CREDITOR all of which are now due owing and payable being:

R600 000.00 (SIX HUNDRED THOUSAND RAND) in respect of amounts lent and advanced; and

R50 000.00 (FIFTY THOUSAND RAND) in respect of amounts lent and advanced; and

R350 000.00 (THREE HUNDRED AND FIFTY THOUSAND RAND) in respect of loss of profit due to the failure by the SUPPLIER/ the DEBTOR to deliver agreed fruit.

The amounts in 6.1.1 and 6.1.2 shall be repaid as follows:

R300 000.00 (THREE HUNDRED THOUSAND RAND) by the SUPPLIER/the DEBTOR to SAFPRO/the CREDITOR by not later than 1 February 2005.

R350 000.00 (THREE HUNDRED AND FIFTY THOUSAND RAND) by no later than 30 April 2005. This shall be by payment by ABSA Bank Limited on its own behalf and/or that of the creditors of the SUPPLIER and/or the DEBTOR. ABSA BANK shall within 7 days of signature hereof supply to SAFPRO/the CREDITOR a written irrevocable undertaking to pay such amount. This undertaking must be an unconditional acknowledgement of debt to pay SAFPRO/the CREDITOR. Notwithstanding the giving of such undertaking by ABSA Bank Limited the SUPPLIER/ the DEBTOR shall at all times remain responsible and liable to SAFPRO/the CREDITOR for such payment.

The amount in 6.1.3 shall only be immediately due owing and payable in the event of ay breach of this agreement/addendum.

SAFPRO/the CREDITOR consents to the movable property over which it holds a Notarial Bond being sold to pay the amount in 6.2.1 subject to the following.

The movable property being sold by Andrag (Mr. Rudie Horn) for and on behalf of SAFPRO/the CREDITOR in consultation with the SUPPLIER/ the DEBTOR.

It being agreed in writing, in advance by Andrag (Mr. Rudie Horn) to SAFPRO/the CREDITOR that the proceeds of the sale of the movable property shall be paid directly to SAFPRO/the CREDITOR until the sum of R300 000.00 (THREE HUNDRED THOUSAND RAND) has been paid

In the event of the amount in 6.2.2 not being timeously paid or ABSA Bank Limited failing to give a written unconditional

acknowledgement to pay SAFPRO/the CREDITOR the full amount by no later than 30 April 2005 then all parties agree that amounts in 6.1.1, 6.1.2 and 6.1.3 shall immediately be due owing and payable with interest.”

Benewens die voormelde verweer, het die verweerders ‘n reeks ander verwere ook ge-opper. In die lig van die slotsom waartoe ek hierin gekom het, vind ek dit nie nodig om te handel met enigeen van die andere verwere aldus opgewerp nie.

Die verlening van summiere vonnis is ‘n buitengewone regsmiddel waardeur die deure van ‘n hof vir ‘n verweerder gesluit kan word en hy aanspreeklik gestel kan word teenoor ‘n eiser sonder die normale prosedure waarkragtens geskille in ‘n verdedigde aksie in ‘n verhoor geventileer word. Om hierdie rede is die praktyk ontwikkel dat summiere vonnis slegs verleen behoort te word indien die eiser ‘n “unanswerable case” het of indien sy eis “unimpeachable” is. (Maharaj v Barclays National Bank Ltd 1976(1) SA 418(A) te 423 F tot H; Soil Fumigation Services v Chemfit Technical Products, 2004(6) SA 29(A) te 35 C tot E: “With regard to the court's overriding discretion to refuse summary judgment even where the defendant's affidavit does not measure up to the requirements of Rule 32(3)(b), it has been said that, in view of the extraordinary and stringent nature of the summary judgment remedy, that discretion may be exercised in a defendant's favour if there is doubt as to whether the plaintiff's case is unanswerable and there is a reasonable possibility that the defendant's defence is good. (See eg Maharaj v Barclays National Bank Ltd 1976 (1) SA 418 (A) at 425H; Tesven CC and Another v South African Bank of Athens 2000 (1) SA 268 (SCA) ([1999] 4 All SA 396) at 277H - J (SA).) The reason why the remedy of summary judgment is referred to as 'stringent' and 'extraordinary' is because it effectively closes the door of the Court on the defendant without affording an opportunity to ventilate the case by way of a trial.”

Sien ook Tesven CC & Another v SA Bank of Athens, 2000(1) SA 268(A) te 277I.

Daarteenoor behoort ‘n Hof nie te huiwer om summiere vonnis toe te staan nie indien die verweer van ‘n verweerder nie bona fide is nie.

Die vraag wat vervolgens beantwoord moet word is naamlik of daar twyfel bestaan of die verweerders se eis “unanswerable “ is en of daar ‘n moontlikheid bestaan dat die verweerders ‘n slaagbare verweer opgewerp het.

Mnr. Gess, namens die eiser, het betoog dat die wese van die skuldoorsaak van die eiser se vordering gegrond is op die voormelde gedeelte van bylae ‘C’; dat die bewoording daarvan duidelik en ondubbelsinnig is; en dat die dokument geen ruimte laat vir ‘n vertolking soos voorgehou deur die verweerders nie. Ter ondersteuning van hierdie argument het hy aangevoer dat ‘n vertolking van bylae ‘C’ soos voorgehou deur die verweerders in effek sou neerkom daarop dat die eiser sy regte voortspruitend uit sy notariële verband en wat dien as sekuriteit vir die nakoming deur die verweerders van hul finansiële verpligtinge teenoor die eiser, abandoneer. So ‘n vertolking, aldus mnr. Gess, is direk botsend met die bepalings en doelstelling van die notariële verband.

Voorts betoog mnr. Gess dat, indien dit die bedoeling van die partye was dat die bedrag vermeld in par. 6.2.1 van bylae ‘C’ betaalbaar was deur die lewering van die bates vermeld in par. 6.4 daarvan, sou verwag gewees het dat die partye dit in eenvoudige taal aldus in die ooreenkoms sou verwoord het. Die versuim om dit aldus te bewoord, so betoog mnr. Gess, is sterk aanduidend daarvan dat dit nooit die bedoeling van die partye was nie.

Wat betref die verweerders se beroep op rektifikasie, betoog mnr. Gess dat die verweerders versuim het om voldoende bewerings te openbaar wat hulle op rektifikasie geregtig sou maak.

Ek moet onmiddellik sê dat ek die goed deurdagte argumente van mnr. Gess uiters logies en aantreklik gevind het. My aanvanklike gedagte was dat die verweerders bloot besig was om hul verpligtinge tot betaling van die verskuldigde gelde te probeer ontduik of minstens te vertraag, en dat die eiser geregtig was op summiere vonnis. Na behoorlike oorweging van die stukke, die argumente en die toepaslike regsbeginsels het ek egter – weliswaar teësinning – tot die gevolgtrekking gekom dat ek my diskresie teen die toestaan van die aansoek behoort uit te oefen. My redes hiervoor is die volgende:

In par. 6.2.1 van bylae ‘C’ word slegs voorsiening gemaak vir betaling van die bedrag van R300 000.00 sonder enige vermelding van die wyse van betaling. Indien die inhoud van hierdie paragraaf vergelyk en saam gelees word met die inhoud van par. 6.4 tot en met 6.4.2, kan die redelike moontlikheid myns insiens nie uitgesluit word dat die partye bedoel het dat die bedrag van R300 000.00 vermeld in par. 6.2.1 betaalbaar was deur die lewering van die bates vermeld in par. 6.4 en die daaropvolgende verkoop daarvan deur Andrag nie. Hierin word immers voorsiening gemaak vir die onmiddelike sogenaamde vrylating van die bates kragtens die notariële verband en die onmiddelike verkoop daarvan deur die agent Andrag wat dit namens die eiser sou verkoop.

Indien die partye bedoel en ooreengekom het dat die bates slegs verkoop sou word indien die verweerders sou versuim om die bedrag van R300 000.00 voor of op 1 Februarie 2005 te betaal, of dat die bedrag van R300 000.00 steeds betaalbaar was op 2 Februarie 2005 selfs al is onvoldoende bates teen daardie datum verkoop, kon die partye die ooreenkoms eenvoudig aldus bewoord het.

Die bewoording van par. 6.5 is, soos adv. Danzfuss, namens die verweerders, betoog het, minstens vatbaar vir ‘n vertolking dat die partye nie bedoel het dat die bedrag vermeld in par. 6.2.1 ten volle betaalbaar was op 1 Februarie 2005 nie. As dit so was, dit wil sê dat die bedrag van R300 000.00 op 1 Februarie 2005 betaalbaar was, maak die inhoud van par. 6.5 in soverre daarin verwys word na onder andere die bedrag vermeld in par. 6.2.1 eenvoudig nie sin nie. Dit kan wees soos mnr. Gess betoog, dat par. 6.5 in hierdie sin opsigtelik verkeerdelik bewoord is, maar daarteenoor mag dit ook wees dat die partye, soos mnr. Danzfuss betoog, dit juis so bewoord het omdat hulle nie bedoel het dat die bedrag van R300 000.00 teen 1 Februarie 2005 in kontant betaalbaar was nie, maar by wyse van die lewering van voldoende bates ter delging van die bedrag.

Minstens kan redelikerwys argumenteer word dat die skriftelike kontrak hieraangaande dubbelsinnig is.

Die waarde van die goedere waaroor die notariële verband geregistreer is, beloop R702 000.00. Indien van die goedere verkoop sou word tot ‘n bedrag van R300 000.00, sou die eiser steeds sy sekuriteit oor die balans van die goedere behou, en sou dit nie – soos betoog deur mnr. Gess – noodwendig tot gevolg hê dat die sekuriteit van die eiser kragtens die notariële verband waardeloos geword het nie.

Die verweerders voer aan dat hulle inderdaad – in uitvoering van hul verpligting kragtens par. 6.2.1 van bylae ‘C’ – die goedere vermeld in par. 6.4 daarvan aan Andrag gelewer het. Dit word so namens Andrag bevestig. Die probleem is daarin geleë dat Andrag nie stoorplek vir al die goedere het nie, en dit ook nog nie verkoop het nie. Op die vertolking van bylae ‘C’ soos voorgehou deur die verweerders, het laasgenoemde hul verpligtinge volledig nagekom. Sou dus, soos ek hierbo bevind het, bylae ‘C’ redelikerwys vatbaar wees vir ‘n vertolking soos voorgehou deur die verweerders, sal die eiser se eis nie kan slaag nie, en volg dit dat summiere vonnis nie toegestaan kan word nie.

Uit hoofde van die voorgaande is dit streng gesproke nie nodig om te handel met die verdere verweer van rektifikasie nie. Nietemin, en gesien die dubbelsinnigheid in bylae ‘C’ waarna hierbo verwys is, meen ek dat voldoende besonderhede deur die verweerders voorgelê is wat, indien dit bewys sou word, hulle geregtig sou maak op rektifikasie van die tersaaklike ooreenkoms. Dieselfde mate van noukeurige bewoording van ‘n skriftelike dokument wat ‘n party wens te rektifiseer word nie vereis in ‘n eedsverklaring ter opponering van ‘n aansoek vir summiere vonnis as wat in ‘n pleitstuk verwag word nie.

“According to the second defendant's averments, this suretyship does not correctly reflect the common intention of the parties. Material terms orally agreed upon prior to or contemporaneously with the execution of the deed of suretyship have not been included therein. Nothing prevents the second defendant from requesting rectification of the document in his pleadings. If such rectification is granted, and second defendant is able to prove the allegations at the trial, it will constitute an answer to plaintiff's claim. On the other hand, if the rectification is not granted, it might not be an answer to his case. I would, however, at this stage not like to pre-empt that decision as I have insufficient facts before me to do so. Moreover, I am not called upon to make such a decision. All I am required to do at this stage is to determine whether, on the papers, second defendant has a defence that is both bona fide and good in law. (See Tesven CC and Another v South African Bank of Athens 2000 (1) SA 268 (SCA) at 275H - 276E.)

Mr Gess contended that second defendant makes no attempt to seek rectification of the clear and unambiguous terms of the deed of suretyship. Rectification is a procedural and not a substantive issue. However, the issue of rectification is implicit in a common mistake of the parties. It is not incumbent on second defendant to formulate his opposition to the summary judgment with the same degree of precision that would be required in his plea.”

(First National Bank of SA Ltd v Myburgh & Another 2002(4) SA 176(K) te 183I tot 184C).

Die partye is dit eens dat, indien die aansoek afgewys sou word, die koste van die aansoek die resultaat in die uiteindelike aksie behoort te volg.

Vervolgens word die volgende bevele hierin verleen:

Die aansoek vir summiere vonnis word van die hand gewys.

Die koste van die aansoek sal koste in die geding wees.

_______________

HJ Lacock

REGTER

Namens applikant: Adv D.W. Gess (i.o.v. Engelsman Benade & Van der Walt, Kimberley)

Namens respondent: Adv F.W.A. Danzfuss SC (i.o.v. Duncan & Rothman, Kimberley)